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Abstract
The research was conducted between August 1993 - June 1996 in Tokyo
The research tests the ubiquity of an em erging individualism  in Japan in the afterm ath of the 
speculative Bubble collapse. The thesis seeks to dem onstrate that an individualism  is emerging in 
Japan and being legitimated in two complementary dynamic processes. One is a 'top-down' process 
whereby individuality is being engendered, legitimated and institutionalized through planned 
com pany organisational restructuring. The other is a ’bottom -up' process w here increasing 
unem ploym ent and a burgeoning flexible economy requires individuals to show initiative and 
independence. Both these processes can be seen to be occurring against a general trend of 
’individuation’ (Dore 1992) which has gathered m om entum  since the oil crises of 1973 and 1974 
(Sengoku 1991). In both cases, the emergence of this individualism is plotted by focusing primarily 
on the economically driven changes between those ethics and practices generally regarded as typical 
of ’the group model of Japanese society', as described by Nakane (1970) and critiqued by Befu 
(1980a, 1980b, 1990), and those ethics and practices emerging to characterize w hat I term a ’new 
individualism’.
Through an ethnographic analysis of two case studies: one a software company, to study the 
’top-down’ process, the other among people who attend Techno music parties, to study the 'bottom- 
up* process, it emerged that a primary ethic of ’group models of Japanese society’ (Befu 1980b, 1990) 
is that the individual self should ’suppress itself or ’deny itself, and conform to uniform standards 
of thought and behaviour set at the collective level. This was in marked contrast to the ethics and 
practice of the two case studies, where the individual self is expected to ’express itself. This 
’redefinition’ of the individual self engenders and is engendered by a complementary redefinition of 
ethics and practice at the collective level, where the requirement to conform to particular uniform 
sets of standards for thought and action associated w ith group models of Japanese society, are 
absent.
In order to apprehend changes to the self at the individual and collective level, the little 
understood concepts of seken and sekentei were used. The research dem onstrates that seken is the 
moral framework of 'the group model of Japanese society’, while sekentei is the ’public self’ of this 
model of society, and that, as individuality emerges and becomes legitimated within society as a 
whole, seken and sekentei, and associated situational ethics and 'multiple’ senses of the individual self 
associated with these concepts, lose their moral and social legitimacy, giving way to a unified sense 
of self within a single, nuanced, universal public domain.
The research also demonstrates that this new individualism is not primarily a colonization 
by W estern individualism , but is an identifiably Japanese individualism  grounded  in well- 
documented aspects of the Japanese self and Japanese society, and best understood as a departure 
from, and redefinition of these aspects of the Japanese self and of Japanese society.
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Introduction
This thesis was conceived and designed while undertak ing  fieldw ork for a thesis on the 
representation of ethics and aesthetics in manga (Japanese comics) between 1993 and 1994. After one 
year in the field/ and after considerable angst/ I decided that it was unrealistic to talk about 
representations of Japan w hen I had not spent enough time there getting to know the country and 
its people first. I decided to stay on in Japan and attem pt another research project. Being there while 
the economic speculative bubble1 economy was imploding, while the U.S-Japan Bi-lateral trade talks 
were failing, and during the rice shortage, had all provided me with an array of perspectives on a 
society undergoing a period of heightened spontaneous reaction and self-reflection at a mass 
collective level, in the face of events, which I felt would provide me with a research subject.
The thesis grew out of a recognition on my part, that with the collapse of the Bubble in the 
early part of 1991, Japan was entering a new  period in its history. This was hinted at in the events 
that were rapidly unfolding as the Bubble economy began to implode. However, recognition that an 
era had ended did not begin to materialize until the end of 1993 and the early part of 1994, when, 
with the recession still deepening after two years instead of passing as expected, the Japanese press 
began to talk of the end of sengo jidai (the Post-WWII Period). The collapse of the Bubble in 1991 
proved to be the event in the minds of the Japanese people, rather than the fiftieth anniversary of the 
atomic bom bing of Hiroshim a and Nagasaki in 1995, which ended the post-w ar era. During the 
period 1991 to 1995, as the Japanese people became aware that it looked as though recent events 
were marking the end of an era, they looked to the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima in 1995 to m ark the beginning of a new era of prosperity and hope. In the end, the 
debacle surrounding the Diet2 resolution for an official Government apology for a war of aggression 
in Asia overshadowed the marking of the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing, and dam pened hopes 
for a new era of harm ony and prosperity. I also heard comments from Japanese that in addition to 
the revelations of 'impropriety' revealed by the collapse of the Bubble, some people interpreted the 
rice shortage in 1994, the earthquake in the Kansai area in January 1995, and the gas attack on the 
Tokyo subway by the religious cult Aum Sliinnjkijd in March 1995, as events of ill-omen which not 
only closed a period of prosperity and hope, but which also signalled the beginning of a period of 
uncertainty and hardship. I heard one person wryly comment that the series of misfortunes marked 
the beginning of Japan's disappearance beneath the waves of the Pacific, as predicted in mythology.
‘Hereinafter referred to as 'the Bubble (babiim)', the term normally used by Japanese
T he Japanese Parliament
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Early in my fieldwork for the other thesis, in the Spring of 1993, I realised that the bursting of the 
Bubble and the ensuing recession was having a significant effect on the way the Japanese thought 
about themselves and the rest of the world. I had been in Japan in early 1991, just at the peak of the 
Bubble, and I had heard Japanese say how many people thought the nation's staggering economic 
success was a direct result of, and proved, their specialness and their uniqueness as a people. In the 
euphoria created by the Bubble, m any Japanese saw the economic boom to be the final proof that 
everything they had been saying about Japan's uniqueness was true. The bursting of the Bubble and 
the subsequent recession, however, provided the sobering evidence for millions of Japanese that 
they are very m uch like everybody else. The psychological im pact of this should  not be 
dow nplayed. For m any Japanese, the late 1980s was the time w hen Japan became N o.l. The 
economy had been growing steadily since the end of WWII, and, swept up in the euphoria on the 
back of the speculative bubble, the opinion in the country was that the Japanese economy was 
immune to the ups and dow ns of capitalist economies in other parts of the w orld, due to the 
uniqueness of 'Japanese C apitalism ’ (Sakakibara 1993). N ational confidence was very high, 
bordering on the arrogant, and the Bubble crash and the recession brought everybody down to earth 
w ith a bum p. As the dust settled, the realisation daw ned for many Japanese that Japan is not 
immune to the fates and tides which govern the lives of other nations, but that we are all intimately 
tied together and dependent on each other, and increasingly so.
In addition to an awareness of the interdependency of the w orld 's nations and peoples, 
came a sense of vulnerability and fragility, not only as a result of the awareness that Japan depends 
on other nations, economically, but from something much closer to home. The revelations that the 
securities industry was compensating the losses of favoured clients during the crash, when millions 
of ordinary Japanese lost their life savings and their pensions, w ith the added  injury that the 
governm ent decided to bail out ailing financial institutions hit by the crash, while refusing to 
compensate members of the general public, was a watershed point because it left many feeling 
disillusioned and mistrustful of their institutions and their government. The pitiful response of the 
government to the Kansai earthquake only served to deepen that sentiment. The practices exposed 
by the collapse of the Bubble and the ensuing 'scandals' followed the Recruit scandal in 1989, and 
other revelations of bid-rigging between government ministers and construction companies. Many 
people lost confidence in public figures after the Recruit scandal (Kent 1992; Ijiri 1993), which was 
then exacerbated by events leading up to and causing the collapse of the Bubble (Okumura 1991; 
Uekusa 1991; Shimada 1991; and others).
The levels of secrecy and  lack of accountability w hich resulted from the relationship 
between corporations, the bureaucracy, and government over the post-WWII period, has led many 
to doubt the whole of the political and economic establishment. This was against a background of 
falling real wages during the Bubble period. In the period 1986-90 alone, following a trend since the 
mid-1970s, labour productivity increased by 33.9%, while real wages increased by only 8.7% (Itoh
1994). The cumulative effect of all these events reinforced the opinion among the vast majority of the 
Japanese people that they were being exploited, and that the real w inners from Japan's economic 
success were politicians and corporations, not individuals (Arai 1992; Itoh 1994; Kogura 1995). In the
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wake of the Bubble collapse, corporations were increasingly perceived by ordinary Japanese as an 
enemy of the people rather than the protectors and benefactors of the people; a remarkable change 
of attitude in a short time. The relationship between government, the bureaucracy, and big industry 
that was exposed by the collapse, together with the response of government to the revelations of 
financial institutions compensating favoured clients, strongly suggested that the custodians of the 
'public dom ain (oyake)', the governm ent, were only protecting their factional interests, not the 
interests of those who actually occupy the public domain, whom they are constitutionally mandated 
to protect: ordinary people. But although certain institutions and individuals had acted outside the 
law, what was perceived by the majority to be unfairness and malpractice was engendered by the 
structure of those institutions and by the structure and morality of society as a whole. Although 
there were cases of malpractice, much of what is regarded by Japanese and foreigners as corruption 
or deviation from accepted practice, was not corruption or deviation in the majority of examples, but 
was long-standing accepted practice and was a case of 'business as usual'.
The structure and m orality of oyake explains how the practice of com pensating favoured 
clients and the practice of hiding losses developed, and why it was regarded as acceptable. So 
acceptable in fact, that the m ost recent evidence confirms w hat was suspected at the time of the 
collapse of the Bubble: that not only did the Ministry of Finance know about these practices, they 
were actually advising financial institutions on how to hide their losses. Revelations like this elicit 
the response of ’institutionalized corruption', but this is not entirely the case. These practices are 
only regarded as 'corrupt' under rules and ethics which accord with business practices in the U.S. 
and Europe, and other countries w hich follow those rules, and under a m orality that privileges 
individual's rights and provides a strong public domain to protect those rights. These practices are 
not corrupt, or unusual, when considered against a morality and structuring of society that existed 
in Japan prior to the Meiji Period (1868-1912), and which has continued to flourish in the m odern 
era. The Meiji Governm ent adopted structures and ethics as enshrined in the concept of a civil 
society, imported from Europe and the U.S. However, the concepts of individual rights and a public 
dom ain did not exist in japan  prior to this time. A different morality and structuration of society 
existed, w hich privileged interest groups over individuals, and which m itigated against the 
establishment of a strong public domain. It is the conflict between these two moralities, and between 
these two types of society, that explains why practices that had been in place for at least fifty years 
were suddenly regarded as corrupt, w hen previously they had not been regarded as such. These 
points are essential to understand w hat is currently happening in Japan, and to understand w hat the 
consequences are likely to be in the next ten to twenty years.
The exposure of fundamental structural and moral incommensurabilities w ithin Japanese 
society has certainly provided an im petus for the proper establishment of individual rights and a 
strong public dom ain as the basis for the continued developm ent of Japan as an economic 
superpow er, and as a m ore integrated m em ber of the global com m unity. However, the most 
powerful engine of change is undoubtedly economic. It is likely that the Japanese economy would 
have entered a period of slow economic growth and possibly recession in the first half of the 1990s 
anyway. Events and developm ents in both the domestic, regional and global economy, all of them
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related, conspired to put considerable pressure on Japan to make changes to industrial practices, but 
which have now been given an added impetus, and a moral dimension, by the clashing of inimical 
moralities and identities. On a global level, during the early 1990s, there was virtual stagnation in 
the m ature capitalist economies. On a regional level, until 1997, the opposite was true. Before the 
current m onetary crises in a num ber of the South East Asian economies, Japan w atched its 
neighbours achieve economic growth rates similar to those achieved by Japan during the period of 
high economic growth (kodo seicho ki) in the 1950s and 1960s. In the period 1992/3, the nations of the 
G7 achieved growth rates w ith an average of 1.5 percent, while the newly industrialised economies 
(IMIE's) in Asia, during the same period, achieved growth rates w ith an average of eight percent 
(Makino 1995), and China in  the first half of 1997 achieved a growth rate of 9.6 percent (Financial 
Times 24/7/97). Japan is very m uch involved and increasingly dependent on these economies, by 
providing technology, through licensing agreements, and by direct investment. Before the current 
situation in East Asia, it was generally regarded that many of these 'tiger economies’ would rapidly 
catch up and overtake Japan and the other advanced industrial nations in many of these industries 
(Makino 1995), as these NIE's were already taking over ’low technology' global markets, such as 
household appliances, TV's and other electronic goods. As things stand in the m iddle of 1998, Japan 
has seen the financial crises in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, adversely affect its economy in a 
m anner it could not have foreseen even three years ago, further increasing the pressure on Japan to 
make structural changes to the economy.
In addition to these sudden reversals of fortune, in the case of inform ation technology 
markets and the rap id  developm ent of the inform ation superhighw ay, not only did it become 
apparent that Japan was losing dom inance in existing markets, it was likely to lose out in the 
markets that would make or break national economies in the 21st century. The problem  for Japan 
was described as two-fold: cut costs to rem ain competitive in existing m arkets, and encourage 
creativity through nurturing initiative to develop new markets (Kogura 1995; Uekusa 1995). Both 
these goals, it is argued, require a fundamental restructuring of company organisation (soshiki) and 
chain of command (shiki keiretsu, meirei shilci, shirei keito), which will have, and is beginning to have, 
considerable ramifications for ideas about self and society. Quite simply a new  type of employee is 
required, one who is able to think independently, and is encouraged to do so, within organisations 
which not only encourage, but through their structural organisation, require people to freely express 
their opinions and take individual responsibility. In short, for economic reasons Japan is being 
forced to em brace a kind of individualism . This is w here the events of the Bubble become 
significant, as the morality and structuring of society which had resisted any kind of individualism 
throughout the post-WWII period has now been discredited by events, providing the opportunity, 
and the public's consent, for industry to usher in changes to w ork ethics and w orking practices 
which accord far more w ith an ethics of individual rights and a strong public dom ain of a kind 
which was first selectively embraced by the Meiji Government (Gluck 1985; Irokawa 1985; Hall et al. 
1988), and enshrined in the Constitution of 1947 (Sakamoto and Ward 1987; Tanaka 1991).
In the Spring of 1995, the weekly economics and business magazines were suddenly full of 
articles about restruc tu ring  the Japanese com pany. I was m ade aw are of this from  the
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advertisem ents w hich hang over the aisles in the trains in Japan - an excellent source of current 
trends and opinion. Articles such as "Schedule for the White-collar change of direction (Uwaito kard 
ryuudoka no sukejyaru)",3 "Fifty years after the war: A transition in the life-style of the salaryman 
(sengo gojnu nen samriiman seikatsu no hcnsen)",4 "Japanese company restructuring plan ('nihon no 
kaisha' kaizo puran)",5 filled the various tokushuu (special editions). This had me digging through my 
new spaper clippings from the same time a year before. In the daily press there had been a num ber 
of articles suggesting that Japanese-style management was in need of a rethink: a rethink along the 
lines of restructuring strategies and policies adopted by US industry in the 1980s. Those lauded 
Japanese industria l practices and structures w ere suddenly  being tou ted  as inefficient and 
expensive, and as endemically corrupt. These articles included discussions of the necessity of 
'hollowing out’ (jattiddka) industry, and of the need to nurture creativity. These themes were to 
appear sporadically in the press over the next year,6 until the weekly magazines began to preach 
vociferously of the necessity to restructure the economy and industry  in the Spring of 1995. 
Economics and  business m agazines such as Shutikan Tdyd Keizni (Toyo Economics Weekly), 
Purejidento, (P resident), and  Daiatnondo (D iam ond), w ere full of articles abou t com pany 
restructuring, in particular a reorganizing strategy called rienjyiniyaringu (Business Process Re­
engineering). At the same time as those first new spaper articles had appeared in the Spring of 1994, 
the popular business book section of all bookstores in the Tokyo area had around four or five 
different titles specifically about Business Process Re-engineering, and a num ber of other titles on 
the need for major structural industrial reform. These books, which were either translations of books 
originally published in the U.S., or interpretations of similar ideas w ith reference to the Japanese 
company by Japanese authors, were just one indication of the debate on structural reform which at 
the end of the 1990's is still on-going in Japan.7 At the time these books were in the shops, I 
considered buying them, or at least making a note of them, but had decided not to. As simple as 
writing dow n a few titles m ight seem, I was constantly buying magazines and m onitoring the 
popular media, and was at the time going through one of my periods of trying to impose a little 
order on the term inal entropy w hich afflicted my research subject in the early stages of my 
fieldwork. As things turned out, the subject filtered through the weekly economics magazines, 
complete with various angles and interviews, proved sufficient.
While risutom (restructuring) was the buzzword in 1994 and 1995,1 subsequently discovered 
that a num ber of Japanese academics, com m entators, and industrialists, had previously held a 
heated debate about the lessons to be learnt from the Bubble collapse and w hat changes needed to 
be made (Tanaka 1990; Uekusa 1990; Takeuchi 1991, 1992; Arai 1992; Morita 1992; Okum ura 1992; 
Shimada 1992; Ijiri 1993). As part of this debate, many were drawing attention to w hat was referred 
to as 'cracks in the system ' (Okum ura 1992). While Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) is a 
program me to im prove efficiency and creativity in the workplace, this debate was as m uch about
3Shuukan Diamondo. 1995/4/15.
4Shuuk(in Diamondo. 1995/4/15.
-Shnukan TdyoKeizai. 1995/4/15.
6Japan Times, 10/1/94. Japan Times, 28/2/94, Japan Times 21/3/94. Japan Times 24/3/94. Asahi Shimbun 19/5/95.
T hese are of the same genre as the popular business books described by Yoshino (1992) in his Cultural Nationalism in 
Contemporary Japan.
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the structural and moral problems at the heart of society which had been exposed by the Bubble 
collapse, and which m anifested themselves through the juggling of inimical moralities. It was a 
heavily ethically tinged debate, for the reasons stated above. With the economy stalled, and with 
growth forecast to be no higher than 3% in the foreseeable future, companies were being forced to 
lay off workers. Consequently, in addition to individual rights being demonstrably shown to have a 
weak institutional base in Japan, w ith pow erful interests controlling a m orality that prom oted 
factional interests and favoured expediency, commitments of job security also appeared to be worth 
very little.
In 1992, in the afterm ath of the Bubble and at the beginning of w hat would turn out to be a 
very long and deep economic slum p, a num ber of Japan's major corporations began a series of 
forced resignations. To begin with, the num bers were in the tens and hundreds. These employees 
were middle managers in their late forties and early fifties who were deemed to be no longer useful. 
But by 1997 hundreds of thousands of employees, and not only older workers, were being forced to 
resign. In addition, it was clear that companies could no longer guarantee their workers, particularly 
their white-collar workers, 'life-time em ploym ent’, an ideal which had become a part of w hat it 
means to be Japanese during the post-WWII period. By 1994 it seemed as though everything people 
believed about themselves and about their country was evaporating systematically before their very 
eyes. No w onder the Kanshin earthquake and the gas attack on the Tokyo subway moved some 
Japanese to comment, often w ith a dark streak of hum our, that Doomsday was imminent. Although 
'lifetime employm ent' had only been the preserve of a lim ited num ber of male employees, and, 
increasing numbers of those were choosing to change jobs when it suited them  (Rohlen 1974; Clark 
1979; Levine 1983; Plath 1983; ICondo 1990; Hamada 1992), it was significant that the ideal of 'lifetime 
employment’ was being phased out, or modified at the very least.
Of more concern to the proponents of change than ’lifetime employment', was the ethically 
prescribed system  of age/seniority . According to the informed opinion (Kogura 1995; Ubukata
1995), it was not prim arily the enorm ous burden  of costs on com panies w hich dem anded 
fundam ental change, for reducing the num ber of employees w ould not change very much, the 
argument went. What was required was reform of the internal organisation and chain of command 
of companies which, based on age/seniority  structures, did not allow for the free flow of ideas and 
initiatives within the organisation (Nakane 1970; Rohlen 1974; Kogura 1995; Ubukata 1995), and 
which was prim arily responsible for the stifling of initiative and of the developm ent of those new 
technologies on which Japan's future depended. These voices argued that employees were more 
concerned with their status relative to the 'significant others' (Hamada 1992) in the company, rather 
than w ith Custom er Satisfaction (CS), one of the cornerstones of the restructuring program m es 
based on the BPR models from the U.S.
By 1994, even though these changes to company practices were still only being discussed, 
rapidly increasing levels of unem ploym ent, together w ith no sign of a recovery in the economy, 
indicated that an upheaval unlike anything in the post-WWII period was occurring. Not only were 
hundreds of thousands of m iddle-aged and increasingly younger employees now unem ployed, 
hundreds of thousands rem ained on payrolls w ith nothing to do. Yet, as significant, and w ith
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arguably greater implications, was the fact that recruitm ent of university and high school leavers 
into jap an 's  top com panies d ropped  by up to 90% betw een 1991 and 1994. As a result, 
unemployment continually broke national records month on month from November 1995 until May 
1997, w ith the figure for the 16-24 age group nearly three times the national average in May 1997, 
creating a rapidly increasing pool of young Japanese who were not being socialized as adults in any 
coherent and systematic way whatsoever. Even as recruitment began to marginally pick up in 1997, 
it became evident that different recruitm ent policies and strategies w ere being adopted and 
im plemented (Kaneko 1997; Inoue 1997; Oaklander and Whittaker 1997; Yahata 1997). Companies 
began recruiting as many mid-career employees as untrained graduate staff, and began employing 
them on more flexible terms. The em phasis was shifting from offering untrained  employees, 
prim arily school leavers and graduates, long-term  employment, to offering trained employees 
various kinds of predom inantly fixed-term contract employment. Spurred on by this burgeoning 
flexible economy (Harvey 1990), a fundamental shake-up in working practices and work ethics was 
clearly underway, w ith implications for the make-up not only of society, but also of personhood. A 
more individualistic society which privileged individual selves over collective selves appeared to be 
developing, replacing a society that privileged collective selves over individual selves, as had 
previously been the case.
Clearly, the implications for what is regarded as the ideal employee were considerable, and I 
saw the same changes in perceptions of personhood and self among those young Japanese, who, 
finding a future they expected had evaporated, were having to show initiative in order to cope with 
a set of circumstances that they had not been led to expect. These events, however, while forcing 
change on people, were also opening up possibilities. I noticed that even for those for whom events 
were impacting negatively on their lives, they were also given a freedom they w ould not have 
otherwise had, w hich m any of them  regarded positively. This was particularly evident among 
younger people. Free of the constraints im posed on them  by an em ploym ent system  popularly 
characterised by 'lifetime em ploym ent' and age/sen iority , and related practices and  ethics, I 
wondered w hat effect these structural changes were having on the reproduction of the social order. 
Arubaito (part-time) and tem porary w ork does not create the same web of responsibilities and 
obligations as these ’Japanese-style m anagem ent' (Itoh 1993; 1994) em ploym ent practices. 
Consequently, I conjectured that many young people were not learning and gaining experience of 
expectations and of established codes of conduct which underpin society as a whole. These young 
Japanese, whose ranks were increasing rapidly  as every year school leavers and university 
graduates entered the job market, appeared to be left to their own devices, growing into young 
adulthood w ith no established codes of conduct to follow. Forced to think for themselves and use 
their initiative, they very soon would begin, I speculated, to establish a degree of independence and 
intransigence. Yet, although these young people were not gaining experience in establish codes of 
conduct and practices, this did not seem to be the problem one m ight have expected, as the very 
codes and practices which they were not being initiated into were being questioned and challenged, 
while the veiy qualities they were being forced to rely on, their initiative and their individuality, 
were being championed as the basis of the new  work ethics and working practices being discussed.
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What appeared to be a 'top-down' process of institutional reform was being accompanied by what 
appeared to be a complem entary 'bottom -up' process of complem entary changes to ethics and 
practices. All of which was aided by the discrediting of the moral framework which would have cast 
both these processes as unjapanese before the Bubble collapse. The collapse of the Bubble seemed to 
have created a moral vacuum, a space in which historical or ideological precedent appeared to have 
less significance, and w hich allowed for a more objective and m easured assessm ent w ithin the 
country of Japan's predicament.
I also noticed a trend among those in full-time employment to reject the practices and codes 
of conduct of the institutions they were members of. Aware that they were not guaranteed job 
security any more, and aware that fundamental changes were afoot, many young employees did not 
seem to feel the need or the desire to devote themselves to their companies in the way the majority 
of their predecessors had. They did not seem to feel the need to build the relationships w ith those 
above them, and they seemed to have trouble unquestioningly following orders or taking part in 
long-standing social practices considered vital to workplace success, such as going drinking after 
w ork and being prepared to give up  their 'private time (puraibeeto bubwi)', a concept which has 
increasingly been gaining currency and legitimacy, and which seems to be linked to the 'emerging 
individualism ' (M iyanaga 1991). On the contrary, they seemed reluctant to give up any time 
between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., openly stating that life outside work is more im portant than work, 
and that work is simply a m eans to earn money to enjoy life. These younger employees were not a 
minority who were bucking the system either, but a manifestation of a nationwide trend of putting 
leisure before work, which had first come to w idespread public attention in the annual NHK 
lifestyle questionnaire of 1988 (Tsukio 1992), and officially recognised in the annual Government 
white paper on lifestyles in 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japanese Government web page 1996)
*******
I reasoned that change was occurring on at least two heuristically separable levels. At an 
institutional level, a ’top-dow n' process, through company restructuring, projected legislative 
deregulation, and the grow th of a flexible economy, accom panied by a 'bottom -up' process, 
legitimated by those institutional changes and the ethics and practices of the burgeoning flexible 
economy. I w anted to dem onstrate what changes were being implemented and the effects they were 
having on perceptions of and constructions of individual selves and collective selves. In order to 
assess the pervasiveness and likelihood of these new ideas about selves and society becoming the 
dom inant ethics of Japanese society, I wanted to undertake two case studies interrogating the two 
heuristically separable processes outlined above. One would ideally be in  a company which was 
implementing a restructuring programme, the other would be among a group of young Japanese 
who could be regarded as living w ithin the 'spaces' (Harvey 1990) which had appeared in Japanese 
society after the collapse of the Bubble, opened up by the recession and the rapidly developing 
flexible economy. I would look for continuities and changes over time, and for similarities and
differences between the two case studies.
Among the employees of a company undergoing a restructuring program me, I wanted to 
study the company's philosophy, its organisational structure, and its command structure. I wanted 
to study  the rew ard  system , m otivational goals, the decision-m aking process, and how 
responsibility is allocated w ithin the company, in order to map w hat I term  the topography of 
selves, both ind iv idual and collective, w ith in  this kind of w orkplace. Initially, I considered 
approaching Sony, or NEC, or one of the big banks, large com panies who I had read were 
im plem enting radical rationalisation program m es. By pure chance, I came to study a sm aller 
company, but one which had already fostered and institutionalized an individualism  through the 
kinds of changes to work ethics and practices being discussed in Japan at the time. For the other case 
study, 1 decided to study those young people who attend underground dance music Techno parties. 
One of the reasons why I decided upon this case study was because I was regularly going to 
underground dance m usic clubs myself, and already had many potential interviewees through 
many friends and acquaintances that I had met during my time in Tokyo between 1993 and 1995. 
But more importantly, it was quite evident that an individualism was flourishing at these events.
In my opinion, the rave or Techno club is the most visible aspect of a post-industrial culture 
which is appearing in many different parts of the world, and which is a p roduct of the kinds of 
economic systemic changes and technological changes which are occurring in Japan at the present 
time. From my own experience I knew that this musical event was in m any ways a performance 
which ritualized and affirmed the cultural ideals of those who attend, and in that sense was a very 
old and trusted means of reiterating and defining social solidarity (Chernoff 1979; Schechner and 
Appel 1990). I w ondered whether a mechanism was occurring at these parties, whereby young 
Japanese who had been left to drift and establish their own adult sense of self, due to the chaos 
w ithin the country as a whole, w ere seeking each other out and m aking sense of w hat was 
happening around them, as well as making sense of each other and of themselves. I speculated that 
an individualism  of some kind was being established, negotiated, and legitimated at these parties, 
and I w anted to establish a m ethod to discover w hether this individualism  was sim ilar to the 
individualism  which had been institutionalized in the software company I was going to study. 
Whatever the results, I decided that these two case studies would allow me to test my theory that an 
individualism  of some kind was being established in post-Bubble Japan through both a ’top-down1 
and 'bottom-up' process.
While all this was fermenting in my mind in the Spring of 1995, I told a Japanese friend, 
whom I knew took a keen interest in sociology and anthropology, about my thoughts. He suggested 
I look at seken and sekentei, about which he had just been reading, and which he regarded as essential 
to an understanding of Japanese society. I told him  that I had never heard of either, but after he 
briefly explained to me w hat seken and sekentei was, I became very interested. I needed a model to 
help me apprehend the individualism  which was clearly emerging around me, and I w ondered if 
the relationship between the concepts of seken and sekentei could be used as an analytical contract to 
plot the development of the emerging individualim.
Seken, w ritten with the characters i/o, whose core meaning is 'world', and aida, whose core
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meaning is 'space between', has almost totally eluded anthropologists, although it lies at the heart of 
Japanese conceptions of morality, personhood, and social space. My initial searches, while in Japan, 
suggested that both seken and sekentei had not been the subject of anthropological investigation. 
Rather than being filled w ith excitement at the prospect of happening upon uncharted territory, 
how ever, I w as m ore concerned that seken and  sekentei had  e ither been considered by 
anthropologists at some time, and had been discarded as inconsequential, or they had been written 
about at some length, and that somehow or other I had missed this. Either way, I was uneasy about 
pursuing this line of enquiry to begin with. Nevertheless, both seken and sekentei seemed important, 
so I continued to investigate them. My friend gave a num ber of titles, all of them  in Japanese (Aida 
1972; Inoue 1977; Abe 1994, 1995), which I patiently scanned in order to assess w hether seken and 
sekentei w ould be useful tools for apprehending a changing Japanese self. My supervisor then 
inform ed me that Benedict (1946) had discussed som ething which sounded veiy similar to seken 
which I should investigate, and upon my re turn  to Britain in June 1996 I eventually found two 
minor references in English to seken and sekentei (Kuwayama 1992; Lebra 1992).
Seken is the major category of social space in Benedict's discussion of girt (a reciprocal 
hierarchical relationship based on limitless obligation) in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), 
even though she never uses the w ord and never elaborates on w hat she repeatedly refers to as 'the 
world': that is, Ego's 'world'. From a position of knowing w hat seken is, it is very easy to see the 
category in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Yet even though Benedict glossed seken as 'the world', 
thus missing its significance, no anthropologist, subsequently, has paused to question the nature of 
U iis^w orld' she constantly mentions. The 'w orld ' that Benedict refers to becomes clear in the 
Japanese translation of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword-. Kiku to Katana (Hasegawa (tr.) 1950). 
Benedict uses a num ber of popular Japanese sayings and proverbs to construct her thesis on giri, 
many of which revolve around seken in the Japanese translation. How seken is used in  Kiku to Katana, 
together w ith other spatial and moral references, clearly illustrates that seken refers to a particular 
category of social space defined and constructed by the expectations and actions of the persons who 
inhabit that space. Countless times Benedict refers to a social space she calls 'the world', in inverted 
commas, which Hasegawa translates as seken, which would almost definitely have been the word 
Bendedict's inform ants would have had in m ind w hen they spoke to Benedict in English, or the 
word they would have used when speaking through an interpreter. Hasegawa picks this up and 
consequently  sp reads a w hole new  light, not only on Benedict (1946), bu t also on the 
anthropological study of social space and personhood in Japan.
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword has been criticised over the years, but the text has not been 
exhausted. There is still much to engage with, particularly chapters six, seven, eight, and ten, on on 
(limitless obligation) and giri. Using the proverbs to orientate the translation, Hasegawa has 'filled in 
the gaps' here and there, interpreting Benedict, making the text m ore precise, and illum inating 
confusion and contradictions which Benedict's imprecise use of the word 'world' caused. From the 
way Benedict used proverbs and sayings, Hasegawa realised that Benedict was talking about seken 
w hen alluding to a Japanese's ’w orld', even though Benedict herself, who spoke no Japanese, 
remained totally unaw are of this. Hasegawa, through translating 'w orld' as seken, clarifies what
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Benedict is discussing, Benedict herself never begins to discuss this 'world', although she was on the 
right track w hen she recognised the existence of identifiable social spaces w ith their particular 
ethics, constraints, motivations and actions.
Seken makes its first appearance in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword in chapter seven. The 
title of the chapter, T he  Repayment H ardest To Bear’, is from a Japanese proverb, Giri hodo tsurai 
mono wa nai (there is nothing as tough as giri) (Hasegawa 1950: 182). In the Japanese translation, 
seken first appears in an explanation of giri in a Japanese dictionary: ’something one does to forestall 
apology to the world (seken e no mdshiwake ni fuimi nagara sum koto)' (Hasegawa 1950:183). This need 
to apologise to seken places seken firmly as a social construction of some importance. Seken is then the 
w ord used by Hasegawa to translate 'world' in one of the 'two quite distinct divisions' (Benedict 
1946: 95) of giri which Benedict herself devises: "What 1 shall call 'giri to the w orld’ - literally 
’repaying giri' - is one’s obligation to repay on to one’s fellow's (Benedict 1946: 95). When the reader 
comes across 'giri to the w orld' at this point in the book s /h e  is unlikely to assign any precise 
m eaning to this 'world'. Not so the Japanese reader who will read seken ni tai sum  giri: 'giri with 
respect to seken' (Hasegawa 1950: 184). Hasegawa interprets Benedict's use of ’world' and translates 
accordingly, giving 'world' its precise meaning in this context. Benedict’s analysis of giri is confused, 
and it is unwise to attem pt to m ap seken from her analysis of giri. Indeed, from my research, the 
relationship betw een seken and giri is far from straightforw ard or obvious. Yet even though 
Benedict's analysis of giri into two types is untenable, it reveals that she undoubtedly  took the 
'world' which she uses in her 'giri to the world' concept, from that 'world' which she was continually 
coming across in  interview. In the interviews she undertook, this 'world' was undoubtedly seken and 
it is therefore not surprising, and correct, that Hasegawa should have translated Benedict's concept 
as Seken ni tai sum  giri: ’giri with respect to seken' (Hasegawa 1950:184).
The next time that seken appears, it is w ith direct reference to that group of persons to which 
an individual is bound by obligations and expectations:
Today’s constantly used phrases are full of resentment and of emphasis on the pressure of public opinion 
which compels a person to do giri against his wishes...All these usages carry the implication of unwillingness 
and of compliance for 'mere decency's sake', as the Japanese dictionary phrases it." ( Benedict 1946:99)
In Kiku to Katana, ’mere decency’s sake' is translated as, 'tada sekentei wo tsukurou tame ni' (Hasegawa 
1950: 192), w hich literally means, "simply for the purposes of preserving sekentei". In the next 
paragraph, Benedict uses a proverb to make her point, 'It is w hat people say that makes it so 
necessary to comply' (Benedict 1946: 99), which Hasegawa translates as: 'seken no torizata ga osoroshii 
kara de am' (Hasegawa 1950:192). Literally, this means, 'because the gossip of seken is frightening’, a 
common expression.
In Chapter Ten, T he Dilemma of Virtue', Hasegawa translates ’society’ as seken (Benedict 
1946:156; Hasegawa 1950: 308). Benedict writes:
The strong identification of circumspection with self-respect includes...watchfulness of all the cues one 
observes in other people's acts, and a strong sense that other people are sitting in judgment. "One cultivates 
self-respect (one must jicho)," they say, "because of society." "If there were no society one would not need to 
respect oneself (cultivate jicho)" (Benedict 1946:156)
Hasegawa reinstates the Japanese sayings: 'seken ga urusai kara jicho seneba naranai', which literally 
means, 'seken is noisy so you have to be careful', and: 'seken to in mono ga nakereba, jicho shinaku tomo
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yoi no da ga' (Hasegawa 1950: 308), which translated literally is : ' if it w asn't for seken it would be OK 
to do as you please'.8
Seken can be further understood as a recognised social space w ith sanctions by draw ing 
attention to the im portant difference between seken and sekai which is revealed through comparing 
the texts of The Chrysanthem um  and the Sword and Kiku to Katana. Sekai is another word meaning 
'the world’ which appears in Kiku to Katana. In Kenkijusha's Nezu Japanese Dictionary, and Shogakukan's 
11 volume Japanese-English Dictionary, sekai is explained as the world as a physical object or space, 
not as a social space. How Hasegawa translates using both seken and sekai throws more light on just 
w hat seken is. The first thing to note about Hasegawa's use of sekai is that it always requires 
qualification by w hat in English gramm ar would be called an adjectival noun, in order to establish 
and fix its meaning in a social context. This is never the case with Hasegawa's use of seken, which 
always stands alone because its m eaning in Japanese is precise and clear. Benedict writes: T o  the 
Japanese it is sufficient rew ard to be respected in his world...' (Benedict 1946: 123). Hasegawa 
translates this as: 'Nihonjin kara mireba, jibnn no zoku shiteiru sekai de sonkei sarereba, sore de mo juubun 
na nuikni de am' (Hasegawa 1950: 244). It is im portant to note that this is not a saying or a proverb, 
and that Benedict does not put the word 'world' in inverted commas in this example. I may be 
reading more into this point than it can hold, but I w ould argue that because 'w orld' is not in 
inverted commas and because Hasegawa did not have a known saying or proverb to refer to, she 
erred on the side of caution and avoided using seken because of its specific meaning. Again she 
translates literally: 'From the point of view of the Japanese, if there is respect from the world to which 
one is affdiated, that is enough' (my italics). Sekai is qualified with jibnn no zoku shiteiru: 'one's own 
affiliated...'.
As another example, Benedict employs a concept she refers to as 'the circle of giri' (Benedict 
1946: 99), which she places in  inverted commas. Unfortunately it is not possible to establish from 
either text whether this is a term coined by Benedict, or a Japanese saying. Hasegawa translates 'the 
circle of giri' as: ’giri no sekai' (Hasegawa 1950: 193). W hether she is quoting a Japanese saying 
adopted by Benedict, or translating Benedict’s own idea, she avoids using seken, because this circle is 
not contiguous w ith seken. Instead she chooses sekai and a qualifying adjectival noun. Again, 
Hasegawa's avoidance of using seken helps us to further get an idea of w hat seken is. Hasegawa 
follows the same approach in another example. Benedict writes: 'the immediate circle of his intimate 
family...' (Benedict 1946: 94). Hasegawa translates this as: ' mijika na nikushin no selaii no naka de,' 
(Hasegawa 1950: 183). Again, this social space described by Benedict is not seken, and I would 
therefore expect Hasegawa to avoid using the word. Indeed, she chooses sekai w ith a qualifying 
noun. In my final example, where Benedict writes: "jTjhe dictionary translates 'It can’t be helped 
because it is giri to the world' as ’People will not accept any other course of action'." (Benedict 1946: 
99), the saying: 'People will not accept any other course of action', is translated by Hasegawa as 
'seken e no giri dakara itashikata ga nai' (Hasegawa 1950: 193), which literally means: "Because of giri to 
seken it can't be helped". In addition to indicating the sanctioning power of seken, another clue to the 
social construction of seken is contained in the word itashikata. The verb itasu is the humble form of
8I am translating jicho as ’prudence' or 'caution'. Kenkyushn Ncio Japanese-English Dictionary. 5th Edition.
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the verb sum  (to do), the common phrase being shikata ga nai: 'It can’t be helped'. The use of the 
humble form, specifically identifies seken as som ething which Ego should accord respect, which 
conforms with the assertion that seken is an im portant and ethically defined social space close to Ego 
that governs motivation and action to a considerable extent.
Seken is the ’w orld1 of an individual that s /h e  either has to be careful to maintain, or feels a 
desire to be positively regarded by. Lebra (1992) gives some examples:
The seken constituency varies in accordance to where self happens to stand...It may include one's kindred 
(outside the immediate family), neighours, schoolmates, colleagues, clientele, or a large ill-defined 
aggregate of people, known and unknown to self (Lebra 1992:107).
Lebra then introduces the sanctioning power of seken which coerces those individuals who comprise 
seken to act according to seken rules. She describes how seken has ’eyes’, ’ears’, and a ’m outh’, 
"watching, hearing, and gossiping about the self" (Lebra 1992: 107). Lebra regards this body 
m etaphor as giving seken a sense of immediacy, which at the same time is invisible and ill-defined, 
and makes the self feel vulnerable. Despite the introduction into Japan of those ethics which are 
enshrined in the W estern idea of the nation state and a civil society, and in Japanese law, which 
privilege the individual in a strong public domain, seken, which privileges factional interest groups 
over individuals, has continued to be the prim ary moral framework of Japan in the post-WWII 
period (Inoue 1977; Abe 1994, 1995), overriding both individual rights and the public domain, and 
even having the potential to override the law, which, by promoting equality of individual rights and 
individuals as autonom ous individuals in the public domain, comes into conflict with seken rules. 
Abe, a historian who has written extensively on seken, draws our attention to the fact that the word 
’society’ was introduced into the Japanese language around the 10th year of the Meiji Period, and 
was translated as shakai. But at the time, if you asked what 'shakai' was, the answer would be that it 
was a European concept (Abe 1994). Abe notes that there are many sayings and proverbs which 
ethically prescribe action which talk of seken, but there isn’t a single one about shaJeai. He tells us that 
seken is a part of everybody’s life in Japan. It is on everybody's lips and they know it well: "There 
isn’t a single adult who does not know about seken (seken wo shiranai otona wn hi tori mo nai it desu)" 
(Abe 1994: 59). In Kenkyusha's New Japanese Dictionary, seken is translated as 'world', but all entries 
refer to social space. In Shogakukan's Nihon Kokugo Daijiten, the Japanese equivalent to the full 
Oxford Dictionary, in volum e eleven all entries refer to a social space w ith  particular ethical 
provisions.
Seken is not something which exists outside hum an beings, but is rather expressed through 
them, through their sekentei. Sekentei is w hat Lebra terms 'the presentational self, a 'face' which is 
presented to seken, a particular way of acting which is in accordance w ith seken rules. Intimately 
connected to seken, sekentei is w ritten as seken w ith the additional character for ’body' (tai) which 
when read as tei means 'appearance', 'air', ’condition’, or ’state’ (Halpern 1990). In their various uses, 
all these meanings throw light on w hat sekentei is: the self that is addressed to seken. Therefore, it is 
individuals who patrol each other and coerce them into acting according to seken conventions. Abe 
gives the example of a group of colleagues going to the same restaurant and all ordering the same 
meal, as an example of the coercive nature of seken, displayed through an ’affiliated group (shozoku 
shun dan)' (Abe 1994: 64). He also outlines seken as something which is very familiar:
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Seken is structured by (sekai to in mono wa de naritatteim) age seniority (nenkd jbretsii), gift giving (zoyo),
mutual compensation (goshuu), etc. The scope (han'i) of seken is the extent to which persons exchange New  
Year's Cards ( nengajo), or N ew  Year’s gifts (o seibo), summer gifts (o chuugen) ...Gift giving and mutual 
compensation are very influential (Itaba wo kikaseteini). If we work back from this, we can see that seken is 
continually being made from scratch from the year grades at junior high and high school, through 
senpai/kdhai (senior/junior) relationships in school club activities (Abe 7994: 63; my translation).
Abe states that seken is given priority over all else, but what this means is that seken is given priority 
over the individual self and over the public domain, and over individuals who are members of other 
'affiliated groups (shozoku shuudan)' and other seken. How seken can work against the interests of the 
greater whole is described by Abe talking about his own experiences:
At the moment I am affiliated to a university (daigakn ni shozoku shiteiru), and there are four or five 
departments, each with its own seken. The teachers of a department mutually recognize each other and seken 
develops ( gaknbti no sensei wa otagai ni kao wo shiiteini to iu inti de seken ni natteimasu). A  university is a 
slightly unusual example of seken, because the manner in which a person enters a university and a company 
is a little different. However, it is the same in the sense that we give our interests top priority. In other 
words we give priority to the interests of the department. This is the main characteristic of seken and it is 
reasonable to say for the moment that the university is a place in which these various seken vie with each 
other.
The literary world is another seken. For example, take what is in fact a pathetic short story which 
everybody praises to the heights...Why is such a worthless piece praised like this? The reason why is 
because the author of the short story is affiliated to the same seken as the critics....I was a newspaper literary 
critic committee member for ten years, so I know the procedure well. A literary critic has his own horse to 
back. Even if the writing of that person is only about six on a scale of one to ten, the critic would say to the 
committee, "this guy hasn't been picked up for two years, so it’s time to do something about him". The 
meaning of this observation is "basically this stuff is no good, but please publish it as a favour (giri de 
iretekudasai yo)". There is no mistake that this is the way they think (to iu koto to omotte machigaimasen). In 
most cases, this relationship is never spoken (kon iu kankei ga zenbu to wa iimasen ga hotondo desu). The literary 
world, the singing world, the acting world, are just like the academic world. Not surprisingly, from the 
centre of this, there is no possibility of any objective standards. What benefits seken gets priority over 
everything else (souo seken no zoku shiteiru mono no riekit o o , nani yorimo yuusen shite kangaem kara desu) (1994:
61; my translation).
Seken appears to be the moral fram ework of 'the group model of Japanese society' (Befu 1980b), 
while sekentei appears to be a presentational aspect of the individual self which the individual self 
mobilises in what anthropologists describe as tntemae (public behaviour) or omote ('front' or 'formal') 
situations (Hendry 1993).
Because seken appeared to impose conformity on its members, through their individual 
sekentei, I reasoned that within a collective self that encouraged individualistic action, in other words 
within a group of individual selves which privileged and legitimated the expression of individuality 
(kosei), seken and sekentei m ight be reconfigured in some way, indicating a reconfigured moral 
framework and ethical base, which described and defined the topography of those individual selves 
in moral terms. I also realised that seken and sekentei, by prescribing and explaining action within a 
given setting, could also describe and define the topography of individual selves within collective 
selves which resemble various group models of Japanese society (Befu 1980a, 1980b, 1990), and that 
by studying any reconfiguring of seken and sekentei, as it was perceived by individual selves within 
the software company, and among individual selves at underground dance music Techno parties, I 
m ight be able to plot the continuities and  changes to concepts of personhood and  to the 
constructions of selves, both individual and collective, that appeared to be occurring within society 
as a whole in the aftermath of the Bubble.
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Theory, H istoriography, M ethod
In this section, I w ant to discuss the m ethodology I used for apprehending and conceptualizing 
selves, both individual and collective. The m ethodology had to be able to apprehend change, 
because my thesis suggests that selves in Japan are being 'redefined'. Redefinition implies change 
from one type of self to another. Therefore, my method had to be able to describe selves both before 
redefinition and afterwards, and then to be able to put forward a thesis of redefinition. ’Before' and 
'after' are arbitrary points in a process that is on-going; selves are never fixed, but are constantly 
changing. In view of this, I sought to develop theory and method which would respect the voices of 
the individuals who were the subjects of my research: the employees in GA, the software company, 
and the party-goers. I would take my cue from them, and develop theory and m ethod from their 
'narratives of being and becoming’. This was no beginning from a blank slate, however. Theory and 
method, as both formal theory and method, and as ’pre-cognition' and 'pre-judgment' precedes such 
beginnings, but there is theory and m ethod which recognizes this and the centrality of ’authorial' 
individual selves to the existence and developm ent of the 'being and becoming of selves'. This 
method is Interpretive Method.
My method can be said to be interpretivist w ith positivistic intentions. Methodology in the 
social sciences derives from m ethod used in the natural sciences in the 19th century. This was 
essentially in order to satisfy prevailing epistemological criteria at the time. But almost as soon as 
the social sciences began to use natural scientific method, it became clear that natural scientific 
method was unsuitable in significant ways. Unlike the natural sciences, the prim ary object of 
investigation in the social sciences, hum an beings, engage in w hat Max W eber described as 'the 
subjective interpretation of action' (Weber 1978). Weber clearly separates the natural sciences from 
the social sciences, on the basis that people, unlike cells or molecules or planets, engage in subjective 
interpretation, and consequently cannot be regarded as 'objects' which can be relied upon to act in a 
particu lar way, u n d er a certain set of conditions, regardless of tim e or place, which other 
investigators can reproduce w ithout too much trouble. In addition, the subjects of social scientific 
investigation often have ideas of their own about what they do and why they do it, which the social 
scientist is both m ethodologically and ethically obliged to take into account. For Weber, these 
differences between natural science and social science require different methods and procedures.
Regardless of the challenges w hich social science theory and  m ethod presented  to 
traditional positivistic theory and m ethod, I w ant to say at the outset, that 1 firmly believe that 
anthropology is a science, That is to say, I believe in the collection of empirical data through the 
rigorous execution of carefully p lanned m ethod, as the fundam ental basis of anthropological 
research. And that through the interplay of inductive and deductive processes, theories and data to 
explain social phenom ena which can be corroborated by others, should be rigorously pursued to 
form a corpus of knowledge, like any natural science. There is m uch about 'scientific method' which
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is fruitful and productive in the execution of anthropology, and which guarantees a degree of rigour 
and an em pirical foundation w hich is indispensable if anthropology, and the social sciences in 
general, are to contribute to our understanding and to knowledge, generally.
W eber was the first m ajor figure in sociology or anthropology to attem pt to build a 
methodology around a subjectively interpreting individual. However, within w hat Gadamer (1975) 
terms the 'hum an sciences’, which includes history, Weber was not alone. The effect of subjective 
interpretation on an analysis by an observer, and its implications for epistemology, became a central 
question for philosophy towards the end of the nineteenth century, and remains so to this day. The 
question of subjectivity and  of subjectively in terpreting individuals, and its challenge to an 
epistemology which was built on the possibility of universal tru th  achieved through objective 
verification, had become im portant for historians attem pting to find some consistency between 
ancient exegetical texts, notably those w ritten before Christ, and those w ritten afterwards. Clearly, 
these accounts were different, not least because they were written by different people, at different 
times, in different places, and under different sets of conditions, creating different views of the same 
events. It was only by taking all these factors into account that historians could begin to find a 
'truth', a consistent viewpoint, and one which they themselves had to piece together, taking into 
account how their own trajectories of experience were brought to bear on their interpretation.
The im portance of subjectivity and of the role of interpreting individuals, both those 
undertaking investigations and those being studied, created w hat G adam er (1975) term ed 'the 
epistemological problem of history'. Put simply, the problem was that it was not possible for one 
viewpoint to be selected from all the available viewpoints, and for that viewpoint to be regarded as 
the objective, verifiable truth. Consequently, under the criteria of inclusion for an epistemology 
based on natural scientific method, historical texts could not be regarded as knowledge. Evidently, 
the question of subjectivity and of subjective interpretation presented  profound challenges to 
epistemology and could not be ignored.
This epistemological problem  of history was also a problem  for the social sciences more 
generally. Just as the study of texts written by individuals who subjectively interpret under different 
conditions, in different times and places, presents a certain set of theoretical, methodological and 
epistemological problems, so does the study of individuals and societies for the same reason. As I 
m entioned above, the question of subjectivity and of subjectively interpreting individuals, as both 
investigators and investigated, presents epistemological and methodological problems which set in 
motion a critique of scientific method and epistemology.
The fact that the prim ary object of social scientific investigation is a living, thinking being 
who interprets subjectively, renders natural scientific method problematic. People do not act with 
the consistency of molecules or planets under similar conditions, and, therefore, m ethod for the 
understanding of social scientific phenom ena has to be able, on the one hand to account for the 
variation that exists, and on the other, has to present results which pass the criteria for the growth of 
knowledge. That is, which satisfy epistemological criteria of verifiability. It was primarily the fact 
that these criteria for the growth of knowledge were built on the principles of objective truth, that 
spurred Husserl and Heidegger (Gadamer 1975) to attem pt to develop a philosophy of being (and as
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social science is essentially the study of 'being', we can say that they w ere foundational in 
developing a philosophy of the social sciences) which satisfied the prevailing epistemology, while 
presenting a critique of i t  Their intent was to develop a philosophy of existence which satisfied the 
criteria for the grow th of know ledge, by explaining how hum an understanding  accum ulates 
through the process of being. For Husserl and Heidegger in particular, it was vital to explain the 
processes of how hum an beings com prehend and conceptualize themselves, which in itself is an 
endeavour to bring subjective truth, or consciousness, within the bounds of epistemology. This 
endeavour of understanding how  hum an beings verify their own existence then provides a starting 
point for the development of theoiy and method for the social sciences. This was Dilthey's approach 
to establishing an epistem ology of the 'hum an sciences’ (Gadam er 1975), and  m ore recently 
Ricoeur's (Ricoeur 1979).
One of the major problem s of natu ral scientific m ethod for the social sciences was the 
insistence on, and belief in, the possibility of strict, objective verification of phenomena. Regardless 
of the questions concerning the problematic nature of regarding social actors as 'objects', which is 
w hat drove H usserl's phenom enological research in his later Logical Investigations, the m ajor 
problem  w ith objectivity is that it also forces us to ignore the im pact of time and space on 
phenomena, simply because objectively verifiable tru th  has to satisfy conditions which transcend 
time and place. Because of the pivotal role of subjectivity, and of subjective interpretation in the 
construction of social reality, historically and in the present, objectivity had to be reassessed both as 
a criterion for the grow th of know ledge, and as a form ulation of the 'way of being’ under 
investigation. As I described above, for philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger, and more 
recently Ricoeur, it was as part of their discussions on the nature of being w hich drove their 
critiques of objectivity, whereas for historians like Dilthey and sociologists like Weber, it was the 
pursuit of theory and m ethod capable of em bracing subjective interpretation which drove their 
critiques of objectivity.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to review the historiographical developm ent of these 
debates in their entirety, but it is necessary for me to discuss certain aspects of them as they impact 
on the anthropological m ethod I have selected for the study of selves. So it is with Husserl and 
Heidegger that I will begin, because it was these men who provided the social sciences w ith insights 
into the processes by which individuals interpret, and argum ents as to why these explanations 
satisfied epistem ological criteria. I will then proceed to Dilthey, who attem pted to provide a 
philosophical and epistemological base for the social sciences, by fashioning a methodology based 
on herm eneutics, d riven  by em piricism , and draw ing  prim arily  on the w ork of H usserl’s 
phenom enology. I then proceed to Gadam er, who as Dilthey's biographer, further developed 
herm eneutic m ethod by looking to H eidegger's ontology of being. I then m ove from the 
philosophers and historians, to describe how sociologists embraced interpretive ideas and method. 
First Weber in com parison to Durkheim , who can be regarded as a positivist ra ther than an 
interpretivist, before following the interpretivist tradition into the m odern social sciences through 
both the sociological and anthropological traditions.
The revelation w hich Dilthey discovered in Husserl was two-fold. First of all, in the fifth
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Logical Investigation, Husserl theorized that consciousness is not an object which can be studied as 
such, but is a 'co-ordination of intentional experiences’, a givenness, constituted by the temporality 
of consciousness as a 'tiine-consciousness' (Gadamer 1975). Husserl argued that consciousness 
follows from the flow of experience, which has a constantly unfolding horizon and which is defined 
by that horizon. All hum an beings are enmeshed in trajectories which cannot be isolated from each 
other, consequently all hum an beings, logically, affect the developm ent of understanding of all the 
others. In this way, H usserl suggests that ind ividual consciousness exists w ithin a world 
consciousness, which he names ’the phenomenon of world'.
The im plications for social science theory and  m ethod was, first: that by regarding 
individuals as a consciousness constituted as a co-ordination of experiences, and as a givenness 
which is constituted by other consciousnesses in time and space, the epistemological basis for 
overcoming objectivity had been prepared. And secondly, it could be argued that social reality is 
intrinsically bound up w ith the consciousness of individuals, that this consciousness is fluid and 
time-dependent, and that method to apprehend it must take the particular horizons of experience of 
consciousness into account in arriving at an understanding. Critical for Dilthey, as part of Husserl’ s 
'phenomenon of world' the writer and reader of texts also exist as 'co-ordinations’ moving forward 
through horizons of experience at different time-points, which also have to be taken into account if a 
'true1 reading of a text, that is, one which satisfies epistemological criteria, can be achieved. In this 
way, Dilthey caught sight of the possibility of both a radically improved theory and method for the 
understanding of historical reality (and we can include social reality in the present), as well as a 
reconfigured epistemological base on which that understanding could legitimately be regarded as 
knowledge.
H eidegger is an  im portan t figure in this discussion because, as G adam er describes: 
"Heidegger entered into the problems of historical hermeneutics and critique...in order to explicate 
the fore-structure of understanding  for the purposes of ontology (G adam er 1975:265). It was 
Heidegger who developed the idea that understanding proceeds as a hermeneutic circle in time. In 
Being and Time, H eidegger explains how an epistemologically grounded understanding  m ust 
proceed as a dialogue w ith oneself, through hermeneutic reflection, whereby the individual must 
rigorously reflect on all experience. Heidegger describes how it is "our first, last, and constant task in 
interpreting...to make the scientific theme secure by working out [the] fore-structures in terms of the 
things themselves" (Heidegger Fore-structures are prejudices, or more accurately, given the
pejorative valence we attach to word prejudice today, pre-conceptions. As Gadam er notes, although 
Heidegger is not concerned with developing a theory and method for the practice of understanding 
social reality for the 'hum an sciences', his project of w anting to show how understanding, as that 
which constitutes being, is achieved, can form the basis of an interpretive m ethod for the social 
sciences. I will quote Gadamer at length , as he describes how Heidegger's work on the ontology of 
being could become the foundation of interpretive method for the social sciences:
All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by 
imperceptible habits of thought, and must direct its gaze "on the things themselves".,.For the interpreter to 
let himself be guided by the things themselves is not obviously a matter of a single "conscientious" decision, 
but is the "first, last, and constant task". For it is necessary to keep one's gaze fixed on the thing throughout 
all the constant distractions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person who is trying to understand a 
text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning
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emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular 
expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working ou t this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in 
terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there...The process that 
Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new  
projection of meaning; rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clear what the unity of 
meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. This 
constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding and interpretation. A person 
who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from fore-meanings that are not borne out by the 
things themselves. Working out appropriate projections, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed "by the 
things themselves", is the constant task of understanding. The only "objectivity" here is the confirmation of 
the fore-meaning in its being worked out. Indeed, what characterises the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore­
meanings if not that they come to nothing in being worked out? ( Gadamer 1975:266) .
Gadam er notes that this process is in fact the 'radicalization' of a procedure that hum an beings 
exercise whenever they comprehend anything (Gadamer 1975: 267).
This careful weeding out of inappropriate fore-meanings is by no means easy. There are at 
least two case in this thesis w hen I projected certain assumptions, based on certain 'fore-structures', 
or 'fore-meanings’. One, which 1 mention at the beginning of 7.1, was how I missed the relevance of 
the word ’affiliation ('shozoku)' in defining a 'group (shuudan)'. From the careful analysis of w hat 
people were saying, and how they were saying it, I eventually concluded that a collective self to 
w hich people are not, in a very strict sense 'affiliated (shozoku)', is not shuudan. I eventually 
concluded that both shuudan and shozoku carry many secondary meanings which refer to a particular 
structure of relationships and ethics, A collective self which is constituted by individuals who give 
primacy to an ethics of individuality  (kosei), do not appear to regard them selves as 'affiliated 
(shozoku)'. This was described as a feeling that, as members of a collective self in which they are 
morally proscribed to 'express their selves (jibun wo dasu)', it doesn't feel quite right to say they 
belong to a ’group (shuudan)'. I say ’feel’, because these reports only express an uneasiness about 
using the word shuudan. These individuals, in all but one case, d idn 't know why it feels strange to 
use the word. A nd even in that one case, the individual was talking about 'affiliation (shozoku)', 
about why ’being affiliated to a group (shuudan ni shozoku suru)' was inappropriate to describe how 
it felt working at GA, the software company. We were not talking about shuudan directly.
People clearly don't fully understand why they do things, or think things, in m any cases, 
which makes the job of the anthropologist all the more difficult. As I discuss below, understanding 
is a collective effort, an intersubjective process. The anthropologist has to understand, that, as a self, 
s /  he is implicated in this intersubjective process of understanding, and that this is the power, in a 
veiy Foucauldian sense, that the analyst has. The social scientist wields a m uch more subtle pow er 
than the natural scientist. It is not an authority to conduct research and draw  conclusions. It is the 
power that any hum an being has to elicit meaning from experience, which is the 'scientific theme' 
that Heidegger alerts us to.
The other example I d idn 't even notice myself, but had to have pointed out to me, and this 
was no small matter. This was the notion that the ethics of individuality that is emerging in Japan in 
the aftermath of the Bubble, is built upon a fundamental ethic of a consistency of action. This was 
my own imputation, in fact, which I had not noticed, as I tried to 'make sense o f all the data which, 
towards the end of the thesis, was, quite literally, lying all over the floor, like autum n leaves in a 
park.
The recognition of the role of w hat G adam er terms ’fore-meanings’ and w hat Heidegger
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refers to as 'fore-structures’, is in the pursuit of knowledge, is of critical importance, not only from a 
methodological point of view, but, crucially, from an epistemological perspective. Strictly speaking, 
the requirem ent to be 'objective' requires the denial of subjective interpretation, so it is through the 
recognition of 'fore-structures' and 'fore-meanings' that objectivity is challenged, and through the 
adoption of rigorous procedures which attem pt to weed out all 'inappropriate' fore-meanings and 
fore-structures, that the epistemological requirem ent for objectivity is overcome. After all, what is 
objectivity', as an epistem ological criterion, bu t the requirem ent that a phenom enon can be 
corroborated to an acceptable degree? Instead of denying the existence of 'fore-structures', or of 
subjective interpretation, Heidegger instead sets about confronting prejudgement as an intrinsic part 
of understanding, attempting to bring it within what he himself called 'the scientific theme'.
G adam er goes on to describe 'the discrediting of prejudice by the enlightenm ent', to 
dem onstrate the roots of objectivism. He dem onstrates that it was 'prejudice due to overhastiness' 
rather than 'prejudice due to hum an authority' which was discredited, quoting Kant from 1784 in his 
essay 'W hat is Enlightenm ent?', in which Kant exhorts: "Have the courage to use your own 
understanding" (Gadamer 1975: 271. italics in original). From Husserl, through Dilthey, and then by 
using Heidegger's ontological structure of understanding, Gadam er makes a strong argum ent for 
the removal of the requirem ent for objectivity from the epistemological foundations of the social 
sciences, paving the way for an interpretive social science on sound epistemological foundations.
'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
For Max Weber, the fundam ental unit of sociological investigation is the individual. Collectivities, 
for Weber, are alw ays groups of individuals, and can only be understood  by studying the 
individuals which constitute particular collectivities. According to Weber, only from there can 
conclusions about social action on a collective level can be drawn. In ways like this, Weber is quite 
different from Durkheim, who regarded the collectivity and its conscience collective as the primary 
unit of social investigation, which could not be reduced to its constituent parts. Durkheim  was a 
positivist in the tradition of Auguste Comte. Weber was a critic of positivistic social science, in that 
he did not regard the m ethods and procedures em ployed in the natural sciences as sufficient to 
understand social reality. This does not mean that he did not attach importance to methodological 
rigour in the collection of empirical data, or did not seek to formulate general laws of social action at 
the collective level, but rather that his position concerning the subjective interpretation of action by 
individuals challenged the positivistic approach.
W eber called the m ethod  he developed , focusing on the ind iv idua ls ' subjective 
interpretation, verstehen. This was a m ethod whereby the social scientist attem pted to forge an 
em pathetic relationship w ith an individual whom  s /h e  was studying, in  order to understand the 
motives and action of that individual. This is not the same as 'taking a person's w ord for it’, and 
therefore indicates that although Weber quite rightly regarded individual subjective experience as 
fundamental to social analysis, he was aware that individuals are not necessarily aware of what they 
do or why they do it, and that, therefore, the social scientist also has a crucial role to play in 
interpreting and explaining social action. In this way, Weber addressed early on, a problem  which
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has concerned social scientific theory and method for most of this century: The reconciliation of the 
subjective interpretation of individual actors, w ith the social scientists' ’need' to interpret that action.
Although clearly addressing the im portance of subjectivity and interpretation in the study 
of social reality, W eber never systematically used his verstehen m ethod (Parkin 1985), and in fact 
noted some of the difficulties involved in such an empathetic approach. Weber went so far as to say 
that it was necessary for both investigator and investigated to hold as similar values as possible, and 
that the more their values diverged, the less likely an analysis was possible. Clearly, as Parkin (1985) 
notes, Weber would have regarded Iris verstehen method as wholly unsuitable as an anthropological 
method. Whereas, in fact, verstehen can be regarded as the basis of an embryonic form of participant 
observation.
Durkheim, on the other hand, had less concerns about the effect the disparity in values 
between him self and those he studied  m ight have on his results. An example is the religious 
practices of aboriginal Australians, which he used to build his thesis on elem entary forms of 
religious life. Such analyses and conclusions were, however, often thoroughly overdeterm ined, for 
all the elements of truth' they revealed. This is not to deny the pow er of Durkheim 's analyses, but 
from the present horizon, analyses which do not put a subjectively interpreting individual at the 
centre of the investigation cannot comprehend selfhood, and in this sense, Weber can be regarded as 
a m ore instrum ental figure than Durkheim  in the developm ent of a m ethodology for studying 
selves.
Although both Weber and Durkheim were equally im portant figures in the developm ent of 
early anthropological method, through the work of Radcliffe-Brown in particular, Durkheim became 
much more influential. Within anthropological m ethod generally at this time, the individual self was 
considered a product of the structures and institutions w hich constitu ted  social reality. For 
anthropologists, the individual, and individual behaviour was not a valid object of anthropological 
investigation. In this way, w hat Cohen and R apport (1995) refers to as 'the problem atic of 
consciousness', was 'sidestepped' in anthropology.
The same cannot be said for sociology, which gave a higher priority to the individual, and to 
intersubjectivity, m uch earlier than anthropology. This was for a num ber of reasons, notably the 
efforts of anthropology and sociology to define their proper domains of investigation in relation to 
each other. From early on anthropology became the comparative study of primitive societies, while 
sociology focused primarily on 'complex' urban populations. This division brought sociology closer 
to the discipline w hich studied  individuals: psychology. Significantly, both studied the same 
communities, which in tu rn  led to the separate discipline of social psychology. There has been 
dialogue between anthropology and sociology, w ith my own university departm ent even changing 
its name to a 'departm ent of anthropology and sociology', but it is clear that an ongoing desire to 
m aintain some distance, certainly among some anthropologists, has resulted in certain im portant 
methodological developments, particularly those concerning the study of the self in sociology and 
social psychology, being ignored. I am referring particularly to the work of social psychologists like 
G.H. Mead, and the interactionist school of sociologists which drew heavily on Mead's work.
Smith (1983), as I quote in 4.3, held this view, suggesting that anthropologists would have
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had a 'm uch m ore plausible theory of the self' if the w ork of Mead had been recognised. By 
considering M ead from an historiographical perspective, it seems to me that the reason why 
anthropologists, particularly in Britain, did not regard Mead's work on the self as im portant, has 
more to do w ith the fact that M ead was a social psychologist, and that his work was taken up by 
sociologists, than the fact that the individual was not the primary unit of analysis for anthropology 
generally, at the time. This certainly seems the case, especially after the Interpretive Turn in the 
1970s, when, just as the ramifications of subjective interpretation were being properly understood 
on a w ide scale in anthropology, anthropologists turned to philosophers like Collingwood and 
Ricoeur, w ith no mention of Mead and the interactionist sociologists. Goffman is the exception, and 
1 will consider him below.
George H erbert Mead's theories of the self parallel Dilthey's hermeneutics, but Mead,
although clearly an exponent of Dilthey's work, was also influenced by the American pragmatists,
John Dewey and Charles H orton Cooley (Prus 1996). For Mead, the self arises from, and is
im plicated in, the in teraction of selves. Like D ilthey, M ead regarded  social reality  as an
intersubjective process that emerges through the interaction of interpreting individuals, in time, in
space. A lthough M ead regarded his own work as social psychology, he taught philosophy at the
University of Chicago, and would have been aware of Dilthey's work. In much the same way that
Dilthey regarded understanding as constantly accruing as horizons of experience roll back, Mead
regarded the self as constantly in the process of becoming, through interaction with other selves,
contingent entirely on their location in time and space, A key feature of this intersubjective
consciousness for Mead, is a reflexive "1" w hich is capable of im agining a 'generalized other', on
which the individual bases and judges his or her own actions:
What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the 
group...There are certain common responses which each individual has toward certain common things, and 
in so far as those common responses are awakened in the individual when he is affecting other persons, he 
arouses his own self. Such responses are abstract attitudes [but] they constitute just what we term a 
man's...principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the community toward what are the values 
of the community. He is putting himself in the place of the generalized other (Mead 1934:162).
Mead's theories of an intersubjective self, both being and becoming, through the interaction of selves 
mobilizing a 'generalised other’, can be seen in the interplay between seken and sekentei, where what 
is regarded as seken nami (that which conforms to seken rules, or is conventional) are the 'abstract 
attitudes' Mead talks of (4.3).
Mead emphasizes, not only that selves only exist in relationships with other selves, and that 
'the self arises out of a social process' constituted by individuals. He is keen to make us aware that, 
although this interaction of individuals 'implies the pre-existence of the group’ (Mead 1934:164), in 
fact, selves, through interaction:
develop a more elaborate organization than that out of which the self has arisen, and that the selves may be 
the organs, the essential parts at least, of this more elaborate social organization within which these selves 
arise and exist. Thus there is a social process out of which selves arise and within which further 
differentiation...takes place (Mead 1934:164).
So, not only does Mead tell us that the self is a social entity which comes to exist through interaction 
w ith other selves, but which, im portantly , through reflective though t and the concept of a 
generalised other, exists in solitude as well. He tells us that individual selves exist in a dynamic
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relationship with, and m utually constitute, collective selves, in a process of being while becoming. 
The parallels w ith Dilthey's horizons of experience and Heidegger's ontology of being are very 
evident, indicating that here was a social scientist propounding interpretive m ethod fifty years 
before anthropology discovered Dilthey.
Mead is the first person to systematically develop the idea of intersubjectivity as the basis of 
hum an 'being' in the social sciences. He does not discuss the position of an observer in defining the 
self, or of the more tricky subject of how the observer is implicated in the intersubjectivity of those 
he observes, which was a major concern of Dilthey and of anthropological m ethod today. Mead 
regarded selves as existing and constantly in the process of becoming, intersubjectively. In this 
sense, he regarded objectivity not simply as impossible, but as irrelevant. According to Mead selves 
'objectify', in the sense that they put themselves in the position of a 'generalised other', but this is 
always contingent on the intersubjective interaction with a given other, imagined or in person.
Mead tackles the subjective, but always w ithin the framework of the intersubjectivity he 
espouses. It is always as an intersubjective 'me' that he discusses subjectivity. M ead is at pains to 
explain that, although the self is constituted by and reflects "the organized relational pattern of [the 
social process] as a whole", every self is different:
Every individual self within a given society or social community reflects in its organized structure the 
whole relational pattern of organized social behaviour which that society or community exhibits or is 
carrying on...but since each of these individual selves reflects a uniquely different aspect or perspective of 
this pattern...from its own particular and unique place within the whole process of organized social 
behaviour - since that is, each is differently or uniquely related to that whole process and occupies its own 
essentially unique focus of relations therein - the structure of each is differently constituted by this pattern 
from the way...any other is so constituted (Mend 1934:201).
The individual is dearly  the prim ary social entity for Mead, but he always stresses that this 
individual is constituted by the 'relational pattern ' of the social processes which surround the 
individual self, m ediated through and constituted intersubjectivity by the subjectivity of those 
whom  Ego encounters. At the same time, the individual self is the 'organ' through which 'social 
organization' differentiates (Mead 1934: 164), so that, in Mead's view, the self is a generative entity, 
and individual and community are clearly m utually constitutive of each other.9 Although I did not 
use Mead's ideas as part of my own method, the relationship between seken and sekentei leads me to 
a theoiy of the self that is remarkably like Mead's. In the final chapter, I suggest that the self can be 
made visible w hen considered as part of a 'trigonometrical triangulation' of individual self, the 
m apping of social space, and morality, in a dynamic, m utually constitutive relationship, revealing 
what I term the 'topography of the self'.
For Mead, it is through language primarily, although he also discusses gesture, that selves 
are implicated in each other, and through which they are revealed to themselves and each other, by 
m eans of "the triadic relation on w hich the existence of m eaning is based" (Mead 1934:145). 
According to M ead both the self and com m unity are defined, and can be known, through the 
existence of shared meanings. Self and community exist as a result of shared meanings, and it is by 
means of communication that m eaning is shared, that selves emerge and exist, and by which
’Mead remarks that the self is implicated in the development of ’more elaborate organisations’. While I agree with him that 
the individual self is ’authorial’ (Cohen 1994), Mead's language suggests an evolutionary process, a view to which I do not 
subscribe.
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community is constituted: a symbolic construction of community (Cohen 1985).
In a veiy fundamental way, Mead is a colossus ignored in the anthropology of the self. Certainly, in 
the anthropology of Japan, Lebra, Smith, and Plath, have all alluded to M ead’s work, but theoretical 
and methodological discussions within anthropology, generally, do not attem pt to systematically 
develop his ideas. It is not until now, over sixty years later, that anthropological work on the self, as 
evinced by this thesis, demonstrates the validity of Mead's work on the self in a comprehensive way.
Yet, my encounter w ith Mead is decidedly 'post-thesis’. I write about Mead here and now, 
only after following the conventions of thesis writing and 'filling in the gaps’ in my own scholarship, 
at the very end. Maybe this is a fair test of M ead's ideas. For while conducting this research, 
analyzing this data, and form ulating the theories I do towards the end of the thesis, M ead was 
beyond my horizon of experience, allowing me to arrive at strikingly similar conclusions without 
knowledge of his ideas on the self. My lack of knowledge of Mead says som ething about the (lack 
of) rigour of my own scholarship, but says more about my undergraduate training, As Cohen notes, 
Mead's work: "has rem ained almost entirely absent from the undergraduate syllabuses of British 
social anthropology" (Cohen 1994: 2).
The work of Dilthey and Mead finds its earliest most coherent and systematic expression in 
the w ork of H erbert Blumer (1900-1987). Blumer was a student of M ead's who elaborated the 
theoretical and methodological implications of Mead's work into an approach he term ed symbolic 
interaction' in 1937. Prus describes Blumer's symbolic interactionist approach as "establishing the 
vital link of the interpretive tradition w ith ethnographic research" (Prus 1996: 69). Once, again, 
though, Blumer's name remains absent from the syllabuses of British social anthropology.
*******
Through my research into seken and sekentei, in the w ork of Inoue (1977) and Abe (1994,1995) I came 
across another developm ent in sociological theory and m ethod concerned w ith the self, largely 
ignored by anthropologists: reference group theory. Reference group theory addressed the very 
im portant concern am ong social psychologists and sociologists, about how  individuals can hold 
opinions and attitudes which appear contradictory to those of the groups to which they belong. 
Since Cooley at least, an ind ividual’s self was regarded as being organized on the 'relational 
patterns' (Mead 1934) of the group(s) to which s /h e  belongs. For Cooley, this was to the extent that 
the self is a reflection. Cooley called this self the 'looking glass self' (Cooley 1909), and the group 
which constituted this self was the person's ’prim ary group’, judged to be so on the basis of face-to- 
face contact.10
Sociologists had been grappling w ith 'the problematic aspects of m ultiple membership', at 
least since Dewey (Hyman and Singer 1968), but did not have a theory to explain w hat Shibutani 
describes as: "the inconsistency of behaviour as a person moves from one social context to another" 
(Shibutani 1968:103). Reference group theory addressed this problem. Shibutani adds that reference 
group theory had been useful: "in accounting for the choices made among apparent alternatives,
10The relationship between seken and sekentei is described by Abe (1994,1995) in similar terms (4.4).
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where the selections seem to be contrary to the 'best interests’ of the actor (Shibutani 1968:103).
H ym an coined the term  'reference group' in 1942, and co-edited a volume in 1968 (Hyman 
and Singer 1968), which sought to draw  together work done since then. In that volume, in a paper 
reprin ted  from  the American Journal of Sociology (1955. Vol 60), Shibutani assesses the various 
meanings assigned to the term  'reference g roup’ since Hym an first used it, and settles on the 
following meaning as the one which should be adopted. "A reference group [is] any collectivity, real 
or im agined, envied or despised, whose perspective is assum ed by the actor [and] whose 
perspective constitutes the frame of reference of the actor" (Shibutani 1968: 105). This is essentially 
the m eaning of 'reference group ' used by Inoue (1977) in his description of seken (4.4), while 
Kuwayama (1992) references both Shibutani (1968) and Inoue (1977) in Iris brief discussion of seken.
The one sociologist who wrote about the self that anthropologists did take an interest in, 
was Erving Goffman. Cohen (1994) places Goffman as a symbolic interactionist in a direct line from 
Mead, although Prus (1996) places him  outside the symbolic interactionists as a 'contem porary 
variant of the interpretive tradition’. Either way, Goffman's work is all about 'interaction', and his 
work concerning ’im pression m anagem ent’, 'face', and the 'dram aturgical m etaphor' of 'on-stage' 
and 'off-stage' (Goffman 1959), should have, and did, prove irresistible to anthropologists of Japan 
especially. However, the movement towards the denial of the individual in the anthropology of the 
Japanese self (4.1), has meant that use of Goffman's ideas in the anthropology of Japan have not been 
used as much as they might have been. His work on 'on-stage' and 'off-stage', and particularly 'front' 
and 'back', were extremely influential on the adoption of omote (frontroom) and urn (backroom) as 
concepts for the framing of Japanese society by anthropologists of Japan. Whereas his work on 'face', 
associated as it is, directly with the individual, has not been systematically developed. Sekentei, 
certainly, suggests Goffman's w ork on 'face' m ight be useful, although Goffman did not present a 
m echanism  describing the linkage between his face-to-face 'interaction o rd er’ and the w ider 
community, suggesting that although sekentei and 'face' indicate similarities, Goffman’s work does 
not help, particularly, in explaining the linkage between seken and sekentei.
In a sense Goffman is an anomaly in the historiography of the self in anthropology. Not 
because his w ork is not of value, but because the work of Mead, the symbolic interactionists, and 
reference group theory, all lend themselves to an anthropology of the self in a m ore coherent, 
rigorous, and potentially productive way. Goffman's ideas are veiy interesting, and, significantly 
maybe, he presents them  in w hat Prus (1996) calls a 'riveting' way. But he never systematically 
develops his m ethodology, and his w ork is quite anecdotal, which although not a criticism per ser 
makes his position in anthropology seem stranger, w hen others were m uch more systematic and 
rigorous in setting out their theory and m ethod. Goffman clearly caught the imagination, whereas 
others did not.
Basham (1978), looking to establish a methodology for the study of complex societies, as the 
basis of the new 'urban anthropology', suggests that anthropologists look to the work of sociologists, 
with their long-standing tradition  of studying urban societies. He reviews the 'urban ecology' 
approach of Robert. E. Park and his students, and the 'community study’ approach, citing W hyte’s 
very ethnographic Street Corner Society (1955) as an exemplary analysis. He then considers the
25
interactionist approach, bu t Goffman is the only example he provides. Cohen (1985) also spends 
some time looking over the work of Park and Burgess and the Chicago school. He challenges a 
number of the assumptions and theoretical and methodological approaches they and their followers 
pu t forward. Cohen's advice is that the analyst is better advised to go further back to Durkheim, 
Simmel and Weber, as these 'classical m asters' provide the surest foundation on w hich to build 
contem porary approaches. W hereas the Chicago School, for all its "intellectual excitement, 
imagination and verve...considerably m uddied the waters" (Cohen 1985: 38).
Cohen's com m ents are part of his study  of the symbolic construction of com m unity. 
According to Cohen (1985), community is not only a dynamic relationship between those individual 
selves which constitute it. Community, and therefore, on the basis of what I have been saying, sense 
of self, is constituted by the existence of other communities, and their relationship and position to 
each other. Just as M ead and the symbolic interactionists describe how individuals in terpret 
symbols, primarily language in Mead's case, in order to define themselves and their membership of 
a given com m unity, Cohen (1985), follow ing Leach (1967) and Barth (1969) describes how 
communities, comprised of individuals, im pute meaning to symbols on the basis that they contrast 
them with both the symbols and meanings of other communities. Leach focused on the contrastive 
nature of the construction of identity , w hich Barth took further by saying that it was at the 
boundaries of communities that identity, or ethnicity, was prim arily visible. W hat characterised 
these approaches, not surprisingly considering they where anthropological approaches, was the 
emphasis on community rather than individuals. Nevertheless, as theories of community, they are 
profoundly im portant in furthering our understanding of selves. As Cohen (1985) argues, the 
meaning that individuals im pute to symbols, be they w ords or objects, or gestures, is invariably 
contingent on the meaning that individuals in other communities give to the same symbols, and that 
meaning depends, not on some quality that is inherent in the symbol itself, but on the interpretation 
of those who assign meaning to it.
The new individuality that I describe as emerging in Japan in the late 1990s, challenges the 
legitimacy of seken as the prim ary moral framework of Japanese society. With the emergence of a 
kind of individuality , there is evidence of a corresponding public dom ain  em erging, which 
transcends seken. Within this developing public domain, which in its nascent form suggests a unitary 
moral field, individuals are forming 'private groups' (Miyanaga 1991) on the basis of voluntary 
commitment. This raises a question of how members of these private groups define themselves in 
relation to other private groups, if they do at all, in the absence of seken and those symbols which are 
regarded as seken nami (consistent w ith  seken). In the case of seken, the m inute differentiation of 
ostensibly similar 'interaction rituals' (Goffman 1959) and 'ways if integrating (sesshi Imta)' which 
exists between groups, provides a good example of Cohen's symbolic construction of community. I 
did not look for the symbolic construction of community among the collective selves I studied, and 
did not notice any such appropriation or mobilisation of symbols. However, 1 believe this would be 
a fruitful area of research for tracking the diversification and fragm entation of references that 
constitute seken, as collective selves in Japan move tow ards collectivities w hich encourage the 
expression of individuality.
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With this particular historiography of the self, I have outlined the theoretical and methodological 
developments which are the antecedents of the theoretical and methodological approaches I have 
used to study the redefinition of Japanese selves in the aftermath of the Bubble. As 1 have said, I 
have taken the indigenous concepts of seken and sekentei as the cue for m y theoretical and 
m ethodological approach. The relationship between seken and sekentei, suggests a theory of 
individual and community, m utually constituted, existing in a dynamic relationship, and one which 
emphasizes the intersubjectivity of individual selves. The relationship between seken and sekentei, as 
a m echanism  w hich connects ind iv idual to com m unity, together w ith  the adoption  of an 
interpretive, intersubjective approach, fitted neatly w ith the method I had decided to use to collect 
and interpret data, which stressed the role of authorial selves and of consciousness in constructing 
social reality.
Cohen (1994) and Cohen and Rapport (1995) in my view indicate the overdue arrival of the 
authorial individual self as a legitim ate anthropological object of investigation. The study of 
consciousness is not new to anthropology (Heelas and Lock 1982), but as Cohen and Rapport (1995) 
point out, the consciousness of any individual tended to be identified w ith the structural logic of 
that individual's social circumstances:
If I am a Nuer, then I must think like a Nuer. Anthropologists thereby provided themselves with a simple 
means of defining away the problematic of consciousness. Their task was to provide a plausible 
interpretation of what the Nuer does. If social structure could not provide the answer, 'culture' could 
always be called in aid. In other than pathological or deviant cases, we simply assumed that people had 
similar kinds of consciousness if they could be depicted as 'sharing' culture or as being located within 
common social structures (Cohen and Rapport 1995:1).
Within such a theoretical framework, individuals were described in terms of roles or offices. Mauss 
(1985) m ade a distinction between the conscious self, moi, and the socially constructed self, in 
personne, but Mauss' peregrinations around both these categories never moved beyond how they are 
socially determ ined. Fortes (1973), was one of the first to present a com prehensive theory of 
personhood, by arguing that all hum an societies have a concept of the person, and that this concept 
is how hum an societies address "how individual and society are interconnected" (Fortes 1973: 288). 
However Fortes' person was not a self as Mead described, but a role or office, conferred by 'society'. 
Individuals, tended to be seen not as individual selves, but as cyphers taking up roles, assuming 
office. This is now changing, as Cohen and Rapport note:
Those whom w e used to see and describe as role-players - realizing scripts written by a social dens ex 
machina - are now recognized as intentional, interpreting, imaginative, conscious agents ( Cohen and Rapport 
1995:3).
Elsewhere, Cohen (1994) argues that culture, and we can include society, does not impose meaning 
on individuals. Culture, Cohen states, provides a framework which is substantiated by creative 
individual selves, who, through interpretation, give it meaning through thought, word and act. The 
framework itself is only ever partially revealed in the thoughts, w ords and acts of individuals. 
Fragments of the framework are collected by the anthropologist, who then tries to create that which 
in fact does not exist. The anthropologist collects fragments, in all their contradictory brilliance, and 
tries to 'make sense o f an often bewildering collage.
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This was the prim ary method I used in collecting and interpreting ethnographic data for this 
thesis. In both G raphic A utom ation, the softw are company, and am ong those w ho attended 
u n d erg ro u n d  dance m usic Techno parties, I collected personal histories, opinions and 
interpretations: narratives, which I then knitted together and interpreted. Like Mead, Cohen and 
Rapport settle on 'narratives' as a 'strategy of capture' to access individuals: "as having distinctive 
narratives of their em bodim ent and being-in-the-world" (Cohen and Rapport 1995: 7). To focus on 
individual selves in this way is not to privilege individual selves over collective selves. This would 
have been difficult in my case, because the individual narratives I collected spoke eloquently of 
individuals' responsibilities to other individual selves and collective selves, and of the importance of 
community for survival and success. It was this evident m utuality between individual selves and 
collective selves, which emerged from the 'narratives of embodiment and being-in-the-world', that 
first struck me about the new individualism  emerging in Japan. As a result, this became one of the 
major themes of the thesis: to dem onstrate that w ith the new individualism  which is developing in 
Japan in the post-Bubble era, so a new  conception of community is also developing, and that the 
two, as far as they are heuristically separable, constitute and define each other. The new 
individualism  em erging in Japan cannot be conceived of or discussed as separate from new 
conceptions of community. The two are inseparable and can only be understood and discussed in 
terms of each other. This required both theoiy and method to recognise and preserve tins mutual 
constitution of individual and community. Cohen and Rapport underline this im portant point:
To pay attention to the consciousness of the individual and to the narratives in which it is expressed is not to
privilege the individual over society; but, rather, is a necessary condition for the sensitive understanding of
social relations and of society as composed of, and constituted by, subjective individuals in interaction.
(Cohen and Rapport 1995:11)
Bringing together a num ber of ind iv idua l selves, in interaction, in o rder to discuss the 
anthropological questions the anthropologist has in mind is, in my view, potentially a much more 
productive m ethod of arriving at an understanding of community and individuality in a given 
setting than  one-to-one interview ing. Simply because it is how  ind iv idual and  com m unity, 
individual self and collective self, exist in-the-world. In this sense, objectivity is bypassed, as the 
collecting of ethnographic data remains part of the intersubjective being-in-the world.
From a results perspective as well, this method has its strengths. Through discussion among 
a small num ber of persons, half realised, often previously unarticulated and partially comprehended 
m eanings are brought into the open. Triggering off each other, the anthropologist included, 
everybody present arrives at an understanding. Having used this m ethod to collect ethnographic 
data, I believe to be both productive and reliable. One-on-one interviewing can be more productive 
in some cases, and I also used this method. But on the basis of w hat I have been saying, the 
anthropologist and one interlocutor stand less chance of at arriving at a representative level of 
understanding. A rem ark which might have appeared as an irrelevant throwaway comment to the 
anthropologist or the interview ee (bearing in m ind that the interview ee is just as likely to be 
unaware of the significance of a remark or particular choice of word), but which might later prove to 
be of critical importance, stands much more chance of being lost in a one-on-one situation. If others 
are present, they might pick up on that comment, consequently the meaning is immediately more
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apparen t, together w ith  its relevance and im portance, if it has m uch. The poten tial for 
m isunderstanding and error is also m uch higher on a one-on-one basis. In the group setting, a 
process of cross-checking occurs spontaneously. Everybody is involved in articulating the 
understanding that is emerging through both verbal and non-verbal means, one person taking up 
another person's point, or presenting a different point of view. This is intersubjectivity in action. 
Slowly, communally, the anthropologist included, consciousness/understanding emerges. Kapferer 
describes this process as follows:
Human consciousness is not something that simply begins with the individual human organism and then, 
in its awakening, moves out towards others. Consciousness takes form in the foundational fact of a unity of 
individual conscious human beings in a world already shared by others. To put it another way, individual 
consciousness emerges in a field of consciousness. It arises in a world of other conscious human beings who 
participate in the process of consciousness of any particular human being...In this view, the life of persons 
as conscious bodies is inextricably and intricately bound up with tire consciousness of others. {Kapferer 1995:
134)
Consciousness, as understanding in H eidegger's sense, constituted intersubjectively, is clearly 
evident in Kapferer's description. Yet, even though this communal collecting of data might emulate 
situations in which understanding emerges in the course of everyday life, the process also occurs on 
a one-on-one basis.
The kind of cross-checking of data which can occur in a communal setting might be lost, but 
there can also be advantages of one-on-one interviewing. Japan is a good example of a place where a 
communal method of interviewing m ight prove to be spectacularly less effective than a one-on-one 
approach. The 'ranking consciousness' w hich Nakane (1970) describes tends to coerce all those 
present to agree w ith the most senior person present, as a matter of good manners despite anything 
else, which w ould provide the anthropologist w ith a disastrously partial view, and one which 
would most likely reinforce and hide the hegemonic order within the setting and within society as a 
whole. Among those I was interviewing using this method, I judged this w ould not be the case, and 
that communal interviewing on a difficult subject would, with these particular individuals, achieve 
results.
Com munal interview ing provides a setting for the individuality of individual selves to 
emerge, or not. Persons familiar w ith Japan, presented with a group of Japanese w ould be able to 
see very easily whether Nakane's 'ranking consciousness was in operation, or whether those present 
were interacting as equals in expressing their 'individuality (kosei)'. Interviewing the employees at 
GA, one-on-one, I was unable to see how much individuality they were expressing, as individual 
selves need others to be individual with. Oblique cross-referenced questioning would help, but in 
the case of the employees at GA, it was prim arily by witnessing them working together that I was 
able to see their individuality 'in action'. In the case of the party-goers, this was very evident in the 
interview, as all those present were clearly being very open, treating, and speaking to, everybody in 
a similar manner. This was also confirmed by observation at parties, where there was an openness 
unlike any other mass public event I went to in Japan.
I was able to interview  those who attend underground dance m usic parties using a 
communal method, and as I felt that this would be productive I chose to do so. I kept the numbers 
low, otherwise the m aterial w hich resulted from the sessions would have been too unwieldy to 
transcribe from tape to paper, and then to translate. With many voices present people talk over each
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other, and the circle is too big for the microphone to pick up all the voices consistently. I decided 
that five was the maximum after having conducted one interview w ith five people, resulting in an 
hour of tape. Interviewing in groups can also be more fun for the interviewees, which resulted in 
relaxed and enjoyable, and therefore productive sessions on more occasions than not.
I used a tape recorder to capture my narratives. I was aware that some people m ight not 
wish to be recorded, but I was able to assure people of the confidentiality of the interviews, and 
nobody show ed the slightest hesitation, or stared at it during the course of an interview , or 
discussion as I preferred to think of them. There was also no alternative to a tape recorder. Using a 
'strategy of capture’ (Cohen and Rapport 1995) which relies on narratives requires a careful and 
intricate dissection and assessment of language, which can only be achieved if the anthropologist 
has captured the nuances of intonation and choice of word. Intersubjectivity is captured within the 
diachronic sequence of verbal and  non-verbal exchanges, carefully preserved and carefully 
considered afterwards.
This finally leads me to the analysis of research data. Thousands of miles away in Oxford, I 
spent, first, weeks listening to the tapes, usually with my wife, whose spoken Japanese is better than 
mine, while I would write dow n the transcription, handw ritten in Japanese. Simply translating the 
narratives from Japanese to English w ithout w riting them  in  Japanese w ould  have denied me the 
necessary opportunity  to go over and over the w ords and sentences, annotated w ith rem arks 
documenting sentiment, intonation or pauses. Having produced a w ritten Japanese text, I then set 
about a translation into English, before beginning the analysis of both.
The process of understanding, just as Gadamer describes, and just as Heidegger warns, is 
full of booby traps, temptations, and seductions. Meanings leap out of the text constantly, from the 
beginning of the first listening of the tapes, to the last reading of the completed analysis. I was often 
straining, groaning, trying to make connections, trying to elicit meaning, while all the time, trying 
not to impose meaning. The social scientific endeavour is a lonely, and often seemingly thankless 
task. Yet, it is also very rewarding. In my own case, it is like a crusade to represent as truthfully as 
possible, whatever that means, and to describe and explain as clearly and as eloquently as possible, 
the people w hose lives, and selves?, I became a part of in the nam e of the anthropological 
endeavour.
'kisit'kirtt'k
Chapter One outlines the collapse of the Bubble by attem pting to dem onstrate how this helped 
create the conditions for the redefinition and legitimation of more individualistic selves, and of a 
com m unity w hich prioritizes the expression of 'ind ividuality  (kosei)'. This redefin ition  and 
legitimation has been occurring either in the workplace, or as a consequence of changing workplace 
ethics and practices. For this reason, Chapter Two moves to the workplace to consider the earliest 
conceptualizations of these redefinitions by Japanese in the first few years following the collapse of 
the Bubble in 1991. These changes were most widely described as the 'collapse' or 'unraveling' of the 
'lifetime employment system (shuushin koyd seidd)', or as the shift from a 'company-centred' society to
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a 'people-centred' society (O kum ura 1992; M orita 1992; Kaneko 1997). The chapter begins by 
attem pting to establish a consensus on w hat 'the lifetime employment system ' is. Anthropological 
representations (Nakane 1970; Rohlen 1974; Clark 1979; H am ada 1980; Levine 1983; Plath 1983; 
Kondo 1990; H am ada 1992) have tended to focus on length of tenure, which has obscured the 
matrices of ethics and practices of which the ideal of lifetime employment' is only one of many other 
equally important workplace ethics and practices, first discussed by Bellah (1957). By going back to 
Abegglen (1958), who m ade it quite clear that 'lifetime commitment was a, not the, characteristic of 
Japanese w orking practices, I attem pt to dem onstrate that anthropological representations of 'the 
lifetime employment system ’ are based on a num ber of distortions which have subsequently been 
reproduced. The chapter considers just w hat is collapsing or unraveling and why, before ending 
w ith a consideration of what is meant by a 'company-centred' society and a ’people-centred' society, 
and how this shift was evident prior to the Bubble.
Chapter Three begins to look in detail at the changes in attitudes to work, and changes in 
w ork ethics and practices w hich constitute w hat can usefully be regarded as a shift from a 
'company-centred' to a 'people-centred' society. The chapter begins by docum enting the history of 
Graphic Automation, the software company I worked at, from the perspective of the experiences of 
Matsuda-san, the president of the company, during his time as a software engineer w ith Toshiba. I 
focus the attention on his reasons for leaving Toshiba, and how these influenced his philosophy for 
his own company and the structure of the company. I then look in detail at the structure of Graphic 
Autom ation (GA), identifying both the continuities and changes between companies of the kind 
described by N akane (1970), Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), Kondo (1990) and H am ada (1992) to 
explain how individuality (kosei) is harnessed to achieve the economic goals outlined in the debates 
concerning company restructuring discussed above. The chapter continues by looking at how the 
reordering  of space and time, and  of m otivations and rew ards w ith in  the com pany, both 
acknowledges a shift towards a 'people-centred1 society occurring within society as a whole through 
a ’bottom -up’ process, and legitimates these reorderings through a ’top-dow n1 process, through the 
company organisational structure and com m and structure. The chapter finishes by dem onstrating 
that, consistent w ith the shift from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society, Graphic 
Automation is a 'company as a collectivity of individual selves' rather than a 'company as family' 
(Kondo 1990).
Chapter Four begins by addressing the need to 'rehabilitate the individual'. A methodology 
of the kind discussed above to interrogate the relationship between individual and community, 
requires recognition of the existence of individual selves. This was not straightforward in the case of 
Japan, where there has recently been a trend of denying any category of the individual self as 
existing in Japan, arguing that categories of individual selves are im ported W estern categories 
(Kondo 1990, 1992; Rosenberger 1992). This is against a background of the country as a whole 
through the post-WWII period, where Individualism  was increasingly situated as ideologically 
opposed to that which constituted Japaneseness. Both these positions m ade a retrieval and 
rehabilitation of the individual self as a social actor an early priority in the thesis. The fact that such 
a self existed was almost beyond doubt to my mind, for it was inconceivable to me that such a self
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could not exist in some form or other and to some degree or other in any hum an society. Hum an 
beings are physically separate from each other, and at this fundamental level this has to inform our 
social selves in some basic way. By presenting a num ber of Japanese theories of the individual self 
(Doi 1973; Moeran 1989; Kuwayama 1992; Lebra 1992; Ikegami 1995), together w ith my own data, I 
was able to rehabilitate the individual self as a subject of anthropological analysis in Japan. I also 
challenged those theories of the Japanese self which deny the existence of a Japanese individual self, 
by raising the empirical and logical inconsistencies in these argum ents, before arguing that the 
individualism  that is emerging in Japan is not so much an individualism  im ported from 'the West', 
but is an identifiably Japanese individualism  that has continuity with Japan's most recent past, as 
well as the d istan t past. In this way, the thesis contributes both to our understand ing  of 
individualism in Japan, and also to our understanding of individualism as a whole, by providing an 
exam ple of an  in d iv id u a lism  w hich  has d ev e lo p ed  d is tin c tly  from  the 'W estern ' 
Hellenistic/ Christian tradition ( Mauss 1985; Dumont 1985).
The chapter continues by seeking to identify the continuities and changes in the relationship 
between individual selves and the groups they belong to within GA, and between those described 
by Nakane (1970, Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), Kondo (1990), Hamada (1992) within the workplace, 
and by Befu (1980a, 1980b, 1990) and Hendry (1993) more generally. It is at this point that 1 also 
introduce seken and sekentei in order to attem pt to plot these changes and continuities. The chapter 
ends by considering the ramifications of the example of GA on how Japanese society has been 
described by anthropologists in terms of g/’ri, and the series of 'bi-polar opposites' (Bachnik 1992) of 
tatemae (public behaviour) and bonne (real feeling), omote ('front' or 'form al') and um ('back' or 
'informal'), and tichi (inside) and soto (outside), which H endry (1993) describes as the 'particular 
combination of elements' which characterize Japanese society.
Chapter Five steps back to place GA within the broader context of the 'top-down' process, 
and to explain the developm ent of the conditions under which a flexible economy is emerging, and 
under which w ork ethics w ithin society as a whole are changing. This is also in order to lay the 
foundations for the discussion of the 'bottom -up' process among the party-goers in the following 
chapter. Chapter Five begins with an analysis of the debate concerning risutora, the neologism (from 
the word ’restructuring') for company re-engineering and reform. By situating this discussion at this 
point in the thesis, it is possible to see how the debates just after the Bubble in 1992/ 3 (Morita 1992; 
Okum ura 1992; Tsukio 1992; Arai 1993; Yamamoto 1993) discussed in Chapter Two are part of the 
later debates concerning risutora (Kogura 1995; Miyauchi 1995; Ubukata 1995), which indicate how 
the debate had advanced tow ards a practical solution while still addressing m any of the earlier 
concerns. The example of GA also serves to show how and in what way these solutions are actually 
being implemented, and what effect they are having on constructions of the self.
Following Harvey's (1990) work on ’flexible accumulation’, together w ith the work of Itoh 
(1993, 1994, 1996) and others, and ethnographic examples, I demonstrate how a flexible economy is
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developing in Japan, and how this together w ith the ’top-dow n’ process is fuelling and also 
legitimating the ’bottom-up’ process. I then finish the chapter with a consideration of changing work 
ethics, dem onstrating how a 'bottom-up' process of 'individuation' (Dore 1992) has arguably been in 
m otion since the early 1970s (Sengoku 1991), evidently gathering m om entum  during  the 1980s 
(Miyanaga 1991; Tsukio 1992; Ijiri 1993), and is now manifest and gaining increasing momentum as 
the 1990s progress.
Chapter Six begins by considering M iyanaga’s (1991) thesis on a ’passive individualism ’, 
which she saw  em erging during  the 1980s. While I do not agree w ith  M iyanaga that this 
ind iv idualism  is ’passive’, I agree w ith  her idea of a ’p rivatiza tion  of groups', w hereby 
individualistic individuals 'come together voluntarily on the basis of personal commitment'. The 
formation of 'private groups' w ith the emergence of an individualism indicates a clear reconfiguring 
of the relationship between individual and community, and that the two do m utually constitute 
each other. What Miyanaga describes is a separation of informal relationships from the workplace, 
which conforms with the processes I describe as part of the shift from a 'company-centred' society to 
a people-centred' society. Using this idea, I suggest that underground dance music parties in Japan 
act as a setting for the negotiation, establishment, and legitimation of an emerging individualism. 
'Private groups' such as underground dance music parties, provide a setting for the establishment of 
guidelines for thought and action, establishing and legitimating selves who have no other formal 
means of doing so, also providing an index and reference for m anaging and negotiating other 
situations, including the workplace.
Following a description of how underground electronic dance music works to facilitate the 
establishing and m aintenance of both a new individualism  and a new community, in a m anner 
found in other types of perform ance (Chernoff 1979; Schechner and Appel 1990), 1 situate the 
interviewees' life courses w ithin the course of the Bubble and w ithin the ensuing aftermath of the 
Bubble collapse. I then end the chapter by asking what is it about these parties that makes people 
w ant to attend. This is because community formed voluntarily on the basis of personal commitment 
has to feel good, in order for there to be community. Having established w hat feels good at these 
parties, I then ask why it feels good. Having established what feels good and bad, and why, I then 
move on to the structure of selves and the relationships between them  in a community voluntarily 
entered, in the following chapter.
In Chapter Seven, I return to consider w hat constitutes the individual self at these parties, 
together with its relationship to a generalised collective self, in a similar m anner to that undertaken 
among the employees of the software company in Chapter Three. Fundam ental similarities emerge 
between the employees of the software company and the party-goers, indicating that a similar kind 
of individualism  and com m unity is em erging th rough both the 'top-dow n' and 'bottom -up' 
processes. H aving considered the relationship betw een this individual self and  a generalised 
collective self, I seek to discover how the party-goers describe an underground dance music party 
and other forms of community they are part of. Familiar terms such as shuudan (group) and nakama 
(intimate group) are regarded as unsuitable, w hich not only sheds light on the new  forms of 
community, but also sheds new light on the meanings these terms have for Japanese today. I then
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return to consider how the party-goers perceive seken and sekentei and w hether they sense seken and 
feel they have to present sekentei at these parties and in other aspects of their lives. Findings which 
match those among the employees of the software company again emerge, so that finally I am able 
to build up a picture of a redefined individual self, dem onstrating and describing its continuities 
and the changes with the past, in terms of the past, a self that is both individualistic and identifiably 
Japanese: the embodiment of an emerging Japanese individualism.
'k & i t 'k 'k 'k ic
Through my discussions with the employees of the software company and with the party-goers, it 
became apparent that the term ’group', in Japanese shuudan, cannot be unproblemmatically used as a 
generic term for a collectivity of individual selves. Shuudan, although used generically by Japanese 
in the course of everyday speech, and etymologically is a generic term, it was shown to contain 
secondary meanings which refer to a particular structure of relationships between individual selves, 
to identifiable codes of conduct, and to particular ways of thinking and acting. I have therefore 
attem pted to only use the w ord 'group', in inverted commas, when translating the word shuudan, 
when used by Japanese in interview or in discussion. Otherwise I use the term  'collective self' as a 
generic term. This term, first of all, cannot be confused with any Japanese word for a collective self, 
thus reducing the possibility of any hidden secondary m eanings being m issed by its usage. Of 
course, it m ight have collected a few by the end of the thesis! Secondly, this term  conveys two 
im portant characteristics that collective selves have: that they are m ade up  of collections of 
individual selves, and that, as socially constructed entities, collectivities of individual selves are also 
selves in their own right.
*******
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1. After The Bubble
1) E xcesses o f  th e  Bubble
2) Shock and Ruin
3) Corruption or B usiness as Usual? Seken , oyake , and the  
Public Domain
Chapter One attem pts to demonstrate how the collapse of the Bubble helped create the conditions 
for the redefinition and legitim ation of more individualistic selves, both individual and 
collective, during the 1990s. The collapse of the Bubble revealed inherent weaknesses in the public 
domain in Japan, by exposing the factional nature of oyake. O y a ke  has been regarded as 'th e  
public' since the early Meiji Period (1868-1912), when the word, which referred to the Im perial 
family, was used to translate the English te rm ’public’. However, the differences are apposite, so 
that when the excesses of the Bubble, together with the subsequent shock and ruin, threw  th e  
custodians of oyake, the government, into conflict w ith the general public, the limitations and th e  
dangers of having o y  a (c eas the public domain, were exposed.
I begin the chapter by trying to give an impression of the scale of the excesses of th e  
Bubble, using statistics, anecdotal accounts, and media analyses (Takeuchi 1991; Arai 1993; 
Greenfeld 1995). W hat emerges is that much of the excess was corporate rather than ind iv idual, 
and that the seeds of dissatisfaction and disillusionment could be seen to exist while the Bubble 
was still growing, before the crash. Certainly, as the Bubble was growing, the mood in the country 
was buoyant, verging on arrogant, as many Japanese perceived events to be the crowning glory of 
Japan's efforts to catch up w ith and overtake 'the W est’. There was a sense that events were 
demonstrating to the whole world that the Japanese were indeed different, and better, just as th e  
national discourses on ware ware niJionjiti/ we Japanese', had suggested. N evertheless, during th e  
Bubble, the Japanese were diverted from producing things, as one commentator described it, to 
speculating on the financial markets, w hich created an unease and an air of unreality in th e  
country that a lot of people also picked upon.
I then show that the Japanese Bubble was very similar to other economic speculative 
bubbles that have occurred through history, in terms of its development, characteristics and 
eventual crash (Kindleburger 1989; Uekusa 1991). However, while speculative bubble crashes are 
known to expose malpractice, in the Japanese case codes of conduct and practices which had been in 
place for many years, which had developed over the whole of the post-WW II period, and w hich  
can even be traced back much further than that, were suddenly being regarded as malpractice and 
corruption (oshoJai). This is because they were regarded by the majority of the population to be
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against the public interest. Yet, even though they were rightly regarded to be against the public 
interest, they were in the interests of o y a k e  The chapter traces the development of th e  
relationship between government, the bureaucracy, and industry over the post-WWII period, to 
show how these practices developed (Clark 1979; Shim ada 1992; Okumura 1991; S ak ak ib ara  
1992), and that reforms to increase transparency and accountability were consistently deferred 'in 
the national interest' (Tanaka 1991).
*******
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1.1) Excesses of the Bubble
The term ’bubble economy' came into vogue in Japan at the end of the 1980's when the prices of Japanese 
land and stocks were being pushed ever higher amid a surge of speculative investments. With a sharp 
increase in the supply of money in the background, the Japanese had been diverted from their normal 
business of producing tilings, by a sudden enthusiasm for money games on the securities and real estate 
markets. The whole economy, it seemed, was being inflated into a gigantic financial bubble (Takenchi 1991:
8 ).
The GNP for Japan grew by 25% between 1985 and 1989, while the value of assets grew 80% 
(OECD). The real estate value of Tokyo was reportedly greater than the real estate value of th e  
whole of the United States, together w ith the value of all the assets of all the companies listed  
on the New York Stock Exchange. As the price of land rocketed, investors, large and small, took 
out cheap loans on the backs of their spiraling land values.
Designer boutiques flourished, Nouvelle Cuisine restaurants opened daily, jewellry and gold vendors 
couldn't keep up with the demand. There was money everywhere and it had to be spent. Between 1985 
and 1990 about $700 thousand million flowed abroad. To buy Louis Vuitton steamer trunks and Rolex 
Perpetual Oyster watches in Paris or Geneva - or flagship buildings and movie studios in N ew  York or Los 
Angeles.
You saw money on the streets of Tokyo, glimpsed it in the rows of chauffeur-driven black Lexuses, Benzes,
BMW's and Bentleys idling outside posh Ginza or Roppongi watering holes. Felt it in the crush of 
consumers jockeying for position at the Tiffany counter in the Mitsubishi department store. Heard about it 
from bar hostesses who described their customers taking them out for thousand dollar, seven course 
dinners. I remember watching a video tape of an NFL play-off game a friend sent me from the United 
States. At one point there was a slick commercial in which a silver, gull-wing Mercedes sports car from the 
Fifties rotated on a pedestal while an auctioneer took bids, photographers snapped pictures and potential 
buyers oohed and aahed at the fine piece of machinery on display. The gist of the commercial was that 
Mercedes Benz made very exquisite, very expensive cars which eventually, if you kept them for forty 
years, became objets d'art that were highly sought after by collectors. In the parking lot across the street 
from my cramped Tokyo apartment, there were three of those gull-winged collector's items parked. In 
December 1989, the TokyoStock Exchange's Nikkei Index peaked at 38,915.87. In less than two and a half 
years it would be down 60 percent, with trading volume off close to 80 percent. Real estate plummeted as 
much as 50 percent...And by 1993 the market had not yet hit bottom. Scandals also frightened investors 
away. Nomura Securities, Japan's largest brokerage, was caught compensating preferred clients against 
stock losses and other chicanery. In addition, the highly publicized Japanese purchases in America, such as 
Mitsubishi Estate's acquisition of the Rockefeller Center, in which it overpaid by as much as $400 million, 
were certified disasters. "The tiring about the Rockefeller Center situation is that it's one case out of dozens.
There are too many to mention," a Mitsubishi Estate executive told me.
The bubble had b u r s t (Greenfddl995: x)
Greenfeld is a h alf-Japanese who edited Tokyo Journal, an English language magazine based on 
London’s Time Out magazine. His is an anecdotal account, but my experiences three years la te r  
corroborate the authenticity and lack of hyperbole in his account. Many Japanese w ith whom I 
discussed this period in time had trouble believing that things were as they remember. D isbelief 
pervaded every discussion 1 had about life at the height of the Bubble. W hen discussing company 
expense accounts most people had trouble getting past t heir own disbelief in order to describe just 
how much money there was and how people tried, and - many added - failed, to spend it all. And 
eveiybody had a story about profligacy and excess. Waste was a word that figured h eav ily : 
everybody described how wasteful people were and how self-centred (wagamama) they became.1
When studied a little more closely, however, it emerges that most of the excessive 
behaviour and profligacy was corporate rather than individual. There is no doubt that a lot of
‘All my accounts were collected in the Greater Tokyo area, but many of the accounts were from people who were from all 
corners of Japan, who confirmed that the babunt (the Bubble) affected the whole of Japan, if not every household.
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individuals had  a great deal of money, and that the majority of Japanese were comfortable. In th e  
ten year period from 1979 to 1989, the monthly income of the average working family rose from 
¥350,000 to ¥525,000, an increase of over 60%. However, during the same period, a three-bedroom 
family house an hour outside Tokyo which sold for $100,000 in 1979, sold for $1.5 million in 1989, 
and in a 1987 survey by the Prime M inister’s Office, only 36.8% of Japan's citizens considered 
themselves to be affluent (Japan Times W eekly Overseas Edition 27/1(90). Many Japanese feel 
that the fruits of that successwere not filtering downto the population as a whole:
I become very angry at Americans and West Europeans when they say Japanese are very affluent. We are 
leading a frugal life" said 33-year-old Masaki Mikura, an employee at a large electric company...Mikura 
complained about the high inheritance tax,2 costly daily goods and soaring land prices...I wouldn’t say I live 
from hand to mouth, but 1 cannot goto the movies and I cannot afford a CD player. I am leading a frugal 
life (JTIE April 16-22 1990).
This raises an im portant point about life during the Bubble. The Bubble was created by, and 
predominately enjoyed by, corporate bodies and their senior staff, yet while everybody was s till  
enjoying the fruits of the Bubble, nobody seemed to be fully aware of the effects that company 
buyingpower and preferential tax deductions were having on the cost of living for individuals and 
families. This is w ith the exception of land prices, which were very much in the news, 
particularly towards the height of the Bubble in 1989/90. The manner in which the price of land 
rocketed had, and continues to have in  1998, an impact on people's daily  lives. In the year up to 
January 1991 the cost of residential land rose 17%, which continued a pattern of yearly rises w hich 
had started in 1986. The cost of used3 apartments, which were rising faster because they tended to 
be closer to central Tokyo, rose by 20% during the same period. (Japan Times Weekly International 
Edition April 16-22 1990). A ra i4(1992) gives examples of a numberof commodities which are out of 
the reach of 'individuals'. The 'm iddle ranked white-collar worker' may have paid ¥10,000 or 
¥20,000 per head at the most to take a family member out for a birthday dinner, while a company 
treating business clients would pay ¥50,000 to ¥100,000 per head. W hen buying a suit, a w h ite  
collar worker, Arai notes:
will at most be willing to pay ¥100,000. More likely he will settle for an off-the-rack suit at a department 
store, waiting until a bargain sale brings the price down to ¥30,000. In Ginza however there are stores that 
cater mainly or only to companies...and the suits they have on hand cost ¥300,000 or more.” (Arai 1992:57)
Golf club memberships are another example that Arai uses. Golf is a very popular sport in Japan, 
but most people hardly ever set foot on a golf course, instead having to content themselves w ith  
the local driving ranges, which are conspicuous for their towering, netted sides that characterize 
the suburbs of all the cities and towns of Japan. A man on retirement m ight be able to spend ¥2  0 
million on a golf membership if he leaves him self and his wife little else:
This is a very large sum indeed, but it is not enough to get into the best clubs in the Tokyo region. Their 
memberships go for ¥40 million, ¥50 million or more, and increasingly it is companies that are joining their 
membership roles. I could easily give other examples, but suffice to say that companies have stupendous 
buying power. On a per-item basis, they are prepared to pay three to five times what the individual will.
This difference in purchasing power is having a distorting effect on Japanese society. The best cooks, tailors,
inheritance tax in Japan is linked to the cost of land. Nationally, land prices between 1989 and 1990 alone rose by 12.6 %. 
{Japan Times Weekly Internatkmal Edition. April 16-22.1990.) Between 1979 and 1989, land prices increased by an average of 
over 500% throughout Japan while salaries over the same period increased on average by 60%. (OECD Economic Survey of 
Japan)
3A  'used' apartment is one which is not brand new.
4Arai Shin'ya is Vice-President of a large national supermarket chain, and an advisor to Sumitomo Corporation, one of the 
largest corporations in Japan, He is also an author and columnist.
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rriaioiials, and locations are now being monopolized by companies. You need an invitation from a company 
to play on the best golf courses, get a good seat at a siimo match, or join the most luxurious overseas 
excursions. Indeed it seems almost as if all beautiful young women save their smiles for corporate 
customers. Individuals are being driven by corporations into a corner of consumer society. At the centre of 
society the company reigns supreme. ( Arai 1992:58)
Arai is aware that a disparity  of means and position in Japanese society is not new. He takes th e  
culture of rydtei, exclusive Japanese-style restaurants, "go[ing] back at least to the Meiji era"(A ra i 
1992: 59) as one example, and he asks himself the question: "Has the difference in financial 
strength between the company and the individual always been so large?". Using examples, A rai 
shows how the situation during the bubbleyears was 'unprecedented'.
This buying power, its effects on the cost of living, and the eventual revelations of 
malpractice and self-interest before, during, and after the Bubble, in corporations, th e  
bureaucracy, and government, fuelled resentment which needs to be borne in mind when considering 
people's reactions to events after the Bubble, and their attitudes and actions during the continuing 
recession. From various angles, the picture of the company as something protective and as a source 
of life and fulfilment began to change into a picture of the company as an exploitative organism 
that feeds off the goodwill and strength of individuals, only to discard them when it becomes 
expedient to do so. Many people now have this attitude towards their employers, which is 
manifesting itself as a shunning of 'corporate centrism' (Okumura 1992, Miyanaga 1991) and a 
desire for a distinct separation of the workplace from the rest of an employee's life (see sections 
2.4, 3.3, 5.4).
The source of this disparity  in buying power between corporations and ind iv iduals, 
according to Arai (1992), is the corporation's right to wide-ranging tax incentives and deductions, 
and the preferential assessment of asset values which corporations receive. According to A rai, 
these privileges are not only unjust, but promote certain values and breed individuals whose sole 
aim is to exploit this system:
The phenomena I have been discussing are not in and of themselves evil. In a free society, people should 
not be criticized for exercising their ingenuity and for looking after their own interests. As long as they do 
not break the law or behave unethically, they should be encouraged to live as they please. This is where the 
energy of a free society comes from. The problem comes when the actions of individuals transform society 
in a way that makes a large number of people unhappy. And as should be evident to all intelligent 
Japanese, the present trends are far from harmless...Tlrus while breaking out of the ongoing recession is a 
serious concern, it is a small problem compared with (Arai.l992:62) [the fact that] the structure that 
created the bubble economy is still intact, and it has grown stronger during the recession. The root problem 
is that companies are rich while people are poor. The buying power of the corporate sector has swollen to 
the point where it is encroaching on the domain of the individual. For people as consumers, citizens and 
individuals, this is the real problem that needs to be solved {Arai 1992:57).
Arai's argument for redressing the balance of power and of rights between the company and th e  
individual describes a mood which is keenly felt among the Japanese public. A situation w here 
companies, as judicial persons, have been increasingly privileged over individuals has been 
developing since the endofW W II. Clark (1979) also notes the privileged position of the company 
as a legal body in Japan. By describing these privileges, Arai explains a root cause of people's 
dissatisfaction when it erupted after the Bubble crashed. Itoh also draws our attention to w h a t 
must have caused smouldering resentment over time, when he notes that, in real terms, between 
1975 and 1990, real incomes in Japan dropped year-on-year (Itoh 1994).
Yet, the Japanese people were in a celebratory mood in the late 1980s. The economy, in
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terms of GDF exceeded that of the U.S., marking the point which many Japanese could never h av e  
imagined ever happening: a time when Japan caught up w ith and overtook 'the West'. O rdinary 
Japanese looked around themselves and wondered where all the w ealth  could be, and saw th e  
excess and profligacy of the Bubble. Just as it looked a though they would receive the rew ards 
they had been told would oneday come,BANG....
I now want to demonstrate that the manner in which the bubble started and grew in Japan 
is consistent w ith other economicspeculative bubbles in history. My reason for doing this is to try 
and distinguish between w hat can reasonably be attributed to financial bubbles, as they h av e  
regularly occurred, and that which cannot. Crashes expose malpractice (Kindleburger 1989),5 
which is w hat happened in the Japanese case, but w hat was different in the Japanese case is th a t  
the structure of relationships and the particular ethics of obligation, w inch were and still are 
widespread throughout society, were responsible for w hat came to be regarded as corruption and 
unfairness. Through the rest of this section and through 1.2, and 1.3, I will attem pt to dem onstrate 
that Japan was quite literally  caught between two stools: one the world of oyake, seken, and giri6, 
and the other, the world of Public and Private, individual rights, and contract law. E ssentially , 
the government, the bureaucracy, and the industrial elites were operating in a tw ilight world of 
obligations, factions, and favouritism , while the general public were excluded from th is . 
However, they were brought into this world through the huge public issue of shares, particu la rly  
in NTT, the national telecommunications giant, when it was privatized. Two quite different sets of 
rules existed, and when the Bubble crashed the fact that there were two sets of rules was brutally  
exposed. When the general public attem pted to seek redress underthe law, commonlaw was found 
to be unable to protect the interests of individuals in the public domain; yet people found 
themselves confronted w ith a set of rules w ith which they were only too familiar. The general 
public's unwillingness to accept, as they had tended to, the inherent favouritism and bias in 
Japanese society, which derives from the ethics of seken and 'group affiliation (shuudan ni 
shozoku sum)' (Nakane 1970; A ida 1972; Inoue 1977; Abe 1994; 1995), indicates a change in 
attitudes and values at the heart of m ainstream  society, w hich was crystallized by the Bubble 
collapse, butw hich manifested itself as confusionand misunderstanding.
Although speculative bubbles appear to be the more exciting part of economic h istory , 
w ith many voices in the afterm ath of speculative bubbles openly saying 'the greedy bastards got 
their come uppance',7 the lives of many are ruined and the consequences for generations are often 
considerable. This is the first speculative bubble that has occurred in Japan's history and it h as 
had a considerable psychological effect on ordinary people, in addition to the economic h a rd sh ip  
it has caused. It was, before the bubbleburst, commonly stated in Japan that w hat exists in Japan 
as Japanese capitalism  or'co rporate ' capitalism , was not susceptible to, or was more resilient to, 
the economic cycles experienced elsewhere in the world, because of its Japaneseness. W hile this is 
undoubtedly true to some extent, and will be discussed in 1.2, the evidence nowshows that Japanese 
capitalism  is not only susceptible to the same cycles and 'manias' as capitalist systems in o ther
5Charles Kindleburger is an often-published academic economic historian.
“Please refer to the Introduction or glossary for an outline of these terms.
'Arai Shin'ya (1992) builds an argument for the benefits of bubble crashes on this attitude.
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situations, but that it is also affected by events on a global scale. This m anifest 
demonstration of interdependency and sim ilarity has had a considerable effect on how th e  
Japanese see themselves and the rest of the world.
Speculative economic bubbles are nothing new, and people 'losing their heads' during 
times of bubble conditions is also not uncommonaccording to Kindleburger (1989). The first chap ter 
of his book is even titled: ’Financial Crises: A H ardy Perennial'.8 Under bubble conditions people 
become susceptible to and suffer from 'displaced thinking', o r'speculation m ania' (Kindleburger 
1989):
They had an immense capital dividend among an immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be 
expected, therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion should prevail in the whole management of their 
affairs. The knavery and extravagance of their stockjobbing operations are sufficiently known, [as are] the 
negligence, profusion and malversion of the servants of the company {Kindleburger 1989:311).
This could have been one of many leader articles in any Japanese new spaper over the last six
years, but it is Adam Smith speaking in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f
N ations  (1776). Clearly, over the centuries, speculative bubbles bring out fam iliar human 
characteristics. Kindleburger gives the following dispassionate description of a bubble cycle:
What happens, basically, is that some event changes the economic outlook. New opportunities for profits
are seized, and outdone, in ways so closely resembling irrationality as to constitute a mania. Once the
excessive character of the upswing is realised, the financial system experiences a sort of 'distress', in the 
course of which the run to reverse the expansion process may become so precipitous as to resemble panic.
In the manic phase, people of wealth or credit switch out of money or borrow to buy real or illiquid assets.
In the panic, the reverse movement takes place, from real or financial assets to money, or repayment of 
debt, with a crash in the prices of commodities, houses, buildings, land, stocks, bonds - in short, in whatever 
has been the subject of the mama. {Kindleburger1989:5).
Kindleburger also tells usthat bubblesare distinguished by individuals or institutions displaying 
the following characteristics:
1) Mob psychology;2) people will change at differing stages of a continuing process, starting rationally and, 
gradually at first, then more quickly, losing contact with reality; 3) rationality will differ among different 
groups of traders, investors, or speculators, including those at the earlier stages and those at the later; 4) all 
will succumb to the fallacy of composition, which asserts that from time to time the whole is other than the 
sum of its parts; 5) there will be a failure of a market with rational expectations as to the quality of a reaction 
to a given stimulus to estimate the right quantity, especially when there are lags between stimulus and 
reaction; 6) irrationality may exist insofar as economic actors choose the wrong model, fail to take account of 
a particular and crucial bit of information, or go so far as to suppress information that does not conform to 
the model implicitly adopted {Kindleburgerl989:32).
For the economist, the economic bubble presents a special problem: how to rationalize their paten t 
irrationality . Kindleburger presents a number of models by economists designed to ra tiona lize  
economic bubbles, but nearly all of them have to recourse to some kind of mob psychology or 
hysteria at some point.9 Herm an Minsky's 'euphoria model' (Kindleburger.1989: 33) characterised 
by ’waves of excessive optimism ' caused by "displacem ent,10 certain structural characteristics of 
the system, and hum an error" (Kindleburger 1989: 33), describes the Japanese case well. An event 
causes confidences to rise and optimism sets in, and financial institutions accept liability for things
8Kindleburger begins with the South Sea Bubble in London in 1719 and the Mississippi Bubble in Paris in 1720. He discusses 
the various 'bubble cycles' (Kitchin cycle: every 39 months. Juglar cycle: seven or eight years. Kuznet's cycle: every twenty 
years: KondratiefFs cycle, set off by major inventions such as the railway and the car. And from observation, he documents 
crises every ten years throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.
"For the anthropologist, the debate on bubbles among economists is interesting. The debate is reminiscent of the rationalist/ 
substantivist debate in 'economic anthropology’ in the Sixties and Seventies, and the Rationality debates. Kindleburger is 
good on arguing the case for anecdote ('historical episodes’) in economics in Appendix A, and briefly in the preface (xii).
10"Displacement is some outside event that changes horizons, expectations, profit opportunities, behaviour...The event must 
be of significant size. Each day’s events produce some changes in outlook, but few are significant enough to qualify as 
displacements." (Kindleburger.l989:46)
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when normally they would not. In this model, a speculative bubble is fed by an increase in th e  
money supply, particularly in the form of credit from banks, which Minsky describes as 
'notoriously unstable'.
Following Minsky's model and beginning with 'displacement', an event which causes 
confidences to rise and optimism to set in, the event that keeps coming up in analyses and 
discussions as the point at which the bubble started is the Plaza Agreement in 1985. Uekusa 
(1991)11 begins his analysis of the bubble in 1980, w ith the election of Ronald Reagan as President 
of The United S tates:
The economic policies which came to be dubbed 'Reaganomics'..-led to a mushrooming federal budget 
deficit, a sharp worsening of the current account balance, a rise in real interest rates, and a strong dollar. By 
the mid-1980s, the vicious cycle of a rising dollar and a growing external deficit had turned into the biggest 
political and economic problem facing the United States. As a result of slumping exports and booming 
imports, the United States turned into a net debtor at the end of 1984 for the first time since shortly after 
World War I....The expedient that the U.S. then chose was to seek devaluation of the dollar.
This was the background to the Plaza Agreement of September 1985, in which the five leading industrial 
democracies agreed to encourage 'orderly appreciation of the non-dollar currencies against the dollar'. This 
accord marked a clear change from the erstwhile U.S. policy of not intervening in currency markets....And in 
the years that followed, the yen-dollar rate shifted dramatically. The dollar stood at ¥260 in February 1985, but 
by January 1988 it was worth only ¥120; this represented a 53% devaluation (Uekusa 7991:23. My italics).
As the yen began to rise, interest rates were lowered, which in turn led to higher asset prices. The 
conditions for a bubble were set, all that was required now was hum an error:
Tn the two years from late 1987 to late 1989, though interest rates remained basically unchanged, both stock 
and land prices surged. These prices went far beyond anything that could be explained on a theoretical 
basis. In other words a speculative bubble was forming. No bubble can grow without the willingness of 
people to accept the 'myth of rising prices' - the belief that assets whose prices have been rising will 
continue to go up in value. But while this sort of delusion is a necessary condition for the formation of a 
bubble, it is not a sufficient condition. There must alsobe an excess of credit in the financial system and this 
condition was met in the late 1980s...And indeed, the statistics on lending by financial institutions in the 
latter part of the 1980's indicate that the bulk of the marginal demand for funds during this period was for 
the purchase of assets. Excess growth in credit was clearly what made the bubble possible (Uekusa 1991: 24).
So far the Japanese bubble would seem to follow all previous bubbles to their unavoidable 
conclusion: crisis, panic, and crash. However, the Japanese bubble departs from other bubbles in a 
number of ways, which are covered in Minsky's 'euphoria' model by his 'certain structural 
characteristics of the system'. It is also these 'certain structural characteristics' which are at th e  
centre of the allegations of malpractice. Relationships and practices w hich have not only been in 
place for many years, but which are also based on relationships and orientations in society as a 
whole, were being classified as corrupt and unfair in the afterm ath of the Bubble.
*******
11 Uekusa Kazuhide is currently a professor at Kyoto University. He is a former member of the Nomura Institute and the 
Ministry of Finance
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1.2) Shndc and ruin
In this section I will briefly outline of the development of the corporate sector of the Japanese 
economy. This is not a review of the internal structure of Japanese companies and management 
methods,, buta review of inter-corporate relations in order to begin to explain how the structure of 
corporate society contributed to the securities scandals. In 1.3, I will look at the responses to th e  
Bubble collapse and at the root causes of how practices regarded as acceptable for so long in society 
as a whole, gradually became unacceptable to the majority of the Japanese people.
The significance of the scandals in Japan (they are referred to as sukyandnru) is the fact 
that the causes were, in no small part, a product of corporate structure and codes of conduct to be 
found throughout society. The depth of concern, both domestically and internationally, is 
compounded by the level of government and bureaucratic intervention in the economy, which not 
only created an unfair playing field, but which implicates members of government and th e  
bureaucracy, including a recent Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, senior ministers, and senior 
bureaucrats:
Whilc...this system is not subject to total government control, neither is it guided entirely by autonomous 
industry initiatives. This approach certainly represents a departure from pure market economics, and in 
some respects is closer to the system of central planning in communist countries (Shimada 1992:19).
I will begin w ith the government's role in shaping and directing economic initiatives since th e  
beginning of the post-WWII period. This will be followed by an overview of corporate structure 
and the relationship between capital and industry. The percentage of capital raised from personal 
savings is high in Japan, a fact w hich is important in understanding the public's reaction to th e  
securities scandals. With this in mind, the section ends with the argument that the public were 
m anipulated by government and industry together, and that, in the afterm ath of the Bubble and in 
the ensuing recession, they feel this acutely.
There is an extensive literature on the reforms implemented by the so-called New D ealers 
of the US Occupation Forces after Japan's defeat in WWII (Sakamoto and W ard 1987; Hall et a l. 
1989; Beasley 1990), but I wish to concentrate on the policies and initiatives of the Japanese 
government in directing and shaping the economy over the following forty years, from 1949 until 
1989. Even though the reforms introduced by the occupying U.S. forces included dism antling th e  
zaibatsu, the pre-war family-owned conglomerates, the structure of industry in the post-w ar 
period closely followed the pre-war zaibatsu  model:
The concentration of modem industry in the hands of a small number of entrepreneurs was...initiated by 
the Meiji Government. Businessmen like Yasuda, Iwasaki of Mitsubishi, and Minomura of Mitsui had been 
offered subsidies, and even the materials to start up new enterprises, and then were left to compound 
their successes, free from taxation. Many of the early entrepreneurs founded a number of companies in 
different industries, and it was these companies, linked by common origins and common ownership, 
supplied with money by the same bank, and trading preferentially with each other, that comprised the 
core of the zaibatsu. Groups like Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo or Mitsui, having started advantageously, 
continued to benefit from government influence in, for example, the allocation of import licences for 
technology. They also gained immeasurably from their privileged access to capital. Each zaibatsu had a 
bank, which acted as a money pump. Deposits from the public were channelled towards the other member 
companies of the group, by loans or by the underwriting of share and debenture issues. The ability to raise
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rani Li! easily allowed the zaibatsu to take the lead in the development of heavy, capital intensive industries 
like engineering and chemicals between the two World Wars (Clark 1979:42).
In the immediate post-WW II period, the Japanese government intervened to nurture particu lar
industries by co-ordinating financial institutions and manufacturing industry in such a way as to
develop a closely supervised rebuilding of the economy and the countty. This included th e
EconomicStabilization Board to coordinate industrial development, and the Reconstruction Bank
to channel funds into particular industries. Successive governments made it possible for particu lar
industries to have access to investment capital at very low interest rates:
By forcing small and medium sized corporate borrowers to deposit money in banks as a precondition for 
taking out loans, financial institutions around the country built up a supply of capital. This practice 
resulted in very high effective interest rates, but the [financial] institutions compensated by providing 
information and expertise that contributed to their borrowers long term growth. Meanwhile, the 
accumulated capital was channelled via city banks into lending to strategically important industries backed 
by Bank of Japan credit guarantees {Shimada 1392:17).
In 1948 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was established, and began to 
encourageatid sponsorthe formation of conglomerates based on the old zaibatsu, built around banks 
(Beasley 1990; 245). W hat began to emerge is a system whereby preferential treatm ent was given 
to strategically im portant industries, but in return for carrying the burden for the cheap loans 
given to these im portant customers, the smaller, less strategically im portant customers would 
receive 'information' from the financial institutions, which was collected by the institutions 
themselves, and by govermnentand those companies earm arked as strategically important. Also, 
much like during the early Meiji Period (1868-1912), the acquisition of technological information 
and foreign currency was m ade a priority. In order to amass both of these, large tax concessions 
were offered for export income and fact-finding tours abroad were organised using w hat scarce 
foreign currency there w as.12 W ithin the country, a culture of inform ation-sharing began to 
develop w ithin networks of industries that were organised around financial institutions, and 
which were nurtured and protected by central government. The government's actions during th is  
period are referred to as 'adm inistrative guidance (gyosei skidd)', a term which has come to h av e  
pejorative overtones in the afterm ath of the Bubble. In 1960 deregulation occurred, and th e  
loosening of regulations and the liberalization of capital transactions m arked a point when 
government took a lesser role in co-ordinating economic development. Government was s t i ll  
involved, however:
[T]here was no consistent targeting or grand design of industrial policy by the government. More likely, the 
government selected key industries as investment and loan recipients because of their vigorous, long-term 
demand for funds and their relative credit-worthi ness, responding more or less passively to market 
demands rather than creating them. This process was of course not solely dictated by economic 
principles...it also inevitably involved political considerations as well {Sakakibara 1993:28).
Following deregulation, the member companies of the various networks arranged around financial 
institutions began to strengthen their networks by acquiring stocks in each other, in order to fend 
off take-over initiatives by foreign investors who were now able to enter the market. This is 
knownas 'cross-shareholding'.
This process led to the formation of keiretsu, or the corporate groups, including the six that took shape 
among the pre-war zaibatsu. The bank that formed the core of each group served as the main bank for the
12Bailey (1990) notes that U.S. purchases of equipment for the Korean War alone amounted to $600 million in 1951, $800 
million in 1952, and $800 million in 1953, which was a substantial injection of foreign currency.
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group’s members {Shimada 1992: IS).
Almost all listed Japanese companies have placed more than half their stock in the hands of friendly 
shareholders who cannot easily be persuaded to join a takeover bid. These shareholders are the firms and 
financial institutions the company does business with, and they are often members of the same corporate 
group (Okiimura 1991:19).
It is the development of this structural arrangement between companies, characterised by
'reciprocal equity holdings’ (Sakakibara 1993) which is, in my opinion, a cause of the securities
scandals and a key to understanding how a system of favoured clients developed. Practices
engendered by this structural arrangement, together w ith the relationship between capital and
industry, discussed below, explains the public's disenchantment with the economic community:
In many cases, reciprocal equity holdings are extremely widespread, stockholders at the top of the list being 
firms within the same corporate grouping and financial institutions. As this takes place on a reciprocal basis, 
the policies chosen by a firm often reflect the interests of the group as a xvhole and even go against those of the 
ordinary stockholder (of the company concerned). This kind of inter-group finance and diversification or 
internalization of the capital market through interlocking stockholding isolates group companies from 
competition in the capital market. As a result of this isolation...group companies are able to select their own 
policies free from market competition...[N]o corporate takeovers will occur even if the corporate 
management concerned does not maximize the companies market value but puisnes the interests of the company's 
direct participants. This is because the major stockholders are insiders protecting the interests of the cunent 
management. Even if, for example, current stock prices are markedly low and capital cannot be raised from 
the market for a necessary investment project, the city banks and other financial institutions within the 
group will meet the fund demand of the company concerned (Sakakibara 1993; 16. My italics).13
Sakakibara clearly states that this re la tionsh ip  between companies leads to the interests of th e  
groupas a whole being greater than individual companies, or individual stockholders. We should 
also include individual investors, because it was the sacrificing of individual investors in order to 
compensate favoured clients, which were invariably keiretsu  members, which caused much of th e  
outcry among the general public. Consequently, we can see that this was common practice w hich  
was then regarded as malpractice by the general public in the afterm ath of t he Bubble.
W ith the rise of cross-shareholding, the level of individual investors has slowly been 
dropping, from a figure of about 60% in 1955, a level comparable to the US, to a current level of 
between 20%-30% (Shimada 1992). Correspondingly, as the quotation above reveals, th e  
importance of the individual shareholder has also declined. In addition to this, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, which was established after WWII by the New Dealers was 
subsequently absorbed into the M inistry of Finance. These structural arrangements reduced th e  
power of the individual as shareholder and allowed for planning and execution of economic policy 
effectively away from the public view.
The next point to consider is the relationship between capital and industry in Japan. The most 
striking aspect of capital investment in Japan in the post-war period, up to and including th e  
present, "is the existence of a financial system overwhelmingly dominated by indirect finance" 
(Sakakibara 1993; 17), that is, prim arily  from savings schemes and co-operatives. In addition to 
this high level of personal financial assets supporting the economy, these assets are not in th e
1 ^Quoted from The Economic Role ui Financial Corporate Grouping' by Iwao Nakatani in M.Aoki (ed) The Economic Anahfsis 
of the Japanese Firm (North Holland.1984)
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bnrs.^s of only a few major banks, but are spread out across regional banks, agricultural co­
operatives, fishing co-operatives, postal savings, sdgo banks (mutual co-operative banks), credit 
unions and worker's credit unions. In 1988, 40% of the overall aggregate of total and financial 
debentures14 was from these small and medium-sized financial institutions, in other words, was 
the savings of small individual investors:
Competitive relations in the fund-raising arena, among the postal savings scheme, the agricultural co­
operatives, and private financial institutions in particular - made it impossible for the major financial 
institutions to exercise oligopolistic control. The result was fierce competition within the government’s 
regulated framework. This competition, coupled with the sheer size of the postal savings system and the 
agricultural co-ops, is probably one of the reasons behind the high savings rate in Japan (Sakakibara 1993:
2 0 ).
I disagree w ith Sakakibara that the structure of the 'fund-raising arena' was responsible for th e  
high savings rate in Japan. In the early 1950s, the Japanese people were encouraged to save in 
order to finance the rebuilding of Japan. It was the policy of successive governments to encourage 
people to save 'in the national interest', for this reason.15
This fierce competition which characterises the fundraising side of the finance industry is 
in stark opposition to the com partmentalized division of the industry on the investment side, 
characterised by the cross-shareholding corporate structure outlined above, in which oligopolistic 
control was guarded by the 'Big Four' securities houses; Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yam aichi. 
But the logic of the system is contained w ithin its raison d'etre, the Japanese government fostered 
a culture of savers among the population as part of their overall economic strategy. Domestic 
consumer spending before the late eighties was significantly lower than other industrialised 
economies, and overall still remains so. Also, even during the Bubble, the level of consumer credit 
w as 'triv ia l' (Sakakibara 1993), and still is, although, more recently this is most likely due to th e  
prolonged recession. The national strategy, until very recently, has been to restrict domestic 
spending, foster saving, and target export markets, although Itoh (1992) argues that the level of 
exports as a percentage of GDP was sim ilar to other industrial economies over most of the post- 
VVWII period. Nevertheless, as a means of gathering and distributing capital to fund the growth 
and viability of the economy, and to secure the position of Japan in the world, the system worked 
very well until 'speculation mania' gripped the business community, and, against a backdrop of 
worsening global economic conditions, which began to adversely affect the economy, more and more 
Japanese began to feel that they were being exploited.
The statistics and comments concerning personal wealth mentioned in 1.1 indicate th a t  
most people do not feel well-off, and are disenchanted with their standard of living. When these 
facts are taken into consideration, together w ith the various points outlined above, the causes of 
the outrage felt by the Japanese people, the extent of the betrayal of trust by the leaders of th e  
Japanese economic community, and the im plication of government ministers and departm ents of 
acting self-interestedly, begins to becom eapparent.
l4Debenhire. A bond of a company or corporation acknowledging a debt and providing for payment of interest at fixed 
intervals. OED.
15Bellnh (1985) tells us that 'encouraging production and discouraging consumption' characterised Neo-Confucian-derived 
economic policy during the Tokugawa period (1600-1868). A past in which diligence and parsimony were ethically weighted 
positively, would have undoubtedly made it much easier for the governments of the post-WWII period to implement their 
policy of encouraging saving ’in the national interest'.
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When the Bubble burst, the relationship between the securities industry, the banking and 
manufacturing industries., government and the bureaucracy, was exposed to public and 
international scrutiny. The structures that coalesced after WWII and which went on to achieve 
spectacular results in a continually expanding global economy, were unable to continue to ach ieve 
the same performance in a mature economy after an economic speculative crash. Since November 
1989, when the first indication of questionable practice in the securities industry came to light, th e  
role of the 'iron triangle', that is, government, the bureaucracy, and industry, in creating the legal 
framework and the moral climate in which the Japanese economy has existed for the past fifty  
years, has been exposed.
The extent of the shock and ruin as experienced by people as citizens, small investors, and 
as employees, comes down to essentially two facts, which are as follows. First, favoured clients of 
the financial and securities industry have been compensated for losses in the financial m arkets. 
Not just recently in the wake of the Bubble bursting, but for many years. Secondly, one of the main 
sources of credit that built the Japanese economy came from small investors. This basic, i f  
simplistic equation of favoured clients, exclusively corporations, being compensated from th e  
purses of small savers, who have in turn suffered at the hands of industry and the government in 
the afterm ath of the Bubble, has outraged the Japanese public. But even in the face of th is  
outrage, the government, the bureaucracy, and even industry, is v irtually  powerless to act to rep a ir 
the damage because of standing obligations binding the top of society. The Japanese elite may be 
more than aware of the th reat to their legitimacy caused by their response, even more so w ith a 
long recession fanning the flames of dissatisfaction, but they are both powerless as much as th ey  
are unwilling to act. Their legitimacy looks increasingly fragile, but the obligations which exist 
w ithin the networks at the top, make it very difficult for them to act, even if they wanted to (1.3). 
Stall and hope the storm, both economic and ethical, blows over, has been the policy of 
government and the bureaucracy in the period 1991 to 1998. The collapse of Yamaichi Securities in 
the Autumnof 1997 may prove to be a pivotal moment, for it is clear to all that if one of Japan's 
blue chip companies has spent the last six years trying to delay the inevitable, the storm m ight 
still only be brewing. This sentiment is confirmed by a numberof Japanese analysts, interviewed by 
BBC News at the time of the Yamaichi collapse, who predicted a wave of major corporate 
bankruptcies during 1998.
I will describe in detail w hat the arrangements between the securities companies and 
their corporate clients were in the next section. It will suffice to repeat here that a different set of 
arrangements existed for ordinary investors. Those employees of the securities companies who 
made the deals were not simply suffering from what Uekusa (1991) called 'the myth of rising 
prices', which I mentioned in 1.1, but were conductingbusiness as usual:
Industry executives appear not to have noticed the clamour when ordinary investors began to vent their 
indignation at the favoritism shown to big clients. After selling shares of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
[NTT] to millionsof individuals, they were deaf to the complaints when the price of shares plummeted. By 
rights they should all have resigned when the bottom fell out of the stock market, taking responsibility for 
the enormous losses suffered by investors, but none even considered this possibility (Okumura 1991: IS).
The government are heavily im plicated in the NTT example, as well: "It is no secret that th e  
[Finance] Ministry intervened to jack up the price at which the NTT shares were sold to the
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public" (Okumura 1991: 21). Far from protecting the public, the authorities treated the public 
terribly. Millions of Japanese put their life-savings into investments which they were 
categorically told were safe. Consistent w ith this, consumer protection is virtually  non-existent in 
Japan, and there is no recourse through the law for these investors. They were totally at the mercy 
of salespersons who had no legal obligation, or felt any moral obligation, it seems, to inform 
potential investors that shares can fall as well as rise, and that their investment is not protected 
if share prices fall. On the contrary, w ith the tacit support of the government of the day, ordinary 
people were urged to buy into the 'myth of rising prices', at unfavourable levels engineered by th e  
Ministry of Finance. Okumura describes how shares were sold in Japan prior to the Bubble 
collapse:
[T]hi_> object is to cultivate as many submissive customers as possible. Neither the buyer or seller needs any 
specialised knowledge. The sales personnel simply tell the prospective customers that because such and 
such a stock is being recommended by their firm, it is bound to rise in value. And in fact this is exactly what 
generally did happen, since the massive orders resulting from the campaign were sufficient to drive the 
stock's price higher. Sometimes, of course, the price would fall instead, but in that event the securities 
house would send a new sales force into the field to regain the confidence of its customers (Okumura 1991:
19).
In contrast to the manner in which they treated ordinary investors, the securities companies went 
to considerable ends to compensate their favoured clients (Okumural992). Under Article 50 of th e  
Securities and Exchange Law, it is illegal to promise clients in advance that losses will be covered 
in the event that they occur. However, these laws were essentially for the benefit of foreign 
financial operations and their clients, in order to m aintain confidence in the Japanese market. In 
actual fact, these regulations were ignored by Japanese financial institutions, w ith the full 
knowledge of the Ministry of Finance.
1,3) Corruption or businessas usual? Seken, O yake, and the Public Domain
This section argues that it was not the structure, practices, or codes of conduct w ithin industry or 
between industry and government which changed and caused the public to regard codes of conduct 
and practices to be corrupt. Instead, the Bubble crash exposed inherent weaknesses in the public 
domain, causing significant changes in attitudes and values which had been developing among th e  
population as a whole (Sengoku 1991; Ijiri 1991), to become polarized and to be revealed.
The securities scams were not, in many cases, strictly illegal, setting them apart from the instances of 
embezzlement and forged certificates of deposit that have been uncovered in the banking industry. 
Providing reimbursement for losses, it transpires, evolved into an accepted practice in the context of the 
cozy relationships among brokerages, big businesses and the government's supervisory organs. Now that 
this practice has been brought to light, however, the need for reform is apparent to everybody 
(Takeuchi.1991:8).
The public perceived particular codes of conductand practices to be corrupt, certainly, but we have  
to ask why, when these codes of conductand practices had not only been in place for many years, 
but also mirrored codes of conduct and practice widespread throughout Japanese society. The 
allegations of corruption were then validated  by the view from abroad that these practices and 
codes of conduct were indeed corrupt. The reason for this view from abroad being w hat it was is 
essentially two-fold: (1) By trading standards in the U.S., Europe, and other countries who h av e  
followed stock exchange trading guidelines in those countries, the Japanese financial industry 
acted unethically; and (2) foreign firms were seeking an opportunity to maximize their own 
business by casting their competitors in Japan, and a rival bourse, as corrupt and a bad risk. First of 
all though, I want to demonstrate that these codes of conductand practices did not change during 
the Bubble, that is during the period 1985 to 1991, but instead developed slowly through the post 
WWII period, and can be traced back to the early years of the Meiji period (1868-1912) and 
beyond.
Until public anger forced the Ministry of Finance to issue 'adm inistrative guidance' 
(Tanaka 1991), w ith a directive that banned loss-covering payments, all these practices 
developed w ithin an economy whose industrial culture successive Liberal Democratic Party  
(jiminto) governments fostered, and w ithin legislation that these governments enacted, from tim e 
to time, over the post-w ar years. Article 50 of the Securities and Exchange Law prohibits brokers 
from promising clients in advance that they will cover losses that may occur. Yet the practice was 
so w idespread it was the norm. W hat brokers did was not to promise compensation in the event 
that losses occurred, but instead they promised profits on investments, and in the cases w here 
those profits were not achieved, compensation was made. In the post-w ar period, during w hich  
the economy was constantly expanding, losses were minimal and 'compensation', in a variety of 
forms, was made by employing various ways of circumventing the law (Okumura 1991). This was 
w ith the open agreement of the authorities "who see their job as protecting and nurturing
50
industry" (Tanaka 1991: 13). Tanaka refers to these schemes of guaranteed profit as 'zflf-tech ', 
financial technology':
Working hand in hand, banks and securities houses persuaded corporate managers to borrow money from 
banks for investments in stocks and bonds, assuring their customers that the yields for the securities would 
more than cover the interest on the loans. Intrigued by this alchemy, companies rushed to take advantage 
of it. Generally, they put the borrowed funds into so-called cigyd tokkin (discretionary accounts) that the 
brokerages manage on their behalf (Tanaka 1991:11).
For Okumura (1991), the internal structure of the securities companies, as well as the structural 
relationship between companies w ithin the same keiretsu  , also explains why favoured clients 
were compensated. In Japan, securities companies are both underwriters and brokers, which creates 
conflicts of interests, but which is offset by valuable information collected by both divisions being 
available to the other. However, the 'discretionary accounts (eigyo tokkin)' were accounts th a t  
were brokered by the underwriting division as a sort of side business, and when, after the crash, 
promises made could not be kept, the whole of the underwriting business was threatened by these 
discretionary accounts:
Delivering on these promises presented no problem as long as the stock market was on a roiL.but it proved 
to be impossible during the market tailspin in 1990. Far from generating the promised yields, the 
discretionary accounts shrank. The corporate [underwriting] departments were desperate to make up for 
their losses.The customers were not just big investors, they were the same corporations the departments 
depended on for their underwriting business...To stay on the good side of their clients, the corporate 
departments were thus ready to accept some red ink in their operation of the discretionary accounts in 
order to cover the clients' losses.It is this scheme that has become the compensation scandal's central issue 
(Okumurn.1991:18).
In the response to public anger, deals that contained 'yield guarantees (:rimawari ho s lid )’ were 
banned underan 'adm inistrative directive'. However, the industry ignored this 'directive', alm ost 
certainly w ith the knowledge of the Ministry of Finance (Tanaka 1991). This has subsequently 
been substantiated by accusations by senior, unnamed, former employees of Yamaichi Securities, 
accusing Matsuno Nobuhiko, then director general of the Finance M inistry's securities bureau 
(Hashimoto Ryutaro, the recent Prime Minister, was Minister of Finance at the time) of 
'instructing' Yamaichi how to keep losses off the books through to b a sh i transactions16 (Bloomberg 
16/4/1998). The banning of yield guarantees was to restore confidence in the system among th e  
Japanese public and among foreign investors, but the directive was quietly waived in order to 
protect the industry and the economy itself. Previously these guarantees were regarded as legal, 
although they were always on the edge of the law. Consequently, deals that contained y ie ld  
guarantees were not put in writing but closed w ith a handshake. These deals were called 
'handshake deals (nigiri tokkin )’. According to Okumura, terms such as rimawari hoshoand nigiri 
tokkin  or nigiri, are part of the Kabuto-chol/ jargon and have been for years, and that "there was 
no way the M inistry's officials could have been ignorant of such a long-established and w idely  
acknowledged practice" (Okumura 1991: 20). It is quite clear that a culture of promising to 
compensate favoured clients was one of a number of wealth generating schemes that developed 
w ithin horizontal keiretsu  (Ham ada 1992) during the post-WWII period. That is, between
loTobashi transactions refer to the practice of keeping losses off the books by moving losses between companies with different 
reporting periods, in order to avoid disclosing losses in end-of-year financial accounts. The Ministry of Finance was long 
suspected of being involved in this kind of murky 'eaz-tech' activity.
I7Kabuto-cho is the area of Tokyo where the stock exchange is located.
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companies linked horizontally, through banks and financial institutions (1.2).
By looking at w hat legislation was introduced over the post-WW II period, together w ith  
when it was introduced, Tanaka (1991) believes that successive Japanese governments never acted 
unless Japanese long-term interests were threatened: the rationale behind all legislation being to 
protect the politico-industrial alliance over and above the general public. Tanaka argues that, i f  
the interests of government and industry was not threatened, no action would be taken, and when 
action has been necessary, tighter governmental control has been introduced. Consequently, 
govermnenthas not only been im plicated in the 'corruption', but is seen to have masterminded it. 
The spate of arrests of Ministry of Finance officials in late 1997 and early 1998 would seem to 
corroborate this. However, the question still remains: was it corruption? If we define corruption as 
a deviation from the norm, then I think we can say that it was not corruption, but 'business as 
usual'. So much so, that Okumura notes that even when the secret accounts used for compensating 
favoured clients were first discovered a full two years before the crash, in 1989, while Tokyo tax  
evasion officers were investigating a D aiwa executive, the press and the public d idn 't take much 
interest in it:
Even at the time of the Daiwa scandal, people were saying that the other securities houses were doing 
much the same thing. But the press chose not to pursue the story....they may have assumed that 
compensating clients was a time-honoured practice that goes on relatively openly (Okumura 1991:17).
Even though these practices and codes of conduct can reasonably be interpreted as 'business as 
usual', the line between acceptable practice and 'corruption' in relations between public servants 
and business, and between businesses, has increasingly been contested in recent years in Japan. 
T orih ik i (literally ’taking and pulling’, but translated a s ’transactions’ o r 'd ea lin g s ')15 is just one 
example. The person who explained to r ih ik i to me, described it as 'under the table dealings'. He 
simultaneously dem onstrated this by moving his hands back and forth under the table. He said  
this was the way politics and business works in Japan, and most people understand that and accept 
it, "although they are not happy about it". Then there is the concept of iiem aw ashiQ iteraU y  
m eaning'to dig around the root) which refers to the practice of laying the groundwork for a dea l, 
or closing a deal, behind closed doors. Another example of'acceptable practice' increasingly being 
viewed as corruption, is sanban which Kent (1992) describes as the three things a Japanese 
politician requires to be effective: 'financial resources (kaban)’, ’influence and reputation 
{kanban)’, and 'organised support (jibim)’. Kent also notes the changes to the traditional base of a 
politician's power, w hich she considers to be a cause of the confusion that gave rise to practices 
once viewed as 'expressions of gratitude (orei)' being increasingly perceived as 'bribery (w airo )', 
and defined as 'corruption (ashoku)’. She describes how people she questioned indicated th a t  
influence and money were essential if politicians were to be effective, even though they then went 
onto criticise them. Discussing 'organised support {jiban)’, Kent remarks:
Organised support (jiban) that was once based on communities...is now having to shift its mode of 
organisation to a greater dependence on associations such as koenkai (support groups for individual 
politicians), and support from companies, trade unions and the like,..[T]he need for kaban - resources - and 
kanban - influence - has not decreased at all; if anything it has multiplied many times (Kent.l992:109).
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Kent argues that w ith the move away from community-based support, the power base of a 
politician also shifts. A sa  result, the needs of his sponsors will also be different, and so .in th e  
eyes of communities, their local representatives are judged to be acting, n o tin  their interests but in 
the interests of their new sponsors, which is w hat happens. Reforms intended to make politicians 
more accountable to ordinary people began to be implemented by the Hosokawa Government in 
1994, butafter Hosokawa resigned in 1994 the reforms ground to a h a lt .
The question of politicians 'acting in the public’s interest' is central to understanding w hy 
the public were so angry. The collapse of the Bubble and the ensuing 'scandals' threw government, 
the bureaucracy, and industry, 'the iron triangle1, into direct conflict w ith the public. Before th e  
Bubble, throughout the post-WWII period, exactly the same codes of conduct, strategies, 
manipulations, and practices, had been going on continually, only such actions and ethics h a d  
never comeinto open conflict with the interests of so many members of the general public. In fact 
these ethics and actions could be seen to be clearly in the national interest, which gave them th e ir  
moral authority. This indicates very well that Japan still does not have an established absolute 
moral order (Abe 1994; 1995), essential for the coherence and smooth running of a nation state, but 
that instead, morality is still quite s ituational. It is the conflict between the perception of an 
absolute moral authority, enshrined in the concept of the nation-state and a civil society, and 
evident in a  body of legislation to protect ordinary citizens as individuals, and the reality of th e  
situational affiliated group-orientated moral framework of seken, that was brutally exposed by 
the collapse of the Bubble.
Kent might well be right when she says that changes in the focus of interest may be 
responsible for ’expressions of gratitude (orei)' being i nterpreted as ’bribery (w aird )’. Certainly, i t  
would appear that the public only regarded these codesand practices as corrupt when they did not 
regard them as beingin their interest. However, I think that the clash of values and ideals w hich  
results from having these two moral frameworks, one absolute and one situational, is the root cause 
of the problem. The outcry in the afterm ath of the Bubble indicates a level of confusion and 
misunderstanding that goes beyond sour grapes, which I believe only clashing values and codes of 
conductcan engender and explain.
It is quite evident that the practices w ithin the various financial institutions, together 
with the practices which existed between financial institutions, other commercial enterprises, 
government and bureaucracy, were not unusual. Certainly laws were broadly interpreted, but 
again, this is not unusual in Japan, where 'deals and transactions (to r ih ik i)’, and 'behind th e  
scenes negotiating (ncm aw nshi)' have been the accepted way of doing business. Such a way of 
doing business requires the law to be broad and open to interpretation. In other words, to be 
deliberately hazy. However, in the case of Japan, this has been necessary, not in order to sanction 
or accomodate malpractice or unethical behaviour, but in order to accommodate the nation's 
situational morality. The idea of 'common law', that is, a law which binds all citizens, fits 
uneasily with the structure of Japanese society, and particularly w ith the moral and e th ica l 
framework of the country.
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State structures as enshrined in the idea of a 'civil society', im ported from Europe and 
America during the Meiji Era (1868-1912), were grafted onto Japanese society where concepts of 
'public' and 'p rivate ', as enshrined in the idea of a civil society (Giddens 1971), did not exist. Doi
(1973) alerts us to the inconsistencies of the idea of 'public' in Japan, as he discusses th e  
problematic alignment of 'inside (nchi)' and 'outside (soto), w ith ’private ' and 'public', together 
w ith the problematic use of th e  word that was used to translate 'public', which was oi/aka  And i t  
is in the confusion over these four domains, ’inside', 'outside', 'private ', and 'public', that th e  
allegations of corruption and of unfairness can be located and understood.
The Western idea of'public', as enshrined in the idea of a civil society, sits uncomfortably 
w ith the Japanese concept of'public', knownas by  aka  Oi/n/cewas the word chosen to translate th e  
English w ord'public ' in the Meiji Era (Doi 1973), but was never very suitable. O yn kew a s  the term 
for the Imperial family, and was chosen because, in a nation where persons were not regarded as 
sovereign individuals equal as members of a public domain, but were instead affiliates of 
'affiliated  groups (shozokn shuudan)', the Imperial family was the only one of these 'collective 
selves' that could conceivably represent all the others. At least since the demise of the Emperor as 
the ruler of a united Japan in the 11th Century A.D., after which the country was dominated by 
warring clans, the prim ary social grouping in the consciousness of the Japanese people has not been 
a national polity, but many clan-like groups. This pluralistic social structure was subjugated to a 
nation-like polity during the Tokugawa Era (1600-1868), by disarming the samurai and through 
strict Neo-Confucian-dominated governance. But loyalty and allegiance was never prim arily to 
the Shogun during this time, even. Allegiance and loyalty were to one's lord, who in turn pledged 
allegiance to the Shogun. After the Restoration of the Meiji Emperor, the Meiji Government, by 
means of the exhaustive propagation of the ideology o ik o k u ta i  ('one nation, one body, under one 
divine Emperor'), ruthlessly enforced a national polity (Gluck 1984; Irokawa 1985; Hall et a 1 
1988), winch reached its nadir in the ultra-nationalism  of the 1930s and 1940s. But again, as in th e  
Tokugawa period, loyalty to the emperor was expressed through diligence at work and in th e  
community, through loyalty to the individual's immediate master. W ith the demise of th e  
emperor in 1945, the Japanese company, not the individual, has emerged as the primary self in th e  
post-WWII period. The pluralist society has again reasserted itself, with the 'affiliated group', 
invariably ’the company', as the prim ary social entity (Nakane 1970; Okumura 1992; Abe 1994, 
1995):
In Japan, the concept o f ’citizen (shimin)' does not exist. This is a little overstated, but generally speaking, 
the idea of ’citizen’ isn’t fixed (teichaktt shiteimasen). Rather than citizens, it is ’affiliation’ which becomes 
important (shimin de am yorimo shozoku ga mondai ni m m  kara desn)...For example, the Japanese always ask 
about affiliation first {shozokii wo mazii kikn wake desii)... When things are not fixed or settled (ochitsukanai 
wake de), Japanese want to know who they are dealing with before anything else. "What company do you 
work for” etc. is without a doubt what they want to hear (Abe 1994: 64 my translation).
So, o i/a  k cmay mean 'public', b u tit is in fact an interest group like any other, which will alw ays 
put the interests of its membersfirst. This is the structure and morality of seken, w hich governs to 
some considerable extent, the motivations and actions of the Japanese people (Inoue 1977; Abe 
1994,1995). In Kodansha’s Nihongo Daijiten  (1989) under the second entry, byakexs  described as 
seken, and as Abe tells us very clearly: "W hat benefits seken gets priority over everything else
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(sono seken nozoku shiteiru mono no rieki wo, mini yorimo yusen shite kangacrn kara desu)" (Abe 
1994: 61). Consequently, because dyake is seken, the potential for the public domain to be 
compromised, in the event that the interests o (5 y  a /crand the public domain conflict, was alw ays 
very real.
It is seken which dictates not only that social space in Japan cannot unquestioningly be 
thought of as 'public' and 'private ', but it is also the structure of seken which has m itigated  
against the establishm ent of a public domain and individual rights. Sekenis  inherently factional, 
which is why d y a k e  is factional, and which in turn, explains why the present LDP-led 
government is unwilling to act 'in the public interest'. Herein lies both the unsuitability of th e  
term dyake to describe ’public', and the reason for the weakness of the public domain in Japan. 
O 1/  a k (• as 'the public', has, since the Meiji Restoration, been represented by the Government, but i t  
has remained a faction consisting of government, bureaucracy, and senior business leaders, 
controlled by the Liberal Democratic Party (jim into) throughout the post WWII period until just 
after the Bubble, the time when the dangers of an underdeveloped public domain, and the dangers 
of having oyn/ccfulfill that role were properly revealed. Prime Minister Hosokawa, who headed  
the subsequent coalition Government, tried to reform the electoral system in order to override 
factionalism by creating a stronger public domain, but factionalism, in the form of those who 
wanted to maintain the status quo, brought him  down. Since his demise, the LDP have managed to 
claw th e ir way back into power, w hich has left the electorate demoralised and the country 
verging on economic crisis. This is in no small part because the LDP-led government is resisting 
necessary change. To all outside observers, and many inside Japan, this policy is perceived to be 
totally against the interests of the nation, and it is. However, this is to misunderstand th e  
structure of oyalce,
M acfarlane (1990) draws our attention to Max Weber placing 'enormous' importance on th e  
dissolution of kinship systems and sim ilar clan-like factions in Europe, as "[this] formed one of th e  
preconditions for the development of public law" (Macfarlane 1990: 112). This is certainly true of 
modern Japan, where public law has not been properly established because of the dominance of 
seken. The creation of a nation state w ith a national polity was not carried out properly by th e  
Meiji Government, as they themselves sought to control dyake. And again, after WWII, the 'h a l f ­
hearted ' efforts of the Occupying Forces to implement a new constitution and new instruments of 
the state were soon reformed 'to suit Japan's special circumstances' (Tanaka 1991). Abe (1994) 
describes the constitution and the electoral system, built on the concept of dyake and seken as a 
'false facade':
The constitution isbasically a false facade (uso wo iu tatemae), and as the constitution issuch a false facade, 
the electoral system is operating under this facade. However, the modern flesh and blood individual does 
not operate under this facade. From the Meiji Era onwards, the Western idea of the self (jiko) has existed in 
Japan, and it has been according to this notion of jiko that the self has developed, particularly among 
scholars. However, as flesh and blood human beings living day to day - mother and child, friends, teachers, 
or in cases when meeting with colleagues from work, none of these relationships can be described in terms 
of the Western individual. Rather, the circumstances for the expression of the traditional Japanese self, 
that is for the expression of a man ora woman under a system of hierarchy, are overwhelming...When we 
talk about this kind of thing, these tightly bound relationships fall within the sphere of seken (Abe 1994: 58; 
my translation).
Over the post WWII period, w hat benefited the custodians of d y a k e  was regarded by the v ast
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majority of the public as in the public interest, simply because the nation as a whole benefited 
from the interests of dyake.  This created the illusion that the interests of o y a k e  were also th e  
interests of the general public, w hich in turn served to substantiate the illusion that d y a k e  was 
the general public. This was always a fragile and potentially disastrous facade, or ’lie', to 
translate Abe (1994: 58) literally. If a situation were ever to arise where dyakeas  a faction had to 
protect itself and its interests, then the ’lie’ of d y a k e  as encompassing the public domain and 
protecting the ’public good’was boundto be revealed. When the Bubble collapsed, this is exactly 
w hat happened. The codes of conductand the practices which developed w ithin and between th e  
corporations, and between corporations, the bureaucracy, and government, were all directed 
towards maximizing the interests of seken: in this case, the interests of dyake.
The sense of unfairness among the general population was compounded by mass ind iv idual 
share ownership, which developed through the late 1980s. All individual shareholders who 
bought shares did so by written contract, which is how the government and the financial industry 
justified their decision not to reimburse ordinary investors. This was in stark contrast to th e  
’handshake deals {rimawari ho slid)’ which characterised so many of the corporate transactions, 
which were not written contract deals but deals bound by seken rules. As I described in 1.2, 
individual investors were not told that they could lose their investments if the price of th e ir  
shares dropped, and were in fact told their shares would rise. When ordinary investor's shares 
crashed and they attem pted to recover some compensation, on the basis that the sales staff of th e  
securities companies had told them they would not lose money, they were told to read th e ir  
contracts and were summarily ignored. This was malpractice on a grand scale and it has caused 
many people hardship, bu tw hat worried people more was the fact that the lim itations of d y a k e  
as the public domain had been exposed, and exposed as a particular seken protecting and 
maximizing its own interests while masquerading as the ’public good'. The acts of the securities 
companies and their staff towards their customers was also a classic example of seken protecting 
its interests over all else. These were deeply unsettling discoveries for a nation which regarded 
written contracts as only necessary in societies where ’individualism  (kojinshugi)’ is predominant. 
However, even though most people were aware that d y a k e wo s  not the same as ’public', nobody 
imagined that the custodians of oyake, that is the government, would put their own interests, 
which included the interests of their confidants and paymasters, over the interests of the general 
public. It is this final point which has not only driven the desire for change among the Japanese 
people, but which explains the strength of their desire. It also explains the confusion, as 
everybody: government, corporations, and the general public, were all invoking both kinds of 
moral guidelines in order to protect their interests.
Responsibility for the confusion lies w ith government, who deliberately acted in order to 
maximize th e ir  own interests, even though this was presented as in the national interest. Due to 
the structure and ethical framework of oyake, the interests of government conflicted with th e  
interests of the public domain. Tanaka (1991) tells us that it is not as if the opportunity to develop 
a public domain did not exist at onetime. It did, but it was carefully avoided in order to preserve 
the status quo:
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The Japanese started off the post-war period driven by a determination to liberate themselves from the 
fetters of a military state, but few people at the time saw a similar need to alter the norms of public 
morality. The attitudes towards the government-led state that had formed in the pre-war and wartime 
period survived the war intact,..In the absence of new thinking on the role of public service, the 
government eventually scrapped or watered down many of the reforms instituted by the U.S. Occupation 
authorities, claiming that they did not suit Japan’s 'special national circumstances’. One example is the 
Securities and Exchange Law. Though it was modelled on American law that has ample provisions for 
protecting investors and compelling companies to disclose information, it has not been enforced in this 
way. The securities and exchange commission that was set up was disbanded before it could go into 
operation. Today, when the costs of land and housing have risen beyond the ordinary individual’s reach in 
major urban areas, when the gap between rich and poor is greatly widening, and when the securities 
market, the core of the capitalist system, is riddled with corruption, the shortcomings to the traditional 
approach to serving the public interest have come home to roost. (Tanaka.1997:15)
*  *  &  *  *  *  A
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Conclusion
Abe, as part of his argument that seken is the prim ary organising principle in Japanese society 
(Abe 1994), asserts that the Western concept of the individual has not taken root in Japan. I do not 
intend to try and prove or disprove this, but w hat I contend, is that a Japanese concept of th e  
individual, one which has been an integral part of Japanese concepts of the self at least since th e  
M edieval period (Ikegami 1995), has been emerging through the Modern Era, and that th e  
collapse of the Bubble, by revealing o y a k e i o  be an interest group of seken-like structure, whose 
interests are always potentially in opposition to the public interest, has provided new impetus 
and legitimacy for the development of a Japanese concept of individual rights and a public 
domain. Japan has been a nation state for over a hundred years, it has the trappings of State, and 
it has national discourses and institutions. It also has common law. This has resulted in a s ta te  
consciousness among the Japanese people. In other words, a sense of a public domain which is 
irreconcilable w ith the concepts of seken and o y a /cchas existed in Japan since the Meiji period. 
During most of the post-WWII period, a morality based on the Western idea of a civil society sa t 
comfortably w ith the moral guidelines enshrined in the concepts of seken, and of a f f i lia te d  group 
(shozokn shun dan). However, the potential for conflict was always there, and has slowly built up 
with the growth of a consciousness of nationhood and individual rights, since the formation of th e  
modern Japanese state by the Meiji adm inistration, and then again by the Occupying Forces 
between 1945 and 1948. The collapse of the Bubble has not only given impetus and legitimacy to 
the establishm ent of an effective public domain, however. It has also given impetus and 
legitimacy to the establishm ent and development of a new individualism . In the following 
chapters, I will begin to describe why and how this new individualism  and new sense of 
community is emerging.
k  k k k k k k
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5 9
2. The Collapse o f 'The Lifetim e Em ploym ent System '?
1) Anthropological R epresentations o f  'Lifetime Em ploym ent'
2) The 'Society o f  Industry' and th e  M echanism  o f Increasing  
Im m obility
3) 'Lifetime Em ployment' After The Bubble
4) From a 'Company-Centred Society' to  a 'People-Centred  
Society'
This chapter begins to look at the changing position of the workplace and of companies in the lives 
of persons in Japan. The workplace has been, and still is, the prim ary 'nodal point of identity' 
(Kondo 1990) in Japan, and consequently both case studies are approached from the position of the 
workplace. So central is the workplace in defining selves, both individual and collective, in Japan, 
that we can speculate that any changes to workplace ethics and practice adopted by Japan's most 
prestigious companies are likely to redefine the model citizen, through a redefinition of the model 
employee.
In the various contributions to the debate on changing workplace ethics and practices in the 
aftermath of the Bubble, the changes have been conceptualised primarily in two ways: one, as the 
'unravelling' or 'collapse' of the 'lifetime employment system'; the other as a shift from a 'company- 
centred' society to a 'people-centred' society. Before engaging with these debates and discussions, 
however, it is necessary to come to some consensus on w hat the 'lifetime em ploym ent system’ is. 
Anthropological representations of 'lifetime employment' and 'the lifetime em ploym ent system' 
have never been clearly enunciated, and have focused far too heavily on length of tenure in both 
defining 'the lifetime employment system', and in judging its ubiquity, so that we have arrived at a 
point where the most recent descriptions have reduced it to w hat Kondo refers to as a 'conceptual 
slippage' (Kondo 1990) and what Hamada refers to as a 'myth' (Hamada 1992).
To talk of the 'lifetime em ploym ent system ' collapsing in Japan in the afterm ath of the 
Bubble is not to talk about changes to a particular working practice confined to a select num ber of 
male employees, as anthropological representations m ight have us believe. Talk of the 'lifetime 
employment system' collapsing, or more accurately, being dism antled, refers to a comprehensive 
redefining of work ethics and practices which will impact on the whole of society. Anthropological 
representations also suggest an 'industrial dualism ', whereby the w ork ethics and practices in 
companies which are perceived to operate a 'lifetime employment’ policy have come to be regarded
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as generically different from those which don't. In this chapter, I will argue that continuity and 
consistency of ethics and practice exists across companies of all sizes, w ith 'large' company work 
ethics and practices defining w ork ethics and practices across society as a whole, and that any 
changes to 'large' company w ork ethics and practices will have im portant ramifications for all 
workplaces, large or small.
Taking a lead from Clark's (1979) 'society of industry', 1 suggest that such a 'society' also 
generates a mechanism which engenders immobility in the upper echelons. In other words, which 
generates a higher incidence of 'lifetime employment' in the upper echelons, regardless of whether a 
company is perceived to operate a 'lifetime em ploym ent’ policy. Utilitarian motives can be seen to 
be working to engender labour immobility, or ’lifetime employment', at the upper end of the scale, 
and labour mobility at the lower end, in both cases m ediated by the same social conventions and 
cultural ideals. Employees in small and m edium  enterprises also stay w ith their employers for long 
periods of time, suggesting that 'lifetime em ploym ent' is not only a characteristic of 'large' 
companies, but is a consequence of social convention and cultural ideals across society as a whole, 
mediated by personal job satisfaction, utilitarian motive, and labour market dynamics.
This is follow ed by a consideration of the various voices w ho argue that 'lifetime 
employment' will continue to be a key feature of Japanese workplaces after the Bubble, although in a 
more restricted way. 'Lifetime employment' looks likely to survive in a more restricted form, with 
less, if any, particular cachet attached to it, and as part of a new matrix of work ethics and practices, 
promoting individual initiative and responsibility.
I end the chapter by looking at 'company centrism’, which is not only a better model than 
’the lifetime employment system’ for conceptualising and understanding Japanese working practices 
since WWII, it is also better suited to conceptualising and understanding the changes in work ethics 
and practices which are occurring in Japan after the Bubble. One of the major ways in which these 
changes are being conceptualised and discussed among the Japanese themselves, is as a shift from a 
’company-centred’ society to a ’people-centred’ society. This refers to both a trend and the desire to 
diminish the role of the workplace in governing people's lives and in defining their sense of self. As 
will become apparent over subsequent chapters, this is already happening, and is in no small part 
being driven by the emergence of a recognisably Japanese individualism.
*******
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2.1) Anthropological Representations of Lifetime Employment
In this section/ I will argue that the term ’lifetime employment' has/ over time, come to obscure a 
whole series of working practices and codes of conduct which are situated in and play an important 
part in legitimating values and attitudes w ithin society as a whole: w hat in Japan are referred to as 
kyotsuu suru bubitn, 'those tilings we think and do which are common to all’. James C. Abegglen first 
commented on the distinctiveness of 'lifetime commitment' in  large Japanese workplaces/ generating 
a lot of debate and criticism w ith his book The Japanese Factory, Aspects o f Its Social Organisation 
(1958). But his critics in the 1960S/ following an obsession w ith com paring Japan and the U.S. 
(Hendry 1996), were more interested in the statistical evidence which suggested that the num ber of 
employees who stayed with the same company in Japan was statistically insignificant compared to 
the U.S. (Taira 1962, M arsh and M annari 1971, Levine 1983). The curren t anthropological 
understanding of 'lifetime em ploym ent’ can be traced back directly to the conclusions draw n from 
these very restricted com parative statistical analyses, which had a very lim ited agenda: to 
emphasize similarities between Japanese and the U.S working practices.
Abegglen was the first person to draw  our attention to what has subsequently been called 
'the lifetime employment system'. He discusses 'lifetime commitment’ (Abegglen 1958: 11) as a rule, 
and clearly describes it as a relationship between employee and firm (Abegglen 1958: 11), which, he 
states, involves much more than the length of time a person is employed by a given company: "The 
area of m utual interchangeability of responsibility and obligation goes considerably beyond the 
regulations and practices governing em ploym ent and dismissal" (Abegglen 1958: 17). Abegglen 
himself chose to concentrate on the limited area of employm ent and dismissal, but only in this 
chapter. He states categorically that other factors exist and are im portant, and goes on to consider 
them in detail. His work on reward and pay structures is rarely quoted by Iris critics, but still stands 
as an excellent piece of m ethodical scholarship. Later on, A begglen does give the practices 
engendered by 'the m utual interchangeability of responsibility and obligation', a name, referring to 
the company em ploym ent practices and ideals he writes about as 'this perm anent employment 
system' (Abegglen 1958: 24), but it has been through the work of those who responded directly to 
Abegglen, such as Taira (1962), Tsuda (1965), Karsh and Cole (1968), and M arsh and Mannari (1971), 
that these practices and ideals became conflated into one system focusing on length of employment 
as the defining and indexical feature of a complex matrix of ideas, ethics and practices. Abegglen 
singled out 'lifetime commitment' as a, not the distinctive feature of working practices in Japan. A 
distortion has occurred, and this has been reproduced in recent years.
Abegglen had the following to say in 1958, pre-em pting many of his critics and making a 
very important point in the last sentence:
The description of job relations given here is held to describe large factories of Japan.
In a few types of industries, notably in construction and shipbuild ing, w orker 
recruitm ent and in traplant relations differ som ewhat from those described in this
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i-eport. Also, in the smaller and specialized shops of the large cities (e.g. in printing), 
movement of a worker from one job to another is common or accepted. ..{Wjhere the 
proportion of female workers is high...the rate of employee exit is high, which does not, 
however, niter the nature o f the commitment o f worker and company through the employment 
period. (Abegglen 7958: 73. My italics).
In this passage, Abegglen clearly states that length of tenure does not dictate the type of relationship
which exists between employees, or between an employee and their company, and that the opposite
is true: the length of the employm ent period has no bearing on ’the nature of commitment' between
employee and company.
W riting in the 1950's, Abbeglen brought a clearly Durkheimian approach to the subject. He 
sees the ethics and practices of the large enterprises he stud ied  as being a p roduct of the 
commitment to perm anent employment: ”[T]he permanent relationship between employee and firm 
imposes obligations and responsibilities on both the factory and the worker" (Abegglen 1958: 11. My 
italics). The reality is more complex, and is more a case of all employees being bound by a range of 
obligations and responsibilities, which engender a commitment to a perm anent relationship on both 
parties over the established employment period, through the ways of thinking (kangaekata) and ways 
of doing (shikntn) of individuals. Through the acts of individual selves, obligations and coercion are 
revealed. This is conveyed by Rohlen (1974) when he tells us:
Only a rare person in [the company] has never considered quitting. Most consider it 
seriously enough to speak to others about it. Few, however, actually quit. The problem 
then is to consider not only why they quit, but also, and more significantly why they do 
not quit (Rohlen 1974:82).
By looking again at what Abegglen wrote, it is possible to see that he did not regard length of tenure 
as the defining characteristic of w orking relationships w ithin com panies w ho do em phasize 
'perm anent com m itm ent'. In fact he took care to rem ind us that the relationship between an 
employee and their company cannot be judged to depend on the length of the employment period, 
and that the relationship betw een an em ployee and their com pany is, in fact, likely to be 
fundamentally the same for the duration of the employment period, regardless of the length of the 
employm ent period, the size of the company, the nature of the profession, or the gender of the 
employees.
Another 'myth' which forms part of anthropological representations of Japanese working 
practices, is a dualism  whereby com panies which operate a lifetime em ploym ent system ' are 
regarded as generically different from companies which don't. That is to say, companies which 
operate a 'lifetime employment system' are regarded as having identifiably different work ethics and 
practices from those which don't operate a 'lifetime employment system'. This dualism can be traced 
back at least as far as Nakane (1970). Nakane (1970) provides us with an early example, if not the 
first example, of a description of 'the lifetime employm ent system ’, and one which has remained 
upperm ost in the anthropological imagination. However, she does not integrate this description into 
her thesis on organisational structure in Japan, which she presents in her book, Japanese Society 
(1970). Nakane’s reasons for writing the book are summarized in the following quote:
This analysis calls for a reconsideration of the stereotyped view that modernization 
and urbanization weakens kinship ties, and creates a new type of social organization
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on entirely d ifferent bases. Certainly industrialization produces a new  type of 
organization, the formal structure of which may be closely akin to that found in 
modern Western societies. However, this does not necessarily accord with changes in 
the informal structure, in which, as in the case of Japan, the traditional structure 
persists in large measure (Natone 1970:8).
Her thesis argues this assertion convincingly. However, her description of 'the lifetime employment 
system', which is from page fifteen to nineteen, reinforces the 'stereotyped view’ of a break with the 
past, which she challenges. She begins her thesis by outlining her basic formulation of bn, 'frame', 
and 'attribute', saying how individuals in Japan reference themselves prim arily by 'frame (ba)', 
rather than by attribute or by reference to an individual 'self, arguing that such a consciousness and 
orientation "fosters the strength of an institution and the institutional un it (such as school or 
company)...[and] is in fact the basis of Japanese social organisation" (Nakane 1970: 3). Here we see 
how the emphasis on affiliation (shozoku) overrides individualism  and reinforces seken morality. 
N akane continues by saying that the prim ary ’frame {bn)' in m any Japanese's lives is kaishn, 
'company', which is borne out by the fact that Japan is regarded as a 'company centred society’ by 
many of its citizens and scholars (Okumura 1985) (2.4). Nakane's assertion is that this relationship an 
individual has with a particular frame ^  prom otes a long-term relationship w here the emotional 
content is encouraged. By arguing that a Japanese has a heightened emotional relationship with a 
given frame, in which the self is implicated in that frame, we can begin to see the coercive and 
consensual dynamic that would exist in such a relationship, and which is born out in practice. The 
self not only relies on the frame, but the frame is also dependent on the self, giving rise to a high 
level of com m itm ent and dependence on either side. This is a very abstract extrapolation from 
Nakane's structuralist explanation, in which selves are presented as identical and remain silent, but 
the basic idea remains a powerful framework for understanding Japanese collective selves (Hamada 
1992) as they are constructed along the lines of 'the group model of Japanese society' (Befu 1980). 
Slowly Nakane builds an argum ent that the ie, "a corporate residential group" (Nakane 1970: 4) has 
been replaced by kaishn and by other frames, which all retain structural, cultural, and linguistic 
references to ie. Rohlen (1974) and Kondo (1990) also argue this. Nakane provides no historical or 
ethnographic data to support this or much of her thesis, as she forewarns in her introduction, but 
she argues convincingly that institutions in Japan have both a tendency to organize themselves, 
through ethics and practice, to strengthen their fraternity and develop their own internal ethics and 
logics, legitimated by the situational morality of seken P-
Nakane then begins to lay the foundation of her argument that ba, 'frames', in Japan have an 
inclusiveness and exclusivity which mitigates against membership based on attribute being able to 
exist between frames. In the section "Emotional participation and one-to-one relationships" (Nakane 
1970: 8), she argues that the integration of people of different attribute is achieved in two 
heuristically separable ways:
Nakane more than once invokes the Japanese saying, ’a man cannot have two masters', conceding that a person may have 
more than one frame, but one of them will be significantly more important than the others. This accords with Abe’s (1995) 
description of seken (1.3).
This internal ethics and logics are seken
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One is to influence the members w ithin the frame in such a way that they have a 
feeling of 'one-ness'; the second method is to create an internal organisation which will 
tie the individuals in the group to each other and then to strengthen this organisation.
In practice, both these modes occur together, are bound together and progress together; 
they become, in fact, one common rule of action, but for convenience sake I shall 
discuss them separately (Nakane 1970: 9).
Nakane argues that this unity is achieved by "fostering a feeling of rivalry against other similar 
groups....facilitated by continual hum an contact" (Nakane 1970: 10). She then gives a brief 
description of how this is achieved in a company setting. Nakane then uses the term 'the lifetime 
em ploym ent system ' for the first time. It relates directly to her previous explanation of how 
company unity is achieved structurally (Nakane 1970: 10), where she argues on the basis of her 
developing thesis, that a closed social group is organised hierarchically in one-to-one vertical 
relationships on the basis of 'frame (ba)'r being imposed on attribute. She describes 'the lifetime 
employment system' as a business enterprise organised as a 'closed social group' (Nakane 1970: 14). 
This description of 'the lifetime employm ent system', does not mention 'lifetime em ploym ent' as a 
characteristic. This is a very im portant point, for the emphasis on length of tenure is the feature 
which has come to dom inate and obscure our understanding of the practices and codes of conduct 
which constitute 'the lifetime employment system', and its importance in defining and legitimating 
relationships throughout society as a whole (Nakane 1970, Rohlen 1974, Befu 1980, Miyanaga 1991, 
Hendry 1993).
Following her initial reference to 'the lifetime employment system', quoted above, Nakane 
refutes critics of Abegglen (1958) who have argued "that this system  develops from Japan's 
economic situation and is closely related to the surplus of labour" (Nakane 1970:15):
The life-time em ploym ent system  [is] characterized by the integral and lasting 
commitment between employee and employer...It has been suggested that this system 
develops from Japan's economic situation and is closely related to the surplus of 
labour. However, as J.C. Abegglen has suggested in his penetrating analysis...the 
immobility of labour is not merely an economic problem. That it is also closely related 
to the nature of Japanese social structure will become evident from my discussion. In 
fact Japanese labour relations in terms of surplus and shortage of labour have least 
affected the lifetime employment system (Nakane 1970:15).
Nakane stresses the role of commitment and the construction of immobility through membership to 
closed social groups in characterizing this 'system ', indicating that both are consequences of the 
relationship between frame (ba) and the individual self. Her emphasis is not on length of tenure, but 
is on ’the integral and lasting commitment’ which may lead to an employee remaining with the same 
company.
Until this point Nakane has described 'the lifetime employment system' within the terms of 
her thesis, as som ething w hich is characteristic of, and characterises, hum an relationships 
throughout Japanese society. But at this point she suspends her thesis to "give a brief description of 
the history of the developm ent of the lifetime employment system in Japan" (Nakane 1970:15). Her 
'description', between pages fifteen and nineteen, breaks the flow of her analysis, and contradicts 
what she has been arguing up  to this point and w hat she continues to argue subsequently: that 
m odernization  and urbanization  do not w eaken kinship ties or create new  types of social
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organization on entirely different bases (Nakane 1970: 8). N akane's discussion of 'the lifetime 
employment system’ also stands out because of its jarring methodological separation from the rest of 
her thesis. N akane’s thesis is a structuralist account, in all its a historical, generalizing brilliance, but 
her account of ’the lifetime employment system’ is pure functionalist description.
In her ’brief description’, labour shortages in the early Meiji period were the stimulus to the 
inception of those practices and ideals which constitute ’the lifetime em ploym ent system ’. Even 
though this was a factor, N akane im plies it was the sole factor, contradicting her defence of 
Abegglen (1958), quoted above. What is closer to the truth, is that during  the m iddle years of the 
Meiji period (1868-1912), w hen industrial w orking practices were developing, labour m arket 
dynam ics acted as a stim ulus to the introduction of practices which were not new, but were 
practices w hich had been replaced by those in troduced from abroad along w ith im ported 
technology. What happened was a case of local practices being reintroduced, m ediating practices 
imported from abroad. This was the case with the development of an ethics of age seniority, and the 
practice of precise rigid ranking, although Nakane infers that both developed as a result of the new 
industrial conglomerates offering job security. She fails to m ention the nature of the commitment 
and the mechanisms which prom ote, m aintain and reproduce that com m itm ent, leaving us to 
assum e that m odernization and urbanization did lead to fundam ental change. There is only 
simplistic causal explanation of the most functionalist kind, which is not referenced to or integrated 
into the rest of her thesis at all. She also argues that the link between serving the company and 
serving the nation, and the nurturing  of the idea that the company is a family, were the result of 
directives from the military government. This was the case, but she does not once mention the 
influence of the ie in these directives, and further reinforces the idea she is attem pting to refute, that 
new types of social organisation were created. Again, having stated that ie ideology was responsible 
for the developm ent of com pany housing schemes, recreation centres at resorts, and welfare 
schemes (Nakane 1970:10), she later states, in her ’description', that labour unions were responsible. 
Nakane fails to embed her ’description’ in an historical context. The fact is that ie ideology and union 
pressure were both significant, but at different points in time. Union pressure was influential after 
WWII, but even then, unions were company unions, not trades unions. In other words, they were 
constructed on the basis of frames (ba) following ie structure, not attribute. Nakane does not mention 
that the structure of trade unions in Japan also follows ie structure, a point which would have 
em bedded her description of the ’lifetime em ploym ent system ’ in her thesis. She then ends her 
description at the very m om ent when the organisational structures, practices, and codes of conduct 
which constitute ’the lifetime employment system ’, were just becoming powerful ideals among the 
Japanese people: in the 1950s and 1960s.
Nakane's description of 'the lifetime employm ent system' suggests the developm ent of a 
discrete set of practices which are exclusive to that ’system’. Such an idea has, I believe, contributed 
to the current anthropological view that the practices and ideals which constitute an identifiable 
'system' are discrete, different, and can be separated off from other types of company organisation 
and from society as a whole. This is surprising given Bellah’s (1985) work, and the work of others. 
The generalising and systematizing tendency in Nakane's structuralist account might reasonably be
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thought to have contributed to the idea of a discrete and hom ogenous 'system ' characterised by 
lifetim e employm ent', but this is not the case. A lthough Nakane system atizes a whole series of 
ethics, codes of conduct and working practices in arguing her thesis, she never singles out lifetime 
em ploym ent’ as an organising and system atizing principle or practice. N akane's thesis is that 
m odern Japanese com pany structure, w orking practices and codes of conduct are part of an 
identifiable matrix of practices and ideals, firmly rooted in society as a whole, and characteristic of 
other companies, organisations and institutions. H er initial mention of 'the lifetime employment 
system' does ground it firmly in the practices and ideals she argues exist across the nation as a 
w hole (N akane 1970: 14), and  she argues forcefully, through her thesis, that 'the lifetime 
employment system', as represented bp a matrix o f practices and codes o f conduct rather than in name, 
has continuity both tem porally through history and spatially across Japanese society as a whole. 
When we think of the lifetim e em ploym ent system' in this way, it becomes much clearer just what 
'the collapse of lifetim e em ploym ent system' refers to: a redefining and refiguring of workplace 
ethics and practices, which will have repercussions across the whole of society. Even so, although 
Nakane convincingly grounds the practices and codes of conduct which constitute 'the lifetime 
employment system ’ and all other 'corporate' working practices w ithin society as a whole, because 
she did not ground her description of 'the lifetime employment system' in those practices and codes 
of conduct, she is responsible for propagating, if not initiating, the idea in the anthropological 
imagination that the practices which constitute 'the lifetime employment system' are fundamentally 
different from other working practices in other contexts.
Rohlen (1974), like Nakane, also argues for the importance of large com pany structure in 
defining ethics and practice in society as a whole:
Like any m odern society, Japan today contains a wide variety of institutions...among 
them the company is undoubtedly the most significant if sheer num bers of participants 
and centrality to national livelihood is considered. In the past, the country's villages 
were pre-em inent by these standards, but the last hundred years has w itnessed a 
tremendous increase of commercial and industrial organisations, and they now surpass 
villages as Japan's major type of social organisation (Rohlen 1974:18).
Rohlen (1974) does not discuss 'the lifetime employment system', and deliberately does not use the 
term 'lifetime em ploym ent system 'P This is both good and bad. Good because the term 'the lifetime 
employment system' is misleading, but bad because he doesn't critically engage with the term at all, 
allowing it to remain unchallenged. This is disappointing, especially as his decision to avoid the 
term was probably influenced by his belief that it was unhelpful. W riting at the beginning of the 
Interpretive Turn, and following Geertz, Rohlen was undoubtedly waiy of'system s' and 'structures'. 
He begins his third chapter, titled, 'Entrance, D eparture, and "Lifelong Commitment'", w ith the 
opening two paragraphs of Abegglen's chapter on 'lifetime commitment' (Abegglen 1958: 11). By 
quoting this passage, however, Rohlen follows critics of Abegglen by focusing our attention on
n
The term 'lifetime employment system' has been dropped from most modern anthropological references to it, with 'lifetime 
employment' as a practice becoming the focus of attention, as the word 'system' generally came to be regarded as 
problematic within anthropology. While this might initially seem a positive move forward, this is not the case, for this 
linguistic move has simply focused attention on length of tenure to the point of ignoring all else. At least with the term 'the 
lifetime employment system' there was the clear indication, contained in the word ’system', that there was something more.
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length of tenure, and reinforces the idea that this is all Abegglen discussed. Rohlen is not a critic of 
Abegglen particularly, instead he draw s our attention to the limited interests of Abegglen's critics. 
He very briefly outlines the response to Abegglen's thesis, citing the works of Taira (1962), Tsuda 
(1965), Karsh & Cole (1968), and Cole (1972), before stating:
The main problem, to sort out the source of variation in both [the U.S. and Japan] so 
that their com parison may be more precise and revealing, is still to be satisfactorily 
accomplished (Rohlen 1974:63).
Rohlen then continues by drawing our attention to two points: that the emphasis in the debate so 
far has been on comparisons between Japanese and U.S. practices, exclusively with respect to length 
of tenure. The second is that the source of evidence is almost exclusively statistical:
The pendulum , once swinging strongly toward an emphasis on the unique qualities of 
Japanese em ploym ent, began to sw ing back in the other direction, and similarities 
between Japanese and American statistics were emphasized (Rohlen 1974:63).
In his introduction, Rohlen states that none of the studies which have dealt w ith Japanese company 
organisation up until this point in time, have offered detailed docum entation of organisational 
structures, daily events, official explanations, or anything which could be called ethnographic data. 
Instead relying on statistics and vagaries which lead to 'gross oversimplifications' (Rohlen 1974: 2).
Although Rohlen states in his conclusion that "This study is obviously not the sort designed 
to answer a particular set of theoretical questions" (Rohlen 1974: 259), he does address the major 
theoretical approaches to company organisation in Japan which were presented in the studies of the 
time, in a system atic and generally thorough way. Chapter three on entrance and departure 
discusses 'lifetime' em ploym ent, by looking a t 'com m itm ent'. C hapter five thoroughly  and 
productively engages with Nakane's one-to-one vertical relationships, and includes an im portant 
consideration of the interplay betw een the 'formal' and 'informal' structure of the company, 
following N akane (1970). Rohlen also looks in detail at rem uneration, rew ards and financial 
incentives in chapter seven, an im portant part of Abegglen's thesis.
Overall Rohlen explains how the organisation of the bank, both formally and informally 
creates an environment whei*e people do tend to stay for the whole period expected of them. Rohlen 
concentrates on the ways in which members of the bank enter and leave the company, documenting 
the 'regular and normal' and the 'irregular and abnormal' ways of coming and going (Rohlen 1974: 
73), so that what emerges is a picture of criteria and value judgm ents associated with recruitm ent 
and departure. This includes the female staff who are also judged to have their 'regular' and 
'irregular' ways of leaving the bank, ideally during their mid-twenties in order to get married. This 
is an im portant point because it tells us, just as Abegglen did, that length of tenure "does not alter 
the nature of the com m itm ent between w orker and em ployer over the em ploym ent period" 
(Abegglen 1958:13). In the same way, the nature of commitment is the same for employees leaving 
the company under either 'normal' or 'abnorm al' conditions, during the employm ent period. This 
means that length of tenure cannot be a criterion on which to define employment codes of conduct 
or practice, as has clearly been the case with 'lifetime employment'. So, m uch like Nakane (1970), 
Rohlen tells us about the matrix of people, practices, ideology, and ethics, which constitute what is
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referred to as 'the lifetime employment system', together w ith how it defines and exists in a dynamic 
relationship w ith ethics and practice throughout society as a whole. But also like Nakane, Rohlen 
has allowed the idea of 'the lifetime employment system ’ as an employment ‘system 1, separate from 
and generically different from other employment practices, to continue.
Clark's (1979) approach to 'lifetime employment' follows both Nakane (1970) and Rohlen 
(1974). He notes the ’irrationality’ of the employm ent practices which sustain the ideal of lifetime 
employment', under the terms of a rational economic model:
The employers' behaviour on the labour market seems paradoxical. There are many 
older workers and their num ber is increasing; and few younger workers and their 
num ber is diminishing. Yet larger employers are paying older workers twice as much 
as younger ones. If the aim of the 'rational em ployer’ were sim ply to obtain the 
cheapest possible labour, we should expect him to pay older men less and younger 
m en more - in other words, to give up ’pay-by-age'. We should also expect him to 
make considerable efforts to recruit am ong older workers, who are in such good 
supply, even though older workers would naturally be mid-career entrants from other 
firms. This latter change of policy would, of course, be inconsistent w ith the practices 
sustaining 'lifetime employment' (Clark 1979:154).
Unfortunately Clark does not identify the practices which sustain lifetime employment. Instead, he 
only tells us: "traditions...values, and...all sorts of moral and political considerations" need to be 
taken into account (Clark 1979:155). This vagueness was also one of Rohlen's (1974: 2) criticisms of 
the work done in the wake of Abegglen (1958). Clark begins Iris assessment of 'lifetime employment' 
on a familiar note, sum m arizing the conclusions of those who have looked at 'lifetime employment' 
before him:
It is apparen t that the term  'life-time em ploym ent' describes the em ploym ent 
conditions of only a part of the Japanese labour force, and is even then a very 
im perfect description. As A begglen him self knew, 'life-time em ploym ent' is not 
offered by smaller companies, which still employ more than half of all workers. Nor 
does it apply to tem porary w orkers or to women. It is enjoyed only by male full 
employees of large companies (Clark 1979:174).
Clark tells us that "the term 'lifetime employment' describes the employm ent conditions of only a 
part of the Japanese workforce". This gives the im pression that the 'em ploym ent conditions' of 
companies which are perceived to offer 'lifetime employment' are generically different from those 
that don't. This dualism is veiy evident in the quote above, and is one which has become deeply 
entrenched in the anthropological imagination. The belief that the ethics and w orking practices of 
companies who are arbitrarily classified as operating 'the lifetime employment system', are discrete, 
homogeneous, and identifiably different from the ethics and working practices in companies which 
are not perceived as operating a 'lifetime employm ent system’, has become deeply ingrained and 
unquestion ingly  accepted in the literatu re on Japan (Kondo 1990). T here isn 't any th ing  
unquestionably discrete nor unproblematically separable from what is posited as falling outside this 
arbitrary category. I have never seen an analysis attem pt to establish the criteria for just w hat ’the 
lifetime employm ent system' is, or a comparative analysis of a company which operates a 'lifetime 
employment system' under these criteria, and one which falls outside. Neither have I seen a method 
or set of criteria for classifying a company as 'an elite firm’, or 'a large com pany’ on the basis of its
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internal organisation, its working practices, or its ethics.
In my experience, sm all com panies and large com panies are organisationally  and 
ideologically very similar. My experience w orking for a small fam ily-owned steel-finishing 
company of eleven employees, and for Kodansha, the largest publishers in Japan, is that they are 
organisationally very similar. Com pany practices and ideals are very similar, the attitudes and 
values of the employees are fundamentally the same, and the organization of time and space is also 
very similar. Offering 'lifetime employm ent', which Kodansha is recognised as doing, does not 
indicate fundamental organisational differences.
Clark's discussion of 'lifetime em ploym ent' as an ideal is the most compelling part of his 
discussion of the subject. 'Lifetime em ploym ent’ as an ideal does act as a coercive ethic to bind 
together, reproduce, and maintain working practices and codes of conduct. Clark rightly notes that 
criticism of the 'lifetime employm ent system' which seeks to play down its importance, on the basis 
that it involves a restricted section of the population, fails to miss its relevance as an ideal:
[These criticisms] do not invalidate the proposition that 'life-time employment' is at the 
same time an ideal, and a very powerful one...At [the company], workers of all ages 
interpreted events as if ’life-time employment’ was normal and right, and exceptions to 
it due to pressure of circumstance or moral deficiencies...The rightness of life-tim e 
em ploym ent' was not an issue, only the reason why it d idn 't exist in practice (Clark 
1979: 775).
It is particularly w hen talking about lifetim e employment' as an ideal, that we begin to appreciate 
its influence on, and relationship to, society as a whole. Clark demonstrates the power of the ideal of 
lifetim e employment' on recruitm ent policy, first towards school -leavers, and then towards 'm id­
career entrants (idumto saiyo)':
One impressive proof of [the pow er of the ideal] was M arum aru's decision to change 
its recruitment practices and take in school and college graduates, a decision that may 
have been prom pted partly by the fact that young people received low wages, but very 
m uch more by considerations of what was right for a firm in M arum aru's position in 
'the society of in d u stry ', and of how a com pany com m unity  o u g h t to be 
com posed...Instead of behaving as our im aginary 'rational' em ployer m ight, and 
encouraging 'mid-career entrants', M arumaru spent tens of millions of yen trying to 
recruit high school leavers who were know n to be unlikely to stay, and completely 
ignored its 'mid-career entrants' (Clark 1979:175).
Just as [the company] took so little trouble over obtaining m id-career recruits, so it 
treated them w ith careless indifference w hen they joined...On the whole mid-career 
entrants were resigned to their treatment, and seemed prepared to accept that those 
who had served [the company] since leaving school deserved greater rewards than 
they themselves did. Yet the inferior treatment of mid-career entrants was inconsistent 
with the meritocratic ideal, which the company...used...to justify the rapid rise of those 
m id-career entrants who had been invited to join [the company]...M ost m id-career 
entrants never caught up, and...found the iterations of meritocracy irksome (Clark 1979:
165).
Clark's discussion of 'm id-career entrants (chuuto saiyo) is consistent w ith the attitudes found in 
Rohlen (1974) and Nakane (1970). Yet, unfortunately, Clark's analysis never progresses beyond the 
purely descriptive and the conjectural, never building systematically on the w ork of those before 
him, and never explaining how the practice of 'lifetime em ploym ent' not only m aintains and
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reproduces itself, bu t also entrenches itself. His only explanation, although true, is that operating a 
policy of 'lifetime em ploym ent’ is a sign to 'the society of industry' and society as a whole, that a 
given com pany has now joined an arbitrary, although prestigious, cultural category. All his 
evidence suggests that powerful social sanctions are in operation, bu t he doesn't tell us w hat they 
are:
Most [mid-career entrants] were surprisingly ready to accept that they had set their 
own careers back by changing companies; and that it was reasonable that, for example, 
school entrants of their age should be preferred over them. None of them...appealed to 
the countervailing argum ent that, for example, mid-career entrants were actually better 
for the com pany than school entrants because they had m ore experience (Clark 
1979:176).
This attitude among people corroborates Nakane's thesis that webs of obligation and hierarchy can 
only successfully be entered from the bottom, and that social capital gained by moving up such a 
hierarchy cannot easily be transferred to another 'fram e (ba)’, in this case, another company. 
However, apart from m aking the im portant point that iife-time em ploym ent’ is an ideal, and one 
that has a high degree of efficacy, Clark never explains why it is an idea! beyond a series of 
tautologous suggestions that tell us very little: "Sanctioned by what is seen as tradition, morally 
correct, and emblematic of Japanese culture, 'life-time employment' is the goal towards which both 
firms and individuals have to direct their efforts" (Clark 1979:175).
In the David Plath edited volume Work and Lifecotirse in Japan (1983), we arrive at the point 
were the anthropologist defers completely to the 'calculations’ (Plath 1983: 15) of the statistician. 
Levine (1983), the statistician, attem pts to arrive at some sort of definitive conclusion regarding 
’lifetime employm ent’, but his analysis offers no conclusions and ends in evident frustration. By this 
stage, 1983, the impression a reader might get is very much one of the analyst tiying to kill the beast 
rather than understand it: If only it can be shown that 'lifetime employment', whatever that means 
now, is insignificant, we can get on and study  som ething 'im portant' (Levine 1983: 31). It is 
emblematic, maybe, that the chapters which deal most directly with 'lifetime employment' in Work 
and Lifecotirse in Japan come at the beginning of the book, being both a recognition that it cannot be 
ignored, and in order to get it out of the way as soon as possible. The same sentiments, of something 
which has the potential to divert an analysis, can be sensed in Nakane (1970), Kondo (1990) and 
Hamada (1992).
Length of tenure is now the only aspect of 'Iarge'^ company practice which Levine, or 
anybody else it seems, is interested in from this point in time onw ards. As if a hunter, the 
anthropologist has identified the beast’s weakness and now all efforts are directed towards it. Plath, 
in his introduction, is still following the pattern  of stressing the sim ilarities between Japanese, 
European and American employment practices, drawing solely on statistical data on 'overall rates of 
job-changing' (Plath 1983:16). Levine's argument is full of caveats regarding the data he presents or 
the conclusions he draws. He notes that the m ethods of data collection and presentation have 
changed over time: "Thus, there is a problem  of data consistency as well as reliability over the
^Again 'large' is tautologously defined by operating a 'lifetime employment system', again with no stated criteria.
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decades since the beginning of industrialization" (Levine 1983: 20). And: "Unfortunately it is difficult 
to estimate precisely how much movem ent is represented by those already in the labour force or in 
employment. The evidence is fragmentary" (Levine 1983: 24). Levine's assessment of the degree of 
job changing in Japan also includes those who are transferred  from  'paren t' com panies to 
subsidiaries or 'closely related firms such as subcontractors' (Levine 1983: 25). Including these 
transfers is highly questionable, as this practice was introduced by em ployers in order to uphold 
obligations pertaining to 'lifetime em ploym ent’ (Hamada 1980; Yahata 1997). In addition, Levine, 
and Holden (1983) in the subsequent chapter, also include data on the highly mobile 55-59 age 
group, which was actually outside w hat is normally regarded as the upper age limit of 'lifetime 
employment' when Levine and Holden were writing. In the late 1970s, the M inistry of Labour was 
urging firms to extend the upper limit. However, during this period of transition, over 50% of firms 
were still retiring their 'lifetime employment' staff at 55 (Hamada 1980). In view of this, Levine and 
Holden should, at the very least, have qualified these statistics.
Levine also refers to T aira’s (1962) study, w hich has been influential in form ing the 
anthropological construction of the 'lifetime em ploym ent system'. As Levine notes, Taira's study is 
based on statistical data collected mainly in the pre-WWU period. This is significant because most 
modern Japanese accounts regard the 'lifetime employment system' as a post-WWII development. 
Levine laments:
Unfortunately, no parallel analysis exists for a post-W orld War II period. However, if 
we assum e that the turnover rate fell by half after the war, the m ovem ent from 
employer to em ployer would have remained substantial, say in the neighbourhood of 
five percent a year. At that rate a worker would typically change companies at least 
two or three times in the course of a career. A sizeable proportion w ould have made 
more changes than that, especially it w ould seem those em ployed by small and 
medium-sized firms (Levine 1983:28).
Levine's conclusions are presum ptuous and purely speculative, and highly questionable as they
include company transfers and the 55-59 age group. Also, bearing in mind Clark's (1979) observation
that many people under the age of 25 change jobs, but still take up what are regarded as 'lifetime
em ploym ent’ positions, what do Levine’s conclusions tell us of any interest? Even if we accept that
'lifetime employment' is not a lived reality for over sixty percent of the Japanese workforce, we learn
nothing about that lived reality, and we fail to even consider tlie effects of that lived reality on the
lives of others. Levine ends his paper saying:
[C]areer patterns and m obility pathw ays appear to differ radically from w hat is 
im plied in the notion of lifetime employment....It is astonishing how  little we know 
about the labour m arket behaviours of these, the vast majority of Japanese workers.
Four fifths of our research energy seems to have been put into investigating the careers 
of one-fifth of the labour force. A change in direction seems more than overdue (Levine 
1983:31).
What we have learned from Nakane (1970), Rohlen (1974), and Clark (1979), is that length of tenure 
does not have a significant bearing on company organisation and codes of conduct. Studies such as 
those by Taira (1962), Marsh and M annari (1971,1972), Holden (1983), and Levine (1983) also allow 
for the same conclusions, as they do not address anything other than length of tenure, which itself, 
by their own admission, provides no indication of fundam ental difference. The fact that length of
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tenure among firms which are supposed to operate a 'lifetime employment system' does not seem to 
differ very m uch from firms that don't, according to these studies, clearly indicates that there is a 
high degree of organisational and ethical consistency, rather than difference across Japanese 
companies.
Two recent analyses of w orking practices (Kondo 1990, H am ada 1992) reproduce the 
dualism that we have seen developing over the years in the various anthropological representations 
of working practices in Japan. Kondo (1990) separates off large firms as employing more than 300 
persons, another arbitrary figure used by the Japanese Governm ent.5 K ondo then  builds a 
fundamental organisational and ethical distinction on this 'culturally salient category' (Kondo 1990: 
50). What falls outside this category of 'small to m edium  size enterprises (chi nisi to kigyo)', is: "large 
industry...elite government bureaucracies, and...the lives of Organization Men in elite firms" (Kondo 
1990: 50). Kondo dismisses the "familiar themes of lifetime employment, harm ony, homogeneity, 
diligence, and a Confucian ethic . She also regards 'the lives of Organization Men in elite firms' as 
an infinitesimal, though pow erful sector’ (Kondo 1990: 50) and as a 'problem atic conceptual 
shppage' (Kondo 1990: 50). Yet she leaves these ’familiar them es' in place, unchallenged and 
unquestioned, and consequently reproduces them. Then, as a result of not paying enough regard to 
the codes and practices of large companies, and of not discussing their influence across the whole of 
the society of in d u stry , Kondo reproduces the dualism  that all ’small to m edium  size enterprises 
{chuushd kigyo)' are discernibly different from 'large' companies.
*******
I have been saying that a whole matrix of ethics and practices which constitute what is known as 
'the lifetime em ploym ent system' have been ignored and trivialized as a result of the emphasis on 
length of tenure. So, w hat is this m atrix of ethics and practice which defines the 'lifetime 
em ploym ent system , and which are the subject of the debates concerning the 'unravelling' or 
'collapse' of the 'lifetime employment system'? Bellah (1985) provides us with a detailed history of 
the ethics and practices of the lifetime em ploym ent system ', dem onstrating that 'the lifetime 
employment system is a generic model for the matrix of ethics and practices which constitute the 
vast majority of Japanese workplaces (5.1, 5.4). The characteristics of Befu’s (1980) 'group model of 
Japanese society', as well as H endry's (1993) 'particular characteristics of Japanese society' are all 
descriptions of the matrix of ethics and practices which constitute the lifetime employment system'. 
A basic m istake that has been m ade w ith anthropological represen ta tions of the lifetime 
em ploym ent system  has been to confuse the practice of lifetime em ploym ent w ith 'the lifetime 
em ploym ent system ' itself. Almost exclusively, all analyses have attem pted to show is that the 
pmctice of lifetime em ploym ent is both limited and gendered. This is not in dispute. What I do 
dispute is that an industrial dualism ' exists in Japan, and that those members of a company who are
There are various governmental/industrial classifications of what constitutes large or small/ medium size companies, 
which are used by different persons or institutions in different contexts. The figure Clark uses to mark of 'large' firms is 1 000 
employees, while Kondo's figure is 300. Neither Clark (1979) or Kondo (1990) seem to be aware that a number of arbitrarily 
chosen figures are used.
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not offered 'lifetime employment' are subject to an identifiably different set of ethics and practices 
from those within the company that do. There is also the inference in the industrial dualism  model, 
that those w ithin a com pany w hich offers lifetime em ploym ent w ho are not offered 'lifetime 
em ploym ent’, fall w ithin the other category, even though they w ork for a company that offers 
'lifetime em ploym ent’, indicating the confusion over this subject. In addition, I argue that the ethics 
and practices which constitute 'the lifetime employment system' are the ethics and practices of the 
vast majority of Japanese workplaces, large or small, and consequently the ethics and practices of 
the society as a whole.
In many ways, this a simply a question of semantics. Rohlen (1974) seems to have thought 
this, for he refused to use the term 'the lifetime employment system', even though he was writing 
about it. But this has only served to heighten the confusion. The criteria used to apprehend 'the 
lifetime employment system' are arbitrary and at best tenuous, and most importantly of all, none of 
them describe a matrix of ethics and practices which can be regarded as different from workplaces 
which do not fall under these criteria. Oyabun/kobun (fictive paren t/ch ild ) relationships are not 
dependent on the practice of recruiting only from high school or university once a year, and the 
ethics and practices pertaining to wom en in companies which are perceived to operate a 'lifetime 
employment' policy is also not dependent on that policy either. The role, position, and life-course of 
wom en in the workplace in Japan cannot be seen to show changes that are consistent w ith the 
perceived presence or absence of a 'lifetime employment policy'. As I aim to demonstrate in the next 
section, utilitarian motives, together w ith cultural ideals which have continuity  through all 
workplaces and among all types of employees, male and female, tend to have a greater effect on the 
incidence of long term commitment’.
Then there is the question of authenticity and validity. 'Traditions' associated w ith this 
'system' can be described as 'reinvented' (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1986). The idea of the salaryman as 
a modern-day samurai being just one example. But the tendency to trivialize and ridicule that which 
is regarded as 'inauthentic' or 'reinvented' should be resisted. H obsbaw n and Ranger's Invented 
Traditions was not an attem pt to trivialize and underm ine the traditions they focused on, but was an 
attem pt to deepen our understanding, both of those traditions and of the process of culture and 
intellectual thought, generally. To allow our own Western assumptions concerning authenticity to 
colour our assessment of any codes and practices is dangerous and unproductive. Japanese history, 
like the history of any other nation, is full of examples of 'invented traditions’: the Tokugawa period 
alone was a hive of activity, w ith num erous intellectual traditions being reinvented in the name of 
political expediency (Tsunoda et al. 1958; Bellah 1985; Nosco 1989).
The fact that what passes as 'the lifetime employment system’ is consistent with values and attitudes 
that underpin the whole of Japanese society, can be dem onstrated by considering the ethics of this 
'employm ent system', w hich can be traced back through Japanese history (Tsunoda 1958; Bellah 
1985). Bellah, in his Tokugawa Religion (1985), attem pts to trace the 'cultural roots of m odern Japan' 
by looking at the relationship betw een religion, philosophy, and society, and between religion, 
philosophy, and the economy, during the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), before arguing that the 
same attitudes and  values underp in  m odern Japan. Many of the ethics and practices which
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constitute the lifetime em ploym ent system 1 can be traced back to Tokugawa period and beyond. 
The practices of seniority by age, and of a strict hierarchy within the household and within society 
as a whole derive from both Confucian and Neo-Confucian ethics, particularly the Confucian notion 
of filial p ie ty , first laid out in the Classic o f Filial Piety. The Japanese em phasis on harmony, very 
evident in Rohlen's (1979) analysis, and both consented to and questioned by Kondo's (1990) sweet 
factory women, is still a vital element in m aintaining position and authority, and is itself derived 
from the Confucian view of the world as harmonious and static. Confucian cosmology argues that 
'dire calamities' will befall M ankind if the correct correspondences between Heaven and Earth are 
not m aintained. A similar discourse could be heard in most Japanese workplaces of all sizes and 
compositions before the Bubble, and probably still can in most. The threat of 'dire calamities' has 
continued to bolster authority  and the status quo in Japan, and has resulted in the notion of 
'harmony (?w)' becoming an im portant motivational goal. The legitimacy of this notion of hierarchy 
was then reinforced through certain Buddhist interpretations of the universe, particularly those 
which emphasised hierarchy, such as the doctrine of the Kegon sect (Tsunoda 1958; Bellah 1985).
From the eighth century, the Classic of Filial Piety was required reading in schools and most 
households possessed a copy. Consequently, the ethics of filial piety came to have increasing 
influence on the ethics of Japan, and on the structure of society. D uring the Kamakura period (1185- 
1333), Bellah tells us that: "the samurai, high and low, even though they m ight have no other book, 
were likely to have a copy of the [Classic of Filial Piety]" (Bellah 1985: 89). By the Tokugawa period, 
Neo-Confucianism was the dom inant philosophical strand adopted by the Tokugaw a Shogunate. 
Bellah tells us that the ethics of filial piety became increasingly institutionalised, so that the 
Tokugawa notion of loyalty was essentially the Confucian notion of filial piety applied to the polity. 
The Tokugawa concept of loyalty derived its legitimacy from the elevated position of the samurai in 
Tokugawa society, who had integrated the notion of filial piety into their own codes of honour and 
loyalty prior to the Tokugawa period, when the country was a series of w arring fiefdoms. The 
structure of loyalty between lord and samurai during this period (1156-1600) was closely based on 
the ethics of filial piety, and was subsequently conceptualised by Yamaga Soko in the 17th Century 
A.D. as ’the way of the w arrio r (bnshido)’. D uring the T okugaw a period, the ’p roud  self- 
determ ination and honourific individualism ' (Ikegami 1995) which also characterised the samurai 
'way' was suppressed in the name of 'civic duty' (4.2,8), but the ethics of filial piety and the tradition 
of loyalty which had characterised samurai conduct came to embody the Tokugawa notion of 'civic 
duty'. As the Tokugawa period progressed, these codes of conduct were dissem inated throughout 
the whole of society. Ordinary citizens were not at all unfamiliar w ith the ethics of filial piety in the 
household, bu t during the Tokugaw a period these ethics were applied to the whole of society. 
Bellah tells us that the whole of society became 'bushidd-ised':
All the evidence about popular sects and ethical movements [during the Tokugawa 
period] indicates that they taught a virtually identical ethics. They all stressed loyalty 
and filial piety, obedience and righteousness, economy and diligence. All dem anded 
selfless devotion to superiors, a m inim um  of personal consumption, and a vigorous 
prosecution of daily tasks and duties. They were at one with Bnshido in being 'ethically 
activist’ and 'inner worldly ascetic' (Bellah 1985:98).
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We come across alm ost identical exhortations at the 'ethics (rinri) retreat' Kondo (1990) visited, 
where virtually the same 'ethical movement' can be seen to be flourishing three hundred years later. 
Kondo's 'ethics retreat' is just one example of a booming industry  in Japan, before the 1990s. 
Companies of all sizes sent both their male and female, full-time and part-time staff for weekends at 
these retreats, w here they are pu t through a series of dem anding challenges w hich draw  on and 
em phasize both Confucian and Buddhist ethics. Asceticism and the ability to accept hardship 
'honourably' are a typical example, and one which requires a very Confucian ’loyalty' to one's 
company colleagues, to the staff at the retreat, and also to one's parents, and a very Buddhist sense 
of the self as requiring continual focus and negation. It is also from the ethic of filial piety that the 
ideology of 'company as family' derives. The idea of the company as a family which looks after its 
staff in a fatherly  m anner, through senpni/ kohni (sen ior/jun ior) oyabim Ikobun (paren t/ch ild) 
relationships, is pure Confucian tradition, and a prim ary mechanism driving not only 'the lifetime 
employment system', but all employment practices for both men and women. W hether we can say it 
has been 'reinvented' or whether it has continued through the ages is a moot point, but one which 
does not alter the significance of these traditions, or their efficacy in the modern age.
Bellah (1985) tells us that diligence and frugality can be seen to derive from both Confucian 
concerns with the economy, and from Bushido. The Confucian concern w ith diligence and frugality 
derives from the need to m aintain harmony. Under the terms of Bushido, diligence and frugality are 
the means to selfless devotion to one's Lord. In this way, the pursuit of diligence and frugality is 
m otivated by both the desire for balance and harmony, as well as a goal-attainm ent-driven desire 
for selfless devotion to one's superiors: two of the prim ary m otivational goals of 'the lifetime 
employment system'. Bellah argues that the mechanism which drove this goal-attainment attitude, 
was: "the obligation to make return for limitless on, which made the concept of 'occupation' almost 
sacred, due to the almost religious nature of this 'selfless devotion':
The occupation of samurai offers a proto type for this fusion [of the concept of 
occupation and the obligation, to make return for limitless on. The tasks and duties of 
his office are seen as fulfilling his obligation to his lord. They m ust be fulfilled with 
utm ost devotion and w ithout consideration of self...Occupation as a m eans of 
fulfilling one's obligations to one's superiors came more and more into prominence 
(.Bellah 1985: U5).
Hierarchy, harmony, selfless loyalty to one’s seniors, frugality, obedience, diligence: these are the 
matrix of ethics and  practices w hich constitute 'the lifetime em ploym ent system ', and w hich 
underpin, not just those companies which are perceived as operating a 'lifetime employment' policy, 
but all workplaces and, consequently, the whole of society, Rohlen (1974) tells us th a t :
"this older social morality is well suited to the organization of m odern, large-scale 
institutions...While public debate, both economic and political has been carried on...in 
the language of a dem ocratic society, the internal life of m any institu tions has 
continued to be influenced by [this] different and more traditional philosophy" 
(Rohlen 1974: 59)
This 'social morality' does not just apply to the kind of large institutions Rohlen was studying, 
either. The popular m ovem ents of the Tokugaw a period (Bellah 1985), the post-WW II period
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(Kondo), and the pervasiveness of the ideology of ’company as family', attest to this.
'Lifetime employment', or more accurately, the commitment to one company, can be seen as 
both a consequence of an ethics of 'selfless devotion to one's superiors', and as an goal in itself, but it 
should not be the defining characteristic of w hat is only a generic model for the Japanese workplace, 
which should be refined not rubbished. As the man who started it all m ade clear: "where the 
proportion of female workers is high [and where] the rate of employee exit is high, this does not 
affect the nature of commitment through the employment period" (Abegglen 1958:13).
'k'k'k'k'k'kit
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2.2) The 'Society of Industry ' and the M echanism of Increasing Im m obility
Although Clark (1979) reproduces the idea of an industrial dualism  based on the perceived presence 
or absence of the ideal of 'lifetime employment' within a company (2.1), he also introduces the idea 
of ’the society of industry ', w hich suggests continuity and consistency across all of Japanese 
industiy, and betw een Japanese companies of all sizes. Following Clark, then, I propose that the 
term 'lifetime employment' is an ideal which all companies, as employers, have, over time attempted 
to realise, but at the same time, 'long-term commitment by both an employee and employer' is also a 
consequence of the ethics and practices 1 outlined at the end of the previous section, which are to be 
found in workplaces ranging from one or two persons, to ten thousand and more.
It is evident that the m ajority of the Japanese people perceive a com pany to operate a 
'lifetime em ploym ent' policy on the criterion of w hether or not the m em bers of that company 
m utually agree that the com pany does operate such a policy (Clark 1979; Kondo 1990). As Clark 
(1979) suggests, all companies aspire to adopt the practice of 'lifetime employment' in order to send 
a signal that they have reached a certain culturally significant level of success. From what Clark tells 
us, companies tend to do this when they have reached a certain num ber of employees. This figure is 
arbitrary, however, depending  it seems, on which classification of w hat constitutes a 'large' 
company the board of directors choose. In Clark's example, this figure was one thousand employees 
(Clark 1979), Kondo's figure was three hundred  (Kondo 1990). Consequently, w hat indicates 
whether or not a company operates a 'lifetime employment' policy, is not its size, but whether or not 
the members of the company say they do.
However, realising that policy is as much a consequence of a mechanism inherent in the 
'society of industry' (Clark 1979), as it is dependent on whether or not a company operates a 'lifetime 
em ploym ent’ policy. As Clark makes clear, the order of ranking of the major companies in all the 
major industries in Japan is common knowledge among the population, and locks into the standard 
ranking system  w ithin  all com panies (Clark 1979: 106), to create a structu re in  w hich it is 
conceivably possible to locate every employee in the country relative to each other, through a 
process of recognizing the affiliation (shozoku) of individual selves to 'affiliated groups (shozokit 
shnudan)', that is, their companies. This is what Clark calls 'the society of industry '. This point is 
important because it indicates two things. (1): the extent to which there is consistency and continuity 
across the ‘society of industry', in  other words across society as a whole, and (2); codes of conduct 
and practice am ong companies at the top of the ’society of industry1 constitute the lives of all 
individual Japanese to varying extents. For these two reasons alone, any 'collapse' or 'unravelling' of 
'the lifetime employment system' has to regarded as significant and worthy of investigation.
A person's company is still the initial, and the major index of orientation between selves for 
most Japanese (Abe 1995). Such information will be more important to some than to others, but this 
fact remains: which company a person is 'affiliated to (shozoku sum)', is the prim ary reference which
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still the m ajority of ind ividual selves use to locate other individual selves relative to E g o .^  
Stemming directly from the fact that a person's company, or absence of company, constitutes their 
identity, albeit to different degrees, a 'society of industry’ is continually reproduced, while at the 
same time in a state of flux, constantly dynamic and contingent.
A u tilitarian  m echanism  w ith in  the ’society of in d u stry ’ w hich engenders ’lifetim e 
em ploym ent’ as a practice, is responsible for creating an increased rigidity w ithin the upper 
echelons of the ’society of industry '. It is this increasing rigidity w hich results in an increasing 
immobility between com panies in both horizontal and vertical planes, and which accounts for a 
higher incidence of ’lifetime em ploym ent’ workcourses in the upper echelons. Immobility is then 
com pounded by the practices and ethics which prom ote what N akane rightly  perceives as a 
privileging of 'frame (hii)’. This has been most immediately identifiable in the practice of taking 
inexperienced personnel once a year, and training them up in ’the ways of the company (slmfti)' 
instead of recruiting experienced skilled personnel as and when they are needed, all year round. The 
skills graduate employees pick u p  could easily be taken to another employer, only there is still the 
perception am ong m any that skills learnt w ith one company are not easily transferable. This is 
consistent with what Nakane refers to as a "method to create an internal organisation which will tie 
individuals...to each other" (Nakane 1970: 9). This is changing, however (5.2, 5.4). This perception of 
non-transferability is part of an em ploym ent culture and work ethics w hich do not prom ote 
mobility, and which helps to engender 'lifetime em ploym ent’. The fact that people do move does not 
negate or deny the validity of the ideals (Clark 1979). We have to look at individual cases, at what 
motivates people to move and, as Rohlen (1974) points out, what motivates them to stay.
When discussing why people stay or move with Japanese, generally speaking, people really 
only think of leaving or staying in terms of Good and Bad: Staying is good, moving is bad, although, 
again this is changing (3.2,3.3). Under the overarching broad ethical prescription of Staying : Good :: 
Bad : Moving, the ’society of industry’ has engendered mobility at the lower end and immobility at 
the higher end. This situation is driven by the structure of the 'society of industry', together with an 
individual's desire to maximize their position within the 'society of industry', against a background 
where, generally speaking, the h igher up the 'society' an individual m oves, the m ore s /h e  is 
satisfied and the more s /h e  has to lose by moving. At the same time, this utilitarian motive is 
prescribed by cultural factors, so that while many people will consider moving, as Rohlen (1979) 
tells us, these u tilitarian  m otives will be tem pered by cultural p rescrip tions pertain ing to 
commitment, which motivate people to stay. At the same time, the degree to which people stay with 
the same company is, to a considerable extent, also dependent on the name of the company and its 
position in the 'society of industry '.'7 The higher the company is in the 'society of industry’, labour 
immobility increases for the following reasons: (1) the employee is less likely to be unsatisfied; (2) 
they have more to lose by leaving, and consequently; (3) these reinforce the bonds between members
^This is also the case for women who do not work, for they are invariably assigned to the position of their husbands or 
fathers.
7While there will be exceptions to this, when the 'society of industry 'is viewed as a whole, such a trend is evident. Having 
said that, members of small companies may be very satisfied, with many examples of 'lifetime employment' possibly being 
documented. Also, people do leave coveted jobs for various reasons.
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of a company, which in turn, due in no small part to the ideology of 'company as family', has m ade 
changing jobs more difficult and less likely. An employee has been less likely to be unsatisfied for a 
num ber of reasons, which include the following: (1) the kudos, or social capital w ithin society as a 
whole which comes with working for a prestigious company; (2) the rem uneration received w hen 
working for a prestigious company will itself be satisfying when considered against standards of 
remuneration across the whole of society. Employees have also had more to lose by leaving as the 
likelihood of gaining a position in a com pany higher up the 'society of industry ' is reduced 
compared to lower dow n the 'society', because the 'society' is like a pyramid.
Immobility has also been engendered by the ideology of 'company as family'. As Rohlen
(1974) and Kondo (1990) describe, this feeling of family is propagated by various means and by 
various individuals in various settings, both those created especially for such purposes and in the 
course of a day's work. A Japanese friend of mine quite emotionally im pressed on me that nobody 
really thought of their colleagues as then  family, but that the notion of family was felt as feelings of 
dependence and of being unable to survive outside the company, as well as feelings that the 
individual self relied on the company for self-actualization, success, and existence, even. I was told 
that these sentiments often only come out when somebody makes it known to colleagues, friends, or 
family, that they are thinking of leaving, at which point they are told that it is not possible to survive 
outside the company. This happened to the president of the software company I worked in, when he 
decided to leave Toshiba and set up on his own (3.2). My friend became very angry and emotional 
as he described to me how companies, regardless of size, more depending on the 'colour' of the 
company,^ would w ork hard to 'disable' the employees, to make them believe they were unable to 
function or survive outside their company, not for the sake of the employee, but for the sake of the 
company. The degree of these feelings would vary from individual to individual, but as my friend 
told me with regard to himself, everybody would to some extent have these feelings, which would 
be sensitized and drawn out by any talk of leaving.
Looking further down the 'society of industry’, or a t the bottom, employees have much more 
to gain by moving and much less to lose. Consequently moving is more common, and can appear to 
those who regard length of tenure as an index of working practices and work ethics, that a different 
set of practices and ethics exists. This is not the case, and even if difference is discernible, this is a 
case of difference by degree, not in kind. Also, employees in small companies do work for the same 
em ployer for years, even though there is no 'lifetime em ploym ent' policy in evidence. What 
determ ines w hether employees move are feelings of personal satisfaction m ediated by personal 
responsibilities to others, together w ith social and cultural ideals that extend across the whole of 
society. There was no 'lifetime em ploym ent' policy at the small steel com pany I worked at, but 
chopping and changing jobs was hardly regarded as an acceptable practice.
Clearly, w hatever utilitarian m echanism  can be identified in the increasing immobility 
w ithin the 'society of industry ', the relationship between individual selves and collective selves 
suggested by N akane’s (1970) 'frame' over 'attribute' thesis, or by Befu's (1980) 'group m odel of
Q
°The 'ambiance (fiiniki)' of a company is described as its 'colour (shiki)' by Japanese. I was given the following examples: 
Sony/Canon - Liberal; Matsushita/Hitachi - stingy; Big Banks - Conservative; Trading Companies - military-like.
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Japanese society', affects how the mechanism operates, even at the lower end, where a 'lifetime 
employment' policy is invariably absent. Cultural ideals which span the whole of society have far 
more influence than 'lifetime em ploym ent’ policy, and where a ’lifetime em ploym ent' policy is 
recognised to exist, this does not negate these cultural ideals, but instead builds on them, again 
indicating the high degree of consistency and continuity of codes of conduct and working practices 
across the whole of the ’society of industry’, and of society as a whole.
********
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2.3) 'Lifetime Employment* A fter the Bubble
I have been arguing that 'the lifetime em ploym ent system' is a matrix of ethics and practices which 
can be found throughout the whole of Japanese society, and that talk of 'the lifetime employment 
system ' collapsing or 'unravelling ' refers, not sim ply to w hether the practice of 'lifetim e 
employment' will be phased out, but more accurately to whether the codes and practices which have 
engendered the ideal of 'lifetime employment' will be phased out.
Yamamoto, an economic correspondent for Asniii shimbun, refers to both 'the practices of 
lifetime em ploym ent' and ‘the lifetime em ploym ent system' (Yamamoto 1993: 381). She discusses 
'the practices of lifetime employment' as an employment ideal. She tells us that employers who have 
made 'tacit promises' (Yamamoto 1993: 382) to guarantee 'lifetime employment' are now rescinding 
on those tacit promises m ade to current employees, and not making those promises to new recruits. 
These changes in ethics and practices, however, are only two of the most sensitive changes. A more 
general 'restructuring' is underway (3.3, 3.4, 5.1,5.2) and it is in this sense that we can meaningfully 
say that som ething w hich very m uch exists is being questioned and  changed. This shift in 
employment philosophy and practice has not been easy, as Yamamoto tells us:
M anagem ent's restructuring efforts to date have had little im pact on the bottom  
line...because of the persistence of the practices of lifetime employment and promotion 
by seniority. These practices, traditionally followed by japan 's leading companies, 
make it impossible for management to lay off workers at will, no m atter w hat the cost 
keeping them on might be the company's health (‘Yamamoto 1993:381).
One thing that emerges from this quote is the apparent impotence of ’management' in removing the 
practices of lifetime em ploym ent and prom otion by seniority. The coercive effect that keeping up 
appearances within 'the society of industry’ has had on companies is one reason for its resilience, 
another is the w idespread belief in the 'rightness' of 'lifetime employment' held by employees and 
by the public at large. Most important, however, is a genuine desire on the part of companies not to 
rescind on an arrangement they have with existing staff. Yamamoto tells us of the public's reaction 
to the changes in employm ent philosophy and practice which were being forced on companies by 
economic conditions. Asahi Shimbun reported in January 1993 that Pioneer Corp. had handed thirty 
five of its managers notices of separation:
The news proved profoundly disturbing to the Japanese public. As other m edia picked 
up on the story, a sense of popu lar indignation and betrayal began to build. 
N ew spapers and television stations w ere flooded w ith letters and phone calls 
condemning Pioneer and questioning whether the action violated labour laws [while] 
Pioneer's m anagers viewed the companies action as an inexcusable breach of trust 
('Yamamoto 1993:382).
The widespread belief in the 'rightness' of these practices among the general public and employees, 
would seem to extend to some imagining that 'lifetime employment' was enacted into law. 'Lifetime
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employm ent’ is a powerful ideal, and w hen Yamamoto talks of 'lifetime em ploym ent1 unraveling, 
she is referring to the fact that the ideal of 'lifetime em ploym ent1, as well as other ethics and 
practices, are being discarded by em ployers. We know already that m any em ployees find it 
expedient to leave an em ployer, while still upholding the ideal (Clark 1979: 176), but w hereas 
employees, and the public, could uphold the ideal while dropping the practice as it suited them, 
w ithout dam aging the ideal, employers could not. For the ideal of 'lifetime em ploym ent1 to exist, 
companies had to be seen to be practicing it. It was not expedient for em ployers to uphold and 
propagate the ideal and rescind on the practice when it suited them.
*******
T he lifetime employment system 1 as a matrix of ethics and practices in a given company may well 
be undergoing radical revision (3.2, 5.1, 5.2), but the practice of lifetime employment looks as though 
it will continue, albeit in a more restricted way, and subject to the performance of an employee. 
Kaneko (1997), D irector of Labour Policy at the Japan Federation of Employers (Nikkciren) and 
au thor of a m ajor policy docum ent on changes w ithin the w orkplace, regards 'long-term 1 
em ploym ent as having a continued value, but is likely to be just one of three em ploym ent 
’portfolios' in an increasingly fluid labour market (Kaneko 1997:158):
a) The first is the long-term  skill accum ulation group, based on trad itional LTE 
[Lifetime Employment], and a desire on the part of both the em ployers and the 
employees in question for long-term employment.
b) The second group will help resolve certain corporate dilemmas by making available 
high-level specialised skills, though not necessarily on an LTE basis.
c) The third group will include various types of workers, required on the one hand by 
companies to do a range of tasks from the traditional to the highly specialised, and, 
from the employee side, ranging from those wanting to utilize leisure time to those 
wanting to use specialist abilities (1997:156).
Kaneko outlines a num ber of ’concrete m easures1 which companies should consider, ’in the face of 
structural changes in the economy1, and 'diversified employee consciousness1 (Kaneko 1997:158):
[Tjhis will involve the following considerations. First, companies will have to be able to 
secure or supplem ent the hum an resources they need, when they need them. This will 
require a more flexible use of hum an resources than in the past. To be able to deploy 
resources rapidly, according to need, will require more active participation in the 
external labour m arket, and  this w ill require  substan tial ad justm ents w ithin 
companies...Second, the recruitment of new graduates will remain pivotal in  the future, 
but attem pts should also be m ade at all-year-round recruiting of 'near-new graduates’ 
and m id-career workers...In order to have the right skills at the right time, flexible 
recruitm ent..should be considered (1997:158)
These suggested changes are discussed in greater detail in 5.1 and 5.2. Kaneko then finishes in the 
following manner:
LTE has contributed to economic growth and social stability in post-w ar Japan. It has 
evolved in response to a changing economic and social environment, and will continue 
to evolve w ithout being abandoned. In the coming years, changing managem ent needs
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and employee dem ands will result in a more diversified em ploym ent system (Kaneko 
1997:158).
Graphic A utom ation (GA), the CAD software company I studied, and which I tu rn  to in the next 
chapter, has already adopted an 'employment portfolio' veiy similar to that suggested by Kaneko. 
At GA, 'lifetime employment' departs from the common understanding of 'the lifetime employment 
system' in im portant ways. First of all, all employees joining the company can opt to be either 
'lifetime employees (sei sha in)\ or ’contract employees (keh/aku shn in)\ As Kaneko suggests w hen he 
talks of the need for a recognition of ’diversified employee consciousness' and 'employee demands', 
GA gives their em ployees the choice. 'Lifetime em ployees' are not privileged over ’contract 
employees' in any way, a marked departure from lifetim e employment system ’ company practices, 
which privilege lifetim e employees’ over other employees. Secondly, there is no discrimination on 
the basis of gender or age. At GA, the majority of the employees are lifetim e employees', including 
75% of the female employees, who make up 30% of the total work force of the company. Most of the 
employees are also m id-career entrants. That is, they have worked for other companies prior to 
joining GA, yet they are still considered lifetim e employees' at GA. As Kaneko suggests, in GA, the 
type of task together with the wishes of the employee primarily dictate w hether or not an employee 
will be a lifetim e employee' or not. An im portant point which emerges from the example of GA is 
that lifetim e employees ' are not privileged over other employees in the workplace, neither are they 
regarded as more important.
Kaneko notes: " [Cjompanies will have to be able to secure or supplem ent the hum an 
resources they need, when they need them. This will require a more flexible use of hum an resources 
than in the past" (Kaneko 1997: 158). This shift in attitudes to recruitment by companies is discussed 
in 5.4. M atsuda-san, president of GA is well aware of this, and although he personally prefers 
lifetime employment', working in the fast-moving software industry he is aware of the advantages 
of employing staff when they are needed (3.5). M atsuda-san’s preference for lifetim e em ploym ent’ 
does not mean that he is in favour of age seniority practices, or of the hierarchical, factional structure 
which has come to characterise Japanese companies in the post-WWII period, many of which derive 
from the ethics and practices associated w ith ’the lifetime em ploym ent system ’ (2.1.). GA is 
structured in a fundam entally different way (3.2, 3.3, 3.4), yet M atsuda-san prefers lifetim e 
employment'. This suggests that even as companies restructure and begin to institutionalize their 
employee's individuality (/cose/), this will not automatically lead to the demise of the practice of 
lifetim e em ploym ent', even though we appear to be w itnessing the dem ise of 'the lifetime 
em ploym ent system ’. Consequently, we can say with some confidence that lifetim e employment' 
will continue, but will be part of a different matrix of work ethics and practices.
The fact that GA has lifetim e em ploym ent’ draws our attention to at least four important 
points regarding lifetim e em ploym ent' in post-Bubble Japan. First, it indicates that lifetim e 
employment will not disappear as companies restructure and encourage individuality (3.6). Second, 
it indicates that not only Japan's elite companies offer lifetim e em ploym ent', but that sm aller 
companies, including the latest high-tech venture businesses like GA, also see benefits in lifetim e 
em ploym ent' for the future. T hirdly, in  the case of GA, lifetime em ploym ent is even being
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broadened to include female em ployees, as all employees are offered the choice of 'lifetime 
employment’. And finally, in the case of GA, those employees who are ostensibly employed 'for life’ 
are not privileged over other employees, do not regard themselves as above contract employees 
(keiyakif sha in) in some way, and are not regarded by the other employees as superior in one way or 
another. O aklander and W hittaker also make this point about smaller firms having long-serving 
employees (2.2), together with the point that new venture businesses, themselves small to medium- 
size companies (SME) are also offering ’lifetime employment’ (Oaklander and W hittaker 1997:174).
*******
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2.4) From a 'Company-Centred' Society to a 'People-Centred' Society
This section introduces the idea of 'corporate-centrism'. One of the problems of focusing on length of 
tenure is that the other practices and codes of conduct which make up the 'lifetime employm ent 
system', tend to be overlooked. For this reason, it is useful to look at another model of the Japanese 
workplace, that of 'corporate or company centrism'. Okum ura (1992) is Professor of Economics at 
Ryuukoku University in Kyoto and an authority on capitalism  in Japan. In his paper Corporate 
Capitalism: Cracks in the System (1992), he argues that 'corporate centrism ' (Okum ura 1985, 1992) is 
the defining characteristic of Japanese capitalism  rather than 'lifetime em ploym ent'. 'Corporate 
centrism ' refers to the central role that com panies, corporations, corporate groups, and task- 
orientated groups play in the lives of Japanese individuals, on an individual workplace level as 
employees, and on a national level in the national consciousness. Rather than foregrounding length 
of tenure, the term  'corporate centrism' focuses on the centrality of the workplace in people's lives. 
On a personal level, this has developed from employees being 'affiliated (shozoku sunt)' to a 'closed 
social group’ (Nakane 1970). On a national level, the privileging of companies was accomplished in 
the m anner I described in 1.2. At the personal level, Okum ura argues that 'corporate centrism' is 
generated by two mechanisms. (1): ’’a kind of absolutism based on the precepts that a company is 
eternal and m anagers and employees alike should subordinate themselves to it" (Okum ura 1992: 
55). The other (2): "employees aim for higher status in the company hierarchy fso] that ultimately an 
em ployee’s com pany consciousness rules his thoughts and his private life, reorientating every 
judgm ent tow ards serving the com pany's interests" (Okum ura 1992: 55). According to Okum ura, 
both these mechanisms developed after WWII, and resulted in 'company centrism ’, although the 
ethic of 'selfless devotion to one’s superiors’ and the moral aspect of 'occupation' described by Bellah 
(1985) (2.1) are clearly evident in this mechanism. Okum ura also adds that, in addition to these two 
m echanisms, 'corporate-centrism ' springs from: "the thorough and consistent diffusion of the 
philosophy [of 'corporate-centrism'] throughout Japanese society and the state" (Okum ura 1992: 57). 
Rohlen also describes how ie 'ideology', is used to motivate employees, through the idea that Imisha 
('the company') is om nipotent and eternal, and the current members are the custodians working for 
the continuation and im provem ent of the company for the sake of past and future members (Rohlen 
1974: 47). O kum ura then argues that this structure and ideology were bolstered by the privileged 
legal status of limited stock companies as 'artificial persons' (Clark 1979; O kum ura 1985, 1992; Arai 
1992). The government's privileging of companies over individuals to rebuild Japan, together with 
coercing the public to save in the national interest, also served to reinforce these developments (1.2). 
The 'society of industry' has then coerced companies, regardless of the size, to make dem ands on 
their employees which require them to put the company before family or themselves.
As I argued in 1,1, dissatisfaction with the dem ands companies were making on employees 
began to appear through the 1980s. These dissatisfactions centred on long working hours, lack of
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holidays/ and lack of personal privacy, which are a product of the two mechanisms noted above. In 
line w ith this, O kum ura continues his argum ent by foregrounding, not economic reasons why 
current ethics and practices are looking shaky, but moral reasons. Slowly through the 1980s, 
employees began to resist transfers (tanshin funin), while reports of karoshi, 'death from overwork’, 
not only began to receive media attention, but also resulted in families taking companies to court for 
damages. These isolated, but widely reported, incidences of resistance were an indication of the 
feelings of resentm ent resulting  from  the grow ing consciousness that the rew ards of Japan's 
economic successes were not being passed dow n to the people who were m aking it possible. The 
events which were precipitated by the Bubble (1.3) then revealed w idespread dissatisfaction. As 
O kum ura (1992) succinctly puts it: "Corporate capitalism  has come under attack [because] 
corporations totally ignore employee's personal circumstances" (Okumura 1992: 59). Kaneko (1997) 
is aware of the need to address this when he says: "the company-centred lifestyle...threatens the 
balance with family and society" (Kaneko 1997:154).
M orita (1992) is also aware of this, as the founder and former president of Sony makes us 
aware in an agenda which he thinks Japanese companies should seriously consider:
1 suspect that Japanese companies have reached a point where they need to thoroughly 
review  their fundam ental business practices. 1 believe they should consider the 
following points. (1) Shouldn’t Japanese companies allow employees more holidays 
and fewer working hours, so they can enjoy their lives more? W ouldn’t it be possible to 
move tow ards the American average of working hours, if not those of Germany and 
France? (2) Are salaries offered by Japanese companies enough to provide employees 
w ith a good ’quality of life'? Is the remuneration system of Japanese companies treating 
individuals fairly according to their contributions? ...(4) Are Japanese com panies 
treating their vendors fairly, in terms of conditions, like purchase price and delivery 
times?
Morita mentions a num ber of other points, concerning shareholders, local com m unities in the 
vicinity of companies, and resources/the environment. Overall, his points indicate that 'company 
centrism’ needs to be rethought, if companies are going to be able to motivate their staff and secure 
their loyalty in the future. Changing goals is a key point in the shift from a ’com pany-centred’ 
society to a ’people-centred’ society. Statistics suggest that Japan is changing from a society in which 
the majority regard w ork as being more im portant than leisure, to a society where more people 
think that leisure is more im portant. This watershed was reached in 1988, when an annual NHK^ 
'lifestyle questionnaire', conducted since 1955, showed for the first time that the majority think 
leisure is more im portant than w ork (Tsukio 1992). Government statistics indicate that this point 
was reached in 1996, in the annual white paper on leisure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Page. 
1 /7 /96). In another poll, the Japanese Electrical, Electronic and Information Union, Denki rengo, 
conducted a survey am ong factories in Japan, Korea, and China in the A utum n of 1994, which 
indicated similar findings (Japan Times 16/7/95). In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 
1989, 90% of newly recruited graduates, male and female, responded that they would not sacrifice 
their private life for their company.
The disaffection with 'corporate-centrism' was fanned by a series of statistics issued in the
^Nippon Host) Kaislm: Japan Broadcasting Corporation
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years just after the Bubble, which also suggested that the pursuit of economic wealth, while not in 
itself bad, had gone awry. In 1993 the nation was shocked by government statistics which revealed 
that 70% of teenage boys never speak to their fathers. Then a poll revealed that m any Japanese men 
between the ages of twenty-five and thirty w ould not marry a Japanese wom an as a first choice, 
many saying they would prefer a Phillipina or Thai wife because they would accept the role of wife 
and mother, unlike Japanese wom en today. Likewise, a num ber of Japanese wom en told me that 
m arriage would mean they would have to give up their independence and they were not prepared 
to do that. Then there was the '1.57 shock': as the average num ber of children for a Japanese couple 
fell below 2.0. While this is recognized as a feature of advanced industrial societies, this was 
regarded as a cause for alarm in Japan, and was interpreted as another sign that 'society' outside the 
workplace has been allowed to suffer in the name of economic success.
A shift away from 'company-centrism ' towards a more 'people-centred' approach is evident 
in the ethics and working practices at GA (3.4), w ith loyalty deriving from neither the company or 
the com pany’s employees making dem ands on the employees outside norm al w orking hours or 
outside the workplace, the modern example of 'selfless devotion to one's lord' (2.1). Rather than an 
ideology and discourses of 'company as family' pervading the workplace at GA, discourses of the 
family stay firmly outside the workplace, reinforcing the strict separation of work from the rest of an 
employee's life. This is what the shift from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society 
actually involves. The shift to a 'people-centred' society is intimately tied to a shift away from 
individual selves being defined through 'affiliation (shozoku)' to individual selves being defined and 
judged on the basis of their individuality (kosei) apprehended through individual acts (7.1). In GA, 
the category of the individual is given prim acy over other categories, including 'the company 
(kaisiia)' (3.3). The employees at GA are encouraged to develop their individuality (kosei), and a 
major part of this involves acceptance and recognition of m em bership groups other than those 
associated w ith the workplace, and allowing employees to place other aspects of their lives and 
other membership groups above the company or at least on an equal footing.
In the case of GA, the employees are encouraged to live their lives and develop their selves 
outside the workplace. However, although this is being discussed by Kaneko and others (5.1), many 
established com panies are having trouble shifting to this new  ’people-centred ' society which 
encourages the expression of ind iv iduality  in the w orkplace and recognizes it outside the 
workplace. What I have term ed a ’top-dow n' process in the case of GA and industry in general, 
because individualism is ushered in through the ethics and practices of the company, is taking time 
in many established companies (5.4). Many employees in these established companies, particularly 
the younger employees, are shunning the workplace as: "a circle of emotional attachment or nodal 
point of identity" (Kondo 1990:174). They are seeking out their own circles of emotional attachment 
and nodal points of identity in what have been called 'private groups' by Miyanaga (1991) (6.1). The 
pace of change is slow w ithin these workplaces, and Miyanaga argues that, as the expression of 
individuality emerges in the m ainstream  of Japanese society, individual selves look for settings 
other than their workplaces to orientate and define themselves, feeling unable to do so at work. 
Employees in a company like GA are encouraged to look outside the workplace to develop their
individuality, but GA is still the exception, not the norm. As Miyanaga (1991) argues, and as I will 
attem pt to dem onstrate using the example of underground dance music Techno parties, primarily 
young Japanese, that is persons up to the age of thirty five, are indeed forming 'private groups', 
’groups entered voluntarily on the basis of personal commitment’ (Miyanaga 1991), bu t not only 
because the pace of change to embrace individuality is slow in established companies. The growth 
of a flexible economy (Harvey 1989; 1990) creates w orking practices w hich give employees the 
opportunity to form collective selves, not on the basis of 'frames (bo), but on the basis of attribute by 
forming ’private’ groups, forming circles of emotional attachment and nodal points of identity away 
from the workplace, ’entered voluntarily on the basis of personal commitment' (Miyanaga 1991). 1 
discovered that these increasing num bers of people do indeed form ’private’ groups (6.2), so that we 
can speculate that, in a ’people-centred’ Japan which has embraced individuality (kosei), ’private' 
groups will vie w ith corporate groups as the primary locus of personal identity.
********
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to dem onstrate how current anthropological representations of 'the 
lifetime employm ent system' have tended to focus on length of tenure, which has obscured other 
aspects of working practices in large Japanese companies, together w ith their continuity across the 
whole of Japanese society. It has been necessary to address this distortion, in order to engage with 
the debate about changing workplace ethics and practice in Japan since the collapse of the Bubble, 
which has been presented as the 'collapse' or ‘unravelling’ of 'the lifetime employment system’.
’The lifetime em ploym ent system ’ in the anthropological im agination is essentially the 
practice of offering male full-time employees the guarantee of a job until the age of sixty (fifty five, 
before 1980). Consequently, anybody who was not a male full-time employee in a company which 
was regarded as offering 'lifetime employment', came to be regarded as outside this ’system ’. This 
included male full-time employees who did not stay with their companies, for what ever reason. In 
addition, the incidence of male full-time employees who were guaranteed 'lifetime employment' 
who actually did only work for one company from graduation until the age of fifty five or sixty, was 
shown to be less than all those who were offered it. This data was then used to argue that 'the 
lifetime employment system' not only affected a minority of the population, but that over the years, 
an increasing num ber of this m inority could not be accounted for un d er the 'system ' either. 
Consequently the lifetim e employment system' came to be regarded as a 'conceptual slippage' and a 
'myth'.
Such a position fails in a num ber of im portant ways. By focusing on the practice of lifetime 
em ploym ent', and length of tenure in particular, the matrices of ethics and practices, of which 
lifetime employment' is an ideal consequence, came to be ignored. Focusing on length of tenure also 
leads to a position where the w ork ethics of male full-time employees w ho leave their companies 
come to be regarded as generically different from their colleagues who stay. Such a position is 
clearly wrong-headed and untenable. It also obscures the influence and immanence of the ideal of 
lifetime employment, and of the matrices of ethics and practices which engender it. Not only are all 
employees in a company which is perceived to operate a lifetim e em ploym ent policy' subject to 
fundamentally the same codes and practices, there are no significant differences, if any at all, in 
ethics and practice between companies w hich are regarded as operating a 'lifetime em ploym ent 
policy', and those which don't. 'Lifetime em ploym ent' is thought to be an ideal which only the 
largest companies can afford, but smaller companies try to emulate the prestigious few. Focusing 
solely on length of tenure, has obscured the fact that most employees in Japan have been subject to 
these ethics and practices, to the point where companies that offer lifetime employment have come 
to be regarded as generically different in the anthropological literature. This is incorrect and 
obscures the consistency and continuity of workplace ethics and practices across society as a whole. 
The case of GA (3.5) and the findings of others (Oaklander and W hittaker 1997), also indicates that
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small and medium size companies (SME) also offer 'lifetime employment', not to send a signal to the 
'society of industry ', as Clark suggests, but to achieve certain task-related ends. Yahata (1997), 
Kaneko (1997), Oaklander (1997) and Whittaker (1997) also hold the view that 'lifetime employment' 
has tangible benefits on worker morale, corporate development, and broader social stability.
Local conceptions of 'lifetime employment', and of a 'lifetime employment system', together 
w ith local conceptions of the role w hich these totems have in society generally, hold far more 
significance am ong the Japanese people than they do in anthropological representations. When 
Japanese say that ’the lifetime em ploym ent system' is collapsing, or unravelling (Yamamoto 1993), 
they are referring to changes to the prevailing values and practices of the workplace in Japan (5.4), 
which in turn legitimates values and practices widely held throughout society (Nakane 1970; Rohlen 
1974; Bellah 1985; Hendry 1993). To talk of the 'lifetime employment system' collapsing is not to talk 
about changes to a particular working practice confined to a select num ber of male employees. Talk 
of the 'lifetime employm ent system' collapsing, or more accurately, being dism antled, refers to a 
comprehensive shift in work ethics and practices which is affecting the whole of society.
1 then considered the future of 'lifetime employment' in the afterm ath of the Bubble, and 
discovered that 'lifetime employm ent' is still regarded as having an im portant role, w ith certain 
tasks within a company being regarded as ideally undertaken by employees who will stay with the 
com pany for m any years. That ’lifetime em ploym ent' will continue to exist, engendered by a 
different set work ethics and practices (2.4), is borne out by the example of Graphic Automation, a 
CAD software developm ent and m anufacturing company, where I undertook fieldwork. At the 
same time, it is recognised that other tasks, many of which were previously undertaken by 'lifetime 
employees (sei sha in)' can now be better dispatched by employees who are employed under fixed- 
term contracts (kehjaku sha in), even though these will be renewed in most cases, over a num ber of 
years. According to Kaneko (1997), under the new 'portfolio1 arrangements, and again corroborated 
by the example of GA, 'lifetime employees' are not privileged over other employees. At GA, this is 
borne out by the fact that contract employees are just as likely as 'lifetime employees' to hold 
management positions (3.2). Although it looks as though 'lifetime employment' will be restricted to 
fewer employees, the example of GA suggests that this will include women, m arking a fundamental 
shift in ethics and practice, while continuing the practice of lifetim e employment' for a restricted 
num ber of specific task-related positions.
In the final section I suggested that 'corporate centrism’ is a better m odel than 'the lifetime 
em ploym ent system ’ to understand  and explain company structure and w orkplace ethics and 
practice, as it has developed in the post WWII period. It is also a better model to explain the process 
of change described as a shift from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society. This 
shift away from the workplace in orientating and defining persons is accompanied by the rise of 
'private groups', w hich is itself an indication of the increase in the num bers of people looking to 
express their individuality (kosei). I regard this establishing of individual selves by means of 'private 
groups' as a 'bottom -up' process, as prim arily persons w ith no formal or legitim ate m eans of 
expressing their individuality, that is to say, persons who cannot express their individuality in the 
workplace, seek other settings in which to do so. Before turning to consider this 'bottom-up process,
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I want to look at a 'top-down' example: a company which encourages and nurtures individuality 
(kosei) through its organisational structure and command structure, while also continuing to regard 
'lifetime employment' as advantageous.
92
93
3. Uchi no Kaisha: Company as a C ollectivity o f Individual Selves
1) M ethod
2) The Only Way is Out
3) Command Structure: The Sam e In Name Only
4) Space and Tim e and th e  Reordering o f Priorities
5) M otivations and Rewards
6) Company as a C ollectivity o f Individual Selves
This chapter begins to look in detail at the kinds of changes in attitudes to work, working practices, 
and relationships between employees, which are occurring in Japan at the moment. I will approach 
this through a study of a computer-aided design (CAD) software development company in Nakano, 
in the sprawling western suburbs of Tokyo. In subsequent chapters, I will attem pt to dem onstrate 
how these changes in attitudes, practices and interpersonal relationships, are redefining ideas about 
the individual self and its relationship to other individual selves.
The company is in fact two companies, Graphic Automation and GA Systems, collectively 
known as GA Group. It was founded as Graphic Automation in 1983 by the president, Matsuda-san, 
a com puter softw are engineer by profession. G raphic A utom ation is the developm ent and 
production company. GA Systems is the sales and adm inistrative arm  of the group. Graphic 
Automation currently employs forty seven people, development engineers, software testers, manual 
writers and editors, after sales engineers, etc. GA Systems employs seventy people, mainly sales 
staff in branches around the country, and administrative staff in Nakano. The company also has its 
main developm ent centre in Yamanashi prefecture, just outside Tokyo, a developm ent and sales 
centre in Beijing, and a development centre in Limerick in Ireland.
The first section concerns method: How GA was selected as an object of investigation. How 
that relates to the research question - not necessarily unproblemmatically or directly. I then discuss 
the developm ent of the specific research questions relating to GA, once selected as an object of 
investigation. The research process is also considered, as this also is not a static process which moves 
along a predeterm ined course. The research process is also considered as a dynam ic process in 
which the researcher is situated, attem pting to maintain a predetermined course, while allowing for 
the research question to develop in the light of the incoming data. These and other issues concerning 
the fiaming, collecting and analysis, of the research data are addressed in Section One.
Section Two describes GA, in  term s of its historical developm ent and its organisational
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structure. This is approached through the analysis and discussion of the one major semi-structured 
interview w ith the com pany president. Many of the criticisms levelled at Japanese companies 
discussed in the previous two chapters are held by Matsuda-san, and GA is a good example of a 
company which is built on the kinds of principles being advocated w ithin the country, and 
discussed in the previous two chapters and in Chapter Five.
Section Three takes up  from Section Two, to consider in detail the organisational structure 
and com m and structure of the com pany, prim arily through the analysis of sem i-structured 
interviews with the staff, and then through a process of corroboration, through my participation 
and observation as a part-time m ember of the company. The way in which organisational structure, 
and the distribution of responsibility within the company is engendered by and reinforces an ethics 
of individuality  is discussed. I then dem onstrate how this then legitimizes and consequently 
engenders a sense of the individual self as the prim ary unit of social organisation. GA is then 
compared to other companies in the literature on japan, as well as in its current temporal and spatial 
context.
Section Four looks at how the organisation of space and time in the company reflects and 
reinforces the philosophical, ethical, and economic aims of the com pany, achieved through a 
radically reordered organisational structure and command structure, and an ethics of individualism.
Section Five considers the reordering of motivations and rew ards which the reconfigured 
ethical base and organisational structure engenders and is engendered by. It is apparent that, as in 
the organisation of time and space discussed in Section Four, the m anner in which employees are 
m otivated and rewarded is also radically different from companies colloquially regarded as 'up- 
down companies' (joge gaisha), a reference to the rigid, hierarchically structure which characterizes 
them.
Section Six, finishes the chapter by dem onstrating that GA is a collectivity of individual 
selves, rather than a 'group' (sluiudan). This was a distinction m ade by m any of the employees 
themselves, as they described the relationship between the individual self and the collectivity within 
GA. The section title, 'Company as a Collectivity of Individual Selves', is a reference, indicating a 
departure from, the popular expression 'Company as Family', as used by Kondo (1990).
*******
95
3.1) M ethods
I came across Graphic A utom ation by pure chance. An Irish friend of mine has his own English 
school in Tokyo and had often mentioned that lessons at a software company he taught at were very 
rew arding for him as a teacher. Alan, my friend, is also an acupuncturist and a qualified shiatsn1 
practitioner, and I knew that English lessons at this company ranged from the spiritual to the 
material, the tangible to the intangible, and all points in between. Unfortunately for Alan, he was 
knocked off his bicycle by a parcel delivery van one day, which put him in hospital for four weeks, 
and left him unable to walk further than the nearest convenience store for nearly two months. Alan's 
misfortune, however, was my good fortune. He asked me if I could take some of his classes, one of 
which was the class at the software company. "It’ll be good for your research!", he quipped. At the 
time I was looking for a company to study the effects on personhood of the new working practices 
and w orkplace ethics w hich w ere being discussed everyw here in the m edia, but I d id n 't 
immediately think that Alan's software company might be the answer. I had been thinking along the 
lines of Sony or a large international Japanese company, and it was only at the end of the first lesson 
I took at GA that Matsuda-san, the president, asked me about my research, and told me that if there 
was anything he could do to help, just ask. In my journal I wrote about my first meeting with 
M atsuda-san and the two other employees who were taking English lessons at the time:
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The president w as w ith Toshiba for five years before he left to s ta rt G raphic
Autom ation. After four years he had enough of not being able to use his ideas or
initiative. He told me 'the company structure makes it impossible'.
I did not pursue the conversation, as it was our first meeting, but his reasons for leaving Toshiba 
were exactly those which were driv ing the calls for change in the country, and which I was 
interested in studying. On the train home afterwards, I decided that, at the end of the last lesson 
before Alan returned to take over, I would ask Matsuda-san if I could study his company. I taught at 
GA on a Monday night for six weeks, which was a perfect introduction to what I had in mind. At the 
end of that six weeks, we were all on easy terms with each other and it was very easy for me to ask 
M atsuda-san if I could conduct some research in GA. He replied: "In principle, of course". I added 
quickly that I d idn 't yet know exactly w hat form the research would take but w hen I had a better 
idea I would contact him, and we left it at that.
This was an im portant tu rn ing  point for me. I was elated by the prospect of studying 
Graphic Autom ation as I made my way from their offices, three m inutes walk away from Nakano 
station. The path from GA passes through a large bicycle com pound, which was still half full of 
bicycles at 8:30pm on a warm April Tokyo evening, and the combination of Spring in the air and the 
feeling that my research had taken a great leap forward, filled me w ith  w hat seemed like an
1Shiatsu is Japanese finger pressure massage. Shi means 'finger', ntsu means 'pressure'.
9 6
inappropriate level of excitement. But I realised almost immediately that it was the feeling of relief, 
that after months of worry about the direction of my research, chance had carried me in the right 
direction. As the train m ade its familiar journey to Shinjuku, I began to think about the role of 
chance in research. As I pondered on the experience of finding a company which fitted the one 1 was 
hoping to find to an extent beyond that which I could have imagined, through a series of bizarre 
events, I was draw n to make a connection between something I had learnt about life, bu t had not 
really understood about research. In life I had learnt to work w ith events, to set goals and pursue 
targets, but to always be ready to modify existing plans in the light of changing circumstances. This 
to me is common sense, yet only now was I rem inded of G adam er discussing 'horizons' of 
experience (Gadamer 1975). Gadamer tells me something about research which I apply to life almost 
without thinking, but which I had not applied reflexively and systematically to my research. The 
desire, more than that, the need, that my data corroborate my still unformed hypotheses concerning 
the effects of the Bubble and its collapse began to evaporate. Equanimity came over me as I realised 
that my security, and my piece of m ind, lay in the authority  of my em pirical data and my 
relationship to it, not in my ability to collect data which supports my inarticulate hypotheses. This 
understanding came as GA appeared on my horizon.
After having taught M atsuda-san, the president, and a num ber of other staff on a Monday 
night over six weeks, I w orked in this company on an occasional basis for nearly a year, as an 
English coach and translator, coaching staff members for speeches and meetings which they had to 
give, often abroad, and translating and preparing marketing and legal documents.
*******
I knew that it may be difficult to get access to a company which was undergoing the kind of 
restructuring program me typical of those being advocated (2.3, 2.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4). I had scoured my 
memory for any contacts that I thought m ight be able to introduce me to such as company, and 
couldn't think of any. For this reason, in the absence of any (cone (connections), I had thought that if 
my first contact w ith a company was to be impersonal, that is, not through a m utual acquaintance, it 
would be easier to approach a large company on the basis of my credentials as a Ph.D research 
scholar at a well-known school.
Here was a significant barrier to a research project. Factors which did not relate to my ability 
to carry out the research, or relate to the quality of the research idea, can significantly affect the 
research. Circumstances outside those norm ally considered valid reasons for being unable to 
conduct research, such as lack of funding, ideas, or ability, can potentially scupper a research project 
or send it in a direction not envisaged by the researcher. Not every aspect of the research project or 
process is a decision made on the basis of free choice. Quite often, the researcher has no choice. The 
tru th  is, that the research project exists w ithin a set of dynamic conditions, where fate and chance 
can play an im portant role.
Having stumbled upon a company through chance, rather than by logically and rigorously 
identifying and selecting one that would allow me to test my hypotheses, I then turned to consider 
the task of developing the specific research questions relating to this particular company. A process
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which began immediately after my first visit to GA, on the train back to Shinjuku, and which 
consum ed m uch of the following day - sitting in my two-room apartm ent scribbling in my 
notebook. The fit between GA and the kind of company I was looking for was remarkably good, 
which I regard as lucky. Therefore, 1 regard my research to have been influenced, not only by fate 
and chance, but also by luck. The researcher has difficulty accomodating these factors in the design 
of the research project, but they need to be recognised and discussed as part of the research 
methodology.
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It would be nice to say that my decision to undertake formal interview s at the earliest possible 
opportunity  was also a decision guided by sound methodological reasons, over w hich I had 
complete control, but again this was not the case. Once again, the research environm ent played an 
im portant role in the timing, location, and setting of the interviews. M atsuda-san's w ords 'in 
principle', and a limit of one hour per interview, were key factors in framing the questions, and in 
the design of the interview. In this way, M atsuda-san took much of the control over the research 
process concerning the collection of data at GA, out of my hands.
I was asked by M atsuda-san to write a brief outline of my research objectives, and to give 
details of how many people I w anted to speak to, and for how long. I described my research idea 
and drew  attention to the suitability of GA. I asked if 1 could interview  tw enty people, from 
different sections of the company, of differing degrees of responsibility, both men and women. I also 
said that the interview would not take more than one and a half hours. In the brief, I stressed that 
the research was for a Ph.D thesis, and that the confidentiality of the employees and of the company 
would be respected.
The reply came through Alan, who told me that Matsuda-san had agreed to give me access 
to GA. Twenty people was no problem, but the interviews would have to be one hour long. My 
decision to ask for twenty interviews was based mainly on logistical reasons. The interviews were to 
be conducted in Japanese, which I would have to transcribe and then translate, in order to undertake 
the close-reading and detailed analysis of language that I intended. Twenty interviews were likely to 
result in thirty hours of tape. With transcribing, translating, and analysis included, I knew that this 
num ber of interviews alone would result in months of work.
Alan told me that a Nonaka-san was waiting for me to call him. Nonaka-san was a kacho in 
the General Affairs section. He gave me a series of dates for me to choose from, all of which were in 
the next three weeks. Consequently, the timing of the interviews was taken out of my hands. They 
took place over three days, a morning and afternoon session with a break for lunch.
The location of the interviews, and the setting, were also decided for me. However, I judged 
this to be acceptable for two reasons. First of all, I was keen to keep disruption to a minimum, and 
cause as little meiwaku (bother) as possible.2 Secondly, organising twenty interviews, as well as 
m aintaining the same conditions for all of them would have been very difficult. I had envisaged
2Meiwaku is a word commonly used when people are referring to sekentei.
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having to sit hunched over endless coffees in Subway Sandwich or D unkin' Donuts, tw isting 
uncomfortably on plastic seats trying to get comfortable, my interlocutor carefully shielding his or 
her w ords from those around us, who w ould undoubtedly  be interested in the spectacle of 
anthropology in the making. Authority and validity would have been far less obvious under such 
conditions. And of course, I w ould  have ended up w ith a tape of the interview  garbled 
incomprehensibly somewhere underneath the Beatles or some Japanese tarento.
Having completed the interviews, I was very happy w ith the data I had collected, and any 
worries I had concerning my lack of control over the timing, location, and setting of the interviews 
evaporated. Anthropological method in action is often a trade-off between competing potentialities, 
all of them with their advantages and disadvantages, sometimes difficult to assess. In this case, I am 
sure my data would have been poorer had GA not been involved in the way they were. By the time I 
had returned to London to begin writing up, after I had worked at GA for nearly a year, I decided 
that I had made the right decision for another reason: Before I got to know the employees well, and 
before I became embroiled in company politics. As things had stood, the conditions under which all 
the GA interviews were conducted had remained very constant, something which is not necessarily 
easy to maintain in anthropological research.
Upon my arrival at the company on the first day of the interviews, I was met by Nonaka-san, who 
took me to the m eeting room and handed me a list of the day's interviewees, carefully typed in 
Japanese, with my name and university at the top of the sheet. I had thought it appropriate to dress 
in a similar way to those 1 was interviewing, in order to reduce the sense of distance between us. 
Consequently, 1 wore a suit and tie. I also calculated that this would give a sense of gravitas to the 
proceeding, which would impact positively in a company setting.
From the m om ent to stepped off the 'plane when I arrived in Japan to do fieldwork, I 
constantly reflected on the effect of my race, nationality, and gender on my perception of the 
country and my encounter w ith it. So it was w ith my thoughts about what I should wear to the 
interviews, and in the way I monitored and judged my relationship to the constantly developing 
research environment. When discussing the effect of factors such as race, gender and nationality, 
and of the role of the researcher in the research process generally, I think it is easier to first consider 
them, not only from the perspective of the design or the conducting of the research, bu t from the 
perspective of the quality of the data collected, judged against the best that has been presented and 
written about by anthropologists of all specialization's already. Tliis is just another reason why it is 
im portant to read outside one's own field.3 To me this is logical. O n this basis, I can say w ith some 
conviction, that my race, nationality, or gender, did not significantly com prom ise my data. It 
undoubtedly affected it, but that is more difficult to assess, let alone quantify. The fact that I say that
h ’his raises the question of whether a bias exists across a whole canon of work, as it has done until very recently. If the 
whole body of anthropological work is by middle class white males of European descent, then this will only disguise the role 
of the race, gender, or class of the researcher, as it did. Today, with a body of literature written and researched by a wider 
cross-section of individual backgrounds, and with a consciousness of these factors now incorporated into anthropological 
theory and method, this method of comparing against other's work to judge the role of the construction of one's own self in 
the research, is more rigorous and more acceptable.
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these factors did not noticeably compromise my data, and therefore my ability to collect it, should 
not be so surprising given the subject of the investigation. Clearly, 1 could have had a great deal 
more difficulty studying other aspects of Japan, as a result of being, for example, non-Japanese, or 
being male. These were considerations I thought about at the very beginning of the research process, 
when capabilities and resources are considered. The role of the researcher in the research project is 
first considered as part of the assessm ent of the overall feasibility of the research project. 
Subsequently, as I described above, I reflected constantly on these aspects of my own self, as I went 
about the business of doing anthropology.
*******
I had a little over two weeks to consider the subjects I wanted to cover in the interviews in order to 
test my thesis. I had been thinking about this and scribbling ideas for m onths, so it did not take 
m uch time to w rite the interview  questions (Appendix A). I w anted to study the com pany’s 
philosophy, its organisational structu re  and its com m and structure , and  how these w ere 
interrelated. I wanted to study the rew ard system, motivational goals, the decision-making process, 
and how responsibility is located within the company. I also wanted to situate GA in its historical 
and spatial context. The structure of the interview was important. I wanted to lead the interviewee 
into the subject, with simple questions requiring short answers, to make them comfortable. Many of 
the questions involved concepts of a quite abstract nature. Therefore, I began with questions locating 
the interview ee w ith in  GA, followed by questions about the com pany's structure and the 
interviewee's working relationships. I then moved to discuss the key w ords which would become 
the focal point of the analysis. I was hoping that, with prom pting and interlocution, these questions 
concerning the key words I was interested in, would lead the interviewee to answer at length.
The interviews were recorded using a tape recorder. This did not appear to present a 
problem. I was aware that some people m ight not wish to be recorded, but 1 assured people of the 
confidentiality of the interviews, and nobody stared anxiously at the tape recorder. There was also 
no alternative. Using a 'strategy of capture' (Cohen and Rapport 1995:) which relies on narratives 
requires a careful and intricate dissection and assessment of language, which can only be achieved if 
the anthropologist has captured the nuances of intonation and choice of word.
The main research method, then, was a sem i-structured interview using a combination of 
closed and open questioning. By 'semi-structured', I mean that I had a list of questions which I asked 
all interviewees, which was to serve as the basis of the interview, and which w ould provide the 
consistency of questioning required to build an analysis. I spent one m orning writing the questions, 
in English, which I then left and returned to over the next two days for half an hour or so at a time, 
or when som ething came to m ind which I wanted to add or change. I avoided closed questions 
com pletely in the formal questioning. Closed questions were asked spontaneously  during  
discussion, to clarify points. Having arrived at a list of open questions which w ould take about an
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hour to deliver and answer, I translated them  into Japanese. There was no pilot interview .4 In the 
interviews, some of the questions were not understood clearly, or seemed irrelevant in the light of 
some of the answers to other questions, and I therefore modified them  by the m iddle of the 
afternoon session on the first day .5 Although, the interviews were arranged to take one hour, they 
ran over by up to twenty minutes in some cases. This was not a problem, as some interviews took 
less than one hour.
As one interview finished, the interviewee would depart from the meeting room and tell the 
next person it was their turn. I usually had a break of a couple of m inutes between interviewees, to 
stand up and stretch my legs, make a few notes, and assess whether the questions were working 
satisfactorily. No arrangements were made for lunch, and I therefore took the opportunity at the end 
of some of the interviews to ask the employees if there were any decent mmemjasan (noodle bars) 
around Nakano station.
At the time of the GA interviews, I had not considered interviewing more than one person 
at a time, believing that individuals in Japan are less likely to be frank and open if in the company of 
others. Therefore, being confronted with an interview ing schedule of one-on-one interviews was 
judged to be acceptable. In view of the fact that I was very happy w ith the GA data, I would most 
likely have chosen to do the GA interviews in the same way, if given the choice now. Even though 
the employees at the company are encouraged, required even, to express their 'individuality (kosei)’, 
or their 'selves (jibun)', and are defined as 'equal (taito)', not only by each other, but by the 
organisational structure and com m and structure of the company, they were colleagues, m any of 
whom hardly knew each other, not friends who would be more likely to speak more openly with 
each other. In addition, the company was a more formal interview setting than the more relaxed 
settings in which I interviewed the party-goers, which I believed suited a more confidential style of 
interviewing, such as one-on-one.
I w ondered if such close proximity to the workplace, and so evidently w ith the authority of 
the company, would adversely the interviews, or bias them in some way. On the basis of the data, I 
would say that this proximity was not detrimental. People were clearly willing to talk to me, and to 
apply themselves. None of my questions directly asked for opinions on the company or on members 
of the company, and I carefully assured everyone of the confidentiality of their responses. The 
setting of the interviews, was certainly different from that which I could reasonably have planned, 
organised as they were by GA. The setting was very formal, som ething that I attem pted to de- 
emphasize, a little, but which I'm sure was crucial in making the interviewees apply themselves to 
the questions seriously. The interview s took place in the m eeting room , w hich was also the 
boardroom. It was a rectangle of about ten metres by five metres, with a large polished wood table 
surrounded w ith fourteen black leather chairs. I sat at one end, and the interviewees would enter
%ix months earlier, I had written a structured interview, which when tested on a number of friends (some of whom I 
eventually interviewed for Chapters Six and Seven) ran to over three hours. This endeavour certainly gave me practice and 
experience in designing and writing an interview.
^Question 15 (see Appendix A ) . The question was designed around terms used by Inoue (1977), but none of the interviewees 
understood, or had heard of the term juttkyo shuudmi, which translates as 'reference group*. My first thought was that my 
pronounciation was the problem, but nobody understood the term when I wrote the Chinese characters, either. They were 
more familiar with shozofat shuudnn, which translates as 'membership group*. See 4.4 concerning jtuikfjo shuudmi and sltozoku 
sHuudan.
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from a door on the side at the other end of the room. They were required to walk across the room, 
while I stood and waited for them, before offering them a chair. Authority and validity were not in 
doubt, and veiy visible.
1 started the interview w ithout any introduction, a tactical decision to keep preconception to 
a minimum. Because of the abstract nature of many of the questions, it often took the interviewees a 
minute or two of thought, maybe seeking qualification of the question, or repeating the question to 
themselves, starting and then stopping a couple of times, all before giving considered answers. All 
of which was carefully analyzed and m eaning extracted. Some interview ees d id  not provide 
answers as long as others, but their answers did not in anyway suggest that they were wary of any 
repercussions from their participation. In fact, eveiybody was veiy candid. When I returned to the 
UK and was considering these issues, I concluded that this proximity, together w ith my association 
with a well-known school, and my business-like manner, all had the effect of conferring validity and 
authority on the research project, and had been instrumental in people making an effort to engage 
with the research questions to the degree they did. Many of the interviewees said they found the 
questions interesting, and tills also must have made a difference.
As the interviewees came and went, it was apparent that M atsuda-san had carefully selected 
a cross-section of ages, departments, gender, length of time with the company, and even characters; 
ranging from the ebullient to the quiet. How were they selected, I wondered? At the end of my 
interview with M atsuda-san, held a couple of days after the other sessions, I asked him how the 
interviewees had been selected. He had asked for volunteers, by email, and had sixty three replies 
from employees expressing an interest in participating. He had selected twenty with reference to my 
brief. On the days when the sessions were held, not everybody was able to attend. In four cases, this 
was due to work which had to take priority. Two others had called in sick.
During the following nine months, I met a num ber of those whom  I had interviewed, but we 
did not discuss the interviews at all. I made it clear that I was not undertaking research while I was 
working for the company, although I was open about anthropological fieldwork method. If people 
asked, and some did, I would tell them that I keep a journal, like a diary, in which I write notes and 
thoughts, but this did not seem to bother or concern people. After one or two incidents at work 
when voices were raised, or something unusual happened, somebody would always ask me if I was 
going to write about it, or if I d id  write about it, in my 'notebook'. 1 always responded with 'No' if 
asked about specific incidents or particular individuals.
*******
Having checked that the recording levels were satisfactory after each interview, I did not listen to 
the tapes for over a year, until I was back in our apartm ent in Oxford where I transcribed the tapes 
and translated them with the help of my wife. I did not translate the party-goers' interviews until I 
had com pleted the analysis of the GA tapes, and written Chapters Three and Four. The way in 
which the analysis progresses through the thesis maintains the integrity of this process. This is 
evident in the analysis and discussion of the w ord shtiudan, and in the argum ent concerning the 
transform ation of the individual self to a more individualistic self. The same is also true for the
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analysis of seken and sekentei. It was only after the translation and close-reading of the party-goers' 
interviews, after having written the chapters about GA, that I was able to draw  the conclusions I did. 
I did consider rew riting Chapters Three and Four to include these findings, but decided that the 
thesis was more interesting if it unfolded like a detective novel! Maintaining the integrity of the way 
the data is analyzed also reveals the process of the analysis if the final results are left until the end.
’ik 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
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3.2) The Only Way is Out
M atsuda-san graduated from Kyoto University with a degree in Com puter Science in 1978, and 
joined Toshiba as a systems engineer that year. He was immediately confronted with a situation 
whereby he could not develop any of his own ideas. "1 was the lowest cell in a big system. In that 
environm ent it was very difficult for me to develop my ideas for com pany products. It was veiy 
difficult for me to work directly w ith the market". When he had been with Toshiba for about two 
years. A friend of his had casually asked him if it was possible to develop a draw ing system for a 
personal computer. Stimulated by the challenge, during the evenings and at weekends M atsuda-san 
worked on a subsystem  of a full-sized CAD system. It took him six m onths, at which point he 
showed the software to a friend of his who was an expert in CAD software. "He was very surprised. 
He said it was incredible to make such software for a PC".
At first M atsuda-san tried to have his software made by Toshiba ; "but it was impossible 
because my division worked on com puter systems for the government. Toshiba had a CAD division, 
but it was very difficult for me to transfer because I had my work on Government projects". I asked 
him if the CAD division at Toshiba knew about his software. "I don’t think so. It would be unlikely 
that my boss would have said anything because he needed me, and they had their own projects”. I 
then asked him if he couldn't have approached the CAD division himself. "No that would have been 
impossible, I couldn't approach anybody myself, directly". Even if he had been in the CAD division, 
he thought that he w ould not have been able to develop his software. "I was the lowest in the 
company and those above me had their own ideas, I'm sure, so I would have had to wait my turn to 
develop my product. Also, nobody had developed a CAD for PC and they probably w ould have 
thought it was a badly conceived idea". When M atsuda-san told his boss he wanted to leave, his 
boss tried vigorously to discourage him:
Eveiybody was against it. At first my family d idn’t think I could make it on my own.
They thought it was m uch better if I stayed with Toshiba . My boss at Toshiba said the 
same thing. And then the head of the factory where I was working came to my house 
and talked to m y parents, and asked them  to stop me leaving. But my father 
understood the situation very well, and said that if I had my own vision he would help 
me. To begin with, Toshiba asked me to wait for three years because I was working on 
im portant projects for them, but if I waited three years, maybe the opportunity would 
pass. So, my boss negotiated w ith the company that I could leave after six months.
I asked him w hether Toshiba tried to m ake him stay by offering him the chance to develop his 
software; "No, but that would have been impossible because Toshiba’s CAD division was working 
on other projects".
Here we have a good example of the kind of organisational inflexibility at the centre of the 
restructuring debates (5.1). Ideas can only be developed from very specific points w ithin the 
organisation. Such inflexibility is created by a self-interest which is the result of status accrued 
through an inward-looking inter-factional competition of the kind described by Nakane (1970) and
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Uekusa (1995), rather than an outward-looking customer service (CS) orientated reward structure. It 
was not in the interests of M atsuda san's boss to try to help M atsuda-san develop his software for 
three reasons: (1) He had his own Government contracts to work on which needed to be completed 
within a given time; (2): M atsuda-san was a valuable m ember of his team, and losing him would 
jeopardise those targets; (3) his division was in competition with other divisions, in terms of targets, 
on which M atsuda-san's boss’ own reputation rested. Directly related to this final point, the CAD 
division were protective of their own staff and their ideas. M atsuda-san put this down to habatsu 
(factions): "Yes, there are many habatsu in Toshiba , and they are very inefficient". Nakane’s (1970) 
description of habatsu is recognisable in M atsuda san’s account of Toshiba :
habatsu...are preoccupied with interpersonal relations inside factions, interrelations of factions within-a-
faction and interfactional disputes. Thus, the goals of the organisation tend to be deflected (Nakane 1970:
55).
The organisational structure of the Toshiba factory engendered a double blow for the company in 
this case: the loss of a very capable employee, and the loss of ground-breaking technology. Matsuda- 
san eventually left Toshiba in M arch 1983, at the age of tw enty five, and started  G raphic 
A utom ation from a single room in Nakano. He contacted a famous venture capital software 
company called Softbank, which at that time had been established two years previously by a Mr 
Sung, himself only twenty two at the time. "I contacted them in 1982. At the time, Softbank were a 
successful distribution company, now they are the biggest. I told Mr Sung about my idea and he 
suggested I meet somebody he knew who had a company (called YDK) which sold CAD systems. 
The president of the company was also a graduate of Kyoto University, the same university as me". I 
asked M atsuda-san if the fact that they went to the same university was a help; " Yes, it was a big 
help. He said he w ould sell my software to his customers. So, I finished my product and his 
company sold it for me".
No sooner had M atsuda-san set up shop in his single room in Nakano, when one of his 
former colleagues came looking for him. "When I left T oshiba, they m ade me promise not to take 
any Toshiba employees after I left, but one young engineer to whom I taught software technology 
came to me and said he wanted to help me. "I want to help you. I don't want a salary, I'll work part- 
time". "But I said I’d hire him part-time. There are many things to do to make com puter products, 
such as programming, testing the software, making manuals, and also sales. One of his friends also 
came and worked for me part-time, so I had two employees". While there was just Matsuda-san, he 
did not have a title, bu t w hen he was joined by his first two em ployees, he became shacho, 
"Company Executive Officer". To begin with, his two employees did not have any titles. "But after a 
while, one became 'Technical Consultant1 and ’After-Sales M anager', and the other became 'Sales 
Manager’".
Initially they sold nothing, but the following year, they developed an upgraded version and 
sold one hundred packages in the six months from May 1984 to November 1984, and earned ¥20m. 
At that time, the 16bit PC arrived. M atsuda san's software ran between five and ten times faster on 
16bit machines; "with 16 bit machines, CAD software became an essential system, so our sales 
increased rapidly, and after one year we earned Y300m."
At this point, M atsuda-san came across one of the problem s facing small companies:
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recruiting high calibre staff. He w anted to recruit another software engineer to develop the 
company's products along w ith himself, bu t he could not attract new graduates from the top 
universities because they all wanted to work for NEC or Fujitsu, or IBM. He had two arubeito (part- 
timers) from a local university, helping with manuals and software testing, but when I asked if they 
stayed on when they graduated, M atsuda-san replied; "They w ouldn't come and work for me, they 
went to w ork for Fujitsu". M atsuda-san had to use recruitm ent m agazines6 and had no luck in 
attracting anybody for nearly a year. He eventually decided to commission a big software company. 
"I was making a lot of money and wanted a better product, so I paid a big software company with 
many good engineers, graduates of Tokyo U niversity or Kyoto U niversity. I designed the 
specification and paid ¥50m, but after one year I got a product that was too big to work on a PC, It 
was too complicated and too slow, so it was difficult to sell. I d idn 't know w hat to do". Again he 
resorted to putting a classified in a recruitment magazine:
One young boy of eighteen replied. He was a ticket puncher at Yuuenji Korakuen7, 
whose hobby was designing software on his PC. I asked him what kind of software he 
developed, and he said; "a prolom compiler". 'Prolom' is an artificial intelligence 
software language, and a 'compiler' is a software to make language. He had developed 
a very complicated software, and it was only his hobby. At first I d idn 't believe him, 
but I showed him my specifications for my next generation CAD software, the same 
specifications I had sent to the large software design company. "OK, I'll try", he said.
After nearly a year he came back with his software. It was a hundred times faster than 
the software 1 had received from that company, and ten times smaller. From that 
experience 1 knew for sure that software development depends on personal power, on 
individual ability.
1 then asked M atsuda-san if he em ployed that boy; "Of course. He is now the top engineer in the 
company".
As Graphic Automation grew, the company experienced the kinds of growing problems that 
all companies are likely to run into. M atsuda-san is a software engineer by profession, and has 
already m entioned the various tasks that need to be done in a software developm ent company. 
Initially he had tw o part-tim ers covering sales and after-sales, neither of w hom  were trained 
salesmen:
I am an engineer, so I can control the development division, but a sales division was a 
big problem because I have no experience in sales, and consequently couldn't manage a 
sales division. So, I hired a sales m anager and delegated the sales division to him. At 
first it worked well, but after two or three years it was difficult for me to control him, 
so I split the company into a sales company and a development company.
What happened next dem onstrates the kind of problems which are likely to be occurring in many 
larger, longer established companies: a clash of shifting corporate cultures, as new ways of thinking 
and doing are introduced (see 5.4). Matsuda-san first described his new recruit: "He was introduced
6Until very recently, employers considered it to be very inappropriate to recruit staff through recruitment magazines. This is 
likely to be for the following reasons. First of all, it transgresses a number of norms for recruitment: to recruit from school or 
university, or to recruit somebody who came by recommendation of a college, trusted friend, or family member. Recruitment 
magazines, until very recently, were considered to be very impersonal. Secondly, recruitment magazines have, until very 
recently, tended to specialise in low grade manual work and part-time work (5.2). A prestigious company looking for high 
calibre staff would not have wished to be seen attempting to recruit staff from among this pool of labour.
7Yuuenji Korakuen is a theme park, next to Tokyo Dome Stadium in the heart of Tokyo.
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to me, and he also was not an ordinary man. He graduated from Tokyo University, and was very 
clever and very confident. To begin with he entered a large company, N ippon Steel, but left them to 
join a sm all venture com pany. But he d id n 't do well there, and w hen I m et him  he w as 
unemployed". As unusual as he might have been, M atsuda san's sales m anager was a traditionalist 
at heart. He began to build a habatsu in the sales division of the com pany, recruiting m any 
administrative staff and creating new levels of management. This is what Matsuda-san was referring 
to when he commented: "it was difficult for me to control him". What was happening in GA Systems 
was the rapid developm ent of a rigid hierarchical organisational structure, which w ent totally 
against what M atsuda-san was trying to achieve in Graphic Automation:
Administration was increasingly trying to adm inistrate us. To set out patterns of how 
things had to be done. An example was request forms. Increasingly request forms had 
to be filled out and subm itted before anything could be done. It was becoming a big 
problem, because the internal business of the company was starting to become more 
im portant than developing and selling software.
Matsuda san's problem was to be solved by the collapse of the bubble: "I couldn't control him. His 
vision and my vision separated. Then, during the bubble economy, he borrowed lots of money from 
the bank to buy real estate. Then the bubble burst and sales dropped considerably. At that time, I 
said to him 'you have to change', so he quit and I became president of both companies. Then risutom, 
restructuring". The proliferation of employees in GA Systems made restructuring essential:
At first I said to the GA Systems employees, if you intend to change companies in the 
next few years, please change now, quickly. I offered them a retirement payment, and 
20%, all of those who had joined in the previous year, left. The payroll had grown 
quickly and we were left w ith the old members. I told them that if they w anted to stay, 
then please accept a salary cut. I cut salaries by 20%. The peak of the bubble was 1991, 
the bottom was 1992.
Since 1992, the company has had the following structure: "I am at the top, as m anaging director. 
Development has seven managers, one for each division. Each division is for one product, including 
a support centre. GA Systems has three managers, one head of sales, one head of adm inistration, 
and head of sales branches. Then there are the members, but everybody is equal ( taito)".
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3.3) Com m and Structure: The Same in  Name Only
"At first my company had no structure. All employees were in direct contact with me, 
and had direct contact w ith the market. We had only one product, and just one layer" 
(Matsuda-san).
The desired characteristics of the organisational structure (soshiki) and com m and structure {shiki 
keiretsn, meirei shiki, or sItireikeito,) at GA, are contained in the quote by M atsuda-san above. For him 
it is essential that: (1) all employees have direct contact w ith him; (2) all employees have direct 
contact w ith each other; (3) all employees have direct contact with the market. W hen he began 
telling me why he left Toshiba (3.2), the three points he mentioned first were: that he "was the lowest 
cell in the company"; "he couldn't develop his own products"; and "he did not have direct access to 
the market". The organisational structure and command structure at GA eradicates 'lowest cells': all 
employees are equal ( taito). It promotes product development by individuals, regardless of position 
in the company, or departm ent, and it gives all employees direct access to the market. 'Direct access 
to the m arket' m eans that all employees, regardless of w hat their job is, can develop their own 
products. This is w hat M atsuda-san was unable to do at Toshiba. Developing products requires 
originality and individuality, consequently the nurturing of both is a prime concern at GA.
'Originality {originality)', together w ith 'individuality  (kosei)' are cornerstones of GA 
philosophy and practice. At GA, employees are encouraged to develop both originality and their 
individuality, not only by the exhortations of M atsuda-san or other employees, but through the 
structural organisation of the company. At GA, 'originality', and 'individuality ' are not simply 
fashionable key words (Moeran 1989: 55), but are engendered by the structural organisation of the 
company, which, together w ith  M atsuda san’s personal philosophy, combine to create a web of 
practices and codes of conduct which then require the employees to act assertively and individually. 
From this, it is hoped that originality of thought and idea will result. This section looks at the 
command structure, to show that it is one in which hierarchy has been radically reduced, and where 
individuals have to take responsibility for their own work, and are encouraged to be proactive in 
developing their skills and company products.
In the course of my time at the company, and in response to my question 'What is your 
rank?',8 I noted the following ranks: shacho (president); bucho (departm ent head); jicho (assistant 
departm ent head); kacho (section chief); nteuibaa (ordinary employee). These are standard ranks 
which can be found in virtually all Japanese companies (Clark 1979). Both Rohlen (1974) and Clark 
(1979) make a point of noting that these ranks do not indicate the details of an employee's work or 
the interrelationship between employees (Rohlen 1974: 25, Clark 1979: 106). In view of this, GA 
departs from the examples presented by Rohlen and Clark in a num ber of fundam ental ways. The 
work of m anagers in GA is defined by their title. The title bncho, jicho, or kacho defines the work of
8C/iri ioa nan desn ka,
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those employees, whereas it does not determ ine their status relative to other employees. This is 
completely the opposite to w hat Rohlen (1974) and Clark (1979) recorded. Rohlen writes:
Alone, rank primarily expresses status. Others recognise a person's importance and achievement from his 
rank. Although they may not know what his actual authority, role, or amount of reward is, people respect a 
person's rank (Rohlen 1974:25).
First of all, in the case of GA, there is no status attached to rank/ title. Moving from menibaa to kacho, 
is neither autom atic nor dependent on age. It is only possible if the employee shows a desire to 
assume a management position.
Kauri sha, m anagem ent, are not above tantdsha, ordinary members, in any sense. If 
somebody wants to become a m anager and that person has a talent for management, 
they can become a manager. But a person who has no interest in becoming a manager 
or has no talent as a manager, they remain taito, equal" (Matsuda-san).
Again, unlike Rohlen's observations, ran k / title does not indicate im portance, achievement, or 
seniority, while it does indicate exactly w hat a person's authority is, and w hat their role is. Finally, 
GA employees do not per se respect a person's rank, respect is tied to other norm s which are 
discussed in 3.5.
M oving on to the com m and structure itself, there are in fact three levels in the company: 
shacho (president); kanrisha or shokusckisha9 (management); and tantdsha (members). Kanrisha, or 
shoku seki sha, are also divided into three levels: "Bncho is top, jicho is next, and kacho is next. Bucho is 
responsible for all, jichd and kacho are responsible for their own particular things, like bucho too" 
(Matsuda-san). But M atsuda-san is keen to make it clear that this does not constitute three more 
layers of management:
In a way it is, but it is not rigid. Traditionally, and particularly in a big company, those 
layers are so rigid. The president never speaks to a jicho , or kacho , or to a tantdsha. The 
president would only discuss with directors, maybe with bucho , but usually directors 
speak with bncho . But in GA it is not so rigid. 1 talk to all members, and they also talk 
to me, or a tantdsha talks w ith a bucho , or a jichd can talk to me. There are no rules about 
who can talk to whom. All of them have the same information. Of course I speak to 
bucho most of all, and a tantdsha is more likely to speak to a kacho or jichd .
What governs who speaks to whom  depends on who can most easily and efficiently answer the 
question of the m om ent. Because w ork is organised on the basis of 'w ork teams', members of a 
particular team are most often to be seen talking to members of that team, including the shoku seki 
sha. But the governing principle, in addition to the fact that there are no rules about who can talk to 
whom, is that you talk to the person who is most likely to have the answer. In the normal course of a 
day, I saw tantdsha asking kacho questions and being referred to jicho for an answer, or tantdsha 
speaking to bucho because of the nature of the question. Everybody is connected by e-mail and has 
access to everybody, and as M atsuda-san m entioned above, everybody has access to the same
\a n ri sha, which is the more usual term for managers, is more often translated as 'administrators', 'managers’, 'supervisors’. 
Shoku seki sha is a term I haven't come across. Shoku seki, meaning 'duty', is a combination of the characters, shoku, meaning 
'employment', 'occupation', 'work', 'job1, post’, 'office', ’(professional) skill', and seki, meaning 'responsibility'. In the case of 
GA, Matsuda san was keen to use the term shoku seki sha; "because the shoku seki sha in my company are not like kami sha in 
Toshiba, for example". There is also a difference of emphasis between the two. The character kail is translated as 'exercise 
control’, and the character n, is translated as 'reason' or 'basic principle'. As a result kanrisha foregrounds the element of 
control, whereas shoku seki sha focuses on responsibility. The difference is apposite.
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information. If a tantdsha has an idea for a product, that person can directly access GA Systems' files, 
GA Systems ostensibly being another company, for sales inform ation on any of the com pany’s 
products in order to make an assessm ent on w hether the product m ight have a market. Such 
activities are encouraged.
At a glance, the structure of GA looks much like other companies. The ranks are the same, 
and contracts, which I shall come to later, are very similar. I asked M atsuda-san what is different 
between the organisational structure, soshiki, 10 at Toshiba and GA. He replied; "Num ber of 
management layers. We have two, Toshiba had about ten". I then asked if this was because Toshiba 
was a large company. "Yes", he replied. But when I suggested that if GA was as large a company as 
Toshiba , GA w ould have ten layers of m anagem ent, he quickly returned: "No, no, no. All 
companies are trying to reduce the num ber of adm inistrative layers. Microsoft now has 20,000 
employees, but only three layers of management". 1 asked what effect does reducing the num ber of 
layers of management have. Matsuda-san explained:
It is very easy to change direction and stay in touch with your customers. Everybody is 
on e-mail, from top to bottom  and from bottom to top. Anybody can contact anybody 
w ithin the company, and is encouraged to do so. And also, now, I m ake a weekly 
report for all my employees in which I am veiy honest w ith them. We are going 
through a difficult time at the moment.
Removing layers of m anagem ent, however, does not itself change the com m and structure, change 
an organisation from an inward-looking status obsessed one into an outw ard-looking custom er 
orientated one, or redefine the ideal com pany employee. It is in this way that GA is radically 
different, yet at the same time displays the kind of organisational structure and command structure 
which is being advocated as necessary for Japan to continue to m aintain its position in the world in 
the next centuiy (5.1). Reducing layers of management will increase response times and efficiency, 
but it will not prioritize custom er satisfaction or the free flow of ideas around the company. This 
requires a redefining of selves and the relationship between selves in the workplace, which is a 
much more fundamental and radical project.
In GA, the developm ent and production company, there are seven developm ent groups, or 
’work teams', with the largest, comprising of thirty members, having bncho, jichd, and kacJio, and the 
smallest of three having just a bucho. Having assessed the sales potential of their product idea, our 
tantdsha , if the product idea relates to a different work team, can approach anybody in the relevant 
work team for any further information. This how the company is organised in order to encourage 
employees to do w hat M atsuda-san tells all new employees: "I tell them that in GA they can use 
their talent to m ake their own product". I suggested to M atsuda-san that in m ost Japanese 
companies he could not talk to a jichd because his bucho would be angry:
Yes, very angry. But in my company, 1 could not have that culture. I think it is very 
bad. The top, such as the president, cannot get real information, or quick information. 
Decisions have to be made quickly to change course if necessary, so the president has 
to be able to speak to any level, and any level has to be able to speak to the president.
^The organisational structure, soshiki, is not the same as the command structure, shiki keiretsii, meireishiki, or shirei keitd. The 
organisational structure describes the position of every person in the company. The command structure describes the 
relationship between every person in the company, drawing attention to the distribution of power and responsibility.
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I then suggested that people are not used to such a system and would be uncomfortable:
Some, initially, bu t most people have no problem. It's the same with habatsu. Many 
companies have habatsu, w ith m any people who do not w ant to join. But they are all 
expected to be a member of a habatsu. There are no habatsu here, no closed groups, with 
many bosses fighting each other. Habatsu are what people are used to, but they have no 
problem working here w ithout them".
*******
I now  w ant to tu rn  to the personal accounts of the em ployees to see how  they describe the 
organisational structu re  of the com pany. W hen considering the personal views of various 
employees, w e are presented w ith opinions and feelings about w orking in such an organisation. 
Explanations come in term s of limits to though t and action, w hich are alw ays partial. As 
anthropologists, we can determ ine w hat people do substantively, but we cannot so easily build up a 
picture from the various accounts to arrive at a framework, within which individuals act. The 
fram ework is only glimpsed, brought to life by acts of individual interpretation which give it 
meaning. We are therefore dealing w ith assumptions that individuals make, and to which we m ust 
give primacy. Meaning exists in the individual interpretations, which the anthropologist then knits 
together to provide a fragmented and often contradictory whole, itself an act of interpretation. As 
Cohen (1994) argues, the fram ework does not make people think in a certain way, but instead 
provides them  w ith  the m eans to think and act. The fram ework, w hich in this case is the 
organisational structure and w ithin it, the command structure, is not m onolithic and does not 
convey uniform  meanings. As Cohen states: "there will be shared meanings, but there will be no 
orthodoxy. Members process...if not wholly as free agents, then at the very least, as interpreters" 
(Cohen 1994: 94). What is revealed below are aggregates of diverse experiences, interpretations 
which are the product of individuals negotiating, interpreting, and constructing frameworks, which 
only become visible through the actions, explanations and justifications of hum an beings.
• Yamada-san had been with GA for five years. He was thirty, and had been working for NTT as a 
software engineer. He was recently m ade kacho. and works in softw are developm ent. "The 
command structure in our company is not fixed. All kinds of tilings passing directly between 
people is the norm."
• W ada-san was the eighteen year old who had been working at Yuuenji Korakuen, punching 
tickets. At the time of the interview, he was thirty five and a kacho, w ith no desire to assume any 
more managerial responsibilities (3.5). "Yes, there is a command structure. There is shacho, then 
bucho. There is some sort of separation between bucho, and those below, but there are often cases 
when bucho bypasses me, akachd, and gives instructions directly to a m em ber of staff. There is 
no 'top to bottom ’ like in a traditional Japanese company, which, to the extent it has a tradition,
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is rigid and inflexible. At GA, there are divisions and there are sections, and we use those 
names, and persons concerned with a particular thing are located in a place associated with that 
thing, but it is very tentative (ichio arun da kedo), and the people in those places operate in a very 
mobile and fluid way (ryuuddteki ni ikon)''.
• Shinkawa-san had only just joined the company at the age of twenty eight. Previously he had 
worked as a program m er for one of Japan's largest departm ent stores. He was a 'member', 
describing himself as a 'general employee (ippan sha in)' but is a 'contract employee (keii/aku sha 
in)'. "If you look at the terrain (chikei) of leadership, it is relatively free {wnri to free, ni natteimasu). 
Everybody is individually responsible."
• Matsubara-san was twenty eight and had been with GA for three years. She studied chemistry at 
undergraduate level, before going to the U.S. to study English for two years. She was a 
'member', a 'lifetime em ployee (sei sha in) who worked in quality control. "The com m and 
structure doesn't exist. It is not at all ordered. To an extent, things run smoothly enough at the 
w ork team level, b u t to be honest, when it comes to completing a w ork schedule on time, it 
never happens. Also, ra ther than  vertical sen io r/su b o rd in a te  type rela tionsh ips, m ore 
importance is attached to equal person to person relationships."
• Iwata-san was twenty nine and had been w ith GA for four months. He previously worked for 
N ippon Steel as a software engineer. He referred to himself as an ordinaiy member, although he 
was a 'contract employee (keiyaku sha in)' and worked on LAN (local area network) systems 
development. "I'm just an ordinary member, so I don't know much about orders that come from 
above. As for my relationship w ith my supervisor, rather than being exhaustive (tettei), I am 
urged to look for a new  consciousness in myself and study those im portant things. "They are 
there, are you aware of them?" my supervisor says. It doesn't always follow that som ething 
happens, but I do have a genuine interest in what he is advocating. In relation to the work itself, 
it is important to absorb all this. Instructions from my supervisor are tough but there isn't really 
any rigidity or constant interference."
• H inata-san was twenty nine and a kacho in GA Systems. He was on the sales side. "There are 
bucho and there is shacho, and staff, which includes me. The working practices (shigoto no shikata) 
include direct communication with shacho. Employees below me, including those directly under 
me, have direct contact w ith bucho and shacho on day to day working matters. This is possibly 
the company's 'way' (sore wa ima no shafuu kainoshiremasen)''.
• inoue-san was twenty four and had worked for GA since graduating from  university w ith a 
degree in m athem atics. She w as a 'lifetim e em ployee (sei sha in)' in the adm inistration  
departm ent. "The organisation of the company is flexible (soshiki wa kochoku shiteinai tokoro desu), 
although there are kacho, jichd, and bucho above me, and then shacho."
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• Yamazaki-san was thirty six. In response to the question 'What position /rank  do you hold?' (c/m 
wa nan desn ka), he described himself as a 'leader' (liida to in koto ni natteimasu), but was in fact a 
bucho . 'The management structure is not built like a pyramid, where there is management, and 
under that m iddle management, and under them  ordinary staff. It is relatively free. There is the 
president, and under that there are the various products, really."
• Ozawa-san was tw enty  five and was in the product planning departm ent w orking on user 
manuals. She describes herself as an 'ordinary employee (futsuu no sha in)', but was a 'lifetime 
employee (sei sha in)'. She joined the com pany in  January 1996, three m onths before the 
interview. "It's very ordinaiy. There is shacho, and under that bucho. It’s very ordinary, much as 
you 'd  expect (honto ni futsuu no keiretsu ni natteimasu). Then in my w ork team  (bnsho) there is 
jicho and kacho, then me. The other side of the fact that there is some freedom here, because 
nothing is fixed (nan demo kimatteinai), is that you need a lot of pow er (powaa) to be able to 
undertake anything".11
• Hashimoto-san was a bucho in the General Affairs (somu), or administration departm ent, which 
is in GA Systems. He was thirty nine and had been with the company for two years. He joined 
as a bucho after having been a kacho with a cement company. "You m ean the order structure? 
Each departm ent has its head and each is self-supporting (dokuritsu saisan), or rather, has 
independent management. So there is the company, then there is the president, then there are 
various departm ents. Each of these departm ents has its own command order (meirei shiki) and 
the right of instruction (meirei ken). The whole company is then under the president’s jurisdiction 
(kankatsukan). It is a venture company. In that sense, the company is a reorganised business (seibi 
sum mono to iuka), there was some industrial restructuring (kigyo seibi)".
• Sakamoto-san was twenty six. He describes his position in the company as "nothing particularly 
(toku ni nai desn)". He was an 'lifetime employee (sei sha in)'. "Many things come directly from 
shacho, but there are also many tilings which are arrived at through discussions at meetings with 
everybody concerned. There is an air of freedom  around here (shanai no funiki ga jiyuu ga 
arimasu). There are no constraints on the developm ent side (kaihatsti stairu wa sokubakn 
sareteinai)''.
The ranks in the company m entioned by the employees were: shacho (president); bucho (departm ent 
head); jicho (assistant departm ental head); kacho (section head); and the ordinary members, which 
accord w ith Matsuda-san's account and my observations. Ordinary members gave various terms to 
indicate their position in the company. These were: ippan sha in (general worker); futsuu no sha in 
(ordinary worker); futsuu no ippan sha in (ordinary general worker); toku betsu nai desn (nothing 
special). Shinkawa-san, who had only been w ith the company a few weeks, described himself as a
^This point about needing energy to 'undertake anything' is extremely interesting. Energy is required to do any work. This 
is basic to our understanding of the universe, but the ’power' Ozawa san refers to is the will (islii) required to act 
independently. The relationship between 'will (ishi)' and 'individuality (kosei)’ is discussed in 7.1
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sei sha in (lifetime worker),12 as well as an ippan sha in, but nobody else m ade a reference to whether 
they were 'lifetime employees (sei sha in)' or 'contract employees (keiyaku sha in). There is evident 
continuity between GA, ostensibly a restructured company, and companies past and present which 
have not restructured, companies such as the Toshiba M atsuda-san describes. Are the similarities in 
name only, however? The answer is, fundamentally, yes. The similarities are invariably superficial, 
resulting, for example, from  m eaning contained in the names of ranks held over from other 
existential situations in which the employee has encountered them. This is evident when watching 
new recruits getting accustomed to working at GA, and manifested itself in the way people referred 
to the various ranks in relation to Ego as being 'above' or 'below' in the interviews. Yet, even when 
such im m ediately obvious spatial m etaphors are being used, w ith  such po ten t directional 
implications grounded in common experience and social norms, on every occasion that I drew  
attention to the apparent contradiction between an overt emphasis on a culture of individual self- 
actualization and equality of selves, w ith a ranking system that embodies what Nakane referred to 
as a ’ranking consciousness' (Nakane 1970: 25), nobody thought it problematic, or strange. Later, 
when reading through the transcriptions of the interviews, I noticed a pattern in the answers which 
suggest there is not so m uch a contradiction as a combination of both hierarchy and equality.
I eventually decided that the subject of the conversation, rather than anything else, caused 
my interlocutors to fall back on concepts w ith which they were familiar, in order to explain the 
command structure to me. Obviously there is a vertical distance between shacho and everybody else, 
and this orientation rather forced everybody into conceptualising their relationships with each other 
in vertical terms. Yet, it was plainly unacceptable to most to talk in these terms. A look at the quotes 
above shows how the explanations tended to begin w ith shacho , which immediately framed the 
explanation in hierarchical structural terms. But by the end of the descriptions, the employees are 
searching for qualifications. The last sentence of the various descriptions, after having begun in 
vertical structural terms, ended w ith explanations such as; 'All kinds of things passing directly 
between people is the norm (direcknto no iroiro na mono ga kekko ii n desn ne), 'not fixed’ ( tettei shiteirn 
mono deiva nai), 'doesn't exist' (shiki keiretsu wa horoboro desn. Keshite kakujitsu dewa nai)', 'relatively free 
(wari to furii ni natteimasu)', 'there isn't really any rigidity (jimuteki ni kore wo yaranakereba ikenai to in 
men ni kan shite wa tettei shiteimn ja nai ka to onion n desn keredomo)', 'everybody talks directly to each 
other (directo ni menla/o wo moratte shigoto sum  koto mo arimasu)', 'flexible (soshiki wa kocho shiteinai 
tokoro desn)', 'everybody is individually responsible (kaku kojin kojin no sekininka de hataraite ii to in 
kanji ni natteimasu)'.
'k ic 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
Do the titles in any way construct or define the relationships between the employees? Yes, but in a 
way not norm ally associated with these terms (Nakane 1970; Rohlen 1974; Clark 1979; Ham ada 
1992). Shoku seki sha w ithin GA have specifically defined roles which refer directly to their work 
activities and their responsibilities. The organisational structure and command structure, together
^?et sha in is discussed in 3.4
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with the codes of conduct which require employees to think for themselves, and to seek and convey 
inform ation directly between employees, radically alters the relationship betw een shoku seki sha 
(kanrisha), and between sltokusekisha and tantdsha. Also, M atsubara-san explained to me one day that 
nobody uses the titles at work, only M atsuda-san is referred to as shacho , and this was borne out by 
what I witnessed. Outside the company, rank is imbued with more traditional meaning by those 
with whom  GA staff come into contact, but it is a self-conscious recognition or reinforcement of the 
'society of industry' by GA staff, and not as strictly as in the manner Clark (1979) describes:
because the ranks are standard throughout so much of Japanese industry, a man's rank within a company 
retains its meaning when he goes outside it. A department head [fewc/rdl at Marumaru would be addressed 
by his rank when he visited a customer or bank, and he would expect to be received by someone with a 
rank appropriate to his own in the other organisation. The appropriate rank would not necessarily be that 
of department head. If he were visiting a big client, a Marumaru department head would see a section head 
[kacho]; for a section head in, say, Hitachi, might be responsible for more people than there were at 
Marumaru, and Hitachi could hardly be expected to produce a department head every time a mere 
supplier came to call (C/rtrfc 2979:2 06).^
This strict observance of formality and vertical rigidity is also described more recently by Ham ada 
(1992). A GA bucho will head a delegation to a customer, or receive a customer, if the occasion 
requires it, but such duties are a part of the duties of being a manager, and are regarded as simply 
that by all GA staff. Status and rank are not linked, rank instead indicates a person’s responsibilities. 
Responsibility for all employee’s work resides w ith the employee, not w ith anybody else. A shoku 
seki sha is not responsible for the w ork of others, but is responsible for co-ordinating the w ork of 
others. That is their job, that is their responsibility. Also, in accordance w ith the convention within 
GA of not using titles when addressing each other, names rather than titles are used between GA 
staff at meetings with customers.
Comparing the decision-making process and the loci of authority and responsibility in GA 
with the examples provided by Rohlen (1974) and Clark (1979), allows for a com parison which 
highlights fundam ental similarities and differences. The command structure of any organisation 
indicates the loci of authority and responsibility, and the process by which decisions are made. 
Yamazaki-san, the bucho of one of the development work teams told me: "The management structure 
is not built like a pyramid, where there is management, and under that m iddle m anagement, and 
under them, ordinary staff. There is the president, and under that the various products, really". This 
is true, under M atsuda-san, everybody is equal, an opinion expressed by all em ployees. As 
M atsuda-san him self said: kanrisha (shokusekisha) are not above tantdsha. N evertheless, as in a 
pyram idal structure, there is a concentration of power at the top of the company, in the form of 
Matsuda-san. Hashimoto-san, the bucho of the General Affairs (soinu) departm ent, also indicates that 
power is concentrated at the top: "Each departm ent has its head and each is self-supporting 
(idokuritsu saisan), or rather, has independent management. Each of these departm ents has its own 
command order (meirei shiki) and the right of instruction (meirei ken). The whole company is then 
under the president's jurisdiction (kankatsukan)".
An incident which demonstrates that power is concentrated at the top was the restructuring 
after the collapse of the Bubble. M atsuda-san offered a set of conditions to the employees, which
l3Clark' s use of the word 'mere' in "every time a mere supplier came to call" (Clark 1979:106) conveys the sense of hierarchy 
within which the relationships he describes are bound up.
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they were obliged to take. The decisions involving restructuring were made solely by Matsuda-san, 
which accords with Rohlen's point about urgent decisions being made according to hierarchy:
One simple rule influencing office decision making is: the more urgent the decision, the more likely it will 
be made according to hierarchy. Another basic consideration, however, is that people favour group 
discussions wherever possible and have an expectation of participating in considerations of office 
affairs...This is also true of policies to which the chief has been committed by higher authorities. Office 
discussions, in this case, can transform an imperative into a solution endorsed and shared by everyone 
(Rohlen 1974:107).
Rohlen makes the point, that discussion occurs after the decision has actually been made, and the 
managers job is not to solicit opinions to decide policy, but to diplomatically implement policy. This 
is not the case at GA. Sakamoto-san also told me that: "Many things come directly from shacho, but 
there are also many things which are arrived at through discussions at meetings w ith everybody 
concerned. There is an air of freedom around here". This freedom comes in the form of an open and 
transparent decision m aking process. This means that in GA there is no seeking of consensus on 
decisions which are im perative, and there is open communication between all employees which 
allows ideas to reach the relevant loci of authority as quickly as possible. There is none of the 
tortuous balancing act, which Rohlen tells us that managers and those in positions of authority have 
to go through:
A chief, anxious for the positive effects of group discussions, may hold many meetings but submit issues of 
minor significance. He might choose to discuss his own decisions with the group. He might also introduce 
a question only when certain that his opinion will prevail. The conclusions may be foregone, but the fact 
that discussions have been held is most important, for a chief is expected to share his opinions, ask for 
advice, and permit dissenting voices to emerge. His trust and respect for others and his acknowledgment of 
the group's importance, both symbolised by this process, are what count (Rohlen 1974:108).
By trying to seek consensus on decisions which have already been decided, tim e and energy is 
wasted. At GA, the decision-making process does not include elaborate discussions on decisions 
which have ostensibly already been made. Except in unusual circumstances at GA, such as the 
decisions regarding restructuring in 1992, there is the opportunity for the sharing of opinions, the 
asking of advice, and the chance for dissenting voices to be heard, prior to a decision being made. In 
this way, a degree of power truly lies equally with all members, whereby their voice genuinely does 
influence decisions.
It is a manager's job to co-ordinate and delegate, and some degree of command is an integral 
part of these responsibilities. Usually in Japanese companies, managers {kauri sha) tell people what 
to do, but in the case of GA, this is not really the case. Managers make sure everything happens as it 
has already been decided and is understood by all concerned. Decisions are made at the work team 
level by everybody, consensually, in a meeting. The agenda for meetings is also set, not by managers 
necessarily, bu t by anybody. M anagers may well pu t points forw ard for discussion more than 
anybody else, because their responsibilities include making sure that decisions get taken and carried 
out. Also, they are likely to have a better idea than anybody else w hat should probably get priority. 
Again, this is not because of any authority implicit in their job, although they do have authority, or 
because they have access to privileged information, which they don't, but simply because their job is 
to co-ordinate, which requires a knowledge of all aspects of a departm ent's or section's work in 
progress. I asked Yamada-san how Iris bucho at GA differed from his previous company: "At GA, my 
bucho is responsible only for co-ordinating the work of our group. That is all". Everything is open to
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question and criticism, both during meetings and in the normal course of a day. During meetings, to 
somebody unfamiliar w ith the company, it is not immediately obvious who is the president, or who 
are shoku seki sha and tantdsha. The organisation of space during m eetings, or anyw here in the 
company, is markedly different from a company or any collectivity of individual selves more rigidly 
and markedly ranked (3.4). Discussion circulates freely between all employees. Ideas are circulated, 
scrutinized and discarded, resurrected and reconsidered, scorned and ridiculed, and implemented.
Myself, I never m ake one sided decisions for any em ployee. Also I engage in 
discussion, not as president, but as a member, like everybody else. All members, sales, 
administration, support, development, gather together and they are on the same level, 
in the same position (Matsuda-san).
Decisions regarding who should do what are also taken at meetings. M atsuda-san and all his bucho 
do not get together behind closed doors and decide what is to be done, while the bucho then decide 
who is to do what.
I asked M atsuda-san what kind of company structure he w anted for his company when he 
still only had ten employees, back in 1986. He replied:
I w anted all my employees to feel the reactions of users, from the market. I wanted 
them to have direct contact w ith users, so I didn't want cells of more than thirty people.
Now we have a num ber of products and all these sections are organised around less 
than thirty people, so all of them are in touch w ith users and the market.
This structure, together w ith encouraging all his employees to input reactions from users, and to 
develop ideas based on w hat they see in the market, engenders decision making at a very grass­
roots level. M eetings are not cock pits in which everybody is fighting to get their idea on the 
draw ing board, either. Problems which arise, or suggestions for im provem ents in products or 
practices, are expressed openly and then discussed.
*******
We can see that M atsuda-san has an authority to make decisions over and above other members of 
the company. This is because he is able to make decisions and implement them  w ithout discussion 
or consensus. This is regardless of whether the idea initially came from him or not. Nobody else in 
the company has this executive power. Shoku seki sha do not have power over and above tantdsha to 
make decisions. Decisions are m ade in weekly meetings, where everybody has equal say .14 Within 
the remit of their job, shoku seki sha are invested w ith the responsibility to co-ordinate the w ork of 
others, but, as I have explained above, they do not have responsibility for the w ork of others. 
Responsibility for that lies w ith the individual. Shinkawa-san, told me: "Everybody is individually 
responsible", and this is reflected in the term tantdsha, which means 'person responsible'. Clark tells 
us that tantdsha is a term  used to refer to a m anager (1979: 109), indicating that the term is redefined
*4Not every decision is subject to this process. Day-to-day decisions, or even quite important decisions are made on the hoof. 
This often involves a member of a work team informing the appropriate shokii seki sha of what course of action they have 
decided to take. Such decisions are not necessarily the result of consultation, either. It is in ways like this that responsibility 
resides in every individual employee. Responsibility is not simply, or even predominantly, a question of apportioning blame 
when something goes wrong, but is rather a matter of giving an individual the power to make decisions.
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in the case of GA. In GA a tantdsha is a manager of their own work: they are responsible for the work 
they do.
If we com pare Clark's (1979) description of responsibility and decision-m aking in the 
company he studied, we can see that there are fundamental divergences. Clark makes a distinction 
between 'symbolic' responsibility and 'real' responsibility:
Japanese most frequently use the word responsibility to refer to symbolic assumption of guilt...The rules of 
this kind of responsibility are simple, for it comes automatically with high position. When something goes 
wrong the senior man or group of men presiding over the mistake will 'take responsibility’ to lift blame 
from their subordinates. Symbolic responsibility, which for the individual is simply the price of status, has 
some value for the company community. It encourages a conscious mutual dependence of seniors and 
juniors. Those below know that those above will protect them. Those above must rely on their subordinates 
not to make mistakes that will lead to responsibility having to be taken (Clark 1979:126).
It is immediately obvious that the structural relationship between employees at GA cannot support 
such a distribution of responsibility. Nobody takes responsibility for anybody else’s mistakes, or 
takes credit for anybody else’s successes, (see 3.5), for responsibility for one’s actions lies w ith the 
individual.
Clark then goes on to describe 'real' responsibility. He does so by looking at the decision­
m aking process. He describes the ringi system, whereby a proposal is initiated in one departm ent 
and circulates around the other departm ents, and up the echelons to the president. He notes that 
some authors argue that this shows that decisions are made at the low er levels, for if there is a 
degree of consensus, it cannot be ignored by the time the ringi reaches the top (Clark 1979: 126). 
Clark goes on to add that the extent to which the ringi can influence com pany policy is often 
severely restricted to m inor decisions, such as where to put the new coffee machine, while major 
decisions get taken at senior m anagem ent level. This accords w ith the description of the decision­
making process described by Rohlen (1974), quoted above.
The situation at GA, then, is almost the opposite of that described by Rohlen (1974) and 
Clark (1979). In GA, leaving aside M atsuda-san having the power of absolute authority in special 
circumstances, authority lies w ith the work group and any other employees affected by the decision 
being taken, such as sales personnel, while responsibility lies with the individual. In the examples 
provided by Rohlen (1974) and Clark (1979), authority  lies w ith ind iv idual m anagers, and 
responsibility lies with the group, although often expressed through the symbolic responsibility of a 
senior individual.
ie'k'k'kie-k'k
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3.4) Space and Tim e and the Reordering of Priorities
It is often possible to locate authority or gain insights into the decision-making process by studying 
the organisation of space in a particular company in Japan, and this is true for either Graphic 
Autom ation or GA Systems. On the understanding  that authority  is not invested in any one 
individual over another, other than M atsuda-san, the organisation of space in GA reflects this. The 
working space of both companies is open plan, except for the Meeting Room, which is a separate 
room used by both Graphic Automation and GA Systems. Graphic Automation is on one side of the 
m eeting room and GA Systems is located on the other side. Both com panies are joined by the 
meeting room, which is accessed from both sides, but dialogue between the two companies is either 
by e-mail or by leaving one of the offices and walking dow n the wide corridor which connects both 
companies w ith a comfortably furnished area w here there are four elevators. Visitors to either 
company are directed to a small reception area which is the entrance to GA Systems. This is because 
most visitors are on business associated with either sales or administration. There is an entrance to 
Graphic Autom ation further down the corridor which is used solely by staff of either company. 
Upon entering the reception area, a partitioned space of approximately thirty square metres w ith 
racks advertising the com pany’s products and a num ber of indoor plants, the visitor is confronted 
with a desk w ith a telephone and a list of departm ental numbers, w ith instructions on what to do to 
contact the desired person. M atsuda-san is also contactable from this telephone. Having contacted a 
person using the telephone, that person then comes to the reception area to meet the visitor, who is 
then escorted to one of four cubicles which contain comfortable chairs and a low table. A meeting 
always begins w ith tea or coffee being offered to the visitor or visitors, but rather than a junior 
female m em ber of staff appearing w ith the refreshments, the m ember of staff whom  the visitors 
have come to see brings them. This is also true of Matsuda-san, who told me a delightful story about 
a prospective employee who had come for an interview, who was visibly shocked that M atsuda-san 
had brought him his tea, and who kept looking at the cup every time M atsuda-san picked up his tea 
and began drinking, not knowing whether to drink it or not.
M atsuda-san has a separate office, located behind the meeting room, which is also accessed 
from either the GA Systems side or the Graphic Automation side. A part from M atsuda-san being 
separated from the rest of the employees in this manner, indicating his authority over the rest of the 
staff, the organisation of space in the rest of the working areas does not reflect any distribution of 
power, other than that the distribution of pow er is equal. The working space in both companies is 
divided according to w ork teams in Graphic Autom ation, and by departm ents in GA Systems: one 
for adm inistration, one for sales, and one for branch sales, which are separated by low partitions 
which do not restrict the field of vision w hen standing up. The organisation of space within the 
departm ents is solely on a division of labour basis and not by authority. Each departm ent is 
separated into development, after-sales back-up and testing, with the shokusekisha sitting randomly
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amongst the rest of the w ork team, the tantosha.
The organisation of space at GA deliberately disrupts conceptions of how space is organised 
in the workplace. It is very common, maybe even universal throughout Japan, that the organisation 
of space reflects the organisation of pow er w ithin the workplace. When I worked at Kodansha's 
Morning editorial office, the atmosphere was very relaxed. Everybody dressed w ith their own style, 
some in T-shirts and faded jeans, others in brightly coloured waistcoats and bow-ties. Others looked 
like preppy Ivy Leaguers, one or two like cleaned-up Hell's Angels. Everybody except the editor, 
that is the direct link w ith the rest of Kodansha, who wore a white shirt and tie, and a suit. 
Everybody worked hard, there was no question about that, and m any of Kodansha's brightest, 
idiosyncratic, employees worked there. Morning is the m ost popular, and most successful 20s-30s 
manga (comic) w ith quite a progressive editorial policy, and everybody was very professional. 
Nevertheless, the im pression of a rather liberal working environm ent greeted the visitor, whether 
myself, initially, the m an who came to fix the photo-copier (I sat next to it - we got to know each 
other), or som ebody from another K odansha departm ent. But authority  was constantly visible 
through the arrangem ent of space in the editorial office. Senior staff, in w hatever section, were 
closest to the editor’s desk, w ith subordinates radiating outwards towards the corner of the office, 
w ith my desk closest to the door, near the photocopiers, and furthest away from the editor. At GA, 
there had been a deliberate rearranging of space to remove the possibility of the organisation of 
space being identified with a discarded organisation of power.
*******
The organisation of time in the lives of GA employees also indicates a reordering of priorities. 
Responsibility for w ork rests with individual selves, and, as will become apparent in the following 
chapter, accompanying this shift of responsibility onto individual selves, both for their work and for 
generating ideas, comes respect for individual privacy in the form of respect for an individuals time 
and space. This is very m uch in line w ith the debates surrounding the quality of life of Japanese 
em ployees I m entioned in 2.4, w hich com plem ents the desire of com panies to lim it their 
responsibilities towards their employees on the basis of a desire to reduce costs.
At GA, all employees jealously guard their own time, which runs from 5:00pm until 9:00 am. 
The responsibility to carry out their work assignments requires them, on occasion, to arrive at work 
early or stay late, but in both cases it is a personal decision as part of a personally organised work 
schedule.15 D uring the time I was there, occasions arose w hen individuals w ould stay behind to 
help a colleague w ith a particular task, but the culture of staying behind in support of colleagues, 
simply staying in the office, as described by Rohlen (1974) and M iyamoto (1993) does not occur. 
Likewise, nobody goes drinking w ith each other on a work team basis. In the interview 1 conducted, 
I asked two questions relating to w ork obligations outside working hours. These were, (1): Do you 
have any obligations or com m itm ents outside w orking hours, such as going drinking w ith
^^Work assignments are left to the individual to organise and undertake. As I indicated in 3.2, employees are encouraged to 
spend a part of their working day doing things for their own personal development, such as training or thinking about ways 
to improve or develop company products.
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colleagues?,16 and (2); W hat about w eekends?17 In both cases the answ er was an em phatic 'No'. In 
response to the question ’W hy?’ Wada-san replied: "Well, it happens sometimes, w ith friends, but 
there is no feeling of obligation to go. Nobody here wants that. I prefer to go home and be with my 
family". Shinkawa-san told me: "I'm an individual. Work and private are completely separated with 
this company (kanzen ni kiriwaketeiru). Within my private life outside work, there is absolutely no 
trace of w ork (puraibeeto no sekai ni shigoto wo mochikomu koto wa mattaku arimasen). Iwata-san 
mentioned that there are things organised on a company basis, but that there is no obligation to go:
Office or work-related things, such as drinking after work, no. A lthough there are 
things we do together as a company occasionally, such as cherry blossom viewing, but 
we have complete freedom  to decide w hether or not to go, and there are no rules 
stating we have to go, or feelings that we should.
Hinata-san answ ered w ith nothing more than an em phatic ’No*. ’Never?' I asked. 'No never' he 
replied. M uroya-san said that nobody had to do anything outside work, unless it involved a tight 
deadline: "After w ork and w eekends are essentially private, although if there was w ork to do, I 
would certainly come in and work". He added that such a situation had never arisen, though. 
Yamazaki-san replied: "We don't have the kind of setup, as in ordinary companies, such as punching 
time cards, staying late, and having to go drinking. We basically work w henever we like and after 
that we can do what we like". This is very different from what Rohlen describes:
To the...observer accustomed to the homeward rush of employees at quitting time, these office meetings 
and parties which last long into the night at first seem profoundly exotic and inexplicable...[T]here is no set 
time when work ends, no time clock, and a reluctance to leave before the rest. Staying late is a common 
quality of office work. In some instances, the whole office will stay until the last person is finished. This 
remarkable degree of cohesion is best understood through an examination of the main facets of... office 
groups ( Rohlen 1974:100).
What Rohlen refers to as cohesion is as much coercion. Miyamoto (1993) provides a num ber of 
accounts of w orking late at the office in the M inistry of Health and Welfare, w hich accurately 
reflects many opinions I have heard regarding staying late in support of colleagues. Many of the 
responses to my questions regarding working late and drinking with colleagues, were noticeably 
peppered w ith emphatic w ords, indicating the strong feelings the employees at GA have about 
guarding their private time. Indeed, Rohlen goes on to explain, in structural terms, why the 
practices and codes of conduct he describes exist. He describes how w ork groups are placed in 
com petition w ith each other, which forces members of a work group together and generates a 
cliquishness w ithin and even hostility between w ork groups. In Rohlen's example, the 'formal' 
structure is then reinforced by the developm ent of 'informal' habatsn, which M atsuda-san regards as 
so inefficient (3.1), which force all members to stay. Miyamoto's (1993) contempt for such a system 
flows off the page. N akane (1970) also supports Rohlen's (1974) analysis and M iyamoto's (1993) 
account. Work teams at GA are not placed in competition with each other and rewards are not based 
on group achievement. As will be dem onstrated in the next section, motivation is not generated by 
the accruing of status w ithin the w ork team and company, but by fundam entally different goals, 
with rewards being contingent on both w ork team performance and individual performance.
^Shigoto wo oiuatte kara shigoto ni kan sum  gimu ga arimasuka. Tatoiieba izakmjn dc osnke wo nondari sum  koto tokn
l7Shuumaisu xoa?
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So, the organisation of both time and space in GA encourages a work place in which hierarchy has 
been radically dim inished, ideas and information flow freely up and down the command structure 
and horizontally betw een any m em ber of the company, and w here both respect for, and the 
development of individual selves, is regarded as ethically and commercially param ount. In the next 
section I describe how these ideals, enshrined in ideas about what an employee should be, and how 
employees should work together, is supported and encouraged by the reward structure.
122
3.4) Motivations and Rewards
If success is directly m easured by satisfying customers, then we can say that motivational goals are 
primarily directed outside the company, towards satisfying the customer, as all reward is governed 
by this criterion. This is the case at GA, were we can see that success is not contingent on relative 
positions between employees w ithin the com pany, but by an em ployee's relationship w ith the 
company's customers, through performance. Achievement and success is contingent on customer 
satisfaction (CS). Along w ith financial rem uneration, status and respect are m otivational goals in 
GA, but the fact that the m otivation for achieving status and respect does not derive from the 
relative differences between staff levels w ithin the company, is a fundamental difference from how 
motivational goals are constructed in companies like those studied by Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), 
and which are generically identifiable w ith Nakane's (1970) analysis.
M otivation at GA begins w ith the Graphic A utom ation em ployee being encouraged to 
develop their ow n talents in order to make their own product. This is M atsuda-san's stated goal, 
with regard to his employees. To GA Systems staff, he says:
Adm inistration is not the company's w ork or product. The object of the company is 
custom er satisfaction. All activity in my com pany is decided from that position - 
custom er satisfaction. But in a large company, administration is a very big prim ary 
objective and customer satisfaction is secondary. At first, customer satisfaction is most 
im portant, but w hen the structure gets big, adm inistration becomes m ost im portant.
Also in my company, the people in adm inistration w ant to adm inistrate everything, 
but I always stop them and tell them that customer satisfaction and giving people the 
space to develop their talents is most important. As small administration as possible, as 
little control as possible.
Developing one's individuality and nurturing one's originality of thought are the requirements to 
achieve the goal of developing successful products and meeting customer's needs, and consequently 
a lot of time is given to encouraging the development of these characteristics. As I explained in 3.2, 
everybody is expected to spend a part of their working day on themselves alone, either studying or 
reflecting on how they can develop themselves as individuals, w ith the company's goals in m ind .18 
Among new members, it is the job of m anagers to coax and cajole the new employees along this 
road. The manner in which Iwata-san was instructed to "look for a new consciousness in myself and 
study those necessary things (fibnn de nan ka shigoto ni tsuite atamshii chiishiki wo motometa toki ni wn 
jib tin kara hitsni/o na mono wo benki/o shiteite)", points to the importance attached to the development 
of m otivational goals inside the employee, as well as outside the company. This is in contrast to 
what Rohlen tells us: "Competition within the age group is the crucial m easure of a man" (Rohlen 
1974: 143). It is the individual employee's task to attain these goals in either case, but the difference 
lies in where the motivations lie. Because success is not measured by difference between employees
8^What constitutes an 'individual' and 'individuality', both in the context of GA, in Japan, and as represented in theories of 
the individual, is discussed in the following chapter.
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at GA, goals are fundamentally different, and therefore motivation is sought in different areas, and 
are in m arked opposition to the m otivational goals and rew ard structure described by Nakane 
(1970), Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), Kondo (1990) and Hamada (1992). I quote from Rohlen:
[Tjlie entire list of payments and benefits ignores the reward that [the] men prize above alL.the status and
distinction that only rank can provide...Issues of motivation...must be discussed primarily in terms of the
Japanese white-collar worker's ambition for high rank: he pays most attention to promotion, not to the
wage system (Rohlen 1974; 175).
Acliieving the rank of buclib by the age of forty, say, is not a sign of achievement or success in GA, 
consequently, attaining rank is only a motivational goal for those who choose to be managers. Even 
then, how that success is m easured is very subjective, because age and rank, or length of service and 
rank are not linked. In addition, the decision to become a manager is a personal decision, which not 
eveiybody chooses to take. Consequently, because rank is not universal throughout the company, it 
cannot be used as a means of measuring status, reward, or success, objectively. The only example 
whereby rank and status are universally acknowledged throughout the company, is in the case of 
M atsuda-san, whereby everybody calls M atsuda-san shachd and acknowledges a difference in status. 
Even, then, how ever, M atsuda-san 's relationship w ith the other em ployees is fundam entally 
different from other examples where status is derived from relative difference in rank. Expressed 
through the com m and structure, and his structural relationship with the rest of the staff, all of 
whom  have equal access to him, M atsuda-san's relationship w ith the rest of the employees, both 
shoku seki sha and tantosha is not easily comparable to other examples (Abegglen 1958; Rohlen 1974; 
Clark 1979; Kondo 1990; Ham ada 1992).
If, with the exception of M atsuda-san, rank cannot be used as an indicator of status in GA, is 
status accrued in GA at all? M atsuda-san stated unequivocally that: "shoku seki sha are not above 
tantosha in any sense", and that if an employee has no talent for management: "they remain equal 
(;taito)". This fact is backed up by all accounts 1 collected from other employees, w hether they are 
tantosha, shoku seki sha, m en or women. H am ada suggests that status is accrued through financial 
differences, but overridden by status derived by rank combined with position within the keiretsu, for 
example, head office or subsidiary (Hamada 1992:159). I could not detect this, myself.
Status is closely tied to respect, and what constitutes respect is very m uch bound up  with 
the ideals of what constitutes the ideal GA employee, which, as I have explained, revolves around 
personal developm ent centred on nurturing individuality and creativity. It also results from a job 
well done, which although stem m ing from ideas about the ideal employee, is also recognised by 
colleagues directly, just as being sloppy and unconscientious leads to a lack of respect. Status is also 
accrued through those hjotsuu sum bubun, 'those things which are common to all', which are not 
exclusive to GA. For example, age is accorded a degree of respect, but this is attenuated in GA 
because age is not linked to authority or responsibility. Status is also accrued through w hat Moeran 
refers to as 'cultural elitism ’ (M oeran 1989: 48), bu t again, this is status accrued outside the 
workplace and not contingent on it. The use of first names in many cases, and names in general, 
over and above titles, also indicates that status is not tied to rank, position, or gender. Not only does 
the tactical use of titles and nam es suggest that status is not accrued through the creation of 
difference within the company, the tactical use of language also does not indicate status. The tactical
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use of language, instead indicates equality, ra ther than degrees of fam iliarity even. Again, the 
exception to this is Matsuda-san, although in relaxed settings, such as English lessons, very informal 
language is used, w ith joking not uncom m on between M atsuda-san and the other em ployees 
present.
As a general rule w ithin the com pany, rank is not a rew ard for achievem ent, as not 
everybody chooses to pursue a m anagem ent position. In cases where an employee has chosen to 
become a manager, movement from kacho to jicho to bucho does indicate reward for dispatching one's 
duties competently, although such a move is not totally contingent on this. More im portant is the 
employee's wishes. Of course, they have to be competent, but it has to be remembered that rank is 
about the nature of the work itself. Changing rank involves a change in the content of the work. This 
is another reason why M atsuda-san only promotes those who wish to be prom oted, as long as they 
are competent. It is a sign of his respect for his employees that he gives them the opportunity to 
make their own life choices, and he knows that many are software engineers because they love the 
work, not management, however talented as engineers they might be. Not all laichd want to be jicho 
or bucho, for the same reasons that not all tantdsha w ant to be shoku seki sha in the first place. Also, 
moving up in rank is not a m atter of prom otion in a strict sense because all employees are regarded 
as equal, and implicit in the idea of prom otion is the recognition that there are levels w ithin a 
company. W ada-san, the prodigy who at eighteen m anaged to do w hat one of Japan’s largest 
software houses couldn't (3.2), is a kacho. He has no intention of assum ing m ore adm inistrative 
duties:
Looking at it objectively, it's a waste of resources. I'm a software engineer, and as a 
kacho I can utilise my abilities to the full. If I aspire to become a bucho, I would be 
diverted from w hat I currently do, because I would have other responsibilities, and 
somebody else would have to take over my work. There is nobody able to do that, and 
1 happen to enjoy my work.
M otivation comes in another form as well. As I noted in 2.4 more and more people look to achieve 
personal satisfaction outside the workplace, as they begin to place more im portance on leisure, a 
sign of a complementary 'bottom -up' process of emerging individualism  (5.2, 5.4). Consequently, 
motivational goals are already shifting away from the workplace, and it is in this way that respect 
for the individual and a strict separation between w ork and private acts as a m otivation to work at 
GA.
Reward comes almost exclusively in terms of financial remuneration. Everybody in GA and 
GA Systems is on an age-related salary. Up to the age of thirty, all men and women earn the same 
basic salary, which is supplem ented by a family allowance (kazokuhjtiu) if the employee is married: 
male or female. When an employee marries, or if a m arried person joins the company, they receive a 
family allowance. On the basis of these two parts of a GA salary, all staff, regardless of rank, 
performance, gender, or departm ent, receive the same income up to the age of thirty. After the age 
of thirty, salaries begin to include a performance-based increment. For an employee over thirty, the 
basic salary (kihonkyuu) makes up, on average, 70% of a salary. How employees are rew arded for 
their performance depends on whether they are shoku seki sha, or tantdsha, and w hether they are a 
salesperson in GA Systems, or a m ember of Graphic Automation, the developm ent company. Shoku
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seki sha receive more than tantdsha in recognition that being a m anager involves more work and 
more responsibility. A buchd receives approxim ately 20% more than a tantdsha of the same age. 
Salesmen can potentially earn more through bonuses received from high sales, but salesmen are also 
subject to fines (baklcin) if they do not hit their sales targets. There are no discrim inations or 
differences in rew ards on a gender basis. One of the highest earners in GA group is a female 
salesperson based in Sapporo, and there is a female kacho in Graphic Autom ation. Inoue-san told 
me: "Ability decides, rather than w hether a person is a man or a wom an. There is no sexual 
discrim ination (shigoto wa nonjoku de kimattc sabetsn de wa nai desu)u. Ozawa-san: "There is no 
discrimination here at work. There are no obstacles for women to rise through the company. Outside 
GA there is, but not here".
In Graphic Autom ation, performance targets for the departm ent are first put forward by 
M atsuda-san, and then agreed by the w ork team  in question as a whole. Performance targets for 
sections are also set in the same manner. Such levels are not a foregone conclusion, w ith adjustments 
being m ade during  m eetings. In GA Systems, sales targets are set by branch m anagers in 
consultation with their staff, in the same way as the work teams in Graphic Automation. The reason 
why M atsuda-san is involved in setting performance targets for Graphic Automation, but leaves the 
setting of sales targets to the departm ents is, as he explained before: "Because I’m an engineer, not a 
salesman".
Length of service is rew arded by many companies, but is not recognised in any way, nor 
rewarded in any way, at GA. Even though GA was only founded fourteen years ago, it is very 
obvious that length of service is not rewarded, or recognised, most of the time. Ability to do the job 
and suitability for the job are rew arded, w ith age being supplem ented as it is accepted that age 
brings family responsibilities which incur a financial bu rden .19 Hashimoto-san joined the company 
as a buchd, and a num ber of other shoku seki sha have only been with the com pany for a few years, 
indicating that employees are not simply prom oted from within. M atsubara-san has been w ith 
Graphic Automation for three years and has already expressed an interest in management. I asked 
her how she approached Matsuda-san:
I began as a tester, which I still am, but I am naturally an organised person, and see 
quality control as not simply the final stage of a process but som ething which can 
productively benefit product developm ent. Those in quality control are the first to 
notice consistent errors, and therefore there needs to be liaison between quality control, 
the final stage of the production process, and design and development, the first stages 
of the process. I just see tilings in their overall context, and feel that I can develop my 
skills and satisfy my natural curiosity by connecting quality control with development.
That is basically w hat 1 said to shacho.
I then asked her what his reply was. "He agreed" she answered.
Not only is length of service not rewarded, but ’lifetime employees (sei: sha in)' are not 
privileged over fixed-term contract employees. Matsuda-san explained the system at GA:
Employees have a choice, w hether they w ant a sei sha in contract or a keiyaku sha in 
contract. They choose to do that because contract employees' income is a little higher
*9Malsuda san sees no end to age being remunerated, rather than being rewarded. The cost of raising a family, particularly as 
the children grow older and educational costs mount, require that age be remunerated, rather than a respect for age itself.
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on a monthly basis. They don't get retirement payments, but they can make alternative 
plans. Private pension schemes are only just beginning in Japan, but they will grow in 
the coming years as the financial industry deregulates and companies look to reduce 
their financial burden. Employees also do this because they expect to change their job.
It depends on the case, w hether or not this is to the advantage of the company. 
Sometimes it is better to employ people on a short term basis. On the whole, I prefer to 
hire them  permanently but this will change, I know. The circumstances in the business 
environment can change very quickly, so it is sometimes better to have employees on 
short term renewable contracts. For example, at the moment, we are developing CAD 
systems for mechanical engineering, but in five years time, we may enter another area 
and reduce the mechanical engineering element. In such a situation, having employees 
on lifetime contracts is not suitable. More and more companies are moving over to 
yearly renewable contracts, which are, on average 20% higher, in terms of salary, than 
sei sha in.
At the present time, twenty people have a fixed term contract, and are referred to as keiyakn sha in. 
Keiyakn sha in are not discriminated against in any way. So far, no keiyakn sha in are shoku seki sha, but 
no conclusions can be draw n from this. Keiyakn sha in are remunerated in exactly the same way as sei 
sha in, except their basic salary is higher.
I asked M atsuda-san if he feels that his keiyakn sha in, and fixed term contract employees in 
general are less motivated and less loyal.
M mm. I don’t think so. Loyalty, in my experience, comes from being m otivated 
properly  and rew arded  property. C om pany spirit (Jaiisha seishin) is less in  big 
companies that have lifetime employment, particularly now. Also, young people who 
w ant to change jobs are criticised for just w anting to have fun. They do w ant to have 
fun, I'm sure, but there is another reason, I think. The big companies, who everybody 
w anted to w ork for up  until a few years ago, are not grow ing anym ore. These 
companies cannot offer the opportunity  for career developm ent, or for im proving 
skills, so m any young people move com panies for this reason. Em ployees in 
established companies think the same. More and more people do not intend to stay 
with the same company. They want to join small, rapidly growing companies, or start 
their own company. I'd say 50% of the employees in large companies now, or people 
who w ant to join a large com pany, do not in tend to stay w ith  the com pany. 
Technology and markets are developing very quickly, companies will increasingly hire 
people w ith special skills. W hen a company needs a particular skill, they will hire that 
person, and pay them  a higher salary. That will be balanced by not having to pay 
pensions or retirement payments.
M atsuda-san tells us that loyalty derives from persons being 'motivated properly and rewarded 
properly'. The basis of m otivation and rew ard in GA is acknowledgm ent of and respect for the 
individual. The individual is rew arded for his or her work, and given responsibility for it. The 
individual’s time is respected, both inside and outside the company. When inside, the individual is 
expected to devise their own work schedule and liaise with whoever it is necessary. When outside, 
the company does not enquire into the life of the employee, not does it seek to control it or 
adm inister it in any way. Unlike O kum ura's diagnosis of the major problem  associated with 
corporate capitalism: that corporations totally ignore employee’s personal circumstances (2.4), GA 
respects the employee's personal circumstances. Also, in line w ith the shift from a society which 
places work above leisure, to a society which places leisure above work, GA has restored the balance 
between company, family and society, a balance which Kaneko argues: "the company-centred life­
style...threatens" (Kaneko 1997: 154) (2.4). As employee's goal’s shift, so m ust the m anner in which
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companies motivate and reward people.
Employer's goals are also shifting, however, and complement the trend among employee's, 
and in society generally. Companies are aware of a need to harness the individuality which their 
employees are beginning to display, in order to develop new technologies and new products (5.1). 
At the same time, they are looking to reduce their labour costs and are therefore also keen to reduce 
their role in the lives of their employees (5.2). As M atsuda-san corroborates, employees are seeking 
to im prove their skills and maximize their opportunities as the flexible economy begins to grow
(5.2). Again, this suits m any employers as they begin to adopt an 'employm ent portfolio’ system of 
the kind described by Kaneko (2.3). Am ong young companies, such as GA, and am ong young 
employees in established companies, the new  developm ents are eagerly aw aited and embraced. 
Problems arise when it is not in the interests of those employees who have already invested much of 
their working lives in the old ways, to embrace the new ethics and practices. Because of this, the 
pace of change is slow, and many workplaces are in a state of confusion and low morale, with both 
young and old unhappy w ith the current state of affairs. M atsuda-san alludes to this in the passage I 
quoted above, when he mentions that ’company spirit (kaisha seishin)' is low in large companies.
We can see that GA has adopted all of the points m entioned by O kum ura (1992), Morita 
(1992), and Kaneko (1997), in order to redress the balance between company, family, and society, 
which has shifted noticeably since the mid 1980’s. This is both economically and ethically driven. 
Arguably the most fundam ental change, however, is not to working practices and ethics per se, but 
to the effect that these changes are having, and will continue to have, on personhood and ideas 
about the self, both individual and collective. In the next section, 1 begin to look at how w ork ethics 
and practices impact upon the self, through the recognition that individual selves have individual 
needs, desires, and strengths, which can be used m ore productively if recognised individually, 
rewarded individually, and motivated individually. What the shift from a ’company-centred’ society 
to a ’people-centred’ society ultim ately entails, is the legitim ation and institutionalisation of 
'individuality (kosei)’.
A******
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3.6) Company as a Collectivity of Individual Selves
The development of the Japanese company since the beginning of the Meiji era (1868-1912) until the 
present day, is a story of ’changing with the times'.20 Because of this, 1 believe it is reasonable to talk 
of the developm ent of the Japanese company in evolutionary terms. Even talking of a Japanese 
company, as if all Japanese companies are the same, invites criticism. But a combination of social, 
technological, and statutory developm ents, which have affected all companies, does allow for the 
analytical use of the idea of 'the Japanese com pany1 within the terms of this discussion. Kondo, as 
part of her analysis contesting the uniform ity and univocality of the idiom  'company as family', 
provides an historical overview of the developm ent of the Japanese company as a family, both 
structurally and ideologically, as an introduction to her consideration of the contested meanings of 
'company as family':
[T]he ie and uchi are still resonant idioms...Moreover, it is during the postwar period that the metaphor of 
'company as family’ is most resonant in large firms, for it is at this point when the 'Japanese employment 
system'...becomes a social reality...Moreover, the ie provides a ready template for social groupings in 
general. It pivots around a hierarchical structure of power and authority ...it links this belonging to task 
performance...A company, a school, a state can all be potentially seen as originations that require of their 
members acknowledgment of authority, feelings of belonging, and meritorious work...Like the ie, the Sato 
company was an organised, hierarchically structured entity which involves many aspects of its employees 
lives. It provides an internally differentiated structure of power and authority, and it serves as a circle of 
emotional attachment and a nodal point of identity (Kondo 1990:174).
Structure and ideology are familiar tools used to apprehend social reality, but they are, analytically, 
distinctly separate from the being, doing subject. In the next chapter I will look at the way structure 
and ideas both create individuals and are created by individuals. In this section, in order to 
dem onstrate both the continuity and difference between ’company as family', and 'company as a 
collectivity of individual selves', I will look at GA through the w ords of the employees. In this way 
structure and philosophy emerge intact, together and unseparated by heuristic licence. As people 
describe and explain, they construct a framework, a structure, using words and ideas (Cohen 1994; 
1995). In GA, frameworks are built on a vocabulary of an emerging individuality, not separate or 
opposed to situational collective selves but in a flux, a dynamic relationship w ith other individual 
selves. There is little of the dichotomy, or opposition between individual self and collective selves, as 
if the two are generically different (4.3).
Kondo tells us that the m etaphor of the ie to describe Japanese companies draw s on their 
hierarchical structure of pow er and authority  w ithin which w ork is g rounded  in feelings of 
belonging and emotional w arm th (Kondo 1990: 174). Nakane similarly draws our attention to the 
m anner in which emotional attachment is encouraged and generated in order to provide cohesion 
and an environm ent for selfless work (Nakane 1970: 8). Okum ura (1992) and before that, Rohlen 
(1974), both see the 'company as family' motif mobilised to create a sense of debt and obligation 
among a workforce to past and future members of the organisation. The instilling of such a sense of
^ e e  also Taira (1970), Hamada (1980), Clark (1979), Itoh (1992,1994,1996).
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obligation and belonging is just one example of how emotional attachm ents are fostered and 
harnessed in the pursuit of profits. Kondo also draws our attention to the mobilisation of 'company 
as family' behind the pursuit of efficiency and productivity (Kondo 1990: 177). In these examples, 
and all cases where 'company as family’ is mobilised in some form or other in workplaces in Japan, 
there is a direct relationship w ith the organisational structure of a given workplace. Having said 
that, Kondo, following Bachnik (1983) locates the ease with which ie ideology is transferable to 
companies in the fact that: "the ie is basically an enterprise/w ork organisation rather than a unit of 
kinship [so] the ie and the company can act as templates for each other" (Kondo 1990: 176). Yet I 
don't think it would be possible for GA to have the structure it has, and at the same time mobilise 
the idea of 'company as family’. This is not to suggest that the kinds of changes to industrial 
structure and philosophy which are being advocated automatically preclude the use of 'company as 
family', for it is reasonable to im agine the existence of companies in the future w here ideals of 
'company as family' and 'company as a collectivity of individual selves' are mobilised together.
In the case of Graphic Autom ation and GA Systems, however, individuality and individuals 
dom inate the idiom atic language of the com pany and, as I have already dem onstrated , are 
engendered by the organisational structure and command structure of the company (3.3). In GA, the 
category of the individual is given a primacy over and above any other possible category of persons, 
such as families, or even knislia, the company. The strict separation between work and private is veiy 
evident. In 3.4 I described how the deploym ent of both time and space supports a collectivity of 
individual selves, who are regarded as equal. Not only does the organisation of time and space 
within the company support such ideals and practices, the location of GA in the larger temporal and 
spatial worlds of the employees also privileges the individual, and it is in the time and space outside 
the company that we find the family. Answers to my questions regarding company activities and 
obligations outside working hours, drew unanimously emphatic responses. My discussions w ith the 
employees about privacy all included a separation between w ork and everything else. Hinata-san 
describes vividly, not only the separation between w ork and private which characterises GA, but 
also the separation between company and family in the minds of the employees: "For me privacy is 
not broadcasting the intimate details of my family life. The company does not expect this of me, and 
in return, I do not expect anything special from the company. Family is family, company is my place 
of work. I w ant this partition to be clear (kono kugiri wo watashi wa hakkiri shitai to in)". Kondo tells us:
The company also serves as a surrogate family in its involvement with important personal events in their 
employee's lives. The Satos, for instance, kept a list of people's birthdays, including those of the part-time 
workers, and when the auspicious day arrived Mr. Sato would present the birthday boy or girl with a 
gift...Gifts were much more lavish if the employee happened to come of age...Marriage was an especially 
important occasion for company involvement...and it...extend[s] a consoling hand to employees and their 
families even in death...From the recruitment process through death, then, the Sato company touches the 
lives of its members (Kondo 1979:180).
Kondo goes on to tell of company involvem ent in the employee's lives through company outings 
too. But everybody is obliged to go, unlike GA. Iwata-san told us that occasionally there are 
company organised events, but that there is strictly no obligation to go, and nobody is criticised or 
ostracised for not going. The company pays for small groups who organise trips, such as O hanami 
(cherry blossom viewing), themselves. Overall, we can see that the level of involvem ent of the 
company in the employee's lives at GA is much less than in the example provided by Kondo, or
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Rohlen (1974), and that discourses of the family stay firmly and distinctly outside the company.
The com pany isn 't sim ply less involved, it is differently involved. The organisational 
structure of GA does not foreground the w ork team  or the office group, or the section, or the 
departm ent, as the prim ary social entity. It foregrounds the individual. Yamada-san described the 
situation:
With this company, rather than doing tilings as groups (shnndan de) w ork is achieved 
through the abilities of individuals w orking together (kojin kojin no nonjoku ni djite 
shigoto sum  to in yarikata). There is not really a groupism feeling here (shuudan shugi to 
in knnji de wn nai). If you look at the w ork we are able to do in this kind of working 
environment we have here, tilings have certainly changed, I think.
GA is not an enclave of individuals surrounded by a nation of groups. To begin with, we have to 
understand just w hat is m eant by 'an individual’ is in these situations, and just w hat 'group1 we are 
talking about, remembering all the time that the two constitute each other and are always one. This 
is dealt with in the next chapter, but I would like to finish this chapter and arrive at a point where 
those discussions can begin, by dem onstrating, in the words of some of the employees, how they 
feel the individuality (kosei) they have had awakened in them, and are awakening in each other, fits 
into the other parts of their lives. W hat are the continuities between how they think and act at work, 
and how they think and act w hen they are in other settings? We can see from the events and debates 
which I have described in the previous chapters, that GA and the employees are in the m iddle of an 
evolving individualism  w hich encompasses the whole country to lesser or greater extents, one 
which is developing as a consequence of processes of change within and outside the country, and at 
the sam e time being encouraged from  within. Also, in GA, even though the expression of 
individuality is encouraged, its dynamic relationship with the collectivity creates new constraints 
synchronically with the new freedoms. As Shinkawa-san remarked:
If you compare this company to others, there are some conservative things about it, 
although I don't think there is much that is traditional here. If you look at the company 
from the outside, it seems to be quite progressive and restructured. But w hen you 
enter, it is a bit disorganised, and quite conservative too (shngai kara miteiru to, wari to 
kakushinteki to in toka shinpoteki ni mieru kedo, jissai ni naka ni haitteiru to mon chotto 
doroknsni to in ka, kekko hoshuuteki nn tokoro to omoinmsn).
Matsubara-san explained this as follows:
In Japan, when you try and do something on your own, more often than not it will be 
regarded as bad. However, w hen you tiy  and do something different at GA, we are 
encouraged to be individual ( kojin wo dashita ho ga ii to iwareru), so there are times when 
it is regarded as a very good thing. But there are also times when it is regarded as not 
so good. For example, we have to follow the company's regulations, bu t at the same 
time we are encouraged to develop our individual abilities in our work (shigoto wa kojin 
no nonjoku wo sugoku noshi nasni).
Adapting to changing situations is w hat selves do. It is an intrinsic part of being-in-the-world. 
Negotiating different settings w ithin GA, such as consciously developing your individuality while 
at the same time following the company's rules, requires the same faculties as moving from GA to a 
family wedding. Both begin with learning to negotiate new settings and both involve the constant
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negotiation of different settings. N either of w hich are straightforward, and both are fraught w ith 
potential failure, albeit minor and fleeting in most cases. In addition to being taught, this is how we 
learn. M atsubara-san indicates this when she says:
Outside work, we should restrain  our individualistic tendencies (kojin wo narubeku 
osaeru). Over the years, social conventions (kimatteiru shakai no kimari) have developed, 
and one of them  is that people should constrain their individualistic im pulses. 
However, at GA we are encouraged to use our individual abilities when working or 
when expressing our opinions. But to be asked to discard a way of thinking which has 
been round for a long time is sometimes difficult.
Having said that, however, M atsubara-san makes a telling remark w hen she adds: "At GA, I do not 
have to adjust, especially, I'm able to be myself (kaisha de wa toku ni adujyasuto sum  koto de wa m i. 
Watashi ga watashi wo motte ireba zoatashi no tadashii to omou koto wo dekirti kaisha da to omoitmsu)".21
GA cannot be separated from its context. It exists and flourishes in Japan, in the world. The 
fact that it is able to flourish tells us something about what is happening outside the plush offices of 
GA. Iwata-san makes this clear:
Japanese have a group consciousness. Thinking individually is weak here. Certainly 
people here think individually , but I personally don’t th ink that m akes people 
individuals. Nevertheless, things are changing, especially among young people. If this 
was the old days, w e'd be expected to work for only one company. Consequently a 
person is affiliated (shozoku sum ) to a com pany group (kaisha to in dantai). Until 
recently, w ithin a company, even if your opinion was different from everybody else, 
there was a com pany w ay of th inking  and doing, and you follow ed it. Now, 
increasingly, relatively speaking, you can speak your mind frankly. You don’t hear the 
expression 'Go w ith the flow (shnndan no nagare ni nagasarern)' so often these days.
*******
21I translated Matsubara san's comment: ”watashi no tadashii to omou koto wo dekiru kaisha da to omoimasa", as: "In this company,
I am able to be myself". Literally, what she said was: "I am able to do the things I think are right, in this company".
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Conclusion
I opened this chapter by documenting methodology. I then began to look in detail at the changes in 
attitudes to work, changes to ethics and working practices, and changes to the relationships between 
employees in the workplace. M atsuda san’s reason's for leaving Toshiba : that he was unable to use 
his initiative and develop his own products, are the base of his own business philosophy at GA. The 
organisational structu re and com m and structure at GA are geared to m axim ize custom er 
satisfaction (CS), which is achieved as a result of all the employees having direct access to the 
market, in other words, the company's customers and potential customers. Customer satisfaction is 
best achieved, according to M atsuda-san, if the employees are not sim ply encouraged, but are 
required, through company philosophy, ethics and practice, to display originality (originarity). This 
is achieved by the employees expressing their individuality (kosei). In order that the employees are 
able to express their individuality, the organisational structure and com m and structure at GA is 
very different from a rigid, hierarchically structured company of the kind described by Nakane 
(1970), Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), Kondo (1990), Hamada (1992), and Hendry (1993).
The most immediately obvious aspect of this radical restructuring, is that everybody is 
regarded as equal ( taito). M atsuda-san, the president, is the only member of staff referred to by his 
title, and he does have executive powers over the rest of the staff, but there are m any occasions 
during the w orking day w hen it is very difficult to tell him apart from the other employees. 
Everybody in  the company is in touch with everybody else, and everybody has access to everybody 
else. This is very different from w hat is normally found in a Japanese workplace, where who an 
employee can talk to, together w ith w hat they can say to a given person, is strictly prescribed by the 
organisational structure and command structure. M atsuda-san regards this rigid structure as slow 
and inefficient, particularly because it does not give all the employees the opportunity to show 
initiative, or to have access to the com pany's customers. Instead, as M atsuda-san explained, 
corroborating Rohlen (1974), such a structure engenders a system where the prime concern of the 
employees is not to satisfy the customers, but to increase their status w ithin the organisation. 
Certainly, this is contingent on satisfying customers, but the fact that an employee’s main focus of 
attention is on his status relative to his colleagues, means such an organisation is not as effective as it 
could be. In 5.1 I will take up this point again.
Being 'equal (taito)' means that everybody has equal access to each other, and has equal say 
in contributing to the developm ent of the company’s products, and to the company generally. There 
is a layer of managem ent, com prised of the three standard ranks found in virtually all Japanese 
companies. These are the ranks of 'departm ent head (bucho)', 'assistant departm ent head (jicho)', and 
'section head (kacho)'. These 'm anagers' are known as shokusekisha, rather than kanrisha, the more 
common term. M anagers are not called kanrisha at GA because kanri indicates a degree of control 
over others, and this is not the function of a m anager at GA. Shokusekisha co-ordinate the w ork of
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others, but do not take responsibility for the work of others. This is a radical departure from form. 
At GA, everybody is responsible for their ow n work, taking the can if things go wrong, and taking 
the laurels when they go well. Taking responsibility at GA is not prim arily a case of taking the 
blame when things go w rong, or of taking credit w hen due. G iving ind ividual em ployees 
responsibility for their work is more a question of giving an individual the power to make decisions.
There is no status attached to rank at GA, except in the case of M atsuda-san, the president. 
Rank indicates the job a person does. It indicates his or her duties and responsibilities. Also, status 
cannot be accrued through rank because becoming a manager is a personal decision: not everybody 
wants to be a manager, and consequently some people, regardless of their age or ability, remain 
tantdsha, 'ordinary employees'. Clark (1979) tells us that the word tantosha is used to mean manager, 
and this is the meaning assigned to the word tantdsha at GA: a tantdsha, an ordinary employee, is a 
manager of their own work, responsible for their own work.
The ordering of space and time at GA reflects the equality among the employees. Very often 
in a Japanese company, the organisation of space closely reflects the distribution of power among 
the persons inhabiting that space. At GA this is also true. M atsuda-san has his ow n office, but 
otherwise, tantdsha and sltokusekisha are randomly spread within their work team areas. The ordering 
of time reflects the fact that the company has very little to do with an individual employee once they 
have completed their work. Continuing the theme from the last chapter, GA is a good example of a 
company which embodies the relationship between a person's workplace and other aspects of their 
life, in what is envisaged as a 'people-centred' society (2.4). The workplace is completely separated 
from the rest of an employee's life. Employees can and do meet each other socially outside working 
hours, but this is not expected, or regarded  as an essential part of developing workplace 
relationships, in a m anner described by Nakane (1970), Rohlen (1974) and Kondo (1990). The 
employees at GA, on the contrary, tend not to see each other socially. N either do they regard a 
lessening involvem ent by the company in their lives as a retrogressive step. They emphatically 
stated their preference for a strict separation of the workplace from their 'private' lives, consistent 
with the trend of placing leisure above work. In keeping with this trend, motivation is derived from 
the fact that the company respects the employees' private lives. This is also reflected in the absence 
of any discourses of 'company as family', a major ideological and ethical developm ent in the post- 
WWII period. Discourses of the w orkplace and of the family are separate, w ith the prim ary 
discourse of the workplace being a discourse of individuality and of ’individuals working together’ 
rather than ‘in groups (shuudan de)\
* * * * * * *
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4. A New Individualism
1) R ehabilitating th e  Individual: 1
2) R ehabilitating th e  Individual: 2
3) Individuality and Com m unity
4) Seken  and The New Individualism
5) Tatem ae , Girt and The New Individualism
In the previous chapter, I described how, in GA, the individual is given a prim acy over other 
categories of persons, such as 'fam ily', or ’group (shnndan, dantai)', and w here the individual 
becomes a locus of responsibility and a springboard for originality. In this chapter I begin to look at 
how a privileging of individual selves and the foregrounding of individuality (kosei) redefines the 
individual self through relationships betw een individual selves, and through the relationship 
between individual selves and collective selves within GA.
The chapter begins by challenging recent studies on the Japanese self, particularly on the 
grounds of their refusal to talk about selves as 'individuals’. This refusal is grounded in the fallacy 
that all traces of individuality in Japan are imported Western notions, which have to be rooted out. It 
is only by exposing this fallacy and its flawed methodological base, that I can then begin to 
introduce native theories of individualism and individuality.
In Section Two, I argue that an identifiably Japanese individualism  is developing in Japan, 
firmly rooted in Japan's past. Individualism and individuality have been traced back at least as far as 
the Kamakura period (1185-1333), and have continued to inform and define Japanese sense of self 
and society in recent years. I briefly review examples of these native concepts of indivduality, 
draw ing particular attention to the fact that notions of individuality  and com m unity in these 
examples, m utually constitute each other and define each other and cannot be separated from each 
other. This m utual inseperability of individuality and community is just as evident in the examples 
of the relationships between individual selves and collective selves among the employees at GA.
Section Three begins by reviewing w ork done on the Japanese self which emphasises the 
mutual constitution of selves in Japan, both individual and collective. I then move on to the analysis 
of my reseach data in detail. I started by I asked the employees w hat being an individual (kojin) 
means, what belonging to a 'group (shnndan)' means, and w hat the relationship is between an 
individual (kojin) and a group (shnndan). By asking them to discuss various words and concepts, the
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topography of individual selves and collective selves within GA emerged, through the suitability 
and unsuitability of various terms to describe the relationship between individual selves and 
between individual selves and collective selves. A more precise m eaning of these terms also began 
to emerge from these discussions.
Section Four looks in detail at the concepts of seken and sekentei, which dem onstrate clearly 
the existence of and the recognition of an individual self in Japanese concepts of personhood. The 
relationship between seken and sekentei also demonstrates, not only the that individual selves and 
collective selves m utually constitute each other and have consistently been perceived in terms of 
each other, but also how this happens. In other words, it begins to look as though the relationship 
betweensdceu and sekentei is the native model describing the dynam ic relationship of between 
shifting selves, individual and collective. The suitability or unsuitability of seken and sekentei as 
term s to describe the re la tionsh ips betw een selves w ith in  GA, reveals m uch about these 
relationships, as well as inform ation about two concepts that have received little attention, but 
which, I will argue, are just as im portant as other terms used by anthropologists to understand 
Japanese society, forcing us to rethink how anthropologists have m apped social space in Japan. The 
ignoring of seken and sekentei also brings into question how is it that anthropologists come to 
privilege some aspects of the societies they study over others. As an example, a listener to a 
conversation between Japanese is far more likely to hear the words seken and sekentei than the words 
tatemae or honne, or omote and um, to explain why they are motivated to act in a certain way.
In the final section I argue that the relationship between selves which is emerging within GA 
indicates that the privileging of 'individuality (kosei)', and of the individual self (kojin and jibun) 
requires us to reevaluate the term s tatemae (public behaviour), honne (true hum an feeling), omote 
(front), um (back), uchi (inside), soto (outside), and giri, as concepts to describe and understand the 
Japanese self in post-Bubble Japan.
■at******
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4.1) R ehabilitating the Individual: 1
Recent studies of self and personhood in Japan begin by launching into an attack on classical 
Western concepts of the individual by saying how insidious and 'incorrigible' (Kondo 1990, 26) this 
essentialist 'self' is (Rosenberger 1992: x; Kondo 1990: 26). To elaborate, this concept of self is a 
(male) self who is an autonom ous subject, who exercises (his) sovereign choice, w ho decides, 
evaluates, calculates, is self directing, and independent, and "who relates to others as no less 
autonom ous agents" (Lukes 1985: 298). Rosenberger (1992), on the first page of the introduction to 
her edited book, has this to say:
Previous studies had restricted the idea of self in Japan to Western, oppositional and implicitly essentialist 
categories of 'individual' and 'society'. Although this opposition continues to haunt us - and, given the 
rhetorical necessities, is almost impossible to escape - our purpose was to ask new questions about the 
constitution of self in Japan (Rosenberger 1992: xi. my emphasis).
These recent studies of Japanese self and society talk of "shifting interaction" (Rosenberger 1992:14), 
"a sliding scale of self and other" (Kondo 1990: 26), "a relational self...highly em bedded in social 
context" (Bachnik 1994: 5). But while these studies talk of a concept of the Japanese self grounded in 
em pirical analysis, em phasising 'm ultiple selves' (Kondo 1990) dependent on situation, they 
dogmatically refuse to talk about selves as individuals. Rosenberger's introduction is primarily an 
a ttem pt to root ou t any traces of W estern ind iv idualism  in oppositional analyses in the 
anthropological canon on Japan, especially those of individual/society and W estern/Non-W estern. 
She appears to confuse individuality with individualism, and also starts from the false premise that 
all discussions of ind iv iduality  come from W estern concepts, and consequently  should  be 
disregarded. She proceeds by installing a huge monolithic O ther by telling us how "Westerners 
living in industrial, economically ’m odern' societies idealize themselves as individuals". W ithin a 
page of avowing to escape this opposition, she reinstates it:
Westerners often affirm this ideal by viewing non-Westemers as swayed by emotion, relation, and context - 
only able to think in the specific case and then only by metaphor. It follows that Western societies can take 
the ’higher’ form of democracy because decision making can be entrusted to the hands of rational 
individuals, whereas non-Western societies require a strong collectivity for cohesion and control of people 
enm eshed in the im m ediacy of relationship and superstition...This point of view  remains with 
anthropologists, even those studying complex, industrialized non-Western societies ( Rosenberger 1992, 2).
Rosenberger then continues to instate very questionable dichotomies by setting up  a distinction 
betw een 'Japanese-trained ' and  'W estern-trained ' anthropologists. Just w hat her criteria of 
distinction are, we are not told. She says how "Japanese-trained scholars ...em phasize Japan's 
concept of the collective self, em bedded in social context and the Japanese natural world." 
(Rosenberger 1992:12). By saying this, she again sets up an opposition between Japan and the West. 
She talks of Japanese-trained scholars em phasising the collective self and context, just as she 
castigates W esterners for em phasising that "non-Western societies require a strong collectivity for 
cohesion and control of people enm eshed in the immediacy of relationship and superstition" 
(Rosenberger 1992: 2).
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The debates that alerted the academic world to Orientalism, 'the politics of culture' and 'the 
politics of representation', were conducted nearly twenty years ago. Since that time, anthropologists 
of Japan have reflexively tried to remove their cultural presuppositions and hold them  up for 
scrutiny. They have been studying Japan in the context of history and the politics of culture in order 
to allow authentic Japanese voices and selves to reveal them selves. These voices tell us of 
dichotom ies and we should listen. D raw ing our attention to hidden assum ptions is fine, but 
Rosenberger has allowed her rightful criticism of Western ideas of individualism  to stray into her 
representation of concepts of individualism in Japan.
The move tow ards the study of self and society through studies of highly situational 
multiple selves is a good analytical move, but although it is Rosenberger's professed aim to move 
beyond dichotomies, because she sets up an opposition between the W est/Japan and ties it to the 
dichotomy of individual/society, she is unable to move beyond them at all. She sets up a dichotomy 
between W estern-trained anthropologists and Japanese-trained anthropologists, and less obviously 
reinstates the opposition  of ind iv idual/soc ie ty  by dam ning the inclusion of concepts of the 
individual within her theoretical framework, on the basis that all theories of the individual in Japan 
are W estern theories im posed by 'W estern-trained' anthropologists. This is simply not the case
(4.2).The dichotomy of individual/society, in the form of W est/Japan, is to be found in varying 
degrees in the four islands of Japan, not only, or predominantly, in the work and subconscious of all 
'W estern-trained' anthropologists. Rosenberger writes "The tem ptation of such general conclusions 
continually bedevils Western-trained scholars of Japan" (Rosenberger 1992: 2).
She fails to recognise the role of 'W estern' ideals of the individual in forming Japanese 
conceptions of self. Countless times a day many Japanese use an idealised W esterner to define 
themselves and Japan through the oppositional dichotomy of Japan/The W est.1 Hendry also makes 
this point (Hendry 1992). How Japanese situate themselves in relation to this idealized individual 
tells us a lot about how they see the history of their relationship with 'the West', and how they see 
and think about themselves. At the moment, w ith attitudes towards individuality and with ideas of 
what individuality 'is' changing, it is vital that we recognise these discourses and not discard them 
because they are a part of a past whose values we no longer regard as acceptable, tenable or 
legitimate. Any discussion of selves with a degree of autonomy, such as being loci of responsibility 
and originality, and given the task of individual thought and action, should not dogmatically be cast 
as the W estern-trained anthropologist "grappling...with the ideology of the individual which is 
em bedded in their theories and common sense views." (Rosenberger:1992.4). Kondo presents a 
similar argument, closing off areas of analysis, in her 1990 study Crafting Selves:
Work done on the 'Japanese self, in the light of my particular experiences...can point us toward the 
profound challenges such scholarship offers to seemingly incorrigible Western assumptions about the 
primacy of 'the individual' and the boundedness and fixity of personal identity ( Kondo 1990: 26).
Such an approach assum es that any discussion of individuality in a Japanese setting m ust be 
premised on 'W estern' concepts of self, im posed by the (Western) analyst. This is clearly not the
*1
In virtually all cases where a Japanese uses 'the West', s /h e  will be referring to the United States', and similarly 'Westerners’ 
invariably refers to Americans.
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case. Ideas about selves expressed in terms of both ethics and practices in GA indicates that new 
ideas about individuality are beginning to emerge in Japan, but that these ideas are firmly grounded 
in Japanese concepts of personhood and society. By refusing to talk about 'individuals (kojin)' and 
'individuality (kosei)', and on such fallacious grounds, we are indicted to ignore native concepts of 
individuality and impose another 'W estern' concept of the self. This is both m ethodologically 
wrong-headed and ethically unacceptable. It is also simply untrue that we are helplessly bound by 
'incorrigible assumptions'. Japanese theories of the self discussed in the Japanese language, and then 
carefully in English, are not bound by the 'rhetorical necessities' Rosenberger talks of.
* * * * * * *
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4.2) Rehabilitating the Individual: 2
Ikegami (1995) tells us that an 'honourific individualism ’ existed in Japan, at least since the 
Kamakura period (1185-1333). This began prior to the Tokugawa or Edo period (1600-1868) when a 
medieval honour culture which placed a high value on aggressive competitiveness developed. This 
aggressive com petitiveness relied heavily on a sense of individual autonom y and concomitant 
individuality:
In the elitist honour culture of that period there flourished the strong belief that the ultimate responsibility 
for the different requirements of social honour creating an honourific identity belonged not to society as a 
whole but to each member of that society (Ikegami 1995:370).
Ikegami tells us that the Tokugawa period was a period of increasingly more organised hierarchical 
social strata, which led to a highly institutionalised culture that placed a value on organisation and 
conformity: "Thus the sam urai culture was considerably refocused” (Ikegami 1995: 335). This led to 
the twin aspirations of ’competitive individuality’ and ’orderly conformity’, and although an honour 
culture based on self-assertive individualism  continued, it was: "reconstituted as a m uch more 
hierarchically ordered value" (Ikegami 1995: 337), with both the sam urai and the state authorities 
sharing the cultural idioms of honourific competitiveness within a set of institutions constructed and 
m aintained by a cohesive and stable political authority.
D uring the Tokugaw a period, Ikegami tells us that there were three major changes in the 
honour culture. There was a shift in the expression of honour, whereby it was less associated with 
violence and more with virtuous self-discipline. There was also a shift in the locus of honour, from 
the personal to the organisational, through the shared destiny of a m aster's (daimyd) house. This 
shift, Ikegami argues, caused a good deal of conflict and still lies at the heart of a tension between 
personal goals and organisational goals in modern Japan. Thirdly, there was a shift in the source of 
honour, from perform ance to status.^ Nevertheless, perform ance rem ained im portant, as the 
militaristic tradition legitimated the position of the sam urai over the other classes, and remained: "a 
prized cu ltural resource suitable for generating  ind iv idualistic action and for expressing 
individuality" (Ikegami 1995: 349).
Ikegami coins the term  'honourific individualism ' to describe the individualism  which 
developed in Japan, as separate from the term usually associated w ith 'modern Western capitalist 
societies'. She describes honourific individualism  as a type of 'possessive individualism ' (cf 
MacPherson 1962; Pocock 1985), whereby a samurai's individuality was inseparably connected to his 
political effectiveness as a w arrior (Ikegami 1995: 353). The sam urai was constantly required to 
assert himself and maintain control. Ikegami tells us that medieval sam urai culture always aspired 
towards independence and self-direction:
This individualism did not imply that a particular samurai would always rebel against the limitations 
imposed by institutional requirements and designated roles. Rather, 'honourific individualism' meant that
o
These developments would be consistent with the growing Neo-Confucian orthodoxy during the Tokugawa period.
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such a man would always take these boundaries seriously, even though the ultimate decision about 
whether or not to conform would be his own and no other's (Ikegami 1995:371).
Self-assertive and flamboyant, a spirit of self-reliance developed among the sam urai through the 
need to defend one's property  and reputation. Honourific individualism , however, developed 
within a concomitant network of effective social relationships and political alliances, so that during 
the Kamakura period, honourific individualism  became a socially accepted goal through honourable 
vassalage.
As the country passed into the Meiji period (1868-1912), Ikegami writes that the sam urai 
were given a new lease of life: "After the Meiji Restoration, the honourific sentim ent was harnessed 
to the task of nation-building, com bined w ith  the fresh incentives of ind iv idual economic 
aspirations." (Ikegami 1995: 362). The honourific sentiment was used to create a moral consensus for 
nation-building, while honourific individualism, latent for much of the Tokugawa period, was given 
free reign through the opportunities for economic development. At the same time, the sam urai, 
educated and with a strong individualist tradition, embraced European liberal thought:
that emphasised the value of the individual and a spirit of self-help. The first generation of Meiji 
intellectuals... consisted mostly of former samurai who had grown up within the samurai culture. It was 
their own indigenous spirit of self-awareness and personal pride that found W estern m odels of 
individualism and independence attractive idioms for the expression of their prideful personhood (Ikegami 
1995:364).
Ikegami tells us that there was a moral dilemma presented by the conflict between individuality and 
conformity in the Meiji period, but that rather than tins conflict appearing as a result of 'Western' 
individualistic values clashing with ‘traditional Japanese values', as is generally accepted both inside 
and outside Japan, it was instead a reform ulation of a cultural process of balancing an honourific 
individualism  with civic du ty  which had been in m otion since the M edieval period, particularly 
through the Tokugawa period, and into the m odem  era. Ikegami argues that it would have been 
impossible to bring about the enorm ous changes which occurred in the Meiji era w ithout the 
'persuasive initiative and determ ined persistence' of men heavily influenced by the sam urai honour 
culture. "It is impossible to imagine the industrialisation of a late-developing society w ithout the 
presence of individualistic agents of change" (Ikegami 1995: 366). This burst of individualism  at the 
beginning of the Meiji period may not have been solely in the tradition of the sam urai honour 
culture. Irokaw a (1985) and Yamaguchi Masao (personal com m unication) describe a sim ilar 
individualism developing among the villages surrounding Tokyo in the early Meiji period. Like the 
samurai elites in Japanese society which Ikegami describes, this 'grass-roots' movement was inspired 
by im ported W estern texts, but it is interesting to consider that these ordinary m en and women 
m ight have been draw ing on other traditions of Japanese individualism  lying dorm ant in society, 
not only the 'honourific individualism ' Ikegami writes about.
Ikegami concludes by saying that Japanese studies in the West and in Japan, has tended to 
focus on the civic duty aspect of sam urai ethics and the honour culture of the samurai, ignoring the 
individualism. Ikegami's opinion as to why the individualistic tradition in Japan has gone unnoticed 
is because scholarship on m odern Japan which attempts to discover the roots of m odern Japanese 
institutions and values only goes back as far as the Tokugawa period, and because there has been a 
tendency to focus on what is 'peculiar to Japanese social institutions and organisations'. In addition,
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I would add that individualism  has also been ideologically positioned as non-Japanese, not only by 
various discourses of the self in Japan, but also by some Western scholars. Ikegami notes that it has 
been the Japanese themselves who have presented samurai honour in terms of self-sacrificial loyalty, 
ignoring the proud self-determ ination inherent in sam urai honorific individualism , covering over 
the tracks which indicate its continuity into the M odern era. She finishes by noting that scholars 
have then reproduced this view.
Ikegami takes us as far back as the 11th Century A.D., but the roots of this individualism  are 
evident as far back as the 7th Century A.D. at least. There are clear references to the existence of, and 
m oral sanctioning of, ind iv iduality  and difference in Article Ten of the Seventeen Article 
Constitution of Prince Shotoku. Article Ten states: "Nor let us be resentful w hen others differ from 
us. For all men have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their right is our wrong, and our 
right is their wrong. We are not unquestionably sages, and they are not unquestionably fools. Both 
of us are sim ply ordinary men (Tsunoda, et al. 1958: 50). The reference to 'ordinary men' also 
indicates an early concept of equality present in Confucian cosmology and personhood, where all 
men are equal un d er H eaven, and all are regarded  as, equally, capable of affecting the 
correspondence between Heaven and Earth. The perception of the individual self in Confucian, and 
particular Neo-Confucian cosmology is of a rational thinker who understands the process of 
causation between Heaven and Earth, and who acts premeditatively, autonomously, to maintain all 
correspondences between Heaven and Earth.
An individualism  is also very evident in the Buddhism  of the period, which required 
individuals to follow their ow n 'inner light (pmjnn)’. This individual self is recognised to be both 
autonomous and intersubjective in a similar way to the individual self which characterises the new 
individualism  emerging in Japan. This Buddhist individual self is regarded as autonomous because 
it is im bued w ith the pow er of reason, and given the responsibility to act, individually, on that 
reasoning, and regarded as possessing the ability to attain enlightenment through the powers of the 
individual mind. But it is also intersubjective because of the belief in m oral causation and the 
interdependence (en) of all things. The self in the Buddhist view is a locus of w hat Carrithers (1985) 
calls 'systematic thought and systematic self discipline' which is 'the central concern of hum an 
existence'. This param ountcy of individual value is what Dumont (1985) regards as the condition of 
individualism.
We can conjecture that individualism  existed in Japan prior to the arrival of Confucianism 
and Buddhism , from the w ritings of the N ational Learning (kokugakii\ m ovem ent in the 18th 
Century. For Motoori Norinaga, one of the leading lights of the movement, the spontaneity of the 
'life-impulse', represented by Takami-musubi (vitality) and Kami-musubi (fertility), two of the gods 
from the Shinto pantheon, were more relevant to the lives of ordinary people, as they explained the 
Japanese sensibility, 'which was more emotional than rational’. This emotional, spontaneous self was 
presented as in opposition to the highly rational Neo-Confucian self of the period, which was the 
dom inant construction of the individual self during the Tokugawa period. But by the end of the 
Tokugawa period, Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas about eveiything had become so fused, 
that the individual self across all sections of society was also, undoubtedly , a combination of
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Confucian, Buddhist, and native Shinto conceptions of the self. What all these concepts of the self 
have in common, is a sense of self as both subjective and autonomous, but also, as an agent of moral 
causation, intersubjective and interdependent.
Until recently, until the collapse of the Bubble in 1991-2, discourses of individualism tended 
to fall under the subject of kojinshugi. Kojinshugi, a translation of the term 'individualism ' from the 
Western concept discussed in 4.1, was im ported from Western intellectual works, first in mid-19th 
century Dutch texts, and, over the years, rew orked through a series of dichotomies to produce a 
whole range of categories and personal characteristics which have been strategically used to help 
define and shape the Japanese sense of self, and on which publishing em pires have been built. 
Kojinshugi has tended to have a negative m eaning (Moeran 1989), and it is significant that the word 
kojinshugi was never used by any of my interviewees to describe the new individualism  taking root 
in  the afterm ath of the Bubble. In fact, I d id  not hear the w ord  kojinshugi m entioned in any 
discussions concerning the prom oting or encouraging of individuality (kosei) or individual ability 
(kojin no noryoku) while I was doing fieldwork, be they discussions I had, or those via the various 
media. Bearing in m ind its ideological roots, mention of kojinshugi has been a defining characteristic 
for 'Western' society in Japan, and has been regarded as unjapanese in this sense since the late Meiji 
period (Gluck 1985), and at other times in the past (Wakabayashi 1986; Nosco 1984). Framed in these 
ways, kojinshugi characteristics were frowned upon and discouraged. In fact 'discouraged' is a little 
euphemistic, the pressure through coercion to not be wagamamn, 'selfish', or jibttn katte ni sum, 'to do 
as you please', was, and still is, a part of daily life in Japan, as M atsubara-san indicated in 3.6. 
Moeran (1989) also regards kojinshugi as essentially referring to negative personal characteristics 
associated w ith idealised Westerners, and he also suggests that kosei, 'individuality ' is the locus of 
what is regarded as good about individualism  (kojinshugi), and is regarded as entirely Japanese 
(Moeran 1989: 70). My own data also indicates that these self-centred ’W estern’ characteristics are 
not regarded as synonymous w ith ’individuality (kosei)'.
M oeran’s discussion of developm ents in the pottery village where he undertook research, 
shows how the developm ent of an individualism  among the potters was inimical to the continuity 
of an organisational s tructure w hich foregrounds horizontally equal collectivities of selves, 
internally ordered hierarchically by age, rather than individual selves. M oeran describes how 
influential critics, and then consum ers, focusing on individuals ra ther than ’com m unity' and 
'unknow n craftsm en’, underm ined the organisational structure of the community, threatening to 
change it from a com m unity ordered on seniority and community, to one ordered on talent, or 
performance, and individuality (Moeran 1989). The problems which were caused in the village can 
be seen as a precedent for the situations which are developing in many Japanese companies, as they 
move from reward systems which primarily reward a collectivity of selves, to rew ard systems which 
single out individuals and reward them.
M oeran tells us that the potters believed that the pots express the ind ividual potter's 
character, by being im bued w ith  the po tter's  'h e a r t/m in d /so u l (kokoro)' (M oeran 1989: 90). 
Consequently, there m ust always have been an element of conflict within households and villages, 
resulting from the veiling of the recognition of individual talent by attributing  success to the
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household or village in general, and the senior males in particular. What is im portant to recognise is 
the existence and recognition by those concerned of individuality (kosei), expressed through the 
concept o(kokoro in the case Moeran describes. Elsewhere, Moeran continues his analysis of kokoro as 
a key concept in Japanese attempts to reconcile the tensions that exist between individual selves and 
collective selves (1989: 70). Over the course of various discussions, he reveals the existence of native 
concepts of individuality and individual selves. He describes how the tensions that exist between 
the desires and goals of collective selves and individual selves in Japan are m ediated and 
rationalised through the ambivalent use of kokoro. The balancing act which Moeran describes, is one: 
"between the tw o points of spontaneity  and social exchange, on the one hand, and outright 
individualism  and 'negative reciprocity’, on the other" (Moeran 1989: 70). M oeran regards this 
balancing act as being negotiated on a ’semantic tightrope’, indicating that spontaneity and social 
exchange, and outright individualism  and negative reciprocity, are essentially the same. Difference 
lies in who is passing judgm ent, or where they are and at what time. By moving forward in time to 
the post-Bubble environment, what is essentially the same as Moeran is discussing, is increasingly 
regarded as positive, as a result of the passing of time and changes in conditions. What Moeran 
describes are Japanese concepts of individuality, which are evident today in the new individualism 
among the employees at GA, and among the party goers (7.1).
Among the potters, spontaneity  is the source of creativity and originality. The potters 
Moeran studied knew this, hence the importance of individuality (kosei), as spontaneity, realised 
through the expression of kokoro. W hat is essentially happening in GA, is that the same process is 
being recognised and nurtu red . Kokoro or kosei, and other w ords and concepts w hich were 
rationalised as being distinct from W estern notions of self in M oeran’s examples, may not be 
consciously recognised in the example of GA, but the characteristics they describe are present. In a 
further discussion of kokoro, Moeran suggests how the individuality which is evoked by the use of 
kokoro in advertising (Moeran 1989: 69), is harnessed to stress the importance of relationships, thus 
transcending ’outright individualism ’ of the kind associated w ith ’W estern’ individualism : ’Thus, 
however individualistic you  are invited to be, you  are often invited to be individualistic for 
somebody...both for yourself and on behalf of others.” (Moeran 1989: 69. emphasis in original). This is 
both reminiscent of Shinto and Buddhist m orally-driven social causality, and very evident in GA, 
where the nurturing of individuality and originality is both openly discussed as both for the benefit 
of the employees themselves and the company, and the company's customers, expressed through 
the twin goals of the personal developm ent of individuality and customer satisfaction, and is also 
visible in the organisational structure and command structure of the company (3.3).
M iyanaga (1991) presents a theory of 'emerging individualism ', which I will discuss in 
greater detail in 6.1. She argues that ’active individualists' have existed on the periphery of society, 
trying to establish their own values (M iyanaga 1991: 128), bu t have tended to give up  their 
individualistic values, and move into the m ainstream of society, in a search for status. Essentially, 
this has involved them  succum bing to the values and practices that m ight be descxribed as 
constituting the various group models of Japanese society (Befu 1990). However, with the growth of 
a flexible economy (5.2) during  the 1980s, they have been able to m aintain their individualistic
145
values and move into the mainstream. Miyanaga does not say what constitutes this individualism, 
but she does, none the less, argue that a tradition of individualism  has existed in Japan 'since the 
turn of the century'. She is presum ably referring to the introduction of W estern values during the 
Meiji period, and she does not, therefore, argue for a tradition of Japanese individualism. However, 
she then turns to her main argument, that a 'passive individualism ' has been growing w ithin the 
m ainstream since the 1970s. She argues that more individualistic Japanese, known as the shin jinrni 
(new breed) were given the task of using their initiative in the workplace, but that their senior 
colleagues in particular, could not accommodate these different values. Consequently, these more 
individualistic young Japanese w ithdrew  into their own 'private groups'. Miyanaga does not tell us 
the roots of this individualism, but she does argue that individualism is a part of Japanese society, 
and that, during the 1980s, it began to emerge within mainstream society.
There is also a kind of individuality  associated w ith m aturity  in Japan. This kind of 
individualism has been identified by Doi (1973) as jibttn ga am , 'to have a self'.
Its essence [jibun ga am] does not lie in rejection of the group; but an individual is said to have a. jibun  when 
he can maintain an independent self that is never negated by the group (Doi:2973:134) .
Doi argues that jibun is a reflexive T, and that to have a jibun, to have a self, is to have an awareness 
of self as, what Inoue (1977) refers to as a 'doing subject' (jcoi shuutai). Conversely, to not have a jibun 
is for a person to not have an awareness of themselves as a separate, empowered, doing subject. Doi 
describes a person w ith a jibun as someone who premeditatively, willingly submits to the aims and 
intentions, to the will, of a collective self. The existence of difference is regarded as normal, however, 
m aturity is being able to subm it to a given collective self while still m aintaining an independent 
self.3 To not have a jibun is to be unable to m aintain an independent self. A person who is jibun ga 
m i will still have a sense of being a separate doing subject, but, according to Doi, this awareness 
arises, not from feeling empowered, but from the spectre of disagreement and separation, whereby 
the desire to belong will be greater than  the pain of disagreem ent (Doi 1973: 134). The im portant 
point is the question of reflexivity, or self-awareness. An individual, a person who has a jibun, will 
decide to act independently. A person who has no jibun is unable to act independently. Lebra also 
comments: "Self saturated in the interactional world is...negatively described by Japanese as jibun ga 
m i (devoid of self), and is advised to retrieve itself, jibun wo torimodosu" (Lebra 1992: 111).
Hendry (1992) also argues that the individual self is recognised and regarded as important. 
Looking at the socialization of young Japanese, she comments that:
Alongside the group identity which they are learning, [the children] also become well aware of the 
individual chnrnctersistics of their peers, and they learn to think of each other as they cooperate in group 
endeavour...Individual effort does not pass unnoticed ( Hendry 1992:60).
Hendry is not talking about how selves are perceived, and conceived, but she is in no doubt that the 
individual, as a social actor, is recognised and valued. This is the first step towards building a theory 
of the individual self, and how it is constituted by other selves, both individual and collective. 
Hendry also stresses the interrelationship between the individual self and other individual selves, 
and between the individual self and collective selves, generally. And although she is careful to stress
3This description of the self accords with Confucian ethics.
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that 'individuality ' (kosei) is socially circumcribed, she argues for the individual as an im portant 
social actor in Japanese society.
Rosenberger (1992) states: "Jibuti literally m eans 'self part' - part of a larger whole that 
consists of groups and relationships. Jibun is always valued in relations to that larger whole (cf 
Dum ont 1970)" (Rosenberger 1992: 4). Rosenberger's opinion on the m eaning of jibun is influenced 
by her refusal to acknowledge the Japanese self as an individual self. Ji is the on (Chinese) reading of 
the character, w hich w hen standing alone is read as mizukara, the Japanese reading. It means 
'oneself. It appears in many com pounds, which, when referring to hum an beings, always refer to 
Ego. In the w ord jibun, the character means 'self', 'oneself. The character bun has many meanings, 
the most familiar of which is 'part', but 'part' is not the only meaning. Of all the various meanings, 
'degree', 'extent', 'condition ', 'state' (H alpern 1990) are m ore ap p ropria te  in this instance. 
Rosenberger's assum ption that jibun means 'self part', rather than 'extent of self or 'state of self is 
based solely on her argum ent that Japanese persons regard themselves as a part of a greater self. 
That is to say, regard themselves somehow incomplete as individual selves. Such a conclusion is 
also based on the prem ise that Japanese breakdow n the m eaning of the w ord jibun into its 
constituent parts, regardless of which meaning they assign to bun. I have talked to many Japanese 
about the way m eaning is constructed in com pound words by bringing together individual 
characters which have their ow n meaning. I myself find it fascinating. Yet all Japanese I discussed 
this with don't even seem to notice that a com pound meaning is constructed from the meanings of 
the various characters that make up the compound. In other words, even if a word is m ade up of 
more than one character, the com pound has its ow n irreducible m eanings. Therefore, I would 
conclude that jibun doesn't even mean ’extent of self or 'state of self', it simply means 'self, a person, 
an individual sentient being that is T.
Even if jibun can logically be argued to mean 'part of a larger self, how the word jibun was 
used by Japanese in discussions of the relationship between individuals and groups (4.3) also clearly 
indicates that Japanese regard the individual self as complete and discrete from other individual 
selves. A num ber of the employees and the party-goers described how a person is expected to 
'suppress their self (jibun wo nnrubeku osaeru)' or 'deny their self (jibun wo korosu)' when among other 
selves in a 'group (shuudan)'. This perception of the self clearly indicates that the individual self, 
rather then becoming whole, is actually regarded as compromised when in a 'group (shuudan)'.
Kuwayama (1992) argues that jibun is: "a reflexive pronoun which is often used to indicate 
the self in opposition to hiio. Hito is the m ost generally used w ord to mean ajnother] person or 
people" (Kuwayama 1992). Kuwayam a's description of jibun as being 'in opposition to hito' also 
suggests that he regards jibun as having distinct boundaries. He is uneasy about analyses which 
submerge the self w ithin a category of 'insiders' where it is given no formal recognition. "This is 
unfortunate because, even though the Japanese self is relational...the self has an identity of its own” 
(Kuwayama 1992:145).
Lebra (1992), searching for a means of apprehending a sense of self which exists in all 
situations within the framework which regards selves as multiple and constantly shifting, draws on 
the local idea of an inner self: "that provides a fixed core for self-identity and subjectivity, and forms
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a potential basis of autonomy" (Lebra 1992: 112). Rosenberger's comment on Lebra's paper is: "she 
seems to be searching for an essential core of individuality that fits w ith  W estern theory." 
(Rosenberger 1992: 9). This is pure assumption and completely ignores the fact that Japanese do talk 
of an 'inner se lf. W hat we see developing is a kind of tyranny, w here all conceptions of 
individuality are regarded as being the result of W estern ideas being im posed from outside. 
Together w ith the belief that Western ideas of individuality are politically unsound, we are asked to 
search for an acceptable theory of the self without the individual.
Lebra's 'inner self’ and 'outer self (Lebra 1992) is evident in Ikegami's (1995) discussion of 
honourific individualism, when describing how honourific individualism  was constructed among 
the samurai in the Medieval period, Ikegami tells us that 'a sense of selfhood' emerged:
though a process of bringing a socially embedded sense of self (that is, the self considered from an 
intersubjective viewpoint) and a more subjective sense of self (the self viewed from its own internal 
perspective) into proximity ( Ikegami 1995:372. emphasis in original).
Ikegami's 'sense of self as both an inter-subjective self m id  an autonom ous self, where a person's 
’sense of se lf is heightened w hen an individual self comes into proxim ity w ith another person, 
conveys the dynam ics of hum an interaction and the intersubjectivity of the hum an self, while 
incorporating the evident consciousness of self as bounded by the physical limits of the hum an 
body. The employees at GA and those who attend underground dance m usic Techno parties all 
described a sense of self w ithin these two param eters, revealed through their perception of their 
selves as individuals in relationships with other individuals. They perceive themselves as individual 
but in a m utually reinforcing arrangem ent with others, so that individuality is only possible when 
there is somebody to be individual 'with'. What emerges is a sense of self which is individual, but 
which is very aw are that this sense of individuality is only possible through community. At the 
same time, there is a very clear awareness that community is dependent on all members being 
ind ividual. Ind iv iduality  th rough com m unity, com m unity through ind iv iduality , m utually  
constituting and defining each other. What indicates that the new individualism  which is emerging 
in Japan is a fundamentally Japanese individualism traceable back through history, is this emphasis 
on the im portance of com m unity in generating individuality  and m aintain ing it. It is this 
fundam ental difference from W estern theories of individualism , which stress autonom y and 
individual sovereignty, that marks out the new individualism emerging in Japan after the Bubble as 
identifiably Japanese.
•k'k'k'k'k'k'ie
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4.3) Individuality and Community
I have described a num ber of theories of the individual, beginning w ith the classical, generalized, 
idealized, Western individual (Lukes 1985). I then discussed how W estern theories of the self have 
been co-opted by Japanese to construct an idealised Other, as part of an oppositional theory of the 
Japanese self, in which characteristics associated w ith this idea of individuality are unjapanese. In 
Japan, this individuality popularly came to be regarded as individuality per se, defining Westerners, 
and known as kojinshugi, 'individualism', which, generally speaking, was regarded negatively. I then 
considered a num ber of native Japanese theories of the individual. M oeran (1989) describes how 
critics and buyers, by draw ing attention to individual craftsmen in a potteiy village, challenged the 
aesthetic ideals which drew  the attention of critics and buyers in the first place, and threatened to 
d isrupt the social organisation of the com m unity. M oeran noted that 'individuality  (kosei)' was 
closely linked to ideas about creativity and ability, both expressed and recognised in a belief in the 
uniqueness of every individual, which is manifested through the kokoro of every potter. This was 
together w ith a belief that appreciation of the pots was through individual interpretation from 
personal subjective standards of beauty (Moeran 1989). What is im portant to note is that aesthetic 
and ethical beliefs concerning 'individuality (kosei) are just as im portant in the village where Moeran 
studied as those concerning 'com m unity', and that 'individuality ' and ’com m unity ' cannot be 
separated from each other, one cannot exist without the other, and changes to one result in changes 
to the other.
We find the same fundam ental characteristics of th e  relationship between individual selves 
and collective selves in Japan in Doi's (1973) discussion of jibun. The individuality suggested by a 
self defined as jibnn ga a m , a person which has a jibun, a 'self, can only be defined by that person's 
relationship w ith other persons. In other words, individuality, as defined by jibun ga am  is 
dependent on the individual self being part of a community. What we see emerging are Japanese 
theories about individuality which are also theories of community. M aintenance of the individual 
self is then ethically prescribed by the association of jibun ga am  with adulthood, where a mature 
person is expected both to conform to, and contribute to the community, and at the same time 
maintain an independent, individual self. Again ideals of individuality and community cannot be 
separated, and have to be described in term s of each other. The sam e in terdependence of 
individuality and community in m utually constituting each other is described in Ikegami's (1995) 
honourific individualism, where an individualistic sense of self 'emerges' from a process whereby a 
more socially em bedded, intersubjective sense of self is brought into proxim ity w ith a more 
subjective sense of self, viewed from an internal perspective.
These same themes of m utual constitution and dynamic interdependence concerning the 
individual self and its relation to other individual selves and various collective selves, emerge in the 
work of Smith (1983) and Plath (1975, 1980,1989), also Lebra (1974,1976) and Bachnik (1986). Lebra
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(1976) begins her assessment of the Japanese individual self and its relationship to other individual 
selves and collective selves, w ith the following ’personal observation’: "the Japanese are extremely 
sensitive to and concerned about social interaction and social relationships." (Lebra 1976: 2). She 
stresses the situationally-dependent nature of Japanese behaviour, and puts forward a theory of 
situational interaction. But it is in terms of morality, that Lebra grounds situationality as a defining 
characteristic of the Japanese self, both individual and collective. This is significant because, as will 
become apparent from my own data, seken has been, and still is, the prim ary moral framework of 
Japanese society (4.4, 7.3). Lebra writes:
The clear-cut dualism...that is a characteristic of unilateral determinism is not congenial to the Japanese 
sense of morality. For the Japanese, goodness or badness is a relative matter, relative to social situation and 
impact...Nor are the Japanese, w ho consider morality socially relative, keen on systematising moral 
doctrines as independent entities (Lebra 1976:11).
Moral doctrines in Japan are indeed typically not systematised as independent entities, as within the 
terms of an objective absolute morality such as typically exists in the Christian societies of Western 
Europe and the U.S (1.3). Moral doctrine in Japan is conventionally, in everyday life, present and has 
a coercive power through that which is regarded as seken nami (consistent with seken rules, or 'good') 
(4.4), which is highly situational, and consequently difficult to document. A lthough Lebra does not 
mention seken, it can be located in her analysis (Lebra 1976) as fundamental to explaining both why, 
and how, the Japanese self emerges situationally.
The perception that the Japanese sense of self and its relationship to other selves was 
somehow different from how  individuals brought up  in a Western Hellenistic/Christian traditon 
perceive their self in relation to other selves, was m ade early on. Benedict (1946) describes her 
perception of what has subsequently been described as a situational or m ultiple individual self, as 
’contradictory' (Benedict 1946: 2). This is because of a perceived lack of consistency of self when 
motivation and action is thought to emerge from a dom ain of transcendent tru th  and universal 
reason, when in fact it emerges from a domain of situational truth and reason (seken ).
For Lebra (1976), this situational self is best understood by focusing on the relationship 
between selves, rather than focusing on individuals per se. She develops the idea of relationship as 
being governed by domains of situational interaction. Based on the dichotomies of uchi!soto, and 
omote /  urn Lebra fashions three dom ains of interaction. There are potentially four dom ains, but 
Lebra regards one domain, nchi-omote as 'unlikely to occur'. Lebra is careful to make to point that 
these domains define ’situations'. That is to say, nchi and soto, omote and um describe a situation in 
whcih action takes place, but cannot describe or explain the details of a given interaction between 
selves. As Lebra herself notes: "the three domains are far from satisfactory, [and] to make it more 
satisfactory we...must proceed to interaction behaviour" (Lebra 1976: 113). In other words, we must 
then concentrate on the details of the interaction, for which we require other means of analysis than 
ttclii and soto, and omote and ura.
Bachnik (1986) also focuses on relationships, and the significance of situation in defining, 
constructing, constraining, and explaining them. She also regards selves as interdependent and 
m utually constitutive, like Lebra. Bachnik tells us that the importance of relationships in Japanese 
life is well understood: "Yet major difficulties remain in the conceptualisation of relationships."
150
(Bachnik 1986: 50). Bachnik rehearses the difficulties, but is unable to fashion a credible alternative. 
Bachnik’s actors (sic) become cyphers divested of their authority to define themselves, points on a 
sliding scale between poles of Individual and Other, fixed by the analyst. Also, Backnik relies on 
omote and wa to explain action, w hen these domains can only partially define action, through their 
m arking of space in which action occurs. These concepts do, to an extent, describe and explain 
m otivation and action, but different selves will act differently within a given omote or urn setting 
according to other factors present. A model that can take these other more person-focused, as well as 
domain-focused, factors into account is required.
Bachnik quite rightly makes a point of stressing how: "Japanese relationships are constituted 
by practice and exist in space and time (Bachnik 1986: 50. italics in original).4 Bachnik finds this a 
problem analytically, because, she argues, when relationships constituted in time and space are 
subsequently studied, a process of objectification occurs. She notes how Bourdieu (1977) points out 
that objectification omits time. How ever, time is surely only om itted if the analyst omits it. 
Arguably, it is only through analysis that time and space can 'actually' be introduced (they may be 
omitted in error). In the m om ent during which an interaction between persons occurs, time and 
space are m om entarily suspended , obliterated, even, while the interaction is occuring, as all 
consciousness is focused on the individuals and their interacting. It is a saturation of the moment by 
the interaction itself that erases all trace of time or place in that instant. Time and place have to be 
reintroduced by the analyst. This is the job of the analyst: to be aware of the m inutae of social 
process, in order to reconstitute it as it never, in fact, occurs in the moment of its being.
Both Smith (1983) and Plath (1975, 1980, 1989) are conspicuous in the way they avoid using 
'bi-polar opposites' (Bachnik 1992; Tobin 1992; H endry 1993), or ’particular elements of Japanese 
society’ (Hendry 1993) which characterise so m uch of the anthropology of Japan. These constructs 
are very valuable in orientating both a social actor or an analyst, but both have to move very quickly 
to a different level of cognitive m apping in order to either act correctly or understand fully. As 
analytical constructs, the 'bi-polar opposite' and ’particular elements' are asked to do much more 
work than they are capable of, a sign that a point of analytical 'lock-in' has been reached, requiring a 
paradigm  shift. Smith (1983) was obviously aware of the effect of theoretical path-dependence in 
constraining analysis, and of the consequent dangers of analytical lock-in:
It is not more idle speculation to suggest that our understanding of these matters would be very different 
today if over the past thirty-five years research had been conducted in the frame-work of the interactionist 
social psychology of figures like George Herbert Mead...Had the intellectual influences been different, we 
should long since have had an eminently plausible picture of the conception of the Japanese self. It would 
have been an interactionist self ( Smith 1983: 74).
Smith's 'picture' of the Japanese self is an interactionist, situational self. However, this self is also an 
individual, and as an individual self it holds an im portant position in Smith's conception of Japanese 
selfhood. He tells us that "the Japanese assign a high priority to the growth of hum an beings as 
social persons" (Smith 1983: 73). Smith describes this individual self as 'constantly shifting', a 
'relational "I" which is not detached from the other' (1983: 73), yet this does not lead him to deny the 
existence of an individual self in Japanese conceptions of selfhood, only th a t it is m utually
4Ikegami (1995) notes that it is not only Japanese relationships, but all human relationships, including those between 
Westerners, that are mutually constituted in time and space.
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constituted by other ind iv idual selves and  by com m unity. An ind iv idual self in Japanese 
conceptions of self only becomes a problem  if the individual self is p resupposed as fixed and 
unchanging.
Plath also regards the Japanese self as an interactionist self: "The interactionist self...emerges 
- or is enacted - in social relations. Awareness [of self]...is endlessly re-created as one lives on, 
responding to the responses of others" (Plath 1975: 3-5).5 And like Smith (1983), he perceives the 
individual self, w ith a 'separate subjectivity', as an indivisible actor in Japanese social relationships. 
Yet this individual self is em bedded in 'circles' of hum an relationships: "engaged in long-term co­
biography" (Plath 1989: 81). Clearly, the individual does not require rehabilitating in Plath's case, for 
he regards it as the locus of Japanese conceptions of selfhood. This self is far from discrete or 
autonomous, yet it is 'unique', Plath writes, echoing Mead, "as no hum an being engages exactly the 
same set of hum an relationships" (Plath 1983: 80). For Plath, individuals in relatonships travel 
together on arcs of co-experience (Plath 1989). Plath remarks that: "These arcs of co-experience are 
enormously diverse in onset, duration, and outcome" (Plath 1989: 82). And I would add, in content. 
How each individual, engaging in a particular interaction, in a particular time and place, approaches 
the other individual self or selves, depends on the sum  of all their experiences, in time and space, 
and how they interpret that experience and the interaction on that occasion, in that place. Plath does 
not pursue analytical closure, or theoretical elegance, and his analysis and description is all the more 
rich and plausible as a result. One can clearly see the interplay between seken and selcentei w ithin 
Plath's (1989) analysis, although he refers to neither, and I will re turn  to his 'arcs, circles, and 
spheres' in 4.4.
The individual Japanese self, then, w ith its subjectivity, is not discrete, but is 'a unique 
person' (Plath 1989: 80). Therefore, I believe that an analysis has to proceed at the level of the 
individual self {jibun). Lebra tells us that the Japanese speaker will often describe relationships by 
differentiating between Ego and Alter, by referring to jibun (self) and its relationship to hito (another 
person / other people). But her suggestion of jibun as a key term in the analysis of the Japanese self is 
very soon replaced in the anthropological study of the Japanese self and society by uclti, effectively 
removing the individual self from the analysis of the Japanese self. Kuwayama (1992) notes this 
point, and argues for a return  of jibun (Kuwayama 1992:142). According to Kuwayama, uchi cannot 
account for the individual self, as it becomes 'undifferentiated' from  other individual selves who 
constitute uciii at a given time and place. A ttem pting to re-categorize social space, Kuwayama 
discusses 'categories of reference others’ in a 'native theory of the self' (Kuwayama 1992: 142), and 
begins, by suggesting a return to the fundamental distinction between jibun and hito.
The reference other model differs from the uchi-soto or inside-outside model, which has been used 
extensively in Japanese studies, in two significant respects. First, whereas the self is ambiguous in the uchi- 
soto model, it is clearly indicated by the term jibun in the reference model. One weakness of the uchi-soto 
model is that the self tends to be submerged into uchi: the self is undifferentiated from an unspecified 
category of 'insiders', and is given no formal recognition...Second, the reference other model can show the 
interaction of the self in more concrete terms than the uchi-soto model (Kmom/ama 1992:144).
Kuwayama (1992) argues for an interaction theory of the self which recognises the person, that is, 
Inoue's (1977) 'doing subject (koi shuutai)', as a self distinct from other selves, w hether they are close
^Quoted in Smith 1983: 73).
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or distant in social terms.
In addition to the concerns raised by  Kuwayama regarding the inadequacy of uchi as an 
analytical construct in explaining Japanese selves, seken also indicates profound inadequacies in the 
uchi/ soto model. In most analyses (most recently: Kondo 1990, 1992; Bachnik 1992, 1994; Hendry 
1993; Bachnik and Quinn 1994; Rosenberger 1992, 1994; Quinn 1994), the boundary of a person's 
'group' is either implied, or stated as bounded, w ith the linguistic m arkers uchi, meaning 'inside', 
and w ith all that is 'outside' as soto, m eaning ’outside'. In terms of an uchi/soto paradigm , seken is 
another ’outside’, which is very m uch ’inside', to which appearances, attitudes and conduct are very 
important. Seken is the world of an individual that s /h e  either has to be careful to maintain or feels a 
desire to be positively regarded by. An analysis which relies solely on an uchi/soto model cannot 
apprehend the im portant category of seken.
Secondly, in my own experience in Japan while doing fieldwork, I can only remem ber soto 
being used as a marker of physical space, not social space. In all my interviews, soto was never used 
as a w ord to describe relationships betw een people. I initially became aw are of this w hen my 
interlocutors w ould seek clarification of w hat I m eant w hen I asked them  questions about social 
space outside the software company, using the word soto. They would invariably seek qualification 
by asking: "Do you mean ’other than (hoka no)'....?". Logically, soto indicates that som ething is not 
uchi, but to describe somebody as sofo in a social sense is to cast them  in a kind of no-man's-land, 
and as all social space is m apped and has its significance in relation to Ego, soto when used to 
describe social space has little meaning.
Quinn, in his paper in Situated Meaning (1994) presents a series of domains in which uchi and 
soto are referenced through language. His categories are 'spatial, 'social', 'psychological' and 
'partative' (Quinn 1994). The num ber of social and psychological references to soto are minimal and 
are in fact spatial references which refer to Ego alone, not to a social relationship between people 
(Quinn 1994: 58). Miuchi, nakama, hoka no, ta no or, 'a Proper noun no', in addition to uchi no, is how 
social space is most commonly described.
A lthough soto may not be a category of social space as such, this does not necessarily 
invalidate uchi /soto as a model. Uchi alone is a major category of social space, which frames 
individual motivation and action to some considerable extent, and one can argue that as long as the 
separation of m odel and ’reality’ is carefully m aintained, and if the uchi/soto paradigm  has an 
explanatory pow er, then use it. However, the existence of seken renders the uchi/soto, model 
problemmatic, with the potential to obscure rather than explain. The uchi/soto model has assumed a 
position of considerable authority, which itself has obscured the model's limitations. Increasingly it 
is rarely stated that it is being employed as a model, a point noted by Bachnik (1986).
A nother major analytical construct used to describe com m unity in Japan is the Group 
Model. The Group Model has been criticised by Befu (1980a, 1980b), Sugimoto and M ouer (1980), 
and many others, as being a highly partial and distorting construct, which, am ong other things, 
cannot account for resistence or conflict, individual motivation or action, and which presents an 
over harmonious picture of Japanese society. Bachnik succintly presents the criticisms as:
"too rigidly organised, too uniform, and too devoid of personal self. The complete submergence of the self 
in the group, and the characterization of the group by consensus, harmony, paternalism, loyalty,
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dependence, hierarchy and holism have all been brought into question" (Bachnik 1986:53)
A major reason why this model is too rigid and uniform, and stresses consensus while being unable 
to account for conflict, is because it does not include a theory of the individual self, or a theory of the 
linkage between individual selves and collective selves. Only individuals resist, as only individuals 
can think and act. Groups do not think, and groups that act are groups of individuals who are 
acting. Plath also notes that the model "fails to bring out this person-centred interdependence of a 
self and its partners" (Plath 1989: 81). Many writers have noted the explanatory pow er of the group 
model while noting its failings, and it is in the model's absence of a theory of the individual self, and 
a theory w hich explains the linkage between this individual self and collective selves, that the 
shortcom ings are located. This linkage betw een ind iv idual self and collective self, and the 
mechanism which describes and explains the dynam ic relationship between individual self and 
collective self in Japan, is found in the concepts of seken and sekentei.
Befu critiques the G roup M odel (1980a, 1980b, 1990), but clearly regards it as having 
genuine value, indicated by his elaboration of it into four models by 1990: the Consensus model; the 
Stratification model; the Social exchange model; and the Conflict model, which is not really a model 
at all (Befu 1990). These are all different aspects of the 'Group Model', most clearly evidenced by the 
way Befu elides the four models in a num ber of ways. Just one example, is how  he describes his 
Consensus model (the 'original Group Model) as characteristically being hierarchically organised - 
the defining characteristic of Ills Stratification model. If Befu's four models in 1990 are considered as 
different aspects of one model, then this is very similar to what he was suggesting in 1980.
Nakane emphasizes the hierarchical arrangement,..Hazama singles out the priority of the interest group,
Iwata is subtely different from Hazama in emphasizing the motivational aspects in the orientation of 
individuals toward the group... I tried to create...a composite model of the 'Japanese group model' ...While 
such a model does not represent the ideas of any one individual, it does highlight major components found 
in a variety of closely related models. Accordingly, in this overview, I shall continue to refer to the 'group 
model' in discussing the composite model ( Befu 1980b: 188).
During the course of my discussions, I refer to 'the group model of Japanese society', and it is Befu's 
'composite model' to which I refer, as a point of reference, bearing in m ind the criticisms outlined 
above. I do not discuss the model beyond a point of reference, and I do not develop the model to 
include seken and sekentei, or jibun. This is because this line of enquiry is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, although I believe that such an endeavour would be fruitful.
Finally, I w ant to finish this review of theories of the Japanese self, both individual and 
collective, by introducing briefly the local concepts of community that I will be looking at in detail. 
In his criticisms of the uchi/soto model, Kuwayama (1992) does not say that it does not have its uses, 
but suggests the need for a m ore refined model. He, together w ith Lebra (1992), introduces the 
category of seken, with both scholars draw ing attention to "the im portance of jibun and seken for 
Japanese hum an relationships" (Kuwayama 1992:142):
While seken has som ething in common with the Western concept of 'reference group'...or with 'the 
generalised other' of Mead, 1 identify it as the generalised audience or jury surrounding the self in an 
inescapable way ( Lebra 1992:107).
With the concept of com m unity know n as seken, we can see the dynam ic relationship between 
community and the individual self present in Japanese conceptions of personhood. Seken is regarded
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as an unknow n collectivity of others (Lebra 1992), and which is a kind of reference group (Inoue 
1977; Kuwayama 1992). Seken acts on the individual self through an individual's sekentei, the self that 
is addressed to seken. Every encounter an individual has mobilizes a particular set of references 
which orientate the self and draw  on a particular manifestation of sekentei, w hat Lebra calls a 
'presentational self (Lebra 1992). Consequently seken and sekentei, community and individual, are 
continually remade with eveiy encounter. Again individual and community are inseparable. It is the 
absence of seken and sekentei, as an ethical fram wew ork and theory of the relationship between 
individual self and collective self in Japan, which explains, to a considerable extent, the vestigial 
explanatory power of the various group models of Japanese society (Befu 1980a, 1980b, 1990). Many 
of the features w hich characterise the various group models are characteristics of seken resulting 
from the dynamic relationship between seken and sekentei.
Because of the authority of the uchi/soto model and other bi-polar opposite constructs in the 
study of the Japanese self, and due to the often 'unacknowleged slippage from model to hum an 
group' (Bachnik 1986: 54), specific concepts of community which are a part of everyday life in Japan, 
such as seken, have tended to become overshadowed. Two other concepts of community which I 
consider in detail are iniuchi and nakamn. Miuchi is w ritten with the characters ini, meaning body6 
and uchi, while nakanm, is written with naka, meaning 'personal relationship’, and ma meaning 'space 
between'. Inoue (1977) had this to say about iniuchi and nakama:
It has been suggested that the archetypal uchi is the ie (uchi). This basic inner-ring [ uchiwn] which symbolises 
uchi, is the concept of miuchi. Like the popular saying 'blood is thicker than water', a blood relationship is a 
better way to define uchitva. Miuchi is not the only fundamental unit (family etc.) of social life, but it is 
common, lasting, certainly not insignificant, and can be expected to continue over a long period of 
time... Miuchi is something which is generally thought of as relatives, but I would give particular attention to 
closely related groups that are like family, such as intimate nnkama uchi and oyabun-kobun [hierarchical 
senior junior relationships]. Since the introduction of the concept of fictitious blood-relationships, true 
blood-relationships, territorial relationships and other social relationships, are all referred to as miuchi..(The 
word miuchi is mainly used in colloquial speech, and in fact is not used that often. In reality, in daily 
conversation, when the word is used, it comes as a surprise. In today's society, where the basic unit is not 
kin-based, the meaning of miuchi has become extremely vague, and the miuchi relationship has also become 
increasingly vague. Rather than miuchi, uakama or nakama uchi have become by far and away more intimate 
words. The word nakama has become the standard word reserved for those blood-like relationships other 
than blood relationships...That sense of working together is also preserved in the word uakama. Relatives 
can naturally think of themselves as working together, so it isn't strange to think of both miuchi and nakama 
as once being considered as based on blood relationships, but subsequently being differentiated (Inoue 1977:
82. my translation).
Both miuchi and nnkama are, according to Inoue, virtually identical and are interchangeable. Because 
of the fact that miuchi and by extension nnkama, as it is a development of miuchi, are based on kinship 
relationships, both blood relationships (ketsuenteki kankei) and in-laws, it is reasonable to assume that 
the fictive kin relationships which form the basis of Inoue’s (1977) description of miuchi and nakama 
will display similarities.
In this chapter so far, I have attem pted to show that concepts of an individual self, and 
individuality, are native to Japan, and that a concept of an individual self is fundam ental to our 
understanding of selves, individual and collective, in Japan. I have also tried to demonstrate that the 
individual selves and collective selves in Japan mutually constitute each other, and exist in dynamic 
relationship with each other. These themes have been discussed in the work of others. However, 
theories of the individual self and collective self in Japan are unable to move beyond the extremes of
Mi is not simply body, as the concept includes both mind and body. The concept of mi also indicates local recognition of a 
complete social and moral Japanese individual self.
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flexibility and multiplicity, in the case of individual selves, and rigidity and uniformity, in the case 
of collective selves, a point noted by Bachnik (1986). This is the result of no credible theory of 
individual self and collective self which expresses the agreed themes of situationality or multiplicity, 
and the themes of m utual constitution and dynamic interaction. And which, therefore, also describes 
and explains the linkage between individual selves, and between individual selves and collective 
selves. In the rest of this section, and in Chapter Seven, as part of a theory of the redefinition of 
selves, I aim to show that the related concepts of seken and sekentei may significantly contribute to 
such a theory of the Japanese self, both individual and collective.
W hen 1 interview ed the employees at GA, I initally approached the subject of the relationship 
between individual and com m unity, by asking them to describe kojin,7 an 'individual', and the 
relationship betw een individual and g ro u p .8 I began by using the term  shuudan for 'group ', 
following Inoue (1977):
The meaning 1 assign to shuudan is extremely broad. For example, a class or caste (kaih/uu), or a social 
stratum (kaisd) are not shuudan, but considering objective prescriptions, everybody has som e kind of 
ascriptive consciousness ( kizoku ishiki), and it is in terms of an individual (kojin) being ascribed to, or 
affiliated to, that I employ the word shuudan (Inoue 1977: 73. m\j translation).
A num ber of themes emerged from the discussions I had with my interviewees on the subject of 
kojin, shuudan, and the relationship between the two. The first theme 1 w ant to consider concerns 
individuals being expected to ’restrain their individualistic tendencies (kojin wo narubeku osaerti)', in 
M atsubara-san's words, and the em ployees’ criticisms of these ways of thinking (Jaingaekata) and 
ways of doing (shikata). This was eloquently explained to me by Muroya-san:
Do you mean individual identity, my own ideas of w hat kojin is? I don’t have any idea, 
really. A living organism might be the best description. Also, to be able to say 'That was 
an enjoyable life’ w hen you die. Basically, being an individual m eans being able to 
assert yourself and have a degree of advocacy (shuucho), and I certainly have that 
desire. However, this is a country in which you cannot assert yourself (kono kuni tte 
shuuchd dekinai kuni nan desu yo) Why can’t we assert ourselves? Well, if you start saying 
Tm  this, I'm  that', and sticking your neck out, you're going to be shot at, so to speak, 
and will be brought down by the flapping and screeching of those around you (mawari 
kara "bata bata" kuzusarent). Frankly, you cannot stretch yourself in this country (nobite 
ikenai kuni nan de). People w ant to stand up and say 'I myself think this or that’, but in 
this country it is as if we are not allowed to (kihonteki ni shitai desukeredomo, kuni ga sou 
in koto wo sasetekurenaiyou da). A lthough it’s not actually prohibited as such, there is the 
pressure not to assert yourself in Japan. Although, I do pretty much w hat I think it is 
OK to do (suki ni katte ni tekito ni ikitemorau yo to iu kankaku de boku wa imasu). At this 
company, however, you can be proud of yourself and say openly w hat you think {kono 
kaisha ni kanshite wa....jibnn no hokotta tokoro, hakkiri ient kankaku ga am).
Muroya-san, like M atsubara-san and Iwata-san, quoted at the end of 3.6, see Japan as a country in
^Both 1 and my interviewees are using jibun and kojin interchangeably. Kojin is thought of as both a human being, or living 
organism (dobutsuteki ni ikiteikeni no ga) as described by Muroya-san, and an individual consciousness, or self, like jibun. This 
is both expressed in the similarity of the expressions jibun t o o  korosu, 'to deny the self, kojin wo nambeku osaeni, 'one should 
suppress one's individuality', and kojin ga nakunatteshimau ,'ior the individual to disappear’, as descriptions of what happens 
or should happen to the self in a group setting such as 'the group model of Japanese society'.
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which individuals are expected to 'restrain their individualistic tendencies'. Just w hat 'individualistic 
tendencies' are, and w hat 'restraining' them  means, is im portant. ’Individualistic tendencies’ are 
personal opinions and personal desires concerning both the business of the group, together with 
more general opinions and desires which are different from the opinions and desires of others, 
particularly seniors, usually males, who govern the group. Not being able to assert yourself, means 
not being able to express, and more im portantly, act on one’s opinions. Iw ata-san clearly and 
dramatically described to me how an individual is taught to restrain themselves and conform: 
"When I was a child everything was gaman (persevere), taeni (endure, p u t up with), jibun wo korosu 
(deny oneself)". Jibuti wo korosu is a common expression which literally means ’to kill one's self'.9 
Even allowing for the fact that the expression does not mean that one should commit suicide, it is 
difficult to see how the principle deny the self (jibun wo korosu)' is reconcilable with the idea of 'have 
a self (jibun ga a ru ) . To 'deny the self', and at the same time 'have a se lf seems contrad ictory .^  
Iwata-san described to me w hat happens to an individual's jibun, 'one's self', w hen they join a group 
(shuudan)':
An individual (kojin), strictly speaking, is someone who has their own mind. Whereas a 
group (shuudan), to a given extent, has a common purpose. When you enter a group, 
there is a divergence between your prior individual self (tasho no jibun no kokoro no zure) 
and the group itself. When you enter the flow (nagare) of the group, you are m ost 
definitely not aiming in the same direction as you were, and you are likely to lose your 
self (magirarem) in the group. So, as a result of being affiliated to a group (shuudan ni 
zoku sum  koto ni yotte), your own sense of self gradually changes (jibun no ishiki dondon 
laiwate ikiteru). One m ight say that the coming together w ith one purpose is w hat a 
group opinion is. However, when you become affiliated to a group, your original idea 
of wanting to go here or there, without you even noticing, gets pulled in the direction of 
the flow of the group (shuudan ni zoku sum  yo ni nam to, jibun no motomoto no "kotchi e 
ikitai' to in shiso ga shuudan no nagare ni itsu no ma ni ka awasate iku).
Clearly, the 'group (shuudan)' which the employees are discussing, is highly reminiscent of a num ber 
of Befu's (1980a, 1980b, 1990) group m odels of Japanese society. The ideal group m ember is 
expected to undergo a change to the self, regardless of where agency resides. W hether by being 
pulled along w ithout noticing (itsu no ma ni ka)', or by 'denying one's self (jibun wo korosu)', or by 
'suppressing one’s self (kojin wo osaeru)', the self is required to submit itself, not only to the aims and 
intentions of the group, but to the 'ways of thinking (kangaekata)' and 'ways of doing (shikata)' of 'the 
group (shuudan, dantai)'. TTiis was most dramatically expressed to me by Yamazaki-san: 'The image I 
have of the group (shuudan) means the complete erasure of the individual (kojin to iu mono wa kanzcn 
ni nakutatte shimau no wa shuudan da to iu imeiji urn watashi motteimasu)". Ozawa-san, also had strong 
words to say:
This is the kind of society in which if you try to express yourself and you manage to, 
you will be crushed (jibun no kojin to iu mono wo dasou to sum  to hatasereba tsubusareru
In (Western) psychoanalytic theory, a child accommodates parental need through a process of learning to consciously hide 
their true self by denying their own feelings and emotions, a process which becomes subconscious. Miller (1979) describes 
this phenomenon of a denied ’true' se lf and a ’false' self which conforms to parental desires, as the child's ’true self killed. 
The expression jibun zoo korosu suggests a conscious cultural recognition in Japan that a similar process is programmatically 
pursued through socialization. The important difference with ’Western’ psychoanalytic theory, of course, is that ’killing the 
self, as a cultural norm in Japan, is a norm, not a pathological condition. And the important similarity is that a similar 
concept of a ’true se lf would seem to exist in both ’Japanese’ and ’Western’ concepts of the individual self.
1°1 present a thesis for a resolution of this apparent contradiction in the concluding chapter.
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slmkai de). It is a very difficult society to live in for me. I was born in japan and grew up 
here, but I have had a taste of the life in America, and the culture shock of w hen I 
returned... I got seriously ill once. This country is a difficult place to develop one's 
personality (paasonariti), bu t this com pany allows me to express m y opinions to a 
certain degree and that is why I work here.
Changes in perceptions of individuality and in how individuality is regarded is the second theme 
w hich em erges from my conversations w ith  the em ployees of GA. W hen describ ing the 
organisational structure of GA, Yamada-san m ade a distinction between 'groups' and 'individuals 
working together':
With this company, rather than doing things in groups (shwtdan de), work is achieved 
through the abilities of individuals w orking together (kojin kojin no noryoku ni djite 
shigoto sum  to iu yariknta). There is not really a groupism  feeling here, I think (shuudan 
shugi to iti kanji de wa nai to omoimasu kedo).
M atsubara-san also described a shift in emphasis:
We don t really talk in term s of groups, but of individuals, so there is a feeling of 
separateness as well (kaisha wa kanari shuudan goto ga kojinteki ni natte kiteiru kara. Dakara 
wakareteiru yd na kanji mo shimasu)".
This was also the opinion of Hashimoto-san, chief (bucho) of the general affairs (somu) department:
Behaviour w here, for example, all employees take part in com pany trips, such as 
Cherry Blossom Viewing (Ohanami), or the like, where everyone unanim ously follows 
the superiors, follows the same behaviour and performs the festivity in a group (dantai).
This is w hat I see as a 'group (shuudan)'. Shuudan shugi, dantai shugi means being 
coerced into a single way of thinking. In places like GA, such trips are individual (kojin), 
for example, people go in small num bers to a place of their choice, it's just that the 
com pany pays for it. We have done it here in this unrestrained way, w here the 
company is a common interest. Here, shuudanshugi has completely collapsed, or has 
been destroyed, rather. I think we are ahead here.
There is a clear shift way from a perception of 'working in groups (shuudan de) to 'individuals 
working together (kojin kojin...to iu yarikata)'. Nakama is also perceived to be unsuitable, and it is 
reasonable to conjecture that this is for the same reasons: an em phasis on individuals and the 
legitimation of the expression of individuality. When discussing nakama w ith me, Sakamoto-san 
said: "I have never used it in GA. We rather use 'w ork team' (zoaakn chiimu), or 'team', instead. 
Nakama is not quite the way I feel about it". Many of the employees said they do not use the word 
nakama, which, together w ith the fact that a num ber of the employees said they do not regard the 
w ord group (shuudan or dantai) as suitable to describe collective selves at GA, suggests a qualitative 
shift in both the structure of groups at GA and the employees' perception of them.
In addition to many, although not all, employees at GA regarding shuudan and nakama as 
unsuitable words to describe work teams, or the company, the employees use of the w ord tanin, 
m eaning various kinds of 'others', also indicates how perceptions of selves, both individual and 
collective are changing. Tanin has been explained as 'strangers' - people Ego doesn 't know 
(Kuwayama 1992; Lebra 1992). Both Lebra and Kuwayama also regard tanin as the unknow n 'third 
person who Ego often regards as constituting seken, but according to my data, tanin are simply
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regarded as persons other than Ego, known and unknown, by some of the employees. Ozawa-san 
replied: "Everyone is tanin. We are just colleagues. We lead our lives in the same place, but everyone 
is tanin". Inoue-san sought qualification when I asked her if there were any tanin in GA11: "Do you 
mean people from other companies, people who are not my friends, or people I don’t know? I asked 
her to interpret the question herself, to w hich she replied: " People I have nothing to do with 
(kakawatta no nai hito). There are people here at GA w hom  I only acknowledge in passing (aisatsu 
shita koto am  gurai shiknnai hito wa imasu)". The point I want to make is that uchi-ness is much less 
pronounced at GA than m ight have been expected. With the emphasis shifting towards individuals, 
so a sense of 'inside1 and 'outside', of 'us' and 'them' diminishes, as the self begins to interact, not as 
an extension of a group of collective selves, through 'affiliation (shozoku/ zoku sum ), but as an 
individual self (kojin kojin de). The lack of any mention of 1 uchi- this’, 'wareware , 'we'-that', in any of 
the conversations or the quotes I have used through this and the preceding chapter, is, I believe, 
significant, and accords w ith the way selves, both collective and individual are being redefined 
within GA.
At the sam e tim e that in d iv id u a lity  and in d iv idua ls  are being  em phasised , an 
understanding  of the need to 'fit in' or to live and w ork in groups is not challenged by the 
employees. This was expressed clearly by M atsubara-san in response to a question about her wishes 
for the future of Japan:12
The Japanese should learn to be m ore well-m annered. For example, doing as one 
pleases. At work, people should ask themselves w hat is best? Certainly people have 
their own ideas about w hat they think and what they want to do, but we can’t only do 
w hat we want. Those around us should also learn to ask themselves what's best for 
everyone.
Taking other’s opinions into account, and being encouraged to develop one's individuality and 
participate in the decision-making process, are not inimical. The employees at GA all believe that 
individuals need to be am ong others, not simply to be productive, bu t in  order to survive. The 
importance of community to the employees at GA remains noticeably high, and indicates that the 
encouraging and legitimating of individuality, as well as privileging individuals does not involve, or 
imply, a lessening of a sense of com m unity, nor a belief that the im portance of com m unity is 
diminished as a result. As Sakamoto-san told me, in answer to the question 'w hat are the good and 
bad points of the individual ( k o j in ) ? ' 'T he bad side is that kojin cannot live on its own, bu t kojin 
itself is a good thing". Inoue-san similarly described the interdependency of individual and group: 
"Kojin is a single hum an being. Things that one person can’t do can be done in a group. Strength is 
increased. N obody can live on their own, so we live together". H iw ata-san, regards groups 
positively, as: "a situation whereby I am able to realise my personal dream s through work {watashi 
no kangae wa shigoto wo tsuujite jibun no yume wo jitsugen sasem tame no ba to kangaete imasu)". For 
Hiwata-san, the group (shuudan) is a place where the individual has to deny their self, but it is also a 
place where the self is able to flourish:
11 *GA de zun tanin ga imasit ka. dal e desu ka, naze tanin no desu ka
1 ?Shorai no nihon no koto de wa donna kibo ga arimasitka 
^K ojin  no yoi men to zoami men zoa nan desu ka
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A group is a stage for achieving particular goals. Individuals achieve these goals, and 
there are many ways of doing so, aiming at our particular goals, dream ing our own 
dreams, wanting to make our opportunities within these arrangements (jibun no suki wo 
ko in fun ni agetai). The place to achieve these things is in a group (sore wo jikkd sum  ba ga 
group toka shuudan de am to omou n). Yet the group has objectives, so individuals cannot 
just do w hat they w ant ( mokuteki wa arimasukara jibun katte yam  koto to iu ja m i). The 
objective of the group is the same for everyone.
There has been a fundam ental shift from kojin and individuality being perceived and regarded 
negatively, to being perceived and regarded  positively. This new  indiv iduality  is not about 
selfishness and chaos, but about advocacy, responsibility, and w orking together. M uroya-san 
regards an individual as a person who is able to assert themselves and has a degree of advocacy 
(shuuchd). W ada-san described kojin as a person who is able to do som ething by themselves, but is 
required to take responsibility. Placing advocacy and responsibility in individuals, and then asking 
them  to come together in a com m on purpose is how the relationship betw een individual and 
community is being redefined in GA.
'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
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4.4) Seken and The N ew  Individualism
In the previous section, I discussed the relationship between individual selves and collective selves, 
em phasising how they m utually  constitute each other and are defined in terms of each other. 
However, the various types of collective selves that I discussed are 'm em bership ' groups. 
M embership groups can be apprehended objectively. That is to say, it is possible for persons other 
than Eeo to confirm the existence of Eeo's membership croun. and Eeo's m embership of it. AnotherU U 1 U JL ' U *
definine characteristic of a membership group, is that it is possible for Eeo. potentially, to meet and
± O 1 ' L k J  '  I J  '
to know every m em ber of the m embership group. GA has a workforce of about one hundred and 
thirty employees. They all know that they are members of GA, and they can, individually, easily 
confirm who all the members are. Also, a third partv can obiectivelv confirm who is a member of
* i. j  j  j
GA and who is not. Likewise, a family is a membership group. It is usually quite straightforward to
confirm who is a m em ber of the family and who isn't. It was this kind of collectivity of selves, this
kind of group, that I have been discussing so far. A membership group is the generic term  for this
kind of objectively verifiable group. ’Affiliated group (shozoku shuudan)' is a particular kind of
membership group, where membership is through 'affiliation (shozoku sum  jzoku sum)'. 1 discuss the
particular characteristics of 'affiliation (shozoku/ zoku)' in 7.1, but for moment will proceed by turning
to discuss another type of collective self relevant to my argument: the reference group, what Inoue
(1977) calls jwifci/o shiiiukui
In 1.2 I introduced to concept of reference groups, and referred to Shibutani (1968) to
provide a definitive m eaning for the term. To briefly recap, Shibutani settled on the following: "A
reference group [is] any collectivity, real or imagined, envied or despised, whose perspective is
assum ed by the actor [and] whose perspective constitutes the frame of reference of the actor"
(Shibutani 1968: 105). Seken is generally regarded as a reference group, although Abe regards it as
both a reference group and  an affiliated group (Abe 1994: 59). The major difference between the
characteristics of a membership group and a reference group is that, whereas a membership group
can be objectively verified and will conform to the subjective verification of any of the members, a
reference group is purely subjective (Inoue 1977). Inoue makes the distinction as follows:
Even if a number of us are affiliated to exactly the same group, the extent to which we individually feel a 
member of that group is different for every one of us. For all members respectively, there are differences in 
attitudes and actions within the accepted limits for actions and attitudes within the affiliated group. The 
group thing [shuudan no koto 1 on which we rely to authorize our individual actions and attitudes is called 
the reference group [pmkyo shuudan}. funkyo shuudmt is something which is totally subjective (Inoue 1977: 70. 
m y translation).
Inoue (1977) regards seken as a reference group, but one which is contiguous to an individual's 
affiliated group, to an extent that it can be so, given his description above. Kuwayama (1992) and 
Lebra (1992) regard seken as a reference group in this way, which is made visible through the sekentei 
of individuals. Sekentei. literallv 'the aonearance. or form, of seken. is described bv Lebra C1992) as
* J  \  A ' * ' j  > '
^Junkyo translates as 'conformity' to customs or to law. Kenkyusha Nero Japanese-English Dictionary 5th edition.
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’the presentational self': "a face-sensitive self which is addressed to seken". (Lebra 1992:107).
A lthough Inoue, Kuwayam a, and Lebra, regard seken as a reference group., Abe (1994) 
regards seken as an affiliated group. Abe tells us that seken is a netw ork of personal relationships 
based on the fact that everybody ’knows each other by sight (kao mishiri no kankei)’ (Abe 1994: 59). 
However, Abe agrees w ith Inoue in that w hat constitutes seken is very subjective. He rather 
eliptically comments: "If we say there are certain standards winch are associated with seken, one of 
them is that everybody has their own standards (seken to in mono ni tsuite no kijnn ga am  ka to ieba, 
minna sorezore ni kijnn ga arimasn)" (Abe 1994: 60). Inoue conveys the same sense of the tangible and 
the intangible:
Seken is not a regulated (kiteisum ) objectively standardised space. It is subjective to individuals, one by one.
Seken is a force, a power (ikioi), something which cannot be anything other than vague and ambiguous 
(haknzen toshita aiinai na mono to narazarn wo enai de nwu). Strictly speaking, it is hard to see seken as anything 
other than a number of individuals. However, in spite of that, when we perceive seken as a reference group 
(junkyo shuudan), we can know seken as something that has a particular structure ( Inoue 1977: 71. my 
translation).
Reference group and affiliated group., can, and do, coincide and overlap. Inoue (1977) and Lebra 
(1992) both make this point. Lebra through her examples of seken:
The seken constituency varies in accordance to where self happens to stand...It may include one's kindred 
(outside the immediate family), neighbours, schoolmates, colleagues, clientele, or a large ill-defined 
aggregate of people, known and unknown to self (Lebra 1992:107).
The interdependence of individual self and collective selves in defining and constructing each other 
is evident in the relationship betw een seken and sekentei. The relationship between seken and an 
individual s sekentei. as theorized in much of the work on seken. m irrors the relationship between 
individual {kojin) and group (shuudan) expressed by the employees in 4.3. and is again reminiscent 
of the various group models outlined by Befu (1980a, 1980b, 1990). That is to say, the individual is 
expected to conform to uniform ways of thinking and ways of doing set at the level of the collective 
self and enforced by individuals policing each other. Indeed, as I suggested in 4.3, it is the existence 
of seken and how it is perceived by Japanese, which has given us this generalised understanding of 
the relationship betw een indiv iduals and groups in Japan. Any rem aking or redefinition of 
individual selves, collective selves, and the relationship between them  is likely to alter how and 
from where seken is perceived, and how and from where sekentei is referenced. Following on from 
this, any redefinition of seken or of the relationship between seken and sekentei. should conform to the 
reconfigured relationship between individual and community. As will become apparent, however, 
like shuudan and naJcama, seken is regarded as a specific type of reference group bv the employees at 
GA.
Inoue (1977), in his introduction, describes the feeling that many of the interviewees at GA 
had about seken and sekentei:
What wo call sekentei, today, generally speaking, is something 'old' to be steered dear of. Especially since the 
war, there are many who deny its existence, considering it to be something feudalistic [hokenteki na mono 
toshite]. Sekentei is unilaterally renounced by these people as something old and bad which it is advisable to 
reject and deny. In reality, though, it should not be denied that sekentei is something which controls, to some 
considerable extent, the actions [kodb ] and the consciousness | ishiki] of the people of this country [wagaknni 
no hito bito]...To look at it from a different angle, if I look back at myself, I feel as if sekentei is completely and 
utterly a part of me. Once, I stubbornly and persistently tried to act and judge subjectively. However, after 
such an occasion, when I thought about it carefully, I would, aghast, suddenly find myself exposed by 
sekentei(Inouel977:iii. my translation).
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Inoue's description of sekentei as som ething which controls to some considerable extent the actions 
and consciousness of the Japanese people, accords with Abe’s (1994) comments (1.3) that ’day-to-day 
living’ for the Japanese falls under the dictates of seken, not the 'false facade’ of a poorly constituted 
Civil Society.
Lebra's (1992) description of seken, stressing its sanctioning power, its oppressiveness, the 
m anner in which it: "surroundfs] the self in an inescapable way...[which]...makes the self especially 
vulnerable" (Lebra 1992: 106), is the popular view of seken, and conforms with Inoue's point above, 
that m ost Japanese regard seken is 'old' and 'som ething to be steered clear of’. The response of the 
employees to my questions about seken suggested that some of them initially thought the questions 
irrelevant to GA, a young, successful company w ith a different kind of philosophy and working 
practices to those associated with all-seeing eyes and ears, and pressures to conform.
Technology has also engendered the transformation of the boundaries of seken, from village 
or daimyd's court in the late Tokugaw a period, to a space which is much larger. Seken is present, 
through TV, radio, in magazines and newspapers, logged onto on the Internet, happened upon in 
the imagination, encountered as a result of the developm ent of railways, the car, air travel, and 
space travel. Before the kinds of changes which are being im plem ented at GA were introduced, 
technology has been extending the boundaries of seken beyond an individual’s affiliated groups. 
When Abe (1994) says that seken is a netw ork of personal relationships based on the fact that 
everybody knows each other by sight (kao mishiri no kankei), I at first thought this a far too restricted 
definition. But if we substitute ’recognise’ for ’know s’, then we can say that a relationship exists 
between individuals who share the same values and attitudes, even if they haven't met. They 'see', 
'hear' and 'gossip' about each other via satellites and in cyberspace, as well as in bars and on street 
corners, as has always been the case. Members of a collective self such as this will congregate at 
certain times in certain designated places, even if they are not all in the sam e city, in the same 
country, or in the same time zone. They will recognise each other in the street by their dress, and 
although they may not even acknowledge each other, they will register one of their number. There 
will be dissimilarities which each may register as sekentei addressed to a m yriad num ber of different 
seken, a different matrix of rehearsed and unconscious thoughts and actions which constitute the 
self.
Inoue (1977), after evoking the vagueness and ambiguity of seken, also suggests that: "Strictly 
speaking, it is hard to imagine seken as anything more than a num ber of individuals ([kibishiku ieha 
kojin no sou dake seken ga am  to iu koto no sum narikanenai)" (Inoue 1977: 71). Again, although this 
initially seemed unsatisfactory to me, seken does reside in individuals and is m ade visible through 
their sekentei. In this way, seken can possibly be viewed as a kind of affiliated group, especially when 
individuals who associate themselves with a particular set of values and attitudes, come together 
and form affiliated groups through common seken, at which point they can be recognised and 
'known' objectively, if not exhaustively.
Plath (1989) does not m ention seken in his discussion of lifecourses in Japan w ithin a 
framework of 'arcs, circles, and spheres', but seken is evident in his description of 'circles':
A person has to find himself socially by integrating his circle, taking evaluations and demands put upon
him by his partners and bringing them into a workable coordination...As an 'institution', a circle is a
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personalised institution...It is not a corporate institution like an ie or like Mitsui Shoji. It has no table of 
organisation, no origin myth...A person must continue to nurture his circle if it is to continue nurturing him.
To be able to do this he must cultivate social skills that are not given at birth. He must acquire the ability to 
care for others in terms of what they need, not just selfishly in terms of what he wants,..So the self must not 
only gain in emotional capacity for caring, it must also gain in cognitive capacity for judging. It must 
understand the arcs of social chronology and where people fit into them. In a word, the self must mature in 
dependability (Plath 1989: 80).
Ultimately, it may the subjectivity of sekentei that defines seken as a reference group, but recognition 
of and respect for individual subjectivity is not a characteristic of seken. Q uite the opposite. 
Uniformity, conformity, and the sense that any deviation will be noticed by, causing 'bother 
(meiwaku)' to: "a large ill-defined aggregate of people, known and unknow n to self" (Lebra 1992: 
107), are w hat seken is known by. Inoue (1977) tells us that no one individual associates themselves 
w ith the same combination of references as another individual, and we can say that all references 
are continually rem ade and redefined as individuals encounter each other, but in a collective self 
where the individual self is expected to 'suppress their self (kojin wo narubeku osnern)' or 'deny their 
self (jibun wo korosu)', all members of that group are likely to be veiy aw are of seken and careful 
about their sekentei, denying subjective difference and seeking to impose conformity and uniformity 
on themselves and all the other members.
'k 'k ic 'k 'k 'k 'k
I began my discussions on seken and sekentei with the employees at GA, by asking for their thoughts 
on what they regarded as seken m ini (conforming to seken standards) within G A .15 We are able to get 
an idea of the conventions of a given seken, through those things which are regarded either to 
conform to seken standards, or to vary in some way or another. Lebra describes how a person or 
action is defined by relation to a given seken: "seken nami (conformative to seken standard , or 
ordinary), seken bamre (incongruent w ith seken convention, or eccentric), seken shirazu (unaware of 
seken rules, or naive)" (Lebra 1992: 107). Yet w hat is described as either ’ordinary’, 'eccentric' or 
'naive', has moral significance. Seken nami is not simply ’standard' or 'ordinary’, but is also 'correct', 
'right', or 'good', which gives seken its moral weight and its sanctioning and coercive power, and 
which motivates its constituency to maximize its /th e ir interests. Ozawa-san described this well, 
talking about sekentei, the sense of self that responds to a given seken nami standard: "1 don't really 
pay m uch attention to it. Although, w hen 1 say that you might get an impression that I live my life 
ignoring sekentei. There is a general level that other people have [seken nami standards], what 
everyone considers the right way of doing tilings... to some extent, a typical Japanese style, although 
that may be a strange way of putting it. For example, 'This is the done thing, You!" (with irritation in 
her voice) or "People are...". That exists. But I don't pay m uch attention to it, so I can't pu t it in better 
words".
My question about seken nami standards in GA was open to interpretation because I asked 
about seken nami within the context of GA. Therefore some people interpreted the question to refer 
to seken nami standards w ithin the company, as a membership group, while others interpreted the
1 RG/l no ban 7 no naka de wa seken nami to iu koto wa nan desu ka
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question as referring to GA as part of a larger, reference group community, either based on users, 
clients and other individuals and communities connected to GA in various ways, or as a community 
of companies competing in the same industry. Yamada-san took my question as referring to seken 
nami in this broader sense, and rep lied :" Seken nami in terms of GA refers to the place of GA among 
our competitors". A possible reason why Yamada-san interpreted my question in the way he did is 
because he sees GA as being part of a particular seken, but does not see GA itself as a particular seken. 
Wada-san and Ozawa-san wondered if salary might be regarded as seken nami, although neither was 
sure. Both were talking about GA alone, not in the broader sense like Yamada-san. Hiwata-san was 
also thinking along sim ilar lines when he commented: "Company rules and regulations are seken 
nami, possibly". Hiwata-san's hesitation as to whether company rules and regulations are seken nami 
indicates that the employees are aware that GA as a membership group is not a unified reference 
group. M uroya-san confirmed as much, also indicating how seken nami refers, not to rules and 
regulations, as Hiwata-san wondered, but to the conventional:
We are not expected to think in a certain way, or do things in a certain way. We are 
expected to express our selves (jibun wo dasu), and to develop our ideas. Maybe that is 
seken nami I
Implicit in M uroya-san’s semi-serious remark is the requirement that a value can only be seken nami 
if it is binding on all members. Matsubara-san, however, suggests that even though the employees' 
reference groups have fragm ented and diversified, they can still be regarded  as seken nami 
standards:
Ordinarily, it’s what is generally thought by most people. As far as seken nami in GA is 
concerned, nobody thinks that everybody should have the same opinion. However, one 
person thinks that seken nami is one thing, and another person thinks it is som ething 
else, so for each person, seken nami is what is normal for them. So, on that basis, I'd say 
there is no consensus (joshiki) w ithin GA: there is no sense of uniformity.
Even though Matsubara-san suggests that the employee's perceive 'what is normal for them’ as seken 
nami standards, because there is no consciousness of seken w ithin the company and because the 
employees also do not feel they have to take care of sekentei within the com pany, it follows that seken 
nami standards will also be perceived to be absent. This was suggested by Iwata-san, w hen he said:
W ithin the context of GA, there isn't really any consciousness in people (jibun de ishiki 
shita) of seken nami-like fixed, defined standards. We are given the m inim um  of 
instructions to enable us to carry out our work. Generally, those minimal instructions 
are what we aim at. Because we are expected to be individuals (kojin wo narubeku dasu), 
there isn't really any consciousness of "this being seken nami", and "that not being seken 
nami.
Within GA, the em phasis on individuals (Jcojin) and individuality (kojin wo dasu/jibun wo dasu) has 
resulted in the em ployees feeling that there are no seken nami s tan d ard s  in GA, due to a 
diversification and m ultiplication of reference groups, a consequence of not being required to 
conform (awaseru), due to the workplace ethic at GA of ’expressing one’s self (kojin wo narubeku 
dasu)', in M uroya-san's w ords, rather than 'suppressing one's self (kojin wo narubeku osaeru)', as 
M atsubara-san described how a person should act in a 'group (shuudan)'.
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The feeling of being watched or listened to, or of feeling vulnerable, which Lebra described, is not 
conveyed by the employees. Lebra's evocation is more in keeping with Abe's description of seken 
being structured by age-seniority, gift-giving, and 'mutual compensation' (1.3). A feeling of needing 
to conform to w hat Hashimoto-san referred to as ’fixed, defined seken nami standards' is clearly a 
defining characteristic of seken. Further indicating that perception of seken is contingent on 
m em bership group structure, m any of the employees com m ented that aw areness of seken nami 
standards increased when they were outside GA. Sakamoto-san made it very clear: "It depends on 
the situation. Inside the company we don 't pay attention to sekentei, bu t w hen even a little away 
from the company it becomes very important".
Opinions and feelings about seken and sekentei followed a similar pattern to the employee's 
sense of seken nami standards w ithin the company: there was no feeling of seken in the company 
among m ost of the employees. Iwata-san contrasted GA to other companies on the basis of seken, 
indicating that companies, as affiliated groups (shozoku simudan), do act as pow erful reference 
groups:
No, we do not have to be careful about general appearance (ippanteki na sekentei). As a 
m em ber of GA, there are general things such as courtesy and politeness, reigi, and 
aisatsn, bu t we do not have to be careful about these things. There are morals which 
every individual, as a m ember of society, has within them, but w hich are different for 
every person. Within society there are established, defined, morals, but everybody has 
their own consciousness of them, this is not sekentei. Other companies are different from 
GA, and you will hear "You have to do tilings this way", som ething associated with 
seken, which you won't find here.
A lack of a sense of seken, of sekentei, and of seken nami standards seems to accompany the 
acknow ledgm ent and recognition of difference which the encouragem ent and recognition of 
individuality entails. Only Yamada-san and Hashimoto-san felt the presence of seken in GA, but only 
when dealing with persons w ith whom  the company does business. Neither of them  perceive GA as 
seken, but both of them have the perception that GA is part of a wider community which is seken:
Generally, I don’t use the w ord seken. However, I’ll give you an example. Something 
like those people who use our products, among which there is the air that w e are 
somehow being evaluated (hyoka sarete tsukate itadakeru). In this kind of situation, the 
feeling of seken is naturally present" (Yamada-san).
Hashimoto-san described a similar feeling:
There is none of that oyake here".16 However, all those who, for example, have to deal 
w ith formal situations, like I m entioned before, we in the general affairs division deal 
w ith banks, where we have to respond in a formal way... That is where sekentei comes 
in. We may apply various sekentei, i.e. talk to the bank in a nice way. We don't invent 
things about the actual state of affairs, but we can talk in a roundabout way by making 
our tone lighter or heavier. We do embellish, or put tilings in a certain way. In my view, 
the essence of sekentei is the desire to be seen in  a positive light. In other words, the 
desire to not be seen as strange by other people [seken banare]. In order to achieve this, 
the reality can be tarted up in various ways, so the negative things can be played down 
(yokunai koto to wakaritsutsu). This way of talking can help things go smoothly, and it is 
still the tru th .
16See 1.3
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Hashimoto-san indicates that the mobilisation of sekentei is a conscious act which Ego has control 
over. So conscious, in fact, he suggests an individual can cast his or her m ind over a selection of 
'presentational selves' (Lebra 1992) and select w hat s /h e  considers the m ost suitable. Such a 
consciousness suggests that success in negotiating one’s environm ent is reflected in, and made 
possible by, an individual's ability to negotiate and manipulate seken through their sekentei, requiring 
a good knowledge of seken nami standards within that given seken. Conceptions of personhood and 
maturity, then, are likely to be closely linked to an individual's ability to recognise seken, mobilise 
their sekentei and meet seken nami standards. The fact that seken, sekentei, and seken nami standards are 
not felt to be present in GA indicates that different conceptions of personhood are acknowledged 
and legitimate within the company, which we know to be the case, and on a very fundamental level: 
persons are expected to express themselves, not suppress themselves, and are expected to respect 
difference, not enforce conformity.
Uniformity does seem to exist, however, in the feeling that rises in the individual when their 
sekentei is aroused, a feeling that is tangible physically and which characterises a person's sekentei, 
regardless of situation. Inoue (1977) notes in his introduction, which I quoted above, how sekentei 
was:
completely and utterly a part of me. Once I stubbornly and persistently tried to act and judge subjectively. 
However, after such an occasion, when I thought about it carefully, I would, aghast, suddenly find myself 
exposed by sekentei' (Inoue 1977: iu. my translation).
Sensitivity to seken is not pu t on and taken off like a cloak, as Inoue powerfully describes. However, 
some people are more sensitive than others, and nobody responds to a given seken nami standard in 
exactly the same way. Muroya-san took the time to try and describe w hat is clearly a difficult thing 
to put into words:
Sekentei... Hmmm.. that's difficult. You could say it's a kind of feeling, a sensibility 
(kankaku)...H aving  the sam e sensibilities as others...especially, w hen som ething 
different seems unpleasant or unacceptable (mazui), that kind of thing. Living a normal 
life (ftitsuti ni ikiru) is not opposing seken, although it is my nature to be stubborn!
Is sekentei a part of today's Japan?
Yes, I think so.
Does sekentei change w hen you move from one setting to another?
For me it s roughly the same, because it is the same feeling even though the situations 
may be different. Sekentei is not something I think about, or are conscious of doing, it's 
something that comes from gut feeling (kankaku kara shite). W hether at work, with my 
friends, or anyw here else, that feeling is the same...For example, in front of friends, 
relaxing, or being more formal at work, the sekentei feeling of "I should do this here", or 
'I should do that there", is present. I don 't think about it especially, it’s unconscious 
(ishiki shinai deijateiru mon) but there is that same feeling all the time.
Lebra (1992), also notes that sekentei makes itself felt emotionally:
Even today, my female informants, if unmarried in their late twenties or older, tend to confess that they are 
eager to marry, not because they really want spouses but because their sekentei hurts (sekentei ga xoarui). They 
wish, in other words, to appear seken nami (Lebra 1992:107).
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Sekentei, then, is regarded as both a ’feeling (kankaku)' and as an act. Hashimoto-san refers to sekentei 
in these two ways. H e first indicates that there are 'various sekentei', w hich can be applied 
premeditatively, therefore consciously as an act, and also describes sekentei as a 'desire to be seen 
positively...to not be seen as strange by other people', which sounds like the kind of unconscious 
'sensibility (kankaku kara shite)' which M uroya-san reported, and which Inoue and Lebra noted. 
Clearly, there is a connection between the two descriptions: a desire to be viewed positively would 
reasonably be expected to spur an individual to act consciously in order to satisfy that desire. But is 
sekentei the desire, the act, or both? The sense of sekentei as a desire accords with M uroya-san's 
description of the feeling 'I should do this here, I should do that there’. Yamada-san is unclear on 
this point, and we can interpret his answer as being both desire and act. Referring to a customer 
having a problem with a GA product, he said: "for me, sekentei is to respond to that problem as 
quickly as possible". W hether sekentei is the desire to respond to that problem , or is the response 
itself is unclear, but we can certainly interpret Yamada-san's description to mean both, which would 
be consistent with Hashimoto-san. Wada-san's description of sekentei also refers to the act:
Maybe, if we take a salarym an as an example, and the air that a particular kind of 
necktie, a white shirt, a suit, gives. That kind of appearance (i/oshi). That kind of 
business-like thing. That is sekentei.
Wada-san focuses on 'the air a particular kind of...gives', and on 'appearance (ifdshi)'. W hether a 
particular person has a desire to dress in a particular way or act in a particular way, or whether they 
feel coerced w ould seem to be unim portant, depending as it would as m uch on how a person feels 
on a particular day. Sekentei is all about presentation, bu t there is clearly a feeling prior to the act 
which is also regarded as sekentei.
Yamazaki-san makes a common observation regarding sekentei: that it is som ething on the 
surface and not som ething ’inside’. The moral provision of seken and the need to conform is also 
evident in his comment when he says 'you have to act a certain way....you have to be this or that':
Sekentei is, for example, the surface seen from outside. It strikes me as an image created 
not on the basis of what is inside, not on the inner part, but solely on what can be seen 
from outside. For example, you have to be this or that. You have to act a certain way, 
whenever anyone looks at you. Things that have nothing to do with w hat you actually 
do, in terms of work, for example. Sekentei is concerned with such tilings.
As Lebra notes, Japanese people have long conceived of an 'inner self and an 'outer self' (Lebra: 
1992), and Yamazaki-san's comments lead us to consider the relationship between kokoro, the essence 
of the 'inner se lf, and sekentei, the essence of the 'outer self. I have reservations about any 
conception of the individual self which does not conceive the self as primarily unitary, and explains 
how  this unitary  self exists-in-the-world. But Japanese do conceive of the individual self as 
com prised of an 'inner se lf  and an 'outer self. And the concept of an individual self whose 
individuality is recognised and acknowledged which is beginning to emerge in the examples of GA 
and underground dance music Techno parties, is best understood w hen described in terms of a 
departure from this 'inner self/ outer self’ conception of the self.
1 want to begin by considering the relationship between jibun, kojin, kosei and sekentei, and
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then jibun, kojin, kosei and kokoro. I have already noted17 that the employees used the terms jibun and 
kojin interchangeably to refer to an individual self. Jibun, which means 'oneself was used primarily 
to refer to the individual self in the first person. Kojin, which means an 'individual hum an being’ was 
used primarily to refer to the individual self in the third person, but both were used to refer to Ego 
as the individual self in a cognitive sense. For example ’to suppress oneself (kojin wo osaeru)' and 'to 
deny oneself (jibun wo korosu)' both refer to the expectation that an individual will subm it to the 
'ways of thinking (kangaekata)' and 'ways of doing (shikata)' of a 'g roup  (shuudmt). Kosei is 
'individuality', and was used interchangeably with jibun. For example, in the expression 'to express 
oneself (kosei wo ciasu or jibun wo dasu)'. Consequently, jibun, kojin, and kosei all refer to one's 'self or 
Ego as a cognitive sense, what Abe (1994) calls jiko.
The relationship between this sense of self and sekentei was revealed by the employees 
during  the discussions concerning the relationship betw een an 'individual {kojin)' and 'group 
(shuudan)' (4.3). M atsubara-san said that an individual is expected to 'suppress itself (kojin wo osaeru)' 
w hen it enters a group {shuudan). Iwata-san used the phrase 'to deny the self {jibun wo korosu)'. 
Muroya-san described an individual {kojin) in the following way: "Being an individual means being 
able to stretch yourself {nobite iku) and have a degree of advocacy {shuuchd). However, this is a 
country where you cannot assert yourself (kono kuni He shuuchd dekinai kuni nan desu yo)". Ozawa-san 
also: 'This is the kind of society in which if you try and express yourself, you will be crushed {jibun 
no kojin to iu mono wo dasou to sum  to Jiatasereba tsubusareru shakai de)". The other employees all 
described the relationship between the individual self and a 'group {shuudan)' in sim ilar terms. 
Iwata-san described how  Ego is likely to 'lose their self {jibun wo magirareru)' in a group {shuudan). 
The ethics of this particular conception of a collective self, and the relationship between persons 
which constitute it, refine the various group models discussed by Befu (1990). In addition, it is also 
clear that the relationship between a person's sekentei and a given seken is reminiscent of the Group 
Model which was the subject of Befu’s first critique (1980a). W hether the employees are talking 
about individual selves and collective selves using the terms kojin or jibun and shuudan, or sekentei 
and seken, the individual is expected to conform to uniform ways of thinking and doing set at the 
level of the collective self and enforced by individuals policing each other. There would appear to be 
a clear connection between 'suppressing the self or 'denying the self' and 'presenting (lit. 'making') 
sekentei {sekentei wo tsukurou)', and  between ’expressing the self and an absence of the feeling of 
needing to 'make sekentei', to the point that we could possibly say that the individual suppresses its 
self by the act of mobilizing sekentei.
Moeran (1989) told us that kokoro is the wellspring of the potter's individuality {kosei), and 
that although the key role of kokoro in the creative process was well understood by all concerned in 
the community, it was necessary to downplay the importance of kokoro and kosei in the production of 
pots, achieved through various communal {seken nami) practices and restrictive aesthetic standards 
set at the collective level, which are presented as more im portant than individual talent in producing 
the pots. This privileging of the collective effort over the individual effort, as well as de-emphasising 
individual talent through practices and an aesthetics which privilege community, is an example of
17See footnote 5
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kosei, as kokoro being carefully circumscribed: essentially, suppressed.
The w ord kokoro was only m entioned once, by Iw ata-san, in any of the em ployee's 
descriptions of how the self should 'suppress it self' in a 'group (shuudan)', or when describing how 
the self should express itself in a collective self which privileges the individual self, such as GA. This 
was Iwata-san remarking that being in a group (shuudan)' involves a 'divergence (tasho no jibun no 
kokoro no zure)' from one's kokoro. Nevertheless, we can fruitfully proceed for now. Kokoro, kosei, jibun 
and kojin are quite evidently very close, semantically, in this case, so even though we cannot say 
jibun wo dasu or kosei wo dasu means kokoro wo dasu at this stage, a brief consideration of tatemae, 
public behav iour, and hoiuie, true feeling', two of H endry's (1993) 'particular elements which 
characterise Japanese society', will allow us to say that 'presenting sekentei (sekentei wo tsukurou)' 
involves hiding kokoro. We can say this because, under the terms of a typical group m odel of 
Japanese society (Befu 1990), the indiv idual self, in 'public behaviour (tatemae)' situations, is 
expected to hide their 'true feelings (honne)', w hich m eans h iding kokoro (H endry 1993). The 
relationship betw een kokoro and  honne, 'true feeling' has been w idely w ritten  about, b u t no 
anthropologist who has written about tatemae, 'public behaviour, has discussed it in terms of sekentei. 
Nevertheless, the connection is clear: sekentei is 'public behaviour' in a given situation. Many of the 
employees at GA reported that the only place other than GA where they do not feel the need to be 
careful about their sekentei is in the family home with their wives and children, a honne setting.
W ithin a recognised honne situation, the individual self is expected to express their 'true 
feelings'. The employees at GA are also expected to express their true feelings, but in a public 
setting. The individual self at GA, in other words an individual self which constitutes a collective 
self that privileges the individual, appears to be a self in which the 'inner self embodied by kokoro, 
and the outer self, a p ersons sekentei, is redefined and is conceived of as unitary. I leave it as 
appears to be for now. My conclusions will have to wait until the party-goers have expressed their 
thoughts on the m atter (7.1), but we can proceed a little further by considering how the conception 
of individual selves and collective selves w ithin GA affects the m apping of social space m apped 
according to H endry s (1993) particular elements', w hat Bachnik refers to as 'double co-ordinates 
[which] are pervasive in Japanese social life, appearing in virtually every sphere" (Bachnik 1992: 
153). On the principle that individual selves and collective selves m utually constitute and define 
each other in Japan, we should see changes in the cognitive m apping of social space among the 
employees at GA which are consistent with the changes that are occurring to the conception of the 
individual self and collective self in GA.
*******
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4.5) Tatemae, Givi, and The New Individualism
H endry (1993), isolates two 'principles' on which Japanese society is organised,, which, she states, 
help to explain the existence of a num ber of oppositional distinctions which Japanese use to 
orientate themselves and negotiate their encounters w ith each other (Hendry 1993: 222). Hendry 
states that tatemae (public behaviour), honne (real feeling), omote ('front' or 'formal'), and urn ('back' or 
'informal'), and uchi (inside) and soto (outside), are: "particular combinations of...elements [which] 
may be found in  particular parts of Japanese society, and recognised as Japanese" (Hendry 1993: 
226). She also states that: "The im portance of these distinctions cannot be overem phasised in 
explaining features of Japanese society" (Hendry 1993: 46). I would also add seken and sekentei to this 
list of 'elements'. These elements and distinctions are major characteristics of the group models (Befu 
1990), which still do explain m uch of the thought and action in Japanese society. However, in 
examples such as GA and other restructured companies, and increasingly in other post-Bubble 
settings, these elem ents and distinctions are being either redefined or conflated. The new 
individualism which is being encouraged in GA and which is developing in other settings in post- 
Bubble Japan cannot be explained, I will argue, using these 'particular combinations of elements' 
(Hendry 1993), or 'paired terms' (Tobin 1992).
The first principle which Hendry regards as fundamental in explaining the organisation of 
Japanese society, is hierarchy, whereby all members of a group are bound together in one-to-one 
vertical relationships (gf. Nakane 1970). H endry’s second principle is the existence of and belonging 
to uchi groups. Following from these two principles, H endry, and m any others, regard the 
distinctions between tatemae and honne, omote and urn, and uchi and soto, to be fundam ental in 
characterising and explaining Japanese society. At GA, both H endry 's 'principles' have been 
virtually removed in the case of hierarchy, and radically redefined in the case of the employees’ use 
of the term uchi groups.
Hierarchy has been removed through the creation of an organisational structure of the type 
described in 3.3. This structure, together w ith the exhortations of the president and his staff, 
encourages the employees to develop their individuality (kosei) and originality (originarihf), and has 
led to the conflation of w hat has popularly  been described as tatemae, ’public behaviour' or the 
’facade of manners', tmdhonne, ’uninhibited hum an feeling’ or 'one's true feelings'. Speaking openly 
and honestly is regarded as part of the 'culturally appropriate sense of self’ (Tobin 1992) within GA, 
which indicates that w hat is regarded as an appropriate sense of self in  GA differs from that 
associated with Hendry's 'particular elements of Japanese society'. In Tobin's paper (Tobin 1992), he 
tells us that preschool children attending a daycare centre (hoikuen), are instructed in the ability to 
make distinctions between the paired terms of omote and urn, and tatemae and honne, preparing them 
for the society H endry describes, based on various uchi groups organised hierarchically. Tobin 
writes:
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the ability to shift levels of intimacy and restraint learned in the inner circle of family relations as a toddler, 
is expanded during the pre-school years to include the larger circles of peers, teachers, and neighbours...On 
the road to adulthood, Japanese school children must learn lessons more complex than simply 
distinguishing inside from outside, front from back, public from private...[T]o have a proper two-tiered 
sense of Japanese self, one must learn to step back and forth across the gap...in the course of a single 
conversation, or indeed even in the midst of a single phrase (Tobin 1992:24).
Following Doi (1986), Tobin regards the Japanese self as a two-tiered self, whereby the facility of 
being able to negotiate the two levels in any situation is a sign of adulthood or m aturity. The two 
tiers would, strictly speaking, not be omote and urn, as Tobin suggests, but would be omote muki and 
urn muki, ’facing the front', or ’facing the back'. Omote and urn, cannot be aspects of self, for they are 
settings in which social action takes place. If we use the terms omote muki and urn muki, which 
Japanese do, we are only then discussing the orientation of Ego, of the self, w ith respect to Other.
Within GA also, all the employees are required to be able to negotiate any situation with 
elan, which requires the mobilisation of different knowledge in familiar situations. M atsubara-san 
described how this is sometimes difficult because the employees are not used to being open and 
honest in situations where they have been taught to be restrained and hide their opinions (3.5). What 
remains im portant in GA while the employees negotiate their new situations, as in other settings 
more associated w ith H endiy 's 'particular elements', however, is the idea of kejime (Bachnik 1992, 
Tobin 1992, Hendry 1993): being able to distinguish between situations in order to act appropriately. 
The need to know how to act in a given situation, or in a given fleeting m oment, is indicated by 
Tobin in the quote above, and is just as im portant in GA. In addition, the need to act accordingly in a 
given situation is not affected by the employees at GA speaking openly and honestly. At the same 
time, however, even if the terms tatemae and honne can still be usefully employed to explain action 
within GA, the idea of a two-tiered self cannot. The employees clearly do move between situations 
which can be explained, albeit very one-dimensionally, as a shift along a tatemae /  honne continuum, 
but it is simply misleading and clearly unsatisfactory to talk of jum ping between two selves "within 
the course of a single conversation, or indeed in the m idst of a single phrase" (Tobin 1993: 24). Much 
in the same way that a theory of shifting, multiple selves is unsatisfactory because there is no sense 
of Japanese selves as anything other than cyphers, so a theoiy of a two-tiered self constantly flipping 
from one self to another conjures images of Tex Avery cartoon m adness rather than individual 
selves negotiating social situations.
If a theory of a two-tiered self, w here one tier effects tatemae and the other is honne, is 
unsatisfactory to describe the Japanese self, can the terms tatemae and honne be used to describe 
types of social action within GA? If the employees at GA are both speaking their minds and being 
polite, are they expressing tatemae and are they in an omote setting? Do we have to discard the idea 
of tatemae and honne, to explain social action w ithin GA, or can we reconfigure them? Hendry 
suggests that w hether tatemae or honne is being expressed is a question of levels of politeness 
expressed through grammatical forms (Hendry 1993). But she indicates that tatemae is not simply a 
case of speaking using grammatically polite language alone, but is also a case of w hat is said. The 
two are invariably linked, but an example I give in 5.3, in which a group of young school leavers 
and graduates were talking to some older salarymen in a TV debate, shows that tatemae is not solely, 
or even predom inantly, about using reverential grammatical forms, but is very m uch to do with
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content. The youths spoke gramm atically very politely, but they were regarded as rude, and 
importantly, immature by the older men because they spoke their minds: they conveyed honne, even 
though they were polite.
Tatemae is generally regarded as restraint expressed in grammatically polite terms, and 
governed by a hierarchical arrangement of persons as explained by H endry’s ’particular elements'.18 
Honne, on the other hand, is described by Tobin (1992) as 'uninhibited expressions of hum an feeling', 
associated with lira (back room) settings and intimate uchi (inside) groups, such as family or friends, 
in the bi-polar two-tier model. The students I discuss in 5.3 express their feelings uninhibitedly 
{honne) in a formal {omote) setting, suggesting the youths hold different values to the older 
salarymen to whom they were talking, but similar values to the employees at GA. In GA, speaking 
openly and honestly in a formal meeting is only possible because the ethics and practices of the 
workplace at GA have been redefined. A departm ental meeting at GA is quite different from 
departm ental meetings in the kinds of companies studied by Dore (1973), Rohlen (1974), and Clark 
(1979), and described by N akane (1970). Not only does the organisation of space in GA indicate 
equality, consistent w ith a flattened organisational structure, those present speak openly and 
honestly to each other as equals, not as intimates. If honne is associated with intimate relations, and 
tatemae w ith formal relations, we require a new set of terms to describe formal relations where the 
members regard each other as equal, each holding and expressing openly his or her own opinions 
and ideas. Setting is im portant, because both tatemae and honne are interactions characteristic of 
particular settings which are recognised and described, at least by anthropologists, namely omote, 
am, uchi, and soto. If one party  either ignores the conventions of the setting, or reads them 
differently, as in the case of the youths talking to the older salarym en, then harm ony will be 
disrupted and there will be conflict. If the setting changes to sanction or encourage new  'forms of 
interaction {sesshikata)', then we can expect social space to be m apped differently, and a different set 
of terms will be required to describe these spaces.
*******
Equality between the employees not only redefines tatemae and honne interactions, it removes any 
sense of giri in the company for most of the employees. A sense of giri, m uch like a sense of selcen 
and seken nami standards, is very subjective. However, the response of the employees to my 
questions about gin indicates that the reconfiguring of hum an relationships w ithin GA removes a 
sense of giri for the overwhelming majority of them. In 3.4 I described the emphatic responses of the 
employees to my questions about working late or having to go drinking w ith colleagues. What 
makes employees go drinking together after work, or staying late even if they themselves have no 
work to do, is a sense of giri, according to Hashimoto-san, which, like tatemae and honne, omote and 
nm, is a concept of hum an interaction associated with particular ethics and social organisation. As 
Hendry (1993) notes:
1 Q 
T^atemae is also expressed through gesture and posture, and through position with the room or space relative to other 
persons present.
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[Tjhere are clear expectations of reciprocity in pairs of relationships, the most striking being the exchange of 
loyalty for benevolence between an inferior and superior in many different circumstances. This type of 
exchange may not be manifest in packets and parcels, but it is none the less binding. These rules may be 
discussed in terms of 'debts' (giri and on) (Hendry 1993:224).
Many of the responses to my question, 'What is giri7 19 are consistent w ith the description Hendry 
gives. Hendry's most distinctive point is that it is characteristic for giri to exist between two persons 
who are in a vertical one-to-one relationship: the principle of hierarchy. Smith (1983) when 
discussing giri describes similar conditions:
Giri is a duty or obligation of a person to behave in certain loosely prescribed ways towards another, to 
whom the person is indebted. The content and scale of the duty or obligation vary greatly according to the 
relative hierarchical positions of the two parties, the nature of the debt and how it w as 
incurred...Nevertheless, the burden on the incurrer of the obligation is the heavier of the two (Smith 19S3:
45).
However, only W ada-san mentioned that giri is something which exists between a superior and an 
inferior, but nearly all the employees remarked that giri involves being tied to somebody, so that 
even when you do something for somebody, that is not the end of it:
Appearance (mie) and these things are all included. It's being courteous in response to 
somebody doing som ething for you (O sewa ni natta baai wa, sore ni taishite no reigi to 
imasu yo ne). After somebody has done something for you, you return the favour, right?
It’s that kind of feeling. However, after you have returned the favour, w ith giri that isn't 
the end of it. And the way of returning that favour is also giri. Both are giri. The feeling 
that you have to re tu rn  the favour, in o ther words, the sense of needing to do 
something in return is gin. This feeling expressed through action is to carry out giri. Giri 
itself is that very thought (Hashimoto-san).
The feeling Hashimoto-san is talking about is the feeling of on, of being indebted to a person. Iwata- 
san expressed the same feeling - of being tied to somebody:
Giri involves a strong feeling of being tied to somebody or something. For example, 
w hen somebody helps you out, you have to settle tilings (O sewa ni natta kara okaisho 
shinakereba ikenai.).20 When you receive an on from somebody, when the time comes to 
repay it in some way, whatever that thing is, you have to do it. Even if it involves you 
looking the other way in some way or another. That is the consciousness of giri.
Even though most of the employees do not specifically identify giri as prim arily existing between 
persons of unequal position, there is the sense of being tied together which is characteristic of 
H endry's hierarchically ordered uchi groups, or N akane’s (1970) inverted  V structure. What 
constitutes repaym ent of giri is also dependent on the seken m ini conventions of a given collective 
self, such as a company departm ent or a 'faction (habatsu)'. Iwata tells us how  giri can require a 
person to 'look the other way', in other words, fulfil the obligation to repay giri regardless of what 
the repaym ent is. A sense of 'us' and ’them ’ (uchi and sofo) can only be heightened by the feelings of 
complicity which result from such trade-offs, and indeed, we only have to look to the collusion and 
complicity in  the securities industry and the bureaucracy in the afterm ath of the collapse of the 
Bubble, to see that giri is alive and well in Japan (1.3). Giri is also regarded as cold or ’superficial1 
(ihydmenteki na tsukiai to iu), or as ’an outw ard thing' (giri wa omote muki). W ords such as mie,
giri to iu no wa nan dcsu ka 
9(1 • ~O seiva m natta kara okaisho shinakereba ikenai. O sewa ni nani means to receive assistance, but implies being indebted to 
someone for the assistance received. Kcnkj/uslm's New Japanese-English Dictionaiy. 5th Edition.
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(appearance), hyomenteki (superficial), and omote muki (outw ard facing) all indicate that giri is 
associated with tatemae and omote,
With these relationships in mind as a setting for giri to exist, it is no surprise that virtually all 
the employees do not regard giri as part of life within GA. Formal and spontaneous, front and back, 
heart and face, are all encouraged to be conflated as part of the new individualism . The kind of 
reciprocal 'helping each other out' which goes on instead of giri infused relationships is described by 
many as 'give and take':
I don't like the w ord giri\ It's a kind of give and take (isshn no gibu undo teiku da to omott n 
desu kedo), although I think Give and Take is better. With Give and Take it's as if there is 
a feeling of kindness involved (yasashisa de sumeru to hi kanji desu kedo) (Shinkawa-san).
Sakamoto-san regards giri as something which occurs between persons who are close to each other, 
or who have done som ething for you, but he still does not regard giri as existing w ithin GA. 
M atsubara-san thinks of giri as som ething which: "is tied up with custom and tradition (giri wa 
shuukan to dento ni shibarareru koto). Yamada-san, also:
Mmmm. Giri, W hat is giril W ith giri there is a sense of the inevitable from times past, 
which cannot be avoided and will invite some kind of divine retribution if it is not 
executed correctly. This is a little different, I feel, to what we have at GA, which is 'Give 
and Take'. With giri a person presents a restrained and reserved face (sokubaku men ga 
am). There is this m eaning in the w ord giri. In the case of 'Give and Take', when 
somebody does som ething for you, in return  you do som ething for them. W ith giri, 
depending on what somebody does for you, there is the air that all kinds of obligations 
with strings attached are being created. That’s how it seems to me.
The sense of reserve and restraint associated w ith tatemae and omote is conveyed by many of the 
employees in their descriptions of giri. Doing things for each other is perceived by the employees to 
occur on a relaxed and friendly basis, doing something for somebody because they w ant to.
When somebody does something for me, I say 'Thank you” and do som ething for that 
person. To be honest, though, the word 'giri' gives a different impression, because when 
I do som ething for somebody, or w hen they do som ething for me, I don 't have the 
feeling which the word 'giri' implies. At work, I do things for people because I w ant to, 
not because I feel I have to" (Muroya-san).
Some of the employees do regard their relationships w ith others at GA as giri relationships. Ozawa- 
san regards giri as: "something you do for someone to maintain the relationship, even if you're not in 
the mood". But Ozawa-san's view of giri is any favour she does for someone when she doesn't feel 
like doing it, but does to keep tilings running smoothly:
A t w ork such situations are ra ther common. Even privately, outside work, w ith 
colleagues sometimes. There are occasions when somebody has asked me to help them, 
and even though it's inconvenient, I think 'Oh, well, got to do them  a favour’. Such 
situations happen all the time among people. I can’t think of an example where it's not 
like that.
A nother fact which has em erged from the discussions on giri is the fact that, w ith giri, there is a 
strong sense that reciprocal actions are thought of as repaym ents for previous actions. As 
Hashimoto-san pointed out: "After somebody has done something for you, you return the favour.
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There is that kind of feeling. Also, after you have returned the favour, w ith giri that isn't the end of 
it". Or as Yamada-san remarked: "With giri there is the air that all kinds of obligations with strings 
attached are being created {giri to iu no wa sore de aite kara ataerareta koto ni yotte nanka sokubaku ga 
hassei sum  to iu fun  na imi ga chotto watashi ni am  yd na ki ga sum  n desu keredomo)". Gin, strongly 
linked to hierarchical relations, can, as Smith describes: "be seen as perpetual, one repayment calling 
forth yet another expression of favour or consideration" (Smith 1983: 46). This is why Yamada-san 
and Hashimoto-san regard giri as open-ended and having 'all kinds of strings attached'. Yamada- 
san’s feeling that giri, if left unattended, can invite divine retribution comes from the fact that giri 
can "transcend generational boundaries" (Smith 1983:46), incurring the wrath of ancestors.
What the employees regard as ’give and take’, doing favours for each other and returning 
favours, is different from w hat they regard as giri. Giri is clearly associated with particular types of 
relationships by the employees which do not exist at GA. The giving and receiving of reciprocal 
favours is not perceived in terms of giri by the employees, or as an expression of 'hum an feeling 
(ninjo) by the em ployees. Once again, we are presented w ith a single sense of action, w hich 
conforms to our graded, bu t fundamentally unitary social space. Consequently, in the same way that 
we cannot think of interactions in terms of tatemae and honne w ithin GA, neither can the giving and 
receiving of favours be thought of in terms of giri and ninjo.
*******
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Conclusion
I began this chapter by challenging recent studies on the Japanese self (Kondo 1990; Bachnik 1992, 
1994; Rosenberger 1992) on the grounds that they refuse to talk about selves as individuals. This 
refusal is on the grounds that all concepts of an individual self, are regarded as 'incorrigible Western 
assum ptions’ (Kondo 1990: 26). A lthough a project of exposing h idden assum ptions should be 
encouraged, it is a fallacy that all concepts of an individual self with a degree of autonomy in Japan 
are im ported Western concepts. Japan has a long history of individuality, and it is in this chapter 
that 1 begin to demonstrate that the new individualism that is emerging in post-Bubble Japan is not a 
Western individualism , but a recognisable Japanese individualism , firmly rooted in Japan's past. 
Evident in these Japanese concepts of individuality, and clearly evident in the example of GA, 
individuality and community m utually constitute and define each other.
I began by asking the employees to discuss the relationship between individuals and groups 
in GA. During the course of the discussions, the employees drew on examples from outside GA and 
I was able to build up a picture of changing ethics and expectations. All the employees began their 
explanation by first describing the ethics and relationships between individual selves and between 
individual selves and collective selves, by describing how individuals are expected to act in a 'group 
{shuudan)'. The picture which emerged was one of individual selves expected to conform to uniform 
standards of thought and action, achieved by means of 'suppressing one's self (kojin wo narubeku 
osaeru)' or 'denying the self (jibun wo korosu)' and w here 'stretching one's self (nobite ikenai)' or 
'asserting one's self (shuuchd sum)' was discouraged and presented as 'unpleasant (nmzui)'. The 
structure of relationships w ithin such a collective self conforms m arkedly to the various group 
models of Japanese society (Befu 1980a, 1980b, 1990), and indeed extends the explanatory power of 
these models. The employees then  contrasted this relationship w ith the relationship between 
individual selves and collective selves at GA. Consistent w ith the flattening of hierarchy, the 
locating of responsibility in  individuals, and an  organisational structure and company ethic which 
requires individuals to nurture their individuality and develop originality, and to stretch and assert 
themselves (3.3), the differences were described by the employees as a shift from selves 'suppressing 
their self or 'denying their self, to selves 'expressing themselves' or 'being themselves'.
I then asked the employees about seken and sekentei. Seken is that group of people, known 
and unknown to Ego, whom the individual self perceives to be watching and listening, making sure 
that Ego is conforming to uniform standards for thought and behaviour set at the collective level in 
a given situation, bu t made manifest through individuals, either directly, via the various media, or 
in the imagination. Seken is a reference group, bu t the constituency of seken changes as Ego moves 
from one membership group to another. Even when alone, the 'ears' and 'eyes', and 'mouth' of seken, 
which gossips about Ego, are felt. These uniform standards are seken standards for thought and 
behaviour, and are known as seken m ini standards (lit. ’In line with seken'). The interdependence of
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the individual self and collective self in defining and constructing each other in Japan is once again 
evident in the relationship between seken and sekentei, literally 'the appearance1, or 'form' of seken. 
Sekentei is 'the face-sensitive self which is addressed to seken' (Lebra 1992).
It was very clear that the employees at GA perceive seken, sekentei and seken nami to be 
absent from GA. This is because they associate seken with particular social relationships which have, 
to use H ashim oto-san's w ord, been 'dem olished' ([kuzushita). This particu lar structuration  of 
relationships which they do associate w ith seken ishighly reminiscent of the various group model of 
Japanese society, so that we can say that seken is the moral universe of a given collective self that 
conforms to the models described by Befu (1980a, 1980b, 1990), and to some considerable extent 
governs and explains the m otivations and acts of the individual selves which constitute a given 
'group (shuudan)' which conforms to these models. In view of this, seken and sekentei could be added 
to Hendry's (1993) list of 'particular elements' which characterise and help explain Japanese society.
I then considered w hether seken and seken nami standards have become fragmented in the 
case of GA, rather than absent altogether. The employees perceive seken to be absent because they 
are not being expected to conform to particular standards and ways of doing, and are expected to 
express their individuality (kosei) and embrace difference. As Iwata-san noted: "Other companies are 
different from GA and you will hear 'You have to do things this way', som ething associated with 
seken which you won't find here". Likewise, Ozawa-san remarked bitterly, it is common to hear This 
is the done thing, You!', or 'People are...', situations where seken is keenly felt by persons. The sense 
of being coerced to think and act in particular ways is very much a part of people's understanding of 
seken, which is why many of the employees associate seken with a particular configuring of social 
relationships. Because the employees at GA are not expected to conform to particular ways of doing, 
many of them feel that the eyes, ears, and gossip of seken are not present, and that they do not have 
to be careful about their sekentei w ithin GA. W hether we can think of these fragmented and diverse 
references as seken, is difficult to say. Conformity to uniform ways of thinking and doing would 
seem to be one of the defining characteristics of seken as a moral and social space. Consequently any 
fragm entation of ethics and practice, resulting from an ethics of individuality, together w ith an 
absence of any feeling of a need to conform to uniform ways of thinking and doing set at the level of 
a collective self, would seem to suggest that seken is replaced, rather than redefined.
The fragm entation and  diversification of reference groups w hich accom panies the 
legitimating and nurturing of individuality (kosei) is a result of individual selves being expected to 
hold different views and have different ways of going about things. This fragmentation stems from 
the requirem ent for an openness of self. There is also an indication that selves are required to be 
consistent in some way or another. This is indicated by the organisation of social space within GA, 
and the cognitive m apping of social space by the employees. The m apping of social space changes 
w ith the new m oral guidelines enshrined in an  ethics of individuality. This is very evident in the 
case of GA. Once again, starting w ith the two-tiered bi-polar model of social space, and the two- 
tiered 'inner/outer' self, it appears that the individual self which embodies the new  individualism 
emerging w ithin GA, inhabits a social space where these paired opposites have been conflated. 
Social space is perceived as fundamentally unitary.
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Does this mean that these individual selves are morally required to be consistent in all situations? 
Certainly,, the m apping of social space am ong the employees at GA, and the eradication of a 
situational morality, suggests that individual selves are required to act consistently. But whose 
notion of consistency would it be? What w ould be the criteria which defined 'consistent'? All of us 
construct consistent accounts of ourselves retrospectively, according to Strauss (1959), as we make 
sense of, or, as some m ight say, justify, our past actions in the light of the present. Too many 
questions remain unanswered at tins stage to address this important question regarding consistency 
of self, and further research on my part is required before coming to a satisfactory answer.
Returning to the subject of the m apping of social space among the employees at GA, it is not 
as if social space is not m apped within this unitary space. Rather, social space is mapped differently. 
The im portance of know ing how m uch individuality  (kosei) to express (as opposed to how 
individual to be) in a given situation means that the ability 'to draw a distinction (kejime wo tsukeru)' 
between different social interactions is as im portant as in the bi-polar two-tiered model. Tobin tells 
us that kejime is: "the knowledge needed to shift fluidly back and forth between omote (front) and mn 
(back)" (Tobin 1992: 24), and Bachnik also leads us to believe that: "Kejime...emerges as a crucial kind 
of native know ledge about how m ovem ent is initiated and defined along the [bi-polar] set of 
coordinates" (Bachnik 1992: 156). However, kejime is not a 'crucial kind of native know ledge’ 
associated specifically w ith these bi-polar opposites, but a noun which m eans 'to be able to 
distinguish between two things (kejime ga am)', or not (kejime ga nai), and is evidently im portant in 
negotiating all social situations, not only those which conform to this bi-polar model.
Neither do the employees at GA have a sense of giri. They do not incur obligations 'with 
strings attached', and which 'never get settled (mada sumanai)'. Instead reciprocal arrangements are 
know n as 'give and take'. Everyone I spoke to except Ozawa-san reported  that they feel no 
obligation to return a favour when somebody does something for them, nor do they expect a favour 
returned when they do something for somebody. Instead the idea is that everybody helps out when 
they can. This im portant shift in reciprocal relations is engendered by two main points: First, giri is 
absent in GA because it is regarded by the employees as 'superficial (hydmenteki)’, 'an outward thing 
(omote muki)', as som ething which em phasises ‘appearance (mie)'. In o ther w ords giri is clearly 
associated w ith sekentei and tatemae behaviour. Second, giri is absent because one of the key 
requirem ents for giri relationships to develop and reproduce, a rig id  hierarchically-ordered, 
organisational structure or command structure, is absent from GA.
*******
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5. Changing Working Practices and Work E thics
1) Risutora  and Re-engineering
2) Flexible Capitalism  and Changing Working P ractices
3) Unem ploym ent and th e  Post-Bubble Dem ographics o f  th e  
Workforce
4) Changing Work E thics
In this chapter, I tu rn  to consider in detail, one of the major themes of the thesis: that a new  
individualism and new community is emerging through both a 'top down' and 'bottom u p ’ process. 
Top dow n' th ro u g h  p lanned  restructu ring  and new  com panies starting  u p  w ith business 
philosophies and practices which embrace and encourage individual initiative, like GA, and which 
empower individuals and give them  responsibility. 'Bottom up ’, through the spaces which open up 
in a flexible economy, as people's routines and lifestyles begin to fragment and diversify, which not 
so much em powers them  and gives them  responsibility, as through the ’top dow n' process, but 
rather forces them  to use their initiative and take responsibility in order to keep body and soul 
together. This is not as bad as it m ight sound, however, as the freedom which the flexible economy 
also creates is regarded as liberation by m any predom inantly younger Japanese. The 'bottom up' 
process has traditionally manifested itself as examples of resistance to the status quo (Irokawa 1985), 
but w ith individuality being legitim ated through its incorporation into the workplace through 
planned restructuring in a ’top-down' process, the emergence of individuality in the mainstream  
through the developm ent of the flexible economy is increasingly perceived less as resistance and 
more as a positive developm ent which will help secure the nation's future, inseparable from the 
planned restructuring in established companies and providing a valuable pool of skilled mobile 
labour.
I begin by presenting the arguments for change which are being debated in Japan during the 
1990s. Having caught up w ith and overtaken (oitsuki oikosu)' ’the West', it has been widely touted in 
Japan that company organisational structure and philosophy geared to 'catching up and overtaking' 
is unsuitable for pioneering new technologies and new  markets in a m ature global economy with 
limited prospects for grow th of the kind experienced during the 1950s and 1960s. The debates 
concern company restructuring ideas developed primarily in the U.S. during the 1980s. The fact that 
these m odels were developed in the U.S., based on American business practices and American 
concepts of personhood, presents obstacles for their adoption in Japan. Nevertheless, the twin
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them es of custom er satisfaction achieved through all com pany m em bers having access to 
information, and then given the task of acting on that information individually, which are at the core 
of these 'Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)' models, are translatable to the Japanese case and 
are being introduced, as the example of GA demonstrates, where customer satisfaction and access to 
inform ation for all are them es developed through the organisational structure and command 
structure of the company with success (3.1,3.2).
O ther im portant aspects of the debate concern creativity and initiative. Encouraging and 
nurturing individuality (kosei) has been one of the most talked about subjects in business circles in 
the 1990s. However, introducing work ethics and organisational structures which will not simply 
accommodate individuality, but will legitimate it and nurture it, and make it the basis of work ethics 
and practice, is another thing altogether. Talk of customer satisfaction and access to information for 
all, is one thing, empowering individuals and investing them with the responsibility to act on that 
information is something else, and is causing tensions in workplaces across Japan. During the 1980s, 
half-hearted attem pts to harness individuality failed to integrate it into existing ethics and practice, 
although this brief flirtation with individuality by the mainstream resulted in seeds of individuality 
being left dorm ant (Miyanaga 1991), which are now beginning to germinate (6.1).
Economic conditions at a local, regional, and global level, have led to the beginnings of a 
flexible economy in Japan. A flexible economy exhibits new  areas of production, services, and 
markets, as well as new types of organisational and commercial innovation, both within companies 
and betw een com panies (Harvey 1990), which, in Japan, is establishing and legitim ating the 
expression and harnessing of individuality (kosei) in the workplace faster than through planned 
com pany restructuring. The m anner in which a flexible economy develops has been noted and 
studied in other advanced capitalist economies in the U.S. and Europe in the 1980s, and Japan shows 
every sign that it is now entering this late stage of capitalist development, having also pioneered a 
number of these developments.
The statistics for unem ploym ent during the middle 1990s, together w ith the demographics 
of the workforce generally since the collapse of the Bubble in 1991 indicate a period of accelerated 
change, during  w hich a flexible economy can be seen to be developing. Many of the trends 
described by Kaneko (1997) in 2.3 are borne out by the statistics for the period. Lifetime employment 
is likely to continue to exist, but the statistics demonstrate that for now, even 'lifetime employees' in 
their thirties are being forced onto the job market. Women also have suffered a set-back in their 
employment opportunities since the collapse of the Bubble.
In this chapter, the changes in the relationship between individual selves and collective 
selves which are occurring in GA can be seen as typical of a national goal and as part of a general 
trend. In the section on changing work ethics (5.4), the type of individual selves and collective selves 
which can be seen to be em erging within GA can also be seen to be emerging across society as a 
whole. The broader perspective of this chapter allows us to see the tensions which exist between 
individualistic selves of the kind legitimated by a company like GA, and those described by the 
employees at GA as characteristic of individual selves affiliated to 'groups (shuudan)' which demand 
uniform ways of thinking and doing. As companies restructure w ithin different time scales, in
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different ways, and to different degrees, and as individuality is increasingly regarded positively, 
workplaces are increasingly the site of tension between these two identifiably different types of 
selves. Changes in the ethics and practices of the workplace are also proceeding much faster through 
the developm ent of the flexible economy than through planned restructu ring  by established 
companies, who are finding it very difficult to reconcile the needs of the future with the expectations 
of their present staff. For these companies, the period of transition is not only painful but potentially 
fatal.
The changes in the relationships between employees and companies which are occurring as 
a result of the burgeoning flexible economy (5.2) can be seen to match the changes in work ethics 
w hich are occurring am ong the popu lation  as a w hole (5.4). This is m ost noticeable in the 
dim inished position of the workplace in the lives of employees in the flexible economy. The shift 
from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society manifests itself through workplaces 
providing less security and acting as less of a 'centre of emotional attachm ent and a nodal point of 
identity1 (Kondo 1990). As we shall see in the next chapter with the example of those who attend 
underground  dance m usic Techno parties, em ployees in a flexible economy either have no 
opportunity to identify w ith their workplaces, or along with an increasing num ber of young people 
working in established companies, choose not to identify with their workplace, instead seeking out 
other circles of emotional attachment and identity where they can express their individuality (kosei), 
which they enter voluntarily as individuals (kojin kojin de).
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5.1) Risutora and Re-engineering
A few points concerning language usage need clarifying before proceeding. The Japanese currently 
use a num ber of terms which refer to organisational changes in em ployment, some of which are 
interchangeable. Kaikaku and kakushin both m ean 'reform' and are used interchangeably, although 
laiknshin has overtones of innovation and of being a little more drastic.1 In common speech and 
usage during fieldwork in 1993-6, the words were interchangeable with no discernible difference in 
meaning, kaikaku being the more popular. Both these w ords refer to structural and organisational 
reorganisation of the kind described by Kaneko (1997) (2.3). More colloquial and probably the most 
common is risutora, a neologism for 'restructuring'. This w ord is used in a num ber of ways, either to 
m ean kaikaku and kakushin, although it connotes the Am erican idea of 'Business Process Re­
engineering (BPR)' and similar coordinated programmes of fundamental organisational change, or, 
more often than not, it refers to the cutting back of staff num bers w ithout major organisational 
rethinking. The w ord gorika, 'rationalisation', refers to cutting back staff. A more common term for 
staff cutbacks is koxjo chosei, literally 'employee adjustments'. A more colloquial expression is chi wo 
nagasu koto, literally 'blood-letting', which reflects images of the company as a living body.
Since 1993/4, when the concept of 're-engineering', developed and pioneered in the U.S., 
first began to be heard in Japan, most examples of risutora, kaikaku, or kakushin, have involved little 
more than gorika, w ith  analysts saying recently that even this process is not being carried out 
sufficiently.2 Certainly, as governm ent figures quoted in 5.3, indicating 'disguised redundancies 
(shanai shitsugijo)' suggest, gorika is not being implemented to the extent it could be, which, according 
to the various re-engineering m odels, is essential before reorganisation can begin. This view is 
contested by those who regard the Japanese employment model as different, rather than inferior, to 
U.S. and European employment models, and point to the fact that in Japan companies, rather than 
government, are the prim ary agents in the control of unem ploym ent (Oaklander and W hittaker 
1997). These voices point to the success of the Japanese economy in the post-WWII years and in 
bouncing back faster than the other industrialised economies after the 1973/4 oil crises, which they 
attribute to the structure of labour in Japan. Either way, company 'restructuring', particularly when 
discussed in conversation, has tended to refer to the shedding of increasingly younger staff and 
significant cutbacks in recruitm ent, ra ther than anything resem bling any of the 're-engineering' 
programmes. This is not at all surprising for at least three reasons. First, the changes which are being 
m ade are changes to existing practices and codes of conduct, rather than a start from a clean slate. 
Secondly, all 're-engineering' models are based on U.S. concepts of company organisation and what 
constitutes an ideal employee, etc. Thirdly, companies are implementing changes in different ways 
with different priorities and in different time scales, and have only been doing so for two to three
*|
Kenkijusha New Japanese-English Dictionaiy. 5th Edition.
9 Analyst Opinions Mixed On Japan Jobless Rate Fall'. ( Renters On-Line News Service. 29/3196)
184
years at the most.
O n paper, the changes which 're-engineering' involves seem almost completely inimical to 
Japanese working practices and codes of conduct, and indeed long-standing companies which have 
relied on tried and trusted practices and ideals for many years are balking at shifting priorities and 
introducing new practices. However, companies founded w ithin the last ten to fifteen years have 
been much more willing to embrace company philosophies, organisational structures and employee 
relationships w hich are quite different from  com panies who display the 'corporate centrism ' 
described by Okum ura (1992). GA is just one example.
Re-engineering, or Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), is the nam e given to certain 
restructuring program m es from the U.S. Ubukata, a well-known economics analyst and writer, 
compares recent U.S. economic history with that of Japan to make a case for re-engineering Japanese 
companies. He describes how re-engineering evolved:
Thu Americans began by studying the division of labour. They said that the division of labour itself is the 
key to raising productivity, and so the U.S. pushed ahead with a thorough reassessment of the division of 
labour. The first result of this was the worker who could, and would, agree to fulfill a number of functions.
During the time when one thing was mass-produced in large quantities, a division of labour which required 
a worker to do just one task produced results. However, as things stand now, with considerable product 
variation in variable quantities, under such a division of labour, productivity dropped. The Americans 
realised that such a division of labour w as adopted along with industrialisation and that with new  
industries and new technologies, a new division of labour was required ( Ubukata 2995:21. my translation).
What Ubukata describes here is re-engineering as a general strategy. The idea of reassessing the 
division of labour w ithin a company in order to realign the ends and the means to achieve those 
ends by the m ost effective and efficient m eans is not a U.S.-culture specific strategy, but is 
translatable to Japan, and is the most w idespread interpretation of ’re-engineering' in Japan. Having 
accepted in principle that such a restructuring is the answer, what is required next is to design an 
organisational structure which can most effectively achieve the desired ends. The first part of this is 
rationalisation (goriloi). M oving tow ards the m ore specific tenets of re-engineering, efficient 
circulation of information and customer satisfaction (CS) are regarded as the most im portant goals 
which em ployees should focus on. H arvey (1990) explains why inform ation is central to 're­
engineering':
[Ajccurate and up-to-date information is now a very highly valued commodity. Access to and control over 
information, coupled with a strong capacity for instant data analysis, have become essential to the 
centralized co-ordination of far-flung corporate interests. The capacity for instantaneous response to changes 
in exchange rates, fashions and tastes, and moves by competitors is more essential to corporate survival that 
it ever was under Fordism {Haivey 1990:159).
Both these priorities of customer service and easy access to information for all employees are at the 
heart of GA com pany philosophy (3.1), and have been developed through the organisational 
structure and  com m and structure of the com pany (3.2). Custom er satisfaction and access to 
information are closely linked. As M atsuda san explained (3.1), it is necessary for all employees at 
GA to have access to the market, which means being able to find out quickly and efficiently what 
customers think of current GA products and services, as well as what they would like in the future. 
This involves calling upon employees to use their initiative, giving them  responsibility to find out 
how to im prove current products and develop new  ones. This is the crux of the argum ent for 
encouraging and nurturing individuality in the workplace through an organisational structure and 
command structure which allows employees access to information, and em powers them to act on
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that information.
W hat I propose to do in this section is to look at a selection of published articles which 
appeared in the Japanese press between 1992 and 1995, in order to outline the developments which 
have led to calls for w ide-ranging reforms, and to discuss what those reforms are. Having done this, 
I will then look at company re-engineering' as it has been presented in the Japanese media. To begin 
with, though, I w ant to consider why reforms considered long overdue are being resisted. The 
problem, as it has been presented by the Japanese themselves, is that Japanese industry has been 
organised 'to catch up and overtake (oitsulci oikosu)' the advanced industrial nations (Kogura 1995; 
Ubukata 1995), and now, having caught up, it has to compete directly. Not only in selling products, 
but also in developing new  technologies and products. In order to do this, so the argum ent 
continues, Japanese companies have to be shaken up in order for the talent within the system to be 
given the freedom to nurture and develop these new technologies. It is this fact, together w ith the 
high production costs caused by overmanning, which are driving calls for restructuring. However, 
although there is a sense of urgency among some (Kogura 1995; Miyauchi 1995; Ubukata 1995), 
these w riters talk of Japanese m anagem ent 'having fallen into a sense of loss of purpose and 
stupefaction (oils it Id oikose no jidai ga own tie, mokuhyo zoo ttshinai bozen jishitsu no jotai ni ochiitteiru)' 
(Ubukata 1995: 20), or of employees having been ’doped' and indoctrinated by Icaisba shijdshugi, 
'company supremism', which is engendered by Okum ura's ’corporate centrism' (Okumura 1992) and 
Nakane's thesis of 'frames (bn)' (1970). Kogura explains how the stupefaction came about:
The bubble burst a long time ago - we are already in the fifth year of recession. The Japanese stock company 
is confronted with 'system distruct (shisutem hakai)' and we are sinking into the depths of confusion. Is 
anybody laughing now? In the Bubble era, talk of 'there is nothing more to learn from Europe and America’ 
was heard over and above anything else. That and 'the Japanese style economic system should be exported 
all over the world'. We were overconfident and, not satisfied with exporting cars, household electrical goods 
and TVs, we believed we had to export the whole economic plan (Kogiira 1995:13. my translation).
It is not simply the last strains of misplaced confidence which Kogura identifies as one of the reasons 
w hy change is being resisted, a lthough loss of face is a factor. Kogura argues that it is the 
persevering management style', gaman no ketei, which is responsible for w hat appears to be a case of 
not facing the writing on the wall. This attitude is a belief that things will get better if we tighten our 
belts and sit it out. Kogura uses the word tnida to describe this attitude (1995: 13), which can be 
translated as id leness, laziness, 'sloth', 'indolence', 'sluggishness'.^ He uses the example of the 
salary system, m ade up of a basic salary "as low as it can possibly be" (Kogura 1995: 13), together 
w ith overtime pay and bonuses:
Salaries during recession possess flexibility. Everybody from the president, through the board of directors 
and middle management, all the way down to the lowest company employee is infused with gaman no kciei.
For avoiding bankruptcy etc., this non-fixed pay system was extremely effective. However, there is a fatal 
downside, because this is also why a management system to turn the economy around, through creative 
distruction (sozoteki hakai), will not be introduced.^ If things continue to get really tough, the 'persevere 
method of management may weaken, but the belief that an upturn in the economic situation ( kaizen kaityo) 
is just around the corner will still remain. This kind of sloth currently characterises Japanese management 
(Kogura 1995:13. my translation).
JKenkynsha New Japanese-English Dictionary. 5th Edition.
^'Creative distruction' is a moment in a managed business process, first put forward by Shumpeter in 1912, which has since 
become an axiomatic model in business organisational change theory. For a useful introduction to ’Shumpeterian innovation', 
see Cambridge Journal of Economixs Vol 23 No. 2. March 1999. Cambridge Journal of Economics is a forum for substantive, 
rather than rational economic debate.
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Kogura locates the reason why change is not being im plemented when it should, in the fact that 
everybody has been 'doped ' or indoctrinated into the ideology of kaisha shijoshugi, 'company 
supremism' (Kogura 1995:14) as well as the belief that 'things will get better if we stick it out’ (gmnnii 
no keiei). He argues that kaisha shijoshugi, 'company suprem ism ' has alienated Japanese people in 
their roles as both em ployees and consum ers, and that companies have pu t them selves in an 
intractable position. The survival of the company is param ount and the interests of the company 
take precedent, yet ironically this philosophy, as it is described from various angles by Nakane 
(1970), Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), Hamada (1980,1992), Arai (1992), Morita (1992), Okuinura (1984, 
1992), Yamamoto (1993), Kogura (1995), and Ubukata (1995), is the cause of its ow n problems:
Most of the rewards do not go to the people at all, but to 'the company’. During the Bubble, the money that 
was kept by the company flowed into stocks and real estate, while excessive production and supply facilities 
became too much to handle. The reason why 'the company1 took the lion's share of the fruits of success was 
basically a conception to counteract the risk of recession...An international competitive spirit was included 
in this. As part of this logic, m anagem ent and workers are, at som e point, supposed to be 
rewarded...Initially, Japanese style management, whether talking of the economy or 'the company', was a 
tool to bring wealth to the people. But despite the people believing this, companies had a different idea.
It is still considered necessary to achieve even greater heights of production and supply, when at the 
present time the balance of trade stands at a huge surplus of ¥130bn. The belief that the company needs to be 
continually strengthened is a product of indoctrinal doping. On a dollar conversion basis, the salaries of 
listed Japanese stock companies are among the highest in the world, but on the important yen scale they 
have been falling in real terms. Production and supply have grown dramatically, but the rise in consumer 
purchasing power has been postponed indefinitely and we have a policy of deliberately not filling the gap 
between supply and [domestic] demand. For the level of production and supply...consumer purchasing 
power could be three times what it is at the moment. The 'supreme company' Japanese company has fallen 
into its own trap. So the answer to the riddle of the demise of the Japanese stock company is nothing other 
than kaisha shijoshugi (company supremism) ( Kogura 1995:15. m\j translation).
So 'doped' is everybody according to Kogura, that: "If you try and shout the w ords 'reform! {kaikaku)' 
or 'restructure! (ikakushin)', one hundred or two hundred times a day, nothing will change." (Kogura 
1995: 15.). M iyauchi (1995), president of Orix Corporation poetically described the situation as 
follows:
At the moment, like the sun just before sunset, we can see the glittering fabulous hard-earned results of the 
Japanese economy. However, everybody is thinking 'It will be different tomorrow'. Be that as it may, it’s 
easy to leave things as they are today, and therefore things are continuing as they have been. Even if there 
are people with the foresight to shout, "Things won’t last like this if you don't do something!" I suspect that 
the answer will be "Shut up. Noisy” (Miyauchi 1995:17. my translation).
In fact the level of noise generated by the subject of risutora is considerable. In newspapers, on TV, in 
bars, on the trains, and in boardrooms and company restrooms. Ushio (1995), founder and president 
of Ushio Denki K.K., a listed company of just over twelve hundred employees, gives an indication of 
the direction the reforms should take in a speech titled, 'If We Continue to Drive for Reform We Will 
Return to Prosperity (Kaikaku wo oshisusumereba, nippon wa 21 seki ni han’ei wo torimodoseru)':
The Japanese economy Is confronted by two problems and has to reform. First, w e have to free ourselves 
from 'one-country-prosperity-ism' and plan for the mutual co-prosperity between many nations. Up to now, 
we have achieved good results in the world market place by developing and thoroughly down-pricing high 
quality goods. However, we cannot go on forever earning our living through large exports. We have to 
convert from an export-led economy to a domestic targeted economy, in particular an economy built on 
information and service. However, despite the fact that this was pointed out some time ago, the pace of 
conversion has been slow. With the yen continuing to rise, a warning should be issued regarding this 
dragging of feet.
Another reform problem is that the corporate-centred economy that has prevailed up until now needs to be 
changed to an individual and family finances-centred economy. Until the present, the Japanese people have 
been able to be happy because Japanese industry has relied on life-time employment, age-related salary, 
control and suppression of bankruptcy, and the interdependence of stocks. However, with this kind of 
Japanese management, our industry has become very inefficient (kigyo no katsuryoku wo ubati kekka ni 
natteim).
This is not the 'it's OK to be very big' age. This is the age of the small active company aiming at specific 
regions and at specialised niches. With respect to precisely matching the myriad needs of consumers, small 
operations are more suitable. Within industry as well, we are looking to give special attention to individuals.
Also, the time has arrived when the company cannot demand its staff to transfer to another location by
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w illingly ignoring family circumstances ( Ushio 1995. m y translation).
Although thin on substantive detail, Ushio draws the reader's attention to the key points in the 
discourse on reform. This 'speech' is typical of the narratives for reform which reflect the changing 
needs of the economy as well as the changes in attitudes which are crystallizing within society as a 
whole. The key points which emerge from all the narratives are, in no particular order: (1) The need 
to shift from an export-led economy to an economy which targets the domestic economy,-5 (2) An 
economy which recognises the importance of information and customer service; (3) The need to shift 
from a 'com pany-centred' economy to one which emphasizes the individual and the family; (4) 
Specialization and niche m arketing, one of the factors driving the developm ent of the flexible 
economy (5,2); (5) A shift in the role of individuals within companies as well as w ithin society as a 
whole; (6) Recognition of the needs and wishes of employees by calling for an end to the current 
system  of shukko (tem porary assignm ent, three to five years away from home, requiring  the 
upheaval of family regardless of the employees wishes or consequences for family) (2.4).
Ushio’s suggested reforms are directed at 'two problems'. One is the need to change from 
'one-country-prosperity-ism ( ikkoku han’ei shugi)' and the other is to move away from a 'corporate 
centred economy to an 'individual and family-finances centred economy (hojin chuushin no keiei wo 
kojin to katei chuushin no keiei ni tenkan sum)' (Ushio 1995: 14). The need for both changes has arisen 
on purely pragmatic grounds. The passing of 'one-country-prosperity-ism' is due to the recognition 
in Japan that it is no longer possible for Japan, or any economic power, to act self-interestedly 
w ithout dam aging long-term objectives. This is a recognition of both moral and economic realities. 
This is a fact of the global economy and was clearly behind M orita’s (1992) calls for change (2.4). 
Japans economic prosperity  has become increasingly dependent on production and investm ent 
outside the country. Japan has invested heavily in the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIE's) in 
Asia, relocating m anufacturing through a large-scale 'hollow ing-out (kuudoka) process to cut 
production costs, and through direct investment. In the same way, Japan has sought to comply with 
import restrictions in  Europe and the U.S., and has consequently shifted production to these regions 
as well. Overall it can be seen that a policy of 'one-country-prosperity-ism' is not only a tiling of the 
past. Japan creates jobs and wealth in these other parts of the world, but that any sign of self-interest 
would provoke a negative backlash in these regions. In addition, Japan’s security relationship with 
the U.S. has been a big factor in Japan being able to build up its current trade surplus. It is still in the 
interests of the U.S. to have a powerful ally in the Pacific, bu t the United States wants to pu t the 
relationship on a more equal trade footing, and Japan has no choice but to comply.
I introduced the concept of the shift in em phasis from a 'com pany-centred' society to a 
society in which individuals are given a higher priority in 2.4, but w e can usefully isolate five 
factors, a m ixture of top-down driven and bottom -up' driven processes, which are driving this 
shift. They are: (1) The need to nurture initiative and creativity to develop new technologies (top- 
down), (2) The need to develop individuals as consumers, to be achieved by passing the benefits of
5This change of direction was initially signalled in the 'Maekawa Report' of 1986 . However, Itoh (1992) argues that the 
Japanese economy has never been predominantly export led, as exports account for only a few percentage points more of 
GNP than the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain.
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Japan s success onto its people (top-down); (3) Recognition of the fact that the Japanese people, 
having accepted a 'company-centred' society as the vehicle to prosperity, feel acutely that company 
self-interest has become the incentive to m aintain such a system rather than the prosperity of the 
nation as a whole, which can only be achieved by reforming the current system (bottom up); (4) The 
recognition that the institution of the company cannot afford to continue to take responsibility for 
the lives of its employees as it has up until now  (top down); (5) A shift in priorities am ong the 
Japanese public over the last few years: in 1988 more Japanese said they valued leisure rather than 
work for the first time (bottom up) (5.4).
Looking at Ushio’s suggested reforms in more detail, he stresses the need to boost domestic 
consumption. In a country w ith considerable consumer choice and where shopping is an obsession, 
it is difficult to imagine that domestic consumption in Japan is lower than in all the other G7 nations 
(OECD Country R eport/Japan  1987-93). Encouraging saving rather than spending has been the 
norm  (1.2), w ith half-hearted attempts by government and banks to stimulate domestic spending in 
the last five years. But while credit as a means of consumption has expanded since the early 1990s, 
consumption has been curtailed by economic recession and job insecurity, and looks set to remain 
depressed (Okasan Keizni Kenlcyuujo Gekki Hokoku, Okasan Research Institute M onthly report 12/96). 
As Kogura (1995) argues, consumer purchasing power could be three times what it currently is, on 
the basis of current levels of production and imports.6
Turning to customer satisfaction now, another popular perception of Japan is that customer 
service is very good, and that customer satisfaction is high on a Japanese company's list of priorities. 
Both of these perceptions are open to question. First, consumers in Japan are only likely to be treated 
well while their dem ands fall within the strict limits of the service provided by the service provider. 
If you've tried to ask for white coffee like the one in the 'cake set', but w ithout the cake, because 
there is no white coffee on the menu, or if you've asked for ymidofu in an izakmja and been told its 
out of season, when it's only bean curd (available all year round) in a broth w ith a few vegetables 
(also available all year round), a person can begin to realise that service (sarbisu) has well-defined 
often culturally fram ed limits. Ytmdofu, for example, is a 'seasonal dish'. Secondly, consum er 
protection legislation is virtually non-existent in Japan, a consequence of a weak public domain (1.3). 
Thirdly, retail prices in Japan rem ain disproportionately high in order to insure against the 
bankruptcy of Japanese companies and whole industries (Kogura 1995:15).
The biggest obstacle to consumer satisfaction (CS), however, is perceived to be the inward- 
looking self-interested company employee whose motivations are focused firmly on increasing his 
status w ithin the company (Okum ura 1985, 1992; Kogura 1995). In 2.4, I quoted O kum ura (1992) 
who noted that the pursuit of status within a company comes to dominate the life of the individual. 
Nakane (1970) draws our attention to the inefficiency of factions (habatsu) in Japanese companies in 
this respect, a point made clearly by M atsuda-san, President of GA (3.1). While Rohlen (1974) draws 
our attention to the fact that the prim e m otivation and prized rew ard of Japanese com pany 
employees is status vis-a-vis each other (3.4). Here is Kogura on this point:
Goods manufactured by Japanese industry outside Japan and then imported for domestic consumption are also classified as 
imported goods, and account for the rump of the increases in imports.
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The will to carry out re-engineering in the Japanese company is weak. For a long time, the Japanese 
company has not thought that CS is necessary, while management and workers together, within a given 
company, have an inward looking lifestyle and will ( shiko) that will hang on to the last. All the more so 
because, as the Japanese company seem s to see it, re-engineering is a sim ple cost-cutting recession 
countermeasure without CS. In addition to this, the majority of managers and middle-level administrators 
are unable to free themselves from a kind of inward-looking behaviour that has been around for a long 
time, focusing on success within the company as the highest priority. Even middle-aged staff who are 
transferred out to subsidiaries strongly maintain the complexion of the m anagement class, and 
consequently, as a whole, CS can be forgotten. ( Kogura 1995:15. my translation).
Satisfying customers has obviously always been important, but Kogura (1995) and Ubukata (1995) 
argue that customers have not been as high on the list of priorities as they now need to be, for the 
following reason:
Why did CS become important? Because the view  from the supply side changed. At the start of 
industrialisation, consumers were in a weak position because they had to buy everything. They didn't have 
anything, so everything was like a necessity. However, when the situation arises where supply power and 
commodities reach maturity, a margin of choice emerges and consumers find themselves in a strong 
position. ( Ubukata 1995:21. m y translation).
While these debates concerning risutora have been continuing, risutora has already begun in the form 
of 'hollowing out (kuuddlai)’ and 'rationalisation (gdrilai)'. The net consequence of these policies has 
been rising unem ploym ent (5.3). In addition to customer satisfaction, investm ent in information 
technology, and company internal restructuring to allow all employees access to inform ation and 
the remit and responsibility to act on that information, companies are also seeking to shift over to a 
more mobile workforce. This is to allow them to accommodate and capitalize on increasingly rapid 
p roduct diversity, d riven  by increasingly rap id  technological developm ents and consum er 
sophistication (5.2).
Kaneko (1997) identifies a num ber of employment trends which are being adopted in order 
to realise these goals(2.3). To recap, Kaneko sees companies adopting an 'em ploym ent portfolio' 
m ade up of the following three general types of em ploym ent : (1) a restricted 'long-term skill 
accumulation group based on 'lifetime employment'; (2) a relatively mobile 'high-level specialised 
skills group' based on fixed-term contracts, and; (3) another relatively mobile group undertaking 
tasks 'from  the traditional to the highly specialised' which fulfills both com panies' desires to 
maintain a flexible element in their workforce, and which also suits those employees which w ant to 
be flexible. Kaneko argues that these portfolios are being introduced due to ’structural changes in 
the economy1 and 'diversified employee consciousness' (2.3).
The biggest obstacles to this shift tow ards a more mobile workforce are both cultural and 
legislative. As 1 explained in 2.2, immobility in the labour force has become entrenched due to the 
broad ethical prescription 'Staying: Good::Bad: Moving', but while the economic situation has forced 
many employees onto the job market, the structural changes to employment practice which Kaneko 
describes, together w ith an ethical shift tow ards 'Moving is OK' is lapsing behind the increasing 
num ber of people in the job m arket caused by hollow ing out and rationalisation. The new 
employment portfolios described by Kaneko are slow to develop due to the underlying reason that 
the economy is sluggish and new jobs are not being created, but this brake on increased mobility is 
com pounded by the fact that em ployees and em ployers are still bound by the ethic ’Staying: 
Good::Bad: Moving'. A lthough it m ight initially seem advantageous for employees to be kept on 
com pany payrolls w ith nothing to do, ra ther than be forced onto the job m arket, a result of
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com panies try ing  to upho ld  obligations of ’lifetim e em ploym ent' and try ing  to control 
unem ploym ent, this is stopping skilled workers finding a place to use their skills, and hindering 
companies moving over to the new practices and bringing in the skilled employees they need. This 
creates a compound problem of high labour costs and inefficient use of that labour:
Japans most talented students in the 1950s sought jobs in the fast-growing industries producing materials 
like steel and cement. Today their companies are in decline. However, many of them have been assigned to 
new positions they were never trained for...In the 1960s, the best and the brightest entered the shipbuilding 
and automobile industries, and in the 1980s they sought jobs in banking and insurance, but all such fields 
like the earlier industrial leaders, w ill eventually lose mom entum . The practice of lifetim e  
employment...lead[sj to mismatches between jobs and the people in them (Tsukio’1992:28).
Specialists who are tied up in a company that doesn’t need them, or who doesn't need them as much 
as another company, is not only an example of wasted of hum an resources, it also demoralises the 
individuals involved (Morita 1992; Tsukio 1992; Yamamoto 1993). W hat is required to initiate 
change to these predom inantly cultural conventions are changes in legislation to encourage Iabour 
mobility. Levels of 'disguised redundancy (shnnni shitsugi/o)', the term  for em ployees kept on 
company payrolls w ith little or nothing to do, are of a m agnitude that doubles the official national 
unemployment rate (5.3), consequently increasing labour mobility is a high priority at the Ministry 
of Labour (Reuters On-Line News Service. 5 /2 /96). New legislation, including the relaxing of many 
restrictions is slowly m aking its way on to the statute books. However, the issue of legislation and 
deregulation is holding up restructuring as much, if not more so than 'cultural' factors because 
government thinking is itself bound by cultural precedent.
Successive Japanese governments have dragged their feet, in spite of substantial lobbying by 
industry and incessant pressure from the m edia to deregulate trade legislation, since the economic 
recession was generally acknowledged to have begun in 1992. Miyauchi (1995) is uncompromising 
in his opinion:
There are far too many restraint controls. Many walls have been built and inside these walls, directed like a 
convoy of ships, industrial activity has been proceeding. But when the pace of the leader slows down, they 
all have to slow down...In the United States, after the much talked about 'competitive-edge crisis’, industry 
was hollowed out, with what was left within the country being strong and competitive. However, in japan, 
ten years behind the hollowed-out U.S., the total opposite development is taking place: only restriction- 
bound uncompetitive industry is left inside the country ( Miyauchi 1995:17; m y translation).
Since the bubble burst, the governm ent and the bureaucracy have been hindering rather than 
helping industry to recover quickly and grasp the opportunities on which economic success in the 
early 21st century will depend. Until now, successive governments have attem pted to revive the 
economy with huge public spending works programmes, injecting trillions of yen into construction 
and m anufacturing rather than opting for systemic structural reform. The reason why successive 
governments have avoided tackling these underlying problem s in the afterm ath of the Bubble is 
because such a move requires reform of the bureaucracy itself, which neither the all-powerful 
bureaucracy or govermnent has had the inclination or the will to do. The schizophrenic nature of 
governm ent action can be understood if the dictates of oynke (1.3) are taken into account: all 
ministries and agencies issue statements indicating that they understand the problems and the need 
for action, but factional interests mitigate against anything other than statem ents of intent. The 
situation in the country has now  got so serious, though, that factional differences, particularly 
within the bureaucracy, have had to be buried for now, and a package of deregulatory measures has
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been pu t together. Even so, confidence in the m easures being carried out is low both inside the 
country and among foreign investors, who are unwilling to invest until deregulation has occurred 
and the reforms deemed necessary to make the relationship between the bureaucracy and industry 
more transparent have been enacted.
Some of the reforms most likely to have a significant impact are those which will facilitate 
the setting up of venture capital businesses (benchiya kigyo,), seen by m any as the spark required to 
reignite the economy:
In my opinion, in Japan at the moment there is considerable potential for starting new businesses. However, 
the conditions are very bad, for there are numerous regulations and restraint controls on raising funds for 
venture capital (Miyatichi 1995:16; my translation).
We are talking of the drive to relax regulations, but because of the need for consensus [within government 
and the bureaucracy], absolutely nothing is happening. There is no relaxing of regulations. That is not the 
only obstacle to reform, however. Industry is also crying out for the relaxing of regulations, but the truth is 
we are unable to free ourselves from the customary business practices of old, such as hierarchical relations, 
keiretsii, consultation, dango, and waiting in line (yokonarabi). So from government down to the people, 
bringing about change is difficult. No venture business is being nurtured, and there are no venture 
businesses springing up in a space prepared by new business regulations, like there was in the U.S., so there 
is no development of new technology, the very stuff of venture business. A situation is developing in which 
there is no engine for future growth (Ubukata 1995:23; my translation).
An important change, scheduled for 1997, was the relaxing of a law that states that a financial backer 
may not participate in the m anagem ent of a company invested in, a law that was recognised as 
discouraging potential investors. O ther significant changes related to the setting up of holding 
companies and the relaxing of restrictions which allow a company to be floated on a stock exchange, 
which should reduce the average length of time it takes for an OTC7 company to become listed on a 
stock exchange from thirty to ten years (Nikkei Weekly 26/2/96). This greatly reduces the length of 
time a financial backer can expect a return on an investm ent which m ust have a positive effect on 
the num ber of venture business start-ups. Venture businesses are recognized in the U.S. as the 
multinational corporations of the 21st century in fields such as software, artificial intelligence and 
biotechnology. In December 1995, 'Inc.' magazine, an American corporate journal, reported that 80% 
of new jobs created in the U.S. in 1995 came from venture capital initiated businesses (Nikkei 
Weekly 26/2/96).
Relaxing and reforming industrial legislation will facilitate labour mobility and the setting 
up of new businesses. Legislation involving pensions will also facilitate labour mobility, as private 
pension funds become available and legislation w hich allows employees to m ove their pension 
plans from company to company is introduced. There is still resistance, however, and not only from 
long-established firms or their senior employees, it seems. A report in Nikkei Weekly had this to 
say;
For most now college graduates, the Japanese dream still seems to involve lifetime-employment with a big 
corporation, one of the theories why new venture companies, many of them in high technology, are finding 
it difficult to recruit young, qualified employees (12/3/96).
By 1997, a trend away from this was noticeable. As it became accepted am ong university students 
and recent graduates that 'lifetime employment' w ould continue, but restricted to fewer employees 
and to fewer skill groups, together with the realisation that the blue chip companies were beginning
*7
An 'Over The Counter (OTC)' company is a company which is not listed on a stock exchange, but which has securities 
which are traded. An example is the NASDAQ trading system in the U.S. In the U.S., companies on NASDAQ are watched as 
potential future high profile corporations before they become listed.
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to employee their specialists already trained, rather than training in-house, more and more young 
people have been looking to gather experience and skills working for smaller companies, where it is 
now recognised that there are more opportunities for training and advancement. With the changes 
in legislation to encourage new business noted above, labour m obility is likely to increase 
substantially over the next five to ten years.
Labour mobility is likely to be facilitated by these developm ents, but it is the developm ent of a 
flexible economy, characterised by the rap id  grow th of a tertiary (service industry) sector,8 
providing specialist service to companies, relieving them  of the need to invest in m anpow er and 
equipm ent for an array of tasks previously undertaken 'in-house'. Harvey describes a flexible 
economy as follows:
Flexible accumulation, as I shall tentatively call it... rests on flexibility with regard to labour processes, labour 
markets, products and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors 
of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified 
rates of commercial, teclmological, .and organisational innovation (1990:147).
The knowledge required to undertake the increasing num ber of increasingly complex skills that 
make up a business operation also makes it increasingly difficult for a business to employ untrained 
personnel and train them to the required standard, until now the preferred way of recruiting and 
training (2.1, 2.2, 2.3). This delegation of tasks to outside team s of specialists is known as 
'outsourcing', and leads to a fragm entation and diversification of skill groups and individuals, 
further encouraging and legitimating the emergence of the new individualism.
*******
Q
For analytical purposes, industry is generally divided into three sectors: (1) Primary includes agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing; (2) Secondary includes manufacturing, mining, and construction; (3) Tertiary includes restaurants, hotels, finance, 
insurance, real estate, social and personnel services, transport, communications, consultancy etc. (Itoh 1994)
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5.2) Flexible Capitalism  and Changing W orking Practices
[Tjhe period 1965 to 1973 [in Britain and the U.S.] was one in which the inability of Fordism and 
Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism became more and more apparent... On the 
surface, these difficulties could best be captured by one word: rigidity ...rigidity of long term and large scale 
fixed capital investments...labour markets...state commitments...Behind all these specific rigidities lay a 
rather unwieldy and seemingly fixed configuration of political power and reciprocal relations that bound 
big labour, big capital and big government into what increasingly appeared as a dysfunctional embrace of 
such narrowly defined vested interests as to undermine rather than secure capital accumulation...The 1970s 
and 1980s have consequently been a troubled period of economic restructuring and social and political 
readjustment [in the U.S. and Britain]. In the social space created by all this flux and uncertainty, a series of 
novel experiments in the realms of industrial organization as well as in political and social life have begun to 
take shape. These experiments may represent the early stirrings of the passage to an entirely new regime of 
political and social regulation {H atvey 1990:145).
Japanese, or 'corporate', capitalism  has its divergences from Fordist models of m anufacturing 
production, but it has an inherent rigidity in the structure of labour, and in its relationship to capital 
and political power, which allows for Harvey's (1990) analysis to be applied fruitfully, and which is 
borne out by recent developments in Japan which closely follow those identified by Harvey. At the 
same time, while Japanese capitalism has a certain structural inflexibility, it also has a flexibility in 
its division of labour which Fordist organisation did not. This 'flexible rigidity' has been discussed 
by Dore (1986). Being able, willing, and expected to undertake more than one task in the work place 
and to generally 'm uck in' has long been a feature of Japanese w orking practices, unlike the 
restrictive practices imposed by organised labour unions in Fordist systems in the U.S. and Europe. 
A flexible division of labour, which already exists in Japan, is a major feature of 're-engineering'. In a 
num ber of ways, the structural changes which have come to be theorized as 'flexible capitalism', or 
'flexible accumulation' (Harvey 1990), are already features of the structure of Japanese capitalism, 
both in terms of internal company structure and also between companies. M anufacturer-centred, 
descending keiretsu systems are an example. Japanese companies pioneered production processes 
which were, in part, responsible for giving Japanese industry a com petitive advantage over the 
other advanced industrial economies in the late 1970s and 1980s. Examples are autom ation and 
robots, which were em braced by Japanese workers who did not see them  as a threat to their 
livelihoods, feeling protected as they were by employment security. This is in m arked contrast to the 
U.S. and Britain. In 1986 there were 60 robots for eveiy 10,000 workers in Japan, compared to 23 per 
10,000 in Germ any and 11 per 10,000 in the U.S. (Itoh 1996). Japan pioneered the Just-In-Time 
inventory flow system which greatly reduces the need to stockpile raw  materials and components, 
and Japanese companies greatly increased the turnover time of products, introducing new products 
at an ever increasing rate. M any of these advantages which Japanese com panies had over their 
American and European competitors were possible because of the structure of manufacturer-centred 
keiretsu. For the just-in-time process, components are not delivered to the assembling plant until just 
before they are needed, requiring contractors to m anufacture components of varying quantities 
w ithin a precise tim etable. The idea that only p lanning and m aybe assem bling is w hat a
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m anufacturing com pany actually does, has increasingly become a feature of m anufacturing 
processes in the other advanced capitalist economies. Japan also pioneered TQC, T otal Quality 
Control’, a commitment to reliability and quality which also kept the nations' industry ahead of the 
competition in the 1980s. There are notable advantages in  the Japanese system over Fordism, but 
unless the economy is growing at over 3% a year, the system is unsustainable (Itoh 1996; personal 
communication). In addition, Japan may not have suffered from the restrictive labour practices 
found in the U.S. and Europe in the 1970s, but restrictive legislation and cultural precedent create 
similar rigidities in Japan in the 1990s (5.1).
Motives for change are not simply economic, either. In addition, the revelations exposed by 
the collapse of the Bubble have raised m oral question marks over m any practices and codes of 
conduct, w hich will have to be taken into consideration by industry , governm ent and the 
bureaucracy, if Japan is to m aintain a highly motivated workforce. As Akio Morita (1992), founder 
and former president of Sony, argues:
AH these practices by Japanese companies have certainly contributed to raising their competitiveness. Yet on 
the other hand, Japanese companies may have sacrificed consideration for their employees...[and] in order to 
increase their own competitiveness.—placed unreasonable demands on their vendors [suppliers] ( Morita 
1992:12).
Within Japan, as the new m illennium approaches, there are five 'processes' through which working 
practices and w ork ethics are changing in line w ith the growth of a flexible economy. These are: (1) 
'Hollowing-out' of m anufacturing industiy  (laiuddka); (2) G row th of tertiary sector industry; (3) 
Growth of part-time, tem porary and 'outsourced' work (predominantly white-collar/ professional); 
(4) A change in em phasis in the balance betw een 'group-orientated' working practices and ethics, 
and 'individual-orientated ' practices and ethics: (5) Increased refinem ent and proliferation of 
markets both creating and targeting continually fragmenting and diversifying tastes.
Harvey (1990) does not discuss the effect of ’hollowing out (kuuddka)' on w ork practices and 
w ork ethics in any detail. H am ada (1992), however, looks at the relationship between a Japanese 
company and its overseas white-collar employees. She dem onstrates that overseas operations are 
still regarded as subsidiaries (kogaisha) by staff, but because Japanese companies are coming to rely 
more and more on their overseas subsidiaries, w ith overseas subsidiaries gaining reputations for 
their products independently of the parent company, and contributing increasingly higher profits to 
company consolidated results, the relationship between employees in the head office and those in 
subsidiaries is shifting. Being m oved to a subsidiary is still regarded as a dem otion or a move 
sideways, and removes the employee from of the centre of vital networking and alliance building 
and consolidating activities (Ham ada 1992). Until recently, H am ada argues, no positive attributes 
were required for being sent abroad, not even English (1992: 155), but w ith companies coming to 
rely more and more on their overseas subsidiaries, the need to send high-calibre staff abroad is 
changing the relationship between companies in the same keiretsu, which in turn  is changing the 
nature and perception of 'overseas assignment (kaigni shnkko)'. However, the sense of keiretsu which 
concentrates power, status and prestige at the centre still exerts a strong pull on kaigni shukko 
employees, which resists change:
In the mind of the Japanese expatriate manager, all subsidiaries are working for the success of the global 
strategies of the parent firm. Their continuous and strenuous efforts for the overseas subsidiaries success is
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based upon their ardent desire to go back 'home' with a mark of distinction. The referees of their 
accomplishments are the organizational insiders, particularly those privileged enough to stay at its core. In 
this case, objective financial data such as the firm's past performance against its international competitors are 
not considered as meaningful as is perceived performance vis-a-vis the domestic unit in Japan. At the 
individual level, the Japanese managers in this study evaluate their performance against the perceived task 
performance of the 'significant others' [in the flagship operations at home] (Hamada 1992:161).
In exactly the same way that Kogura (1995) argued that the ’inw ard-looking’ Japanese m anager is 
more concerned w ith his status vis a vis Iris colleagues at work, and consequently is less interested 
in customer satisfaction, so we can see the same mechanism in H am ada’s (1992) description above.
For blue-collar workers, the effects of 'hollow ing-out' are not a transfer abroad but 
unemployment. Working practices in manufacturing, for those who remain in employment, are not 
subject to talk of restructuring beyond 'blood-letting' at the moment. Shopfloor working practices 
also tend to change incrementally over time with the introduction of new production technology. In 
the blue-collar sector of manufacturing, labour costs were already at a m inim um  possible using 
current technology (Itoh 1993), in marked contrast to the bloated white-collar sector. However, this 
is not low enough, which is why m anufacturing jobs are now being transferred abroad, where 
labour is cheaper and, as Harvey puts it; "the social contract with labour [is] either weakly enforced 
or non-existent." (Harvey 1990:141).
Turning to the grow th of the tertiary sector, it can reasonably be said that the sub­
contracting system in Japan allowed for the development and implementation of flexible production 
systems, w ith far less disruption to the organisational structure of production than in the U.S. and 
Britain. Not only did it allow Japanese companies to pioneer what Harvey usefully calls the move 
from economies of scale to economies of scope (Harvey 1990: 155), rapidly increasing both the 
turnover time of products and product diversity, the sub-contracting system also took much of the 
strain  in tim es of economic dow nturn , acting as a buffer to protect larger com panies and 
corporations. This was the case in the 1970s, and the same thing has happened again through the 
1990s. Unlike the 1970s, however, m ost of the job losses have been in adm inistrative jobs in the 
aftermath of the Bubble, which have tended to be concentrated in the m ain company and its direct 
subsidiaries. However, this will eventually be offset by the growth of the tertiary sector in Japan, 
which has so far followed that of other advanced industrial nations (Harvey 1990: 157), suggesting 
that in spite of the sub contracting system, a fundamental shift in the organisation of production is 
currently underway in. Japan in the 1990s.
The role of technology in the developm ent of the tertiary sector is also significant. The 
technologies of economies of scope, together w ith the technologies of 'time-space compression' 
(Harvey 1990: 201), particularly inform ation technology and com m unications, stim ulated the 
consumption side. As Harvey puts it:
Flexible accumulation has been accompanied on the consumption side...by a much greater attention to 
quick-changing fashions and the mobilization of all the artifices of need inducem ent and cultural 
transformation this implies. The relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism has given way to all the 
ferment, instability, and fleeting qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, 
ephemerality, spectacle, fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms (H amey 1990:156).
This m arket sensibility, rather than  a post-m odern aesthetic, m ade possible by technological 
developm ents and the pursu it of m ore m arkets, in turn led to a proliferation of industries to 
produce, finance, and spread, not only products, but product and corporate images, through events
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and spectacles. This whole process, however, requires a high level of consum ption, not only 
consumption of products and images by individual consumers, but also consumption of services by 
producers. In addition to a proliferation of services generated by the m arket possibilities opened up 
by new technology, activities previously internalised within m anufacturing firms were 'outsourced'. 
The combined effect of these two processes has led to the growth of tertiary industry as a qualifiable 
stage in the developm ent of capitalism , producing  a consciousness w here every stage in a 
production process becomes a consum er/ producer loci. Hence the central importance of customer 
service (CS) and access to information:
The emphasis on information has also spawned a wide array of highly specialized business services and 
consultancies capable of providing up-to-the-minute information on market trends and the kind of instant 
data analysis useful in corporate decision making. It has created a situation in which vast profits stand to be 
made on the basis of privileged access to information...Access to scientific and technical know-how has 
always been important in the competitive struggle, but here too, we can see a renewal of interest and 
emphasis, because in a world of quick-changing tastes and needs, and flexible production systems, access to 
the latest technique, the latest product, the latest scientific discovery implies the possibility of seizing an 
important competitive advantage. Knowledge itself becomes a key commodity, to be produced and sold to 
the highest bidder, under conditions that are themselves increasingly organized on a competitive basis 
{Harvey 1990:159).
For the year January 1995/6, the fluctuations in  employment in Japan by sector on the previous year, 
indicates the current trend of a decline in secondary industries and a grow th in tertiary industries 
(see below)
D istribution  of Em ployed bv Industry  Sector. lanuarv  1996
Industry Jan 1996 year-on-year change
Manufacturing 14.26m -1.7%
Construction 6.47in -1.8%
Services 15.91m +2.0%
T rading / Hospitality 14.38m +0.9%
Transport/Telecommunications 4.00m +1.8%
Source: Nikkei Weekly 7 /5 /9 6 . Figures: Ministry of Lnbour ( m l  who)
In many respects, w hat is referred to as post-Fordism (Itoh 1992) in advanced industrial economies 
such as the U.S. and Britain, has been a feature of Japanese capitalism  since 1973: increased 
flexibility brought about by microelectronic (ME) technology, the 'cooperation' of the work force of 
large m anufacturers in im plementing automation and flexible production, a subcontracting system 
already in place, and employees expected to undertake more than one task in the workplace. The 
grow th of a service sector of the kind described by Harvey (1990), characterised by operations 
previously m anaged ’in-house1 being ’outsourced’, increasing in scope and complexity, and by the 
rapid developm ent of a cutting-edge high-technology industrial sector, is only just beginning to 
emerge in Japan, but emerging it is. Up until now, venture business, which has been such a feature 
of the revival of the U.S. economy, has been held back by restrictive legislation (5.1), a conservatism 
bred by corporate centrism, and an education system  which has m itigated against the brightest 
minds taking the plunge and starting out on their own (5.4). Slowly, as in the U.S. and Britain, 
increasing num bers of capable employees are being made unem ployed and this is creating a pool of 
labour which venture business, w hen it takes off, as it must, will tap into. There are also increasing 
numbers of capable employees within companies who would like to move and will take advantage
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of the opportunities deregulation will bring, as a climate that is much more favourably disposed to 
labour mobility continues to emerge.
In addition, as part-tim e and fixed contract staff undertake more of a company's business, 
com panies are aw are that they have to offer their part-tim e and fixed contract staff sim ilar 
conditions as their full-time staff. This is already happening in industries which already have a high 
level of 'part-time' staff, such as retailing, as they move towards a workforce in which around 70% of 
staff are 'part-time' (Nikkei Weekly 7 /1 0 /9 6 ).9 There is a great deal of interest in a plan known as 
the 'cafeteria plan', whereby employees are given points which they can 'spend' on various benefits 
and services which a company provides, including m andatory benefits such as health insurance. In 
the cases where the plan has been adopted, all employees regardless of position, gender, age, or 
years of service, receive the same num ber of points. According to a M inistry of Labour bulletin,10 
com panies are recognizing the d ifferent and diversifying needs of em ployees. On average, 
mandatory benefits such as health insurance, account for 65% of employees benefits, the rest made 
voluntarily by companies as part of employees remuneration. Under this plan, points are allocated, 
a certain am ount of which can be used on a variety of categories offered. By more accurately 
targeting the needs of employees it apparently reduces company benefit budget’s, which probably 
explains its popularity amongst employers. Giving 'part-time' workers similar benefits to full-time 
staff is not so much an act of philanthropic generosity as recognition that as the workforce becomes 
more flexible, loyalty and m otivation have to be created in new ways, itself a recognition of the 
diversifying needs and desires of employees.
*******
As part of their attem pt to stim ulate labour m obility, the governm ent p lanned  a package of 
legislation for 1997, designed to encourage the grow th of the flexible economy by giving labour 
m obility a legitimacy, and so that both em ployees and em ployers are given an idea of their 
responsibilities to each other. Two im portant pieces of legislation are: (1) the extension of the 
m axim um  contract period  for contract em ployees from 1 to 3-5 years. From  an  em ployees 
perspective, this will give contract employees more security. From a com pany's perspective, they 
can expect to attract higher calibre staff and match skills with jobs if those prospective employees 
know that their lifestyle will not be compromised by the insecurity of a one year maximum contract; 
(2) The liberalization of the business objectives of employm ent agencies. This is in response to the 
growth in dem and for part-tim e and more flexible employment, which in the Tokyo area grew by 
18% in the first half of 1996 (Financial Times 5/12/96). Until early 1996, employment agencies could 
only provide tem porary staff in sixteen largely clerical categories perm itted by the Ministry of 
Labour. These are to be expanded to allow agencies to offer not only staff in a w ider range of
'Part-time' refers to staff who work a full working week, but do not receive the benefits of 'full-time' staff. Neither are they 
expected to do overtime, except under special circumstances. With the current changes in working practices and ethics the 
idea of 'full-time' and 'part-time', as it has been used up until now, is changing.
^'Custom-Made Benefit Plan: Growing Number of Firms to Give Employees a Choice'. Japan Information Network.13/11/96. 
http://www.jinjapan.org
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specializations, but also more comprehensive services through outsourcing. In anticipation of the 
new legislation, Pasona, Japan's largest temporary staff agency, set up a new company called Pasona 
SoftBank in 1995, offering a num ber of outsourcing services which until recently would only have 
been dealt w ith  in-house by com panies. Pasona Softbank also offers training program m es in 
advanced information technology, indicating a trend to outsource company training, previously a 
vital part of developing the loyalty and motivation in employees.
Pasona s brochures aimed at people who might be thinking of temping, stress the absolute 
necessity of professionalism. Most of the personnel that register w ith Pasona are women, but Japan 
has a highly educated female workforce that are easily motivated, according to the staff I spoke to. 
Tem porary em ploym ent w orking practices accord w ith work ethics which are more in tune with 
how these wom en see themselves and their relationship to an employer in an ideal situation. What 
this means essentially, is that their job description is clear cut, their hours are strictly defined, and 
they enter into an agreem ent w ith an em ployer 'with no strings attached', to use the expression a 
num ber of the GA employees used to describe giri relationships (4.5). Working as a temp gives the 
women a feeling of being in control of their lives which they would never have as employees of the 
companies they tem p at. They also receive more respect, for I was told they receive far less sexual 
harassm ent in the workplace as outsiders w orking for another com pany than they w ould as 
insiders.
An emphasis on customer satisfaction and a the awareness that supplying temporary staff is 
a producer/consum er loci, two of the recognised characteristics of flexible capitalist relations of 
production (Harvey 1990), are evident at Persona: temporary staff, ostensibly employees, are treated 
more as customers than as employees. This is very evident in the relationship between the Pasona 
staff and the temps who are registered w ith them. 1 went through Pasona's 'new client orientation', 
one of a small num ber of m en who do. A Pasona em ployee carries out skill assessm ent and 
language aptitude tests, the applicant is then graded and pu t on a database. As is quite common in 
Japan, registrations and assessments like this are not carried out in private, but in a semi-public area. 
There were dividers to separate the applicants and their assessor, but I was able to listen to over ten 
other applicants, all of them  Japanese women, and in  each case I was aw are that the Pasona staff 
treated their potential employees' as if they were customers. Also during my visit, I saw a num ber 
of registered Pasona temps come into the offices for various reasons, and in all cases they were 
treated with respect and courtesy by Pasona staff as if customers. Most contracts are three to six 
months, and are often renewed, which suits the temporary worker who w ants flexibility. However, 
a Pasona staff m em ber told me: It is not uncom m on for a company to w ant to keep a temporary 
employee who is efficient, especially if that person is liked by the company staff. But we have had 
tem porary staff who have w orked at the sam e company for m ore than six m onths or a year 
complain to us that they began to be treated as a company employee (shti in). What they meant was, 
they were slowly treated w ith less and less respect".
The brochures which are aimed at companies who may be thinking of hiring tem porary staff 
stress the lack of adm inistrative costs which hiring temporary staff gives. It is stressed that staff are 
provided fully trained to do specific tasks, w hether it is photocopying and typing, or fully trained
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m ulti-lingual personal assistants who are specialists in particular industries, such as finance, 
manufacturing, etc. In 1994, w hen I spoke to Pasona staff, most of the personnel registered on their 
books were women, and the majority of enquiries m ade by companies were for secretarial staff. 
Pasona specializes in supplying staff to foreign companies in Japan, who were m uch more familiar 
with flexible working. In 1996, though, I contacted Pasona again and asked them to send me some 
information on their latest services. W hen it arrived, Pasona had set up  a new  company, Pasona 
Softbank, which specializes in outsourcing and training. The company were clearly moving in the 
direction of providing a more comprehensive hum an resources service, a developm ent which is in 
line with Harvey's (1990) description of a developing flexible economy.
Pasona is clearly a well-organised, professional and morally correct organisation. That is to 
say, it does not seek to compromise its clients, either its temporary staff or the companies which hire 
Pasona's temps. As a whole 'hum an resources' industry develops, devoted to placing staff with 
companies on either temporary, part-time, or longer fixed term contract bases, there are bound to be 
some less than scrupulous agencies, particularly those who bring together the less able staff and 
com panies who see the new  w orking arrangem ents as another way of exploiting the more 
vulnerable members of the workforce. A burgeoning 'training industry* has already been blighted by 
training course scams (japan Times 16/3/95), whereby persons who have been approached over the 
telephone and asked if they would be interested in a num ber of training schemes, are suddenly 
hassled for paym ents, accused of signing up  for courses and not paying up. So, although the 
government is currently liberalizing the legislation on employment companies in order to cater for 
the growing flexible labour market, it will also have to introduce new safeguards in many areas, as 
new em ploym ent portfolios’ are developed and w orking practices diversify in a weak public 
domain.
*******
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5.3) Unemployment and the Post-Bubble Demographics of the Workforce
Between May 1992 and May 1997, according to the unemployment figures issued by the Japanese 
government, unem ploym ent nearly doubled from 1.8% to 3.5%, the highest figure ever recorded 
since figures were first kept in 1953. This period has also seen the highest ever m onth on month 
increases, between N o v /95 and M a r/97. Since the beginning of the recession, in the wake of the 
Bubble collapse, the trends in unem ploym ent have followed a path which indicates the response of 
companies to the increasing economic difficulties over the period. Essentially this has been as 
follows: To begin w ith, com panies targeted m anagers in the 45-54 age band, bu t even then, 
'involuntary resignations (fusho taishokn)'n  were kept to a minimum, w ith m any companies keeping 
staff on payrolls w ith nothing to do. These employees are known as 'disguised redundancies 
(kigybnai s}iitsug\jb)'. Certainly, the figure for those recorded as unemployed by the Management and 
Coordination Agency ( sbtnu sho) is estim ated to be at least half the figure that includes 'disguised 
redundancies'. 'D isguised redundancies' may turn  up to w ork everyday, or they m ay, as is 
increasingly the case, be kept on the payroll at around 70% of their salary w ithout having to turn up 
for work. The existence of disguised redundancies at all, should be regarded as an indication of the 
strength of obligations engendering 'lifetime employment', which employers feel towards their older 
employees. However, as I indicated in 5.1, some analysts suggest that this is also part of a sense of a 
w ider social responsibility, encouraged by government and supported by public cash handouts to 
com panies who keep staff on payrolls (O aklander and W hitteker 1997). This sense of social 
responsibility can also be interpreted as pressure from the Japanese Governm ent on companies to 
keep everything looking like 'business as usual’, in  order to limit the dam aging social effects of 
w idespread long-term  unem ploym ent which the nation is facing. Figures for the gender of these 
employees was unavailable, but it is likely that the majority of 'disguised redundancies’ are men. 
Female unemployment is discussed below.
The governm ent unem ploym ent figures are recognised as being conservative, due to the 
strictly defined m eaning of 'unem ployed ' in Japan. But it is recognised by both international, 
Japanese government, and private data research institutions, that the figure including those who fall 
into the 'disguised redundancy' category, would be double the official figure, at least. The Economic 
Planning Agency (keizai kiknku sho) figure, the official government estimate, puts the unemployment 
total three points higher if 'd isguised redundancies' are included (Economist Intelligence Unit 
12/1 / 96). The Japan Federation of Employers Association figure is about the same (Reuters On-Line 
5 /2 /9 6 ), while the OECD figure of 10% (EIU 1 2 /1 /96 ) also includes those wom en who are 
estimated to have given up  looking for w ork altogether, in the face of m ounting discrimination as 
the job m arket enters a period of instability. A figure of 6-10% would be more in line w ith other
^T hese 'resignations', are 'involuntary resignations {fiisho taislwkii)', which: "indicates the loss of a job against the worker's 
desire, such as dismissal, employer pressure to leave, employer bankruptcy, or the closing of a family business” (Nikkei 
Weekly 30/4/96).
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advanced industrial nations (OECD).
'Disguised redundancy ' certainly keeps the official figure lower than it m ight otherwise 
have been, but, many economists argue, this is merely delaying the inevitable. This is reflected in a 
growing concern about a mismatch between the staff companies have on their payrolls and the skills 
which the same com panies are beginning to require as the inform ation age and new  business 
philosophies begin to be adopted. This m eans many employees kept on the payroll will not be 
suitable even when conditions pick up. At the same time, staff who might be more useful elsewhere 
are also forced to stay w ith their employers due to the current instability and due to attitudes to 
moving (5.1,5.2).
Even though there are hundreds of thousands of employees being kept on payrolls w ith 
nothing to do, the level of unem ploym ent does keep rising ever faster. The year on year increase for 
J a n /96 was 680, 000, an increase of 100,000 on January the previous year, w ith the Nihon Keizai 
Shimbnn (Japan Financial Daily N ew spaper) noting that the rise in the num ber of heads of 
households out of work is increasing substantially (Nikkei Weekly 30/4/96), There is also a trend of 
increasingly younger employees being forced to resign through 'involuntary resignations (fusho 
taishoku)'. The Nikkei notes that an increase of 70,000, year-on-year, 'involuntary resignations' in the 
25-39 age band, recorded in F eb /96, indicates a new  trend as increasingly younger employees are 
forced out of work (Nikkei Weekly 30/4/96). Many of Japan's leading companies are continuing the 
trend which Yamamoto (1993) recorded, reducing their workforces between 10% and 12%. Some, 
like Daiwa Bank, are planning a 27% reduction (Reuters On-Line 7 /3 /96). M eanwhile, the collapse 
of a num ber of Japan's major financial institutions in the autum n of 1997, who had been trying to 
postpone failure since the collapse of the Bubble, has resulted in a num ber of analysts predicting 
further increases in the unemployment figure.
In addition to forcing employees to resign, and keeping many on the payroll w ith nothing to 
do, employers have been cutting back on recruitment. Forced resignations have been a shock to the 
nation. The practice of rescinding on obligations which are so institutionalised that some even think 
they are statutory, has caused a national shock in itself, regardless of the upheaval to the lives of 
employees and families directly affected. C utting back on recruitm ent to the extent that graduate 
recruitm ent has dropped  by as m uch as 90% (Nikkei Weekly 7 /5 /9 6 ) is having a sim ilar effect. 
'Involuntary resignation' has tended to affect older workers, although increasingly younger workers 
are now finding them selves victims, w hereas cutting back on recruitm ent has been prim arily 
affecting the young. In M ay/96, against a background of an official overall unem ploym ent figure of 
3.5%, the official figure for the 15-24 age-band was 8.5%, nearly three times the national average. As 
an example of how graduate recruitm ent12 has dropped, Japan Travel Bureau, the country's largest 
travel organisation, reduced its graduate intake from 900 in 1992, to 130 in 1996. Sony reduced their 
intake from 1,000 in 1992, to 280 in 1996, and IBM Japan reduced their intake from 1,500 in 1990, to 
140 in 1994 (Nikkei Weekly 7 /5 /96). When these figures are analysed by sex, they reveal that males 
are finding more openings than females for the corporate jobs. The figure for job openings for males 
dropped by 12% year-on-year in 1996, while the num ber of openings for wom en dropped by 20%
12Graduate recruitment refers to high school and university graduates
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(Nikkei Weekly 7 /5 /9 6 ), w ith M itsubishi Bank not recruiting any female graduates at all in 1996 
(Reuters On-Line 12/12/95), citing that investm ent in information technology had removed the 
need for any new  female staff. Female graduates in Japan have consistently been excluded from 
career positions in Japanese companies, invariably having to settle for clerical jobs w ith little or no 
responsibility or opportunity for career development. While this has been a source of contention for 
women, especially those trying to im prove the position of w om en both w ithin and outside the 
workplace, the current situation, in which discrimination on the basis of sex has come to the fore, 
has attracted both a lot of attention and a lot of criticism. This trend has been rationalised, or 
excused by apologists, as 'being in the national interest'. Such reasoning does not mollify the large 
num bers of educated women in the m aim er it has done in the past, however. What is happening is 
that wom en are being excluded from the jobs they were beginning to be able to compete with men 
for, such as sales and adm inistrative careers in industry and in retailing, while opportunities for 
lower paid part-time w ork w ith little security are flourishing. The conditions under which many of 
these part-tim ers work are also causing concern, as employment laws have yet to catch up with the 
rapidly changing w orking practices. W hat am ounts to a reversal of trend, in which w om en are 
increasingly being forced back into a kind of employment underclass, is revealed in the employment 
statistics which show that while youth male unem ploym ent continues to rise, up 1.1 y-y to 8.5%, 
female unem ploym ent in the 15-24 age band showed a drop of 0.1% in 1996, to 7.1%. So while the 
num ber of career openings for w om en has decreased faster than men in the 15-24 age band, the 
num ber of w om en in w ork has increased faster than m en (Nikkei Weekly 7 /5 /9 6 ). The only 
conclusion to be draw n from these figures is that women are filling up the increasing num ber of 
badly paid, insecure positions which are being created at the bottom end of the flexible economy.
Having said that, wom en are also currently taking the majority of the new  tem porary and 
outsourced jobs which are appearing as industry  begins to move tow ards the flexible w orking 
practices which are increasing mobility in the work force. These young w om en are given a new 
found freedom and security, provided by the backing of the employment companies they work for 
(5.4). The reason why women are leading the way, however, is not due particularly to equality being 
built into new  practices, b u t because secretarial and adm inistrative jobs w ith  little or no 
responsibility  are the first to be outsourced and given over to fixed term  and tem porary  
arrangements. The recent situation, in which young wom en have been discouraged from applying 
for jobs when contacting companies, have been given false information so they miss introductory 
seminars, or are given interviews but then are simply ignored (Japan Times 31/7 /95), has blown a 
gaping hole in the nation's equal opportunity  laws, and revealed the w idespread sexism in the 
Japanese workplace that was never far from the surface.
Pressure has also filtered dow n into the education system. This is having a twin effect. On 
the one hand, it is forcing university students to w ork harder than they had thought necessary, as 
prospective employers become more selective and demanding. Also, in addition to the increased 
competition among students, resulting from drastically reduced graduate recruitment, these young 
graduates are also having to compete w ith older more experienced staff, as em ployers begin to 
rethink their recruitm ent strategies and their attitudes to m id-career entrants. Again, networks
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between companies and educational establishm ents have virtually broken dow n w ith graduate 
recruitm ent falling as it has, and now w ith ability and ind iv iduality  becom ing increasingly 
im portant in the selection process, some companies, together w ith employing m id-career entrants 
and specialised staff on fixed-term contracts, are experimenting w ith application forms which do not 
ask for the candidate's school or university. Sony are just one example (Morita 1992). Although this 
is unlikely to become common practice, it shows that companies are serious about finding the most 
talented, self-motivated, creative employees. In the same way, pressure is on high school students, 
too.
The num ber of unem ployed graduates has also been increasing, as a result of the drop in 
graduate recruitm ent and due to the new recruiting practices of hiring experienced staff. The result 
has been an increasing num ber of young people who are facing a future they cannot predict and 
which has no precedent in recent experience. They are being forced to be inventive and are having 
to live for the moment, becoming increasingly independent. Being forced to use their initiative in 
this way, however, these young adults are coming to rely on their individuality, and instead of 
lelying on and looking for guidance from those older than themselves, they are forming associations 
with persons of similar but not necessarily the same age, of different sex, and of similar interests, or 
attributes. To use Nakane s (1970) terms, these young Japanese are increasingly coming to associate 
on the basis of attribute, not frame, and they are developing a sense of self, not as extensions of 
coipoiate groups, but as individuals, and as part of a flexible economy which encourages and 
legitimates the ’bottom -up’ process of developing and nurturing individuality.
*******
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5.4) Changing A ttitudes to W ork and  Changing W ork Ethics
In 5.1 I discussed the reforms which are being debated and im plemented in established companies 
to varying degrees in Japan in the afterm ath of the Bubble. Together w ith the arrival of companies 
like GA, in which individuality  (kosei) is legitim ated through the organisational structure and 
command structure of the company, these reforms are a 'top-down' program me which is redefining 
work ethics and practices. In 5 .1 ,1 briefly mentioned that some of these measures which were being 
considered were in response to changing attitudes and values am ong the Japanese public, trends 
which can usefully be thought of as a 'bottom-up' process. In this section, I will look a little closer at 
some of these changes in attitudes and values which are a part of this 'bottom- u p 1 process, as well as 
how  they constitu te the new  indiv idualism , before in troducing  those people w ho attend  
underground dance music Techno parties, in the next chapter.
Many of these changes in attitudes and values, which are part of the gradual redefinition of 
individual selves and collective selves, were fermenting, or were evident, p rior to the Bubble 
collapse, tended to be perceived as the colonisation of the Japanese self by a W estern individualistic 
self, and were regarded negatively (4.1, 4.2). The two most significant m anifestations of these 
changes, even though closely related, indicate that a fundam ental shift in this perception has 
occurred in Japan over time. The first significant manifestation, that more people regard leisure as 
more im portant than work, occurred in the mid-1980s, and was generally regarded as proof of a 
gradual colonisation by Western individualism . In terms of the relationship between w ork and 
other parts of a person's life, however, this simply meant that more people regarded work, less as an 
end in itself and more as a means of allowing individuals to pursue their lives more as they wish, by 
associating with whom  they like when they like. The second manifestation was a desire on the part 
of ordinary people to move from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society. This shift 
in attitudes, although essentially the same as the first, was not at any time, as far as I am aware, 
regarded as a colonisation, but as an overdue adjustment (2.4). The idea that Japan should move from 
a company-centred society to a 'people-centred' society is largely a response by 'opinion leaders' to 
the changes in attitudes tow ards work, and is a recognition of the need to redefine the ways in 
which employees need to be motivated and rew arded, in view of these changes. This recognition is 
an example of the dynam ic process that exists between 'top-dow n' p lanning  and 'bottom -up' 
momentum, while the trend of placing leisure above work and of w anting to reduce the importance 
of the workplace in life itself appears indicative of an emerging individuality and a concomitant 
desire to redefine the structure and ethics of community.
It has been suggested that the fall of the workplace as the 'centre of emotional attachment 
and nodal point of identity (Kondo 1990) in the lives of the majority of the Japanese people began at 
least as far back as the early 1970s. This does not mean that there was not resistance to prevailing 
w ork ethics before this, undoubtedly there was. W hat 1 am  talking about is a qualitative shift in
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values (Jmchikan) am ong a significant num ber of people, which leads to pronouncem ents, usually 
retrospectively, that 'tilings changed'. Recent studies on changing attitudes and values among young 
Japanese in the 1980s (Sengoku 1991) suggest that these changing values started with the parents of 
the current under 25 s. Sengoku (1991) argues that the first oil crisis in 1973 was a turning point. He 
begins by stating that in Japan’s m odern history, that is since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the 
nation has alw ays been united  behind certain  goals, and devoted  itself to p u rsu ing  and 
outperform ing the major Western countries: what was known as the task of catch up and overtake 
(oitsuki oikosu) (5.1). This goal m otivated and united the country under all governments from Meiji, 
through the military dictatorships of the Taisho (1912-1926) and early Showa (1926-1945) period, 
and through the post-w ar late Showa (1945-1989) period (Hall, J et al. 1977; Gluck 1985; Okum ura 
1984, 1992; Itoh 1992, 1994; Ubukata 1995). Sengoku argues that m ost people diligently worked 
towards this one goal until the first oil crisis in 1973, when values changed drastically because the 
inyth of ever-continuing economic growth was shattered, and businesses were forced to cut wages 
and reduce work forces. Sengoku describes how people were ’devastated’ and ’shattered’, having 
sacrificed their lives believing economic growth would continue. As a result, some members of the 
public began to w onder if there was more to life than sacrificing oneself for the company and the 
economy. Sengoku argues that it was this change of values that influenced those born in the early 
1960s, who came to be know n as the ’N ew  Breed’ (shinjinrtii) (6.1). W hat characterised this 
generation, according to Sengoku, is that, as a generation, they did not unquestioningly accept as 
absolute the values of previous generations, and that this led to a diversification of values.
In addition, these young people have been increasingly exposed throughout their lives, to 
values associated w ith ideas about self-expression and freedom of choice, through the m arketing of 
all m anner of products and services. Yet self-expression and freedom  of choice are not simply 
alluring concepts co-opted by East Japan Railways to sell day trips to H akone13 or skiing holidays to 
Hokkaido, which older Japanese look at with detachment. For younger Japanese, freedom to come 
and go and self-expression are realities w ithin the spaces that the post-bubble environm ent has 
opened up. The rapid expansion of flexible capitalism  or post-Fordist em ploym ent practices 
(Harvey 1990; Itoh 1992) has then legitimated and begun to entrench these spaces, creating a new 
kind of society, not through top-dow n’ planned restructuring directly, but in a ’bottom -up’ process 
in the spaces opened up by the flexible economy, legitimated by the work ethics which the flexible 
economy promotes. Generally speaking, young Japanese under the age of around thirty also know 
the fruits of the Japanese economic miracle better than anybody else. Children and young adults 
who have reached m aturity in the 1980s and in aftermath of the Bubble have grown up  in a time of 
affluence. Within a context of a generally high level of affluence, enormous product diversity and 
reinvention, and the propensity  of m others to spoil their children, young Japanese are very 
sophisticated consumers with a highly stimulated level of desire. A life of suppressing one’s desires, 
one s opinions, one’s very self, is not only anathem a to many young Japanese, it is not something 
they have ever had to do. Now, as young adults, they may well have to suppress some of their 
desires, but they are already familiar w ith the new work ethics of expressing yourself and using
1 “i A popular spa resort, an hour by train from Tokyo
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your initiative.
In the post-Bubble environm ent, many young Japanese who have graduated from high 
school and university in the afterm ath of the Bubble are being left to drift, growing into young 
adulthood w ith no established codes of conduct or practices to follow. The rising figure for youth 
unemployment (5.3) together w ith the falling figures for job openings corroborate what can be seen 
on the streets of Japan's major cities: thousands of young people 'hanging out' at all times of the day 
or night. Many of them are getting by working in the lower end of the flexible economy, waiting for 
things to pick up. Forced to th ink  for them selves and use their initiative, expressing their 
individuality (kosei wo dnsu) becomes a way of life, as they very soon begin to establish a degree of 
independence.
The period beginning w ith the afterm ath of the Bubble in 1991 is a period of accelerated 
change and confusion in the workplace, as the following accounts demonstrate. Sengoku's study is a 
dispassionate look at the changing values he identifies. Ijiri (1990), on the other hand, an editorial 
writer for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun new spaper and a critic who has w ritten extensively on the effects 
of global capitalism on ethics and aesthetics in Japan, gives us a polemical view which calls for a 
return to the past. In a paper titled "The Breakdown of the Japanese W ork Ethic", written before the 
Bubble collapse, Ijiri begins with the conclusions of the Ministiy of Labour's 1990 White Paper:
The 1990 white paper, issued in July, provides startling evidence of the shift in attitudes. It notes that the 
young workers who hope to stay at their present place of work has decreased so sharply in numbers that 
their share in the work force is now smaller than that of satisfied workers in other industrial countries. It 
further states that young workers in Japan express less satisfaction than those in the United States and 
Britain in each of the following respects: wages, working hours, employment security, chances to utilize 
one's talents, opportunities for promotion, and the quality of interpersonal relations. ( Ijiri 1990:35)
Ijiri argues that Japan's youth  have been corrupted by consum erism  and by the em ploym ent 
industry.14 He refers to Japan's youth  as the ’life-begins-at-five' crowd, stating that the employment 
magazines such as B-itig and Tot'nbaii/n (from the French travaille1) have 'vulgarized' the work ethic 
of the Japanese (Ijiri 1990: 39).15 He ignores the fact that the increase in flexible working practices is 
predominantly market-led, preferring instead to concentrate on the glamourisation of these jobs and 
the lifestyle they offer/entail. He castigates 'other industrial interests', particularly those in the 
leisure industry  and service sector "for encouraging the recreational habits of the younger 
generation" (Ijiri 1990: 39). He is wrong, however, in believing that the ’life begins at five’ generation 
are dissolute young Japanese doing part-tim e or tem porary work. Consistent w ith the statistics 
which indicate that work is not an end in itself to an increasing num ber of Japanese, the employees 
at GA, all of them highly trained full-time professionals, made perfectly clear they carefully guard 
their time after five o'clock (3.3).
Recruit is the leading company in this industry, and Ijiri's polemic is heightened by the Recruit scandal, which occurred 
just before he wrote this paper, and whoso name actually appears in the Japanese title of the paper. Kent (1992) gives a brief 
outline of the Recruit scandal as part of a sociological analysis of public reactions to the scandal.
The work ethics which Ijiri states as having been vulgarized are described by him through the negative description of 
emerging work ethics. He writes, I cannot sympathize with the view that a job is a means of making money and nothing 
more. This mentality reduces work to slave labour that is devoid of dignity and other non-monetary rewards. It negates the 
possibility that productive activity can be enjoyable and offer something to live for...UntiI today, the Japanese have been 
inclined to view  productive activity as work rather than labour. They have seen work as a form of discipline more than forced 
toil, as expounded by the thinker Ishida Baigan [1685-1744]. When people work to train themselves, it does not matter what 
job they do. Provided that they work diligently, any occupation becomes a sacred calling" (Ijm l990:36). Bellah (1985) 
discusses the significance of Ishida Baigan on post-WWII Japanese work ethics.
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Ijiri accuses recru itm ent m agazines of glam ourizing w orking practices w hich allow 
individuals to place other aspects of their lives ahead of work, legitimizing the ethic that work is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself. The magazines stress the flexibility of these working practices, 
rather than then  insecurity, but this is not particularly disenginuous. In the afterm ath of the Bubble, 
nobody believes that any job guarantees security, and everybody feels exploited and cheated. 
Consequently, even those who have the choice are more than happy to trade ’insecurity' for 
’flexibility':
Recruits B-ing, which specializes in job listings for people making mid-career job changes, featured a series 
of articles in its August 9,1990 issue under the general heading "A Farewell to Overtime". The section urges 
readers to Switch jobs and make ¥30,000 a month more while working 20 hours less.". ..Torabayii... aimed at 
young women, featured in its August 3 issue, a comparison of the wages of young women and middle-aged 
men. Taking jabs at older male workers, the section proclaimed...that many men have no meaningful work 
to occupy their time, and cannot, despite long years of service, operate high-tech machines, like 
computers...Glancing through Tombayii's table of contents for its August 17 and 24 issues, 1 found the 
following entries: Jobs with companies that have at least two full days off a week." "Start your work day at 
9:30 a.m. or later. Work only three days a week." "Jobs that require only five working hours a day.", and 
"Avoid the crowds by taking weekdays off: Jobs at companies with at least one day off a month in addition 
to weekends and holidays." (Ijiri 7990:36).
W hat employees are after is not always flexibility per se, but em pow erm ent. Signs of the new 
individualism  are most evident in the desire among people, not to shy away from work, but to set 
their own life goals, and be rew arded for their ability and their hard work. In the absence of being 
able to do these things, they look for other arenas for recognition and satisfaction, outside the 
workplace (6.1). In the afterm ath of the Bubble, not only does a job w ith a large corporation not 
guarantee security, as M atsuda-san, President of GA, pointed out (3.4), more and more young 
people regard  large com panies as unable or unw illing  to offer train ing, responsibility, or 
opportunities for career advancem ent (3.4). On the contrary, young people feel that they will be 
required to conform  for reasons they don 't support, will be trained as and w hen it suits the 
company, and will have to wait for years for responsibility, status, and reward.
Ijiri (1990) describes a television programme he watched, in which a num ber of middle-aged 
salarym en and university  students discussed em ploym ent and lifetim e goals. W atching the 
program me Ijiri tells us how be became very irritated and indignant at the attitude of the students:
The students rattled off what they wanted in a job: good pay, plenty of holidays, no overtime. The veterans 
snarled back that the youngsters were still wet behind the ears and life was no laughing matter (Ijiri 1990:
37).
What upset Ijiri was not only w hat the students were saying, but how they were saying it. He 
reflects: [T]hey were vulgar...not intentionally rude; they were simply unable to communicate in 
thoughtful language.,.[w hich]...reveals distorted attitudes" (Ijiri 1990: 37). I did not see the 
programme, but I have heard enough complaints about the way young Japanese use the language 
and I am familiar enough w ith the way they use the language, to know that w hen he says they are 
"simply unable to communicate in thoughtful language", 'thoughtful' means ’reverential’, or with 
due respect, and their ’inability' does not refer to grammatical conventions pertaining to station not 
being observed. It more often than not refers to the manner in which young people openly disagree 
and question. Talk of a lack of politeness in most cases like this does not refer to a habit of speaking 
using informal grammatical forms, which is rarely the case, but refers to a lack of discretion in 
following social conventions about what should and should not be said (Miller 1967; Nakane 1970).
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Young people are not deliberately impolite in most cases, but their perception of themselves and 
their relationships to others, particu larly  seniors of a significant age difference, creates an 
impression of disrespect in the older person because of the familiarity and openness with which the 
younger speaker expresses themself. This openness is the students expressing their individuality 
(ikoseiwo da.su).
Another example of changing attitudes is revealed in a major feature article in the 'Business, 
Culture, and Entertainm ent' weekly m agazine, Spa!, titled 'Japan's Generation X: The weird 
generation that avoids friction (Nihon han jenereishon X: mnsatsu laiihi scdai no Imkimi)' (Shuukan Spa 
3/8 /94). The report, conducted by the magazine, quotes the complaints of employees in supervisory 
positions about their young subordinates in various types of established Japanese companies of the 
type which are trying to restructure. The article then quotes a number of these maligned young men 
and women, before finishing up with the opinions and exhortations of a num ber of 'experts'. The 
report begins with the following introduction:
When you look at the new generation of salarymen and OL's16, isn't there something you just don’t 
understand? During meetings they just sit there in silence. Even when going out drinking, they just nod and 
make all the right noises, never giving their own opinions...Are we seeing the rapid rise of a type of person 
who avoids any confrontation, while fervently protecting their own little worlds? {Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:39; mu 
translation).
Typical complaints are:
They re very good at making ail the right noises, but when it comes to talking about themselves, or about 
their own ideas, it’s all vague and insincere ( Shuukan Spa 3/8/94: 39 )4^
They push ahead stubbornly with their own way of doing things, which is not necessarily a bad thing. But 
why do they say something like Really? if they have no intention of taking their supervisor's advice? Cases 
like this are extremely common. When a supervisor draws their attention to their conduct, their reply is 
submissive, but it still doesn't change their attitude. Bank employee 39 (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:40).
It s like they ve just come down off a mountain. Supervisors are at a loss for words when a subordinate with 
ajKm-confrontntional face behaves in such a contradictory way. Publishing employee 30 ( Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:
Replies to these comments by the young people in question included the following:
In the current recession, a lot of older guys are getting the push in the restructuring (risutora de), yeh? These 
guys look at us in our situation and are envious, so they come down on us. Despite the fact that our attitude 
(kansei) is better suited to life such as it is now (fukyo no toki koso bokura no kansei wo ikashita ho ga ii), they 
don't understand. Department store employee. Male. 25 (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:47 ).
Despite having a break at the weekend being a natural right ( tozen no kenri), we're always asked why wc 
want to have a break. Insurance employee. Female.22 (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:41).
For older men, the company is the centre of their life. It's not like that anymore, not to that extent (sono teidd 
dewanaku) Hotel. Female.23. (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:41).
They think an adult is supposed to be somebody whose mind yields to some kind of society or organization. 
Factory worker. Male. 22 (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:41).
Supervisors start from the beginning with the attitude that things are going badly, which they are these 
days. That's why w e resign ourselves to rejecting communicating with them, to avoid any antagonism. 
Chemical company employee. Male. 25 (Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:41).
With tanin there is no chance of understanding. I wouldn't dare to create a confrontation. Food company 
employee. Female. 23 (Shuukan Spa3/8/94:41). ^
16OLs are office lad ies. Office Ladies in Japan are the predominantly young, single women, who primarily undertake 
general administrative duties with little or no responsibility.
I'7All quotes my translations.
18
lanin is a word with a number of meanings, all referring to 'other people' in various ways. The subject of tanin is dealt with 
in 4.3 and 7.2). ’
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Many examples are given of the unwillingness of young men to join in after-work drinking. These 
youths are polite and make the right noises {(lisntsit)', but don't really join in. They come across as 
strange and false. W hat these young employees have to say in response to these criticisms is 
revealing:
I only drink Oolong tea. I drink it everyday. At work, everyday, five or six guys pile into a bar; you know, 
colleagues. All they do is grumble about work, getting the stress out of their systems. Distribution. Male. 25 
{Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:43).
When I go drinking with colleagues from work, we never talk about work. We just get drunk and talk a load 
of rubbish. When the old guys pour alcohol down their throats, the conversation just dribbles on, the same 
topics being repeated time after time. Speaking honestly, it's difficult to listen to all that stuff, having to sit 
there for ages listening to the old guys railing against everything. Us at the bottom just get together 
ourselves and make a noise. That s where we get our energy for the following day. Department store. Male.
22 {Shuukan Supa 3/8/94:43).
The sermons I hate. Isn t there more than one way to go drinking with your colleagues and have a good chat 
together? As far as our attitude to drinking goes, it's an unexplainable good feeling. Without thinking too 
deeply about it, you can open your heart. However, this is something limited to your tniuchi. With miuchi 
even if you make a big deal about something and there is no progress, it’s OK. When it’s over, you feel
refreshed and things are OK for a while. Department store. Male 22 {Shuukan Spa 3/8/94:43).19
The last two quotes actually describe what these young people appear to be rebelling against: the 
culture of drinking with colleagues after work. Rather than a contradiction, this suggests that it is 
not the idea of relaxing w ith colleagues after w ork which they resent, bu t instead, they w ant to 
choose whom  they relax with. The culture of after-work drinking (o sake no noiniknta) is being 
shunned by young Japanese men, not because they do not drink, or see after-work drinking as 
strange, but because they do not w ant to drink with their seniors at work, resenting the fact that 
their prospects are dependent as m uch on their willingness to kow-tow  after work, as in the 
workplace. Instead, they prefer to mingle w ith who they choose: colleagues from work, friends from 
other companies, friends who work part-time or who are unemployed, and women. The similarity 
of view with the employees at GA is striking, only at GA these attitudes are enshrined in the work 
etliics and practices of the company. Young Japanese like these discussed in the Spa! article have to 
look outside the workplace to ’be them selves’ and express their individuality , a trend which 
Miyanaga (1990) saw developing in the 1980s (6.1).
The 'diagnoses’ of the 'experts' present familiar themes as to why young Japanese are 
perceived as not accepting established work ethics and codes of conduct. A psychiatrist finds the 
root cause in the education system, and that young people organize them selves very m uch in 
groups, having the effect of coercing young people to hide their true feelings in order to conform. 
Otherwise, he says, they will be branded as w eird and stigm atized Qien nn yutsn to uiivmete 
ijimerarerti) . This is arguably true, but it does not explain their desire to express their individuality 
through choosing to drink with colleagues and friends from outside the workplace. The fact of the 
m atter is that they are stigmatized and branded as 'weird' because they are trying to express their 
individuality (kosei wo dasu). They are in fact transgressing the ethics and practices of their seniors, 
who are themselves coerced to conform to fixed standards through group membership. The actions 
of the young Japanese indicates a degree of independent thinking which is perceived as different 
and therefore weird. Their seemingly duplicitous behaviour derives from the fact that they are
-|Q
Miuchi is discussed in 4.3.
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trying to conform as much as possible, but are both unable to and unw illing to. Many young 
employees in the sam e position feel that there is nothing to be gained by nurturing  workplace 
relationships with seniors after work, knowing that fundamental changes are underway. As one of 
the young employees remarked: "our attitude is better suited to life such as it is now (firiafo no toki 
koso boknra no kansei wo ikashita ho ga it)".
A nother of the experts, a com pany personnel departm ent head, locates the problem  in 
young people not having 'a sense of a vested interest (mottomo jtnn/o na no wa tbjisha ishiki wo 
motaseni to in koto desn)' (Shuukan Spa 3 /8 /94 : 47). He begins by saying "At the present time, these 
young people are unable to adapt to company practices (kaisiia soshiki)", and that "if supervisors who 
are training up subordinates think about it, this situation is not at all unnatural...not an unexpected 
state of affairs" (Shuukan Spa 3 /8 /94 : 47). The implication is that supervisors are not managing to 
get through to their subordinates. It is to be expected that one or two new recruits may turn out to 
be unsuitable and that a supervisor m ight have trouble with them, but w hat this report suggests is 
that som ething more fundam ental is occurring. The personnel director is aw are of this w hen he 
says:
Whatever is to be done, the fact is that the numbers of these young people are multiplying rapidly, and
whatever happens, these young people will come to dominate society (Shuukan Spa! 3/8/94: 47; my
translation).
What he argues they are missing, apart from a sense of a vested interest, is a sense of responsibility 
for som ething larger than themselves, and to achieve this, "more im portant than knowledge or 
experience is the manifestation of strength, chikara wo hasshi sum , which m ust always be at the front 
of one’s mind". Clearly, the personnel director regards ’strength’ to conform, rather than skills or 
ability as m ost im portant, indicating how entrenched w ork ethics which require an employee to 
’suppress their self’ are (4.3). For him, the key is to somehow tap in to the vitality and inspiration 
(mukin/oku, mukando ningen nanka ja itai) these people seem to display in their private life (puraibetto 
biibun), but his answer does not suggest that this should be achieved by harnessing the source of this 
vitality: their individuality (kosei). He then asks the question, "What do we have to do to raise this 
ability and energy as far as a sense of a vested interest?" it is im portant to note that he says ’as far as 
a sense of vested interest’, for any further would be a manifestation of individuality, of self-interest, 
and of weakness, not a manifestation of strength. He answers his question by advocating a return to 
the past:
We have to harness it to the guiding codes of those who are senior (senpaitachi no gaido no yarikata ni
kakatteini), for we were raised by our seniors (senpai) (Shuukan Spa! 3/8/94:47; my translation).
Within a rigid company workplace environment, structured by working practices and work ethics 
associated w ith ’the group model of Japanese society’ (Befu 1980), slight differences in ethical and 
aesthetic sensibilities, revealed through non-conformity to seken nami standards, become polarized 
(6.1). The picture which emerges from this report in Spa! is one of confusion and uncertainty, and a 
sign that young Japanese w ith qualifiably different values, different goals, and different ways of 
thinking, are emerging. As we saw amongst the employees at GA, there is difference within these 
workplaces, but unlike GA, difference is not recognised or encouraged, it is stigmatised. For all the 
talk about individuality in the workplace, the evidence provided by the Spa! article is that there is a
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lack of will am ong senior managem ent in Japan to im plement the kind of organisational structure 
and command structure that there is at GA. W hat is surprising to me, is that none of the 'experts' the 
magazine drafted in to com m ent on these young Japanese recognised w hat is happening, and 
against all the talk of a need to move forw ard, redefining workplace ethics and practices, they 
advocated a return to the past. The personnel director is both right and w rong w hen he says the 
young employees have no sense of a vested interest or responsibility. He is right that they have no 
sense of vested interest iit the workplace, but he is mistaken to imagine that they have no vested 
interest at all. Their vested interest lies in their individual lives outside the workplace.
The assertiveness and independence of thought which is being encouraged on the one hand 
in the rhetoric of the debates on reform, and which is being established in companies like GA and in 
the flexible economy, is being criticised on the other. This confusion manifests itself in the workplace 
and is causing problems, as the Spa! report suggests. As to w hether the students in the TV debate 
Ijiri m entioned are unaw are of the conventions which Ijiri regards as im portant, I would argue that 
they are aw are of them, but they do not interpret their relationship to the salarym en in the same 
way as Ijiri does, or the salarymen do, which is a manifestation of changing values. Glamourizing 
flexible w orking practices, em phasizing the personal gains to be had from  them , belittling the 
practices and attitudes of m iddle-aged com pany employees, all indicates a shift in aesthetic and 
ethical priorities. W hat Ijiri interprets as an 'inability to communicate in thoughtful language', is a 
language communicated thoughtfully, but one that adheres to a different set of ethical and aesthetic 
priorities. The portrayal of m iddle-aged salarym en, held up  for ridicule in a young wom en's 
employment magazine, very probably reflects the opinions of the vast majority of young Japanese 
women who are forced to p u t up with the dem eaning attitudes and attention of some of these men, 
under the kinds of w orking conditions Ijiri advocates. If his indignation is roused by the barbed 
hum our of Torabaiyn magazine, w hat would he make of the brochures published by Pasona, which I 
discussed in 5.2? The brochures aimed at those who may be thinking of registering for temporary 
work w ith Pasona stress the flexibility and control over one's life which tem porary em ploym ent 
gives. They stress the advantages of a clear cut job description and hours, draw ing the attention to 
the benefits and salary which Pasona can offer.
*******
Changing workplace ethics can also be observed in changes to recruitm ent practices as well. Strict 
adherence to consensual decision-making practices governed by age/ seniority hierarchy militates 
against independent thinking and assertive employees (Nakane 1970; Miyanaga 1991) and favours 
the opposite. A certain type of employee has been considered most suitable, but now a different type 
of employee is required. As A tsushi Seike, a professor of labour economics at Keio University, 
succinctly put it:
Companies always face two risks in hiring employees: the risk of hiring incompetent people and the risk of 
missing competent people. The former risk is very serious under long-term employment. As a result,
Japanese companies have tended to resort to hiring low-risk people who would be willing to work diligently 
and obediently for them. Now, though, the risk of missing capable people is greater. Companies need to 
reach out to innovative people. (Nikkei Weekly 26j8l96).
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The importance of innovative people is now widely recognized, but although companies are making 
tentative steps to restructure recruiting procedures to attract and catch personnel who are more 
assertive and independent thinking, the transition will take time. Both governm ent officials and 
independent analysts have said that there is a gap between w hat com panies require and w hat 
prospective employees have to offer in terms of skills, attitudes, and what they are prepared to do. 
As a w orking culture w hich favours immobility begins to em brace m obility, encouraged by 
legislation and changing ethics and practices, the right people will increasingly find the right jobs. 
As we saw at GA, individuality and sense of self is engendered by the organisational structure and 
com m and structure of the company. As long as com pany structures favour strict hierarchical 
relations and the ethic of 'suppress the self (kojin wo osaeru)' or 'kill the self (jibun wo korosit)' instead 
of 'express the self (kosei wo dnsn /  jibun wo dasu)', individuality  will not be accepted in the 
workplace, and employees will increasingly become indifferent and less motivated.
In terms of skills and self-presentation, there are signs that high school students are still 
being taught to be, and university students are still preparing themselves to be compliant 'do-as- 
they're-told-don't-ask-any-questions-or-m ake-any-suggestions' types of employees. W hether the 
more independent-thinking high school students are being discriminated against is difficult to tell. 
The school system still selects those students who simply copy and memorize, and discriminates 
against those who question and query, and this is a cause for concern among employers across the 
industrial spectrum. Goodm an's (1989) w ork on 'returnee school children (kikoku shijo) certainly 
indicated this. These young Japanese returning from abroad are well-suited to the new challenges, 
but often shun the corporate jobs because they still, justifiably, fear discrim ination. I heard the 
complaint that new recruits these days are timid and without motivation or any initiative from staff 
working in companies of all sizes. Yet, in all the debates about nurturing individual potential and 
relocating responsibility and accountability w ithin the workplace, it is rare to hear the opposing of 
'g roup-orien ted ' and ‘ind iv idual-o rien ted ’ in discussion. I have heard  'assertive' linked to 
'aggressive' and then opposed to 'co-operative', but this is also rare. W hat is more common is the 
contradiction that arises w hen different debates are considered together. O pinions that young 
Japanese are far more 'individualistic' and assertive are just as w idespread as those which argue that 
they are compliant autom atons who never have an original thought in their head, products of an 
education system which is increasingly out-of-step w ith the needs of industry and the economy. If 
the professor of economics at Keio University is right, however, the opinion that all new recruits are 
lacklustre and timid confirms that all the compliant students have tended to be recruited while all 
the assertive ones are passed over. Yet, although there may be an element of tru th  in this, even 
'com pliant' and 'assertive' cannot unproblem atically be opposed, as the example of the young 
employees in the Spa! article confirms.
*******
Isn't it unrealistic to talk of giving employees more time off, and saying that companies should be 
more responsible to their suppliers and to the environment, in a period of economic difficulty? Even
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if Japan were not in a deep recession, would it still make good business sense? In all the advanced 
industrialised nations, the cost of a num ber of previously unquantifiable variables, 'unanalysables’, 
are beginning to be included in m onetaiy flow calculations, not just at the level of company 
performance, but also at the level of GNP. The cost of dam age and depletion to resources or the 
environment has been debated for some time now, but is only now entering the economic equation. 
Now, the cost of unhappiness and satisfaction is also beginning to enter the theoretical sphere. It is 
increasingly recognized that the cost benefits of m otivating a workforce and of understanding the 
values behind those motivations might be significant. Economic science is embracing the nebulous 
subject of Happiness (Independent 2 1 /2 /9 6 ).20 W ith the spoils of the national goal of catching up 
and overtaking the other advanced industrial nations seemingly escaping along with the air from 
the bursting Bubble, together w ith disillusionm ent w ith the governm ent, the bureaucracy, and 
corporate-centrism ', m otivating the workforce has become a priority, hence talk of a 'people- 
centred1 society, an 'individual and family-centred' society', and the centrality of 'lifestyle' in political 
and economic rhetoric in Japan in the afterm ath of the Bubble.21 It is particularly in the realm of 
motivations and rewards that we see 'top-down' programmes and ’bottom -up’ processes negotiating 
the way forward
So far, top-dow n’ programmes to establish and nurture individuality in the workplace have 
not emerged much further than the arena of rhetoric and debate, as the example of the companies in 
the Spa! article suggest, and the cases of some of the party  goers I introduce in the next chapter 
attest. C om panies like GA indicate that ’top-down* program m es are likely to em erge more 
successfully th rough  new  businesses. In the m eantim e, ind iv iduality  is being engendered, 
legitimated, and institutionalised in the flexible economy. The development of the flexible economy 
in Japan is a dynamic flux of both piecemeal ’top-dow n’ planning and 'bottom -up’ momentum: Part 
planned in response to the Bubble collapse, recession, and long-term economic outlook, part fall-out 
from the Bubble collapse and the recession. Confusion and m isunderstanding is rife, and talk of an 
education system which is not preparing young Japanese for the tasks and the society ahead is not 
untrue. But w hether working for a company like GA which engenders and nurtures individuality 
through the organisational structure and com m and structure, or, as we shall discover in the next 
chapter, w hether w orking for an established company and looking outside the company for their 
future, or forced to think for oneself in a nascent flexible economy, as one of the ’experts’ in the Spa! 
article noted, these selves will come to dominate society. The citizens who will run the economy and 
inhabit the people-centred' Japan in the twenty-first century are already here, preparing themselves 
and establishing their selves for the journey ahead.
' k 'k 'k 'k ' k 'k *
90  /Quality of Life Enters the Balance Sheets'. Independent 21j2t96
Tile rhetoric surrounding koknsaika, internationalization, springs to mind when the Japanese government coins the phrase 
seikatsu taikoku, lifestyle superpower1, to capture its vision of Japan in the future. This is because both phrases never really 
seem to move from the level of rhetorical. Yet for all the complexity and apparent contradictions in the rhetoric of koknsaika, it 
signalled recognition of a need.
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6. A New Community
1) Passive Individualism  and th e  Privatisation o f Groups: A Half- 
Way House?
2) The R edefining and Resurgence o f Com m unity
3) Strategies o f  Capture
4) The F eeling o f Community: The M eaning o f  Com m unity
This chapter introduces the young people in Tokyo who associate themselves with the underground 
dance music movement, dem onstrating through this and the following chapter that the values and 
attitudes of these young people, and the relationships between individual selves and collective 
selves among them, are the same as those which 1 described in the case of GA, indicating that the 
same values and ideas about individual selves and collective selves are developing in the 'spaces’ 
(Harvey 1990) being opened up by the flexible economy, as those being implemented by established 
companies. W hat is in effect a 'top down' process in the case of GA and industry in  general, is being 
accompanied by a 'bottom up’ process within the turbulence created by the collapse of the Bubble.
Section One considers a w ork on Individualism  (Miyanaga 1991), which suggests that a 
phenom enon of passive individualism  began to develop in the 1980s, and that this is beginning a 
shift away from task-orientated affiliated groups, such as companies, as the prim ary loci of selfhood 
in Japan, to groups formed on the basis of voluntary, personal commitment. This developm ent is 
consistent w ith the shift in attitudes which regards work as a means to an end rather than an end 
itself, revealed through the belief that leisure is regarded as more im portant than work by an 
increasing majority of the population. This trend is a driving force behind the move from w hat is 
regarded as a com pany-centred’ society to a 'people-centred' society. M iyanaga's model of 'private 
groups' looks to be one way that a shift from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' 
society is developing. Her 'private group' theory appears to be a kind of halfway stage between 
individual selves and collective selves as constituted within 'the group m odel of Japanese society’ 
(Befu 1980a, 1980b), and ind iv idual selves and collective selves constitu ted  in the kind of 
organisational structure at GA. It is clear from the example of GA, the example of the young 
employees in established companies interviewed in Spa!, from the example of the temps at Pasona, 
from the example of the flexible economy in general, and with companies in general looking to 
nurture individuality and reduce their involvement in the lives of their employees, that a shift from 
a 'company-centred' society to a ’people-centred’ society is underway, and that this shift can be 
understood as a redefinition of ind iv idual selves and collective selves engendered  by the
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recognition and legitimation of individuality (kosei).
The workplace has been, and still is, the prim ary nodal point of identity in Japan, even 
though there is a trend away from this with work increasingly being regarded as a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself, and w ith the move from a ’company-centred' society towards a 'people- 
centred' society. It is changes in workplace ethics and practice which is allowing individuality to 
emerge, and w hich is legitim ating a redefinition of individual selves and collective selves on the 
basis of an ethics of individuality. Consequently, it is from the position of the workplace that 1 
proceed to investigate the redefinition of selves.
U nderground dance m usic Techno parties are, I will argue, 'private groups', but of a 
sufficient size to throw individual social expectations into relief, where they can become objectified 
and acquire an authority to establish and legitimate selves. In this way, I argue that these parties 
operate to set guidelines for thought and action at the level of the individual and  at the level of 
community, established and negotiated through individual selves. In 5.4, the personnel director 
who was interviewed in the Spa! article commented that companies need to 'tap into the vitality and 
inspiration young people display in their private lives'. This vitality and inspiration is 'individuality 
(kosei)', engendered through a nascent ethics of individuality, negotiated and established in 'private 
groups'. The indications from this research are that these 'private groups' do fulfil a legitimating and 
authorising role in this way. However, further research is required to dem onstrate how  this 
happens.
Section Two provides a brief introduction to the developm ent of Techno music, drawing 
attention to the way it facilitates the strengthening of both individuality and community in a given 
setting. Section Three details the 'strategies of capture’ (Cohen and Rapport 1995) used to collect 
data on the party-goers, and to present it to the reader in a way that captures the tapestry of their 
lives. I opted for a ’concatenation of evocations', extended passages of descriptive prose, arbitrarily 
arranged to give the reader both a picture and a feel for the lives of these Children of the Bubble. 
These are then followed with a review of the interviewee's lifecourses through the post-Bubble 
landscape, looking for similarities and differences.
The chapter ends by considering w hat it is about these parties that makes people w ant to 
attend. When people enter groups voluntarily, there has to be something that makes them feel good 
about being part of such a community. After considering the data collected among the party-goers, I 
contend that, w hat feels 'good' and 'bad' is an indication of w hat people regard as 'right' and 
'wrong', and that it is on the basis of that which is regarded as Good and Bad, that a nascent ethics 
of Right and Wrong emerges within these 'private groups'.
I do not undertake an analysis of underground dance music Techno parties as a kind of 
subculture in the manner of Hebdige (1979) or McRobbie (1994), but as one example of a nationwide 
developm ent in  Japan of establishing selves outside the workplace through 'private g roups’ 
(Miyanaga 1991), entered voluntarily, on the basis of personal commitment.
********
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6.1) Passive Individualism  and the Privatisation of Groups: A H alf Way House?
M iyanaga (1991) presents a thesis of 'em erging individualism '. N ever saying w hat constitutes 
individualism, she begins by saying that individualism in Japan has always been an option, but one 
which is regarded as a deviance from the norm and which consigns persons to live in a 'cultural 
vacuum' (Miyanaga 1991: 73). She discusses individualism  in two ways, both as deviance from the 
mainstream. One as 'active individualism', the other as 'passive individualism'.
Active individualists, she argues, have existed since 'the beginning of the century' and have 
lived on the periphery of Japanese society, trying to establish their own values (Miyanaga 1991: 
128). If and when they become successful, these active individuals have invariably moved into the 
m ainstream  to gain respect and status, bringing wealth and prosperity w ith them. This process, 
Miyanaga states: "has given a fundamental stability to Japanese society" (Miyanaga 1991: 124). She 
describes how individualism , which could only exist on the periphery of society, has, until the mid 
Eighties, been sucked into the m ainstream  as the 'individualistic' entrepreneurs sought status and 
prestige, not just capital reward:
A member of a powerful and established organisation gains a share of the prestige of his 
company...Individuals on the periphery, having no powerful organisation to identify with cannot achieve 
the same level of prestige..M oney can buy many things, but not respect from others. In order for the 
wealthy outside the economic mainstream to gain respect, they must, in effect enter the mainstream by 
constructing their own corporations built on groupist structures. In this traditional cycle in the modern 
Japanese economy, entrepreneurs on the periphery willingly give up their ['individuality'] in order to gain 
status in the mainstream (Miyanaga 1991:24).
According to Miyanaga, however, there was a trend through the 1980s of these active individualists 
remaining on the periphery rather than moving into the mainstream  in order to gain status and 
prestige. This was part of the initial shift to post-Fordist production (5.2), which favoured small, 
flexible companies which could develop and market new products quickly, stealing a march on the 
larger enterprises, who could not respond to technological innovations or market trends so quickly. 
A lthough this developm ent was small, Miyanaga argues that a new  relationship between these 
small, predominantly hi-tech companies run by individualists and the larger established companies 
began to develop, becoming more contractual and less based on 'quasi-kinship relationships'. GA 
fits into this category.
Following the slow dow n of the global economy in the 1970s, the shift to a post-Fordist 
production philosophy of greater p roduct diversity and sm aller p roduction  runs also led to 
pronouncem ents in Japan that the new  breed of individualistic Japanese, popularly known as the 
shin jinrui (the new breed)1 (5.4), w ould be ideally suited for the production goals which the 
established companies were beginning to address. Miyanaga argues that the term shin jinrui was 
regarded positively when it first emerged in the mid-Eighties, with the Chairmen of companies such 
as NTT and Daiwa Securities having high expectations of the 'new breed'.
1'New Breed' is the usual translation for shinjinmi. Literally, shinjinmi means 'new type of person’.
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According to M iyanaga, the high expectations of the shin jinrui failed to m aterialize, which she 
attributes to a num ber of reasons. Instead of their showing initiative and being influential, the need 
for them to fit in and conform reduced them  to being noncommittal and w ithdraw n. Consequently, 
shin jinrui took on a negative connotation, as elder Japanese, notably their seniors in the workplace, 
regarded them as uncom m itted and w ork shy. M iyanaga notes, however, that rather than being 
work shy, they were the first generation to shun corporate loyalty.
Miyanaga describes this w ithdraw al as an individualism  which manifests itself passively, 
which she terms 'passive individualism ', and which leads to what she regards as a 'privatisation of 
groups':
Instead of expressing their frustrations in an active effort to change work conditions, the younger 
generation has tended to withdraw into small groups. They ignore the larger categories of group, even 
that of 'Japan'...Reduced corporate loyalty and the privatisation of groups may be defined as passive 
individualism (Miyanaga 1991:80).
The w idespread developm ent of private groups' has led, M iyanaga tells us, "to a separation of 
informal relationships and formal social organisation" (Miyanaga 1991: 88). This has led to Japanese 
youth being accused of being 'masked', of not revealing their true selves: "so that to their bosses, 
they are strangers w henever they m eet".2 Using Goffman's (1959) term, M iyanaga argues that the 
youths shun the interactional rituals' of the mainstream, such as social drinking. She theorizes that 
this is due to young Japanese not being educated in these interactional rituals. However, 1 do not 
agree w ith her on this. Rather, young Japanese, in keeping with her ’private group' explanation, are 
developing their own social conventions within their 'private groups' outside the workplace or, as is 
suggested in the example of the young employees in the Spa! article (5.4).
Passive individualism , Miyanaga continues, had been tamed and accepted, integrated into 
the mainstream. Together with the scorn for the shin jinrui which grew towards the end of the 1980s, 
marking the shunning of individualism  in the workplace after a brief courtship:
individualism among the Japanese youth is conceived to be passive. It has withdrawn from the public 
domain of society to privacy, is meekly practiced in the work situation, and is not at all revolutionary in 
any sense (Miyanaga 1991:100).
However, Miyanaga concludes by saying that passive individualism is a latent force:
Passive individualism creates and accelerates existing structural pluralism against cohesion based on 
nationalism, thus undermining the ideology of the homogeneous Japanese culture on which the modern 
culture...depends. The strength of passive individualism is found in its position in the workforce in the 
mainstream...W hen structural pluralism is fully expressed...passive individualism  will create a 
momentum for structural strange (Miyanaga 1991:100).
W riting in the late 1980s, M iyanaga tells us that individualism  was still view ed as deviant 
behaviour. This was com pounded by the opinion that 'passive individualism ' was destructive. Yet, 
as M iyanaga em phasises, these passive ind iv idualists were an increasing num ber of the 
mainstream, shunning corporate centrism  and the workplace as the centre of their lives, instead 
often form ing small, private, w ork-unrelated groups. M iyanaga refers to this trend as 'family- 
centrism , as many of these passive individualists are young m arried salarymen and workers who 
made their families the centre of their lives.
2
Miyanaga points out, however, that: "the proponents of groupism speak as if their own actions are not 'masked' in anv wav" 
(Miyanaga 1993:89). y y
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M iyanaga's term  'family centrism ’ tells us that during the late 1980s, prior to the Bubble 
collapse, the recession and the current long-term economic outlook, she regarded the privatisation 
of groups as essentially a case of young m arried salarymen, not so much turning their backs on their 
companies as m aking the decision to spend time with their wives and young children, unlike their 
own fathers and many of their older colleagues. Not surprisingly, this tended to sour relations with 
senior colleagues at work. Leaving early to be w ith the family, how ever, could no t easily be 
criticised, in the late Eighties, the caring, family-orientated New Man image was as evident in Japan 
as in every other advanced industrial economy. Aspiring 'New Men' were resented in the workplace 
but lauded outside, and consequently could not easily be criticised within the workplace. Clearly, in 
the late Eighties, even though the economy was doing well, as I indicated in 1.1 there was growing 
dissatisfaction am ong employees with the dem ands companies made on their lives, fuelled by the 
belief that the fruits of Japan’s economic success were not filtering down to the employees. This was 
a time w hen the strains pu t on the biological family unit by companies was m aking news. The 
practices of tenzokn and shukkd, sudden transfers to other company sites, often w ithout consultation 
(Hamada 1992), were being increasingly criticised by the public and in the press in the late Eighties, 
w ith employees beginning to refuse to uproot their families, or instigating legal proceedings against 
their company, practices unheard of a few years before. This dissatisfaction can be regarded as an 
indication that a conflict of values was beginning to develop w ithin the m ainstream , expressed 
within the workplace, according to M iyanaga's terms, as passive individualism , and outside it 
through the forming of 'private' groups.
W riting prior to the Bubble collapse, the recession, and the current economic situation, 
M iyanaga argues that individualism , as ’passive individualism ’, was regarded as a threat to 
corporate loyalty and the particular forms of collective group orientation described by Befu (1980) 
as the group model of Japanese society’. Her description of young employees w ithdraw ing from the 
work group, matches perfectly the description of the employees labelled Generation X six years later 
in the Spa! (1994) article, who were accused of being w ithdraw n and not revealing their true selves, 
and choosing to do w hat they w ant and associate with who they please after work, instead of 
drinking and socialising w ith their workgroup peers and senpai.
Before discussing how M iyanaga’s thesis relates to post-Bubble Japan, and w hether it might 
describe a half-way stage, I want to focus on two problems, both to do with 'passive individualism'. 
First of all, there is the w ord passive itself. 1 understand why Miyanaga chose the word, in order to 
describe the non-confrontational a ttitude of the employees. However, a ’w ithdraw al', as she 
describes it, has to be regarded as a prem editative act, with consequences. This is not sim ply a 
question of semantics. The formation of 'private groups', entered voluntarily on the basis of personal 
commitment, to use M iyanaga's words, is also a prem editated act. What appears as w ithdraw al, 
looking from the position of the workplace, is involvement and participation elsewhere. Secondly, 
M iyanaga tells us: "I have called the w ithdraw al from corporate loyalty a form  of passive 
individualism, because it is not an intentional rebellion against mainstream values" (Miyanaga 1991: 
128). The first question that needs to be asked is: what are mainstream  values? I would argue that 
corporate centrism and the ideology of 'company as family' were certainly the dominant values at the
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time Miyanaga was writing. In which case, a w ithdraw al from corporate loyalty and the formation 
of private groups clearly is a rebellion against 'dominant' values. Such a w ithdraw al and formation 
of 'private' groups w ould also be a rebellion against the values and practices of the work-team or 
company, in m ost cases at the time. The question which remains, then, is: were the values of the 
majority different to the dom inant values? At the time Miyanaga was writing, although there clearly 
was a trend away from corporate centrism and the ideology of 'company as fam ily’, it had not 
reached a point w here it can be said that 'family centrism ' or 'private groups' had supplanted 
'corporate centrism' and the dominance of w ork orientated groups in the informal relationships of 
the majority of employees in Japan. Miyanaga evidently required her young employees to express 
their frustrations in an active effort to change work conditions (M iyanaga 1991: 80) before she 
would regard them as ’active individualists', or as rebelling.
M iyanaga's idea of the 'privatisation of groups' describes the situation at GA well, where 
there has been a separation of informal relationships and the w ork place. At GA, corporate loyalty 
does not depend on the employees placing the workplace at the centre of their lives, w ith their 
loyalty being questioned if they form 'private groups’. On the contrary, loyalty derives from the 
company respecting the employee's privacy outside working hours. M iyanaga's thesis of emerging 
individualism  does appear as a half-way house when looking at GA. Certainly we can see a 
separation of informal relationships and formal social organisation, bu t while I believe we can 
usefully continue to use the concept of the 'privatisation of groups' w e cannot describe the 
employees at GA as 'passive individualists'. Everybody is not simply encouraged, but required by 
the organisational structure, com m and structure, the ethics and practices of the company, to act 
individually w ithin the workplace. When we consider the situation in the Spa! article, Miyanaga's 
thesis appears less as a half-way stage. The examples provided in the Spa! article suggest that GA is 
the exception and M iyanaga's thesis is still the current state of affairs. However, while this may 
initially appear to be the case, structural changes to harness and encourage individualism  are being 
implemented across the whole of the society of industry, both in established companies and among 
venture start-ups where companies like Nintendo provide a shining example. The actual examples 
described in the Spa! article support my assertion that Miyanaga's thesis is indeed a transitional 
stage. The attitudes and actions of the young employees, together w ith the dissatisfaction of their 
senpai, reveals workplaces in a state of flux and confusion, with m isunderstanding and resentment 
rife throughout. These companies are experiencing very real problem s as they try not only to 
accommodate young Japanese growing up  w ith a different set of values and attitudes, but also to 
harness the individuality these young people display, while at the same time trying to m aintain an 
organisational structure and command structure which is still in the interests of the majority of the 
employees. Difficult and painful for many older employees, the attitude of the young employees 
tells a different story. They confidently talk of having time on their side and of being in tune with 
the requirements of the country. They consider their private time a given and are both incredulous 
and dismissive of the idea that they should invest in nurturing relationships w ith their seniors 
outside working hours in order to secure their future. It is not that they refuse to in principle: the 
likely truth is, they know their future will be secured in other ways. Their view would not be out of
2 2 1
place at GA, w here, as Shinkaw a-san succinctly pu t it: "Work and private  are completely 
separated".3
*******
'-'At the steel factory where I worked, at 5:30p.m. everything would stop and everybody would go their separate ways. If 
there was a job that needed finishing, somebody would stay behind and work, but only enough people to do the job. 
’Company-centrism' (2.4) did not seem to characterise the steel factory, and does not seem to characterise many small 
workplaces in Japan. However, the notion of a separation of work and private is more to do with a change in how the self is 
constituted in Japan. The increased importance of the private domain, as one of the more visible characteristics of the shift 
from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society, is itself an indication of the less readily visible process of a 
redefinition of selves which incorporates other parts of a person's life, whereby the self is not constituted almost exclusively 
through affiliation to the workplace, as has been the case in Japan in the post WW11 period up until now, and as it was in the 
steel factory when 1 worked there, even though everybody goes their separate ways at 5:30p.m.
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6.2) The Redefining and Resurgence of Community
At the time I was conducting fieldwork in 1995 and 1996, 1 identified three ways in which the new 
individualism  w as emerging. One way was in a company like GA, w here the organisational 
structure and the command structure of the company frames and encourages individuality (kosei), 
through nurturing the creativity of the employees and investing them  all individually with the 
responsibility for their work (3.2). Another way in which the new individualism  is emerging can be 
seen in the examples of the young employees in the Spa! article (5.4), and as conceptualised in 
Miyanaga's (1991) thesis of ’passive individualism ’ and 'private groups'. Looking back from 1997, 
the developm ents described by M iyanaga and evident in the Spa! article, in 1994, indicate a 
transitional period, where many young Japanese employees, men and women, are having trouble 
adopting and accepting the working practices and codes of conduct of their companies, which are 
them selves trying to adjust in  o rder to incorporate and harness their young  em ployee's 
individuality. This is creating a conflict which is causing these young employees to appear non­
committal and work-shy, rejecting practices such as socialising with their work groups. An example, 
which I have already discussed in 5.4, is male juniors shunning the drinking rituals which are an 
intrinsic part of working relationships, in w hat many young Japanese refer as ’up-dow n' companies 
(PSe 8a^ ia)r a reference to the strict hierarchical, factional (habatsu) structure of the post-w ar 
Japanese company described by Nakane (1970), Rohlen (1974), and Clark (1979). These young 
people, as well as w ithdraw ing from work-related social activities, are displaying signs of their 
emerging individualism  in two other identifiable ways. One is listening to the instructions or 
suggestions of a senior, acknowledging w hat has been said and then ignoring the advice or the 
instruction. The other is the formation of 'private groups' outside the workplace where they can 
express their individuality.
The third way in which the new individualism  is emerging, is am ong those who are living 
and working in the spaces which are appearing as the flexible economy establishes itself. Part-time, 
temporary, and fixed-term contract work, often short, characterise the working practices of a flexible 
economy. Unlike the young employees in the 'up-down' companies, there seem to be no webs of 
responsibility or obligations attached to these kinds of working practices which require individual 
selves to suppress their selves', and consequently these young people appear to have very little 
constraints on their emerging individuality. Certainly they will have obligations to dispatch their 
duties efficiently and properly at work, but do these jobs "serve as a circle of emotional attachment 
or nodal point of identity” (Kondo 1990:174) for these employees?
I have been saying how individual selves and collective selves cannot be separated, as they 
construct and define each other, and I have argued that individuality and community can only be 
described in term s of each other (3.6, 4.3). So, with a separation developing between informal 
relationships and formal social organisation, and w ith the w orkplace assum ing a dim inished
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responsibility in the lives of individual selves, w hat kind of com m unity do these increasing 
num bers of predom inantly young Japanese belong to, and how does it provide a fram ework for 
referencing and legitim ating their individuality  in the absence of a fram ework provided by a 
company like GA?
When I was discussing the organisational structure and command structure in GA (3.2), I 
used Cohen's (1994) model, whereby individual selves are not only seen as "creatures of their social 
relationships [but are also] their orchestrators" (Cohen 1994: 93). Am ong the employees at GA, 
w ithin an identifiable organisational structure and command structure, there was an identifiable 
discourse of individuality which indicated parameters for thought and action, so that a narrative of 
the relationship between individual selves and collective selves emerged. In this chapter, I will 
attem pt to dem onstrate that Miyanaga's 'private groups' provide a framework for constructing and 
legitimating the individuality of persons who currently have no other formal means of doing so, 
and that, in the case of those working in the spaces forming in the flexible economy, 'private' groups 
provide an  index and reference for m anaging and negotiating other situations, including work. 
Miyanaga gives the example of a nuclear family as a 'private group', but 1 would question whether 
the nuclear family fits even M iyanaga's model. In post-Bubble Japan, there are m any kinds of 
intimate 'private groups' which help people orientate themselves and each other, and as groups 
entered voluntarily on the basis of personal com m itm ent, all 'p rivate groups' are likely to be 
constituted by emerging individualists. This is the impression Miyanaga gives, and this is borne out 
by the example of the employees at GA, the employees in the Spa! article, the temps at Pasona, and 
the young people who attend Techno parties. But in any given example, w hat defines these selves, 
these em erging individualists? On the basis that individual selves and collective selves m utually 
constitute each other, an examination of a 'private group' should help us begin to answer that 
question.
The 'private' groups I chose to study are underground dance music Techno parties. These 
are referred to as Techno parties ( tckuno paatii) in Japan. Techno is a particular genre of music which 
1 will discuss below. The Techno party in Japan is, I will argue, a gathering of individual selves 
seeking to confirm and legitim ate their individuality  at the sam e time that they are enjoying 
themselves. W hat makes these events occasions to confirm and legitim ate the self rather than 
occasions to simply have fun, such as golf, bowling, or going to see a film, is that enjoyment and 
satisfaction depend on a feeling of com m unity, individuality, and m utual understanding being 
attained. This is achieved through coming together under a set of basic conditions which can be 
regarded as a set of identifiable practices and codes of conduct. As w ith the employees at GA, 
individuality and community are inseparable and m utually reinforce and define each other at these 
parties. Through participating and observing, I came to appreciate and understand how a Techno 
party is one setting which helps define, affirm and legitimate selves, individual and collective in 
post-Bubble Japan.
* *  •k 'k 'k 'k 'k
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Against a background of a history of electronic music being m ade and listened to in Japan, the 
underground dance music scene in Japan developed from young Japanese going abroad and 
bringing home what they had experienced in Europe, particularly Britain, from 1987 onwards. They 
did not buy it in the shops and bring it home, indeed they could not, and they were more keen than 
they had ever been to tell their friends about it and experience it w ith the people they cared about 
most and knew best. W hat these young Japanese experienced was not solely a musical performance, 
but also an affirm ation of com m unity, and ind iv iduality , from the feeling of energy and 
completeness which comes from common purpose and the reaffirmation of that purpose. The music 
is a facilitator, a means to establish and reaffirm ideas of what constitutes the individual self and 
collective selves in a given setting. Like many forms of performance in many cultures and societies 
all over the world (Chernoff 1979; Schechner and Appel 1990), whether it is pure entertainment or in 
some way socially significant, the dynam ic relationship between the m usicians and the other 
participants makes or breaks the performance and is crucial to a satisfactory result. At a House or 
Techno party, as w ith all performance of this kind, the crowd votes with its feet, but also, as with all 
performance of this kind, everybody is hopeful and expectant of a good performance, to achieve the 
desired reaffirm ation of ind iv idual self and com m unity. And w hen it comes, the feeling of 
satisfaction and unity is uplifting and life affirming.
In many ways a Techno party is a very old, and very tried and trusted formula. W riting 
about African music, Chernoff tells us:
Africans who pay informed attention to the distinctive quality or style of a musical performance are 
concerned with the distinctive quality of its social setting, and they will even judge the music in terms of 
the success of the occasion. They expect the music to be responsive to the development of a situation, and 
they expect a musician to rely not only on his virtuosity, but also on his mood and sense of 
appropriateness...A musician orders or extends his rhythmic variations to suit the movement of the crowd 
of spectators and dancers...A true master must time his playing to replenish the dancers' physical and 
aesthetic ^ energy at the right psychological moment...The intimacy of this communication means that a 
musician's creative contribution will stem from his continuing reflection on the progress of the situation as 
both a musical and a social event, and just as the music will tell a participant what to do, so will the 
situation provide a musician with an index of how well he may be doing (1979: 65).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain the structure and content of House and Techno music 
in detail, or describe the developm ent of House music from its initial beginnings in the black gay 
clubs of New York and Chicago in  the 1970s and early 1980s, and from the desolate urban 
landscapes of Detroit, where a small group of black Americans spaw ned Techno music. Neither is it 
necessary to describe these histories fully, for w hat I will be concentrating on is not the music, but 
the individual selves and the particular structure of community which is facilitated by the music 
and engendered at these social gatherings in Japan.4
Derrick May, one of the progenitors of Techno music in Detroit, has said of the music: 
com puters and digital technology have given me the whole history of music at my fingertips".® 
Techno and House music are dance musics and are characterised by powerful rhythms, often very 
complex. Detroit Techno, still the definitive Techno music, is characterised by a tension between 
m ultiple rhythm s, which are almost always uplifting, and melancholic strings and soundscapes, 
which gives the music an emotional depth and sincerity. The music works as a facilitator of social
4Collin (1997) provides a brief history of the music and the development of the dance music scene in Britain. 
^Personal communication
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interaction in exactly the same way as African drumming. Its makers, either the artist who produces
the single ’tune’, or the DJ6 who weaves all the tunes together into a musical collage, shaping
sounds, cutting and pasting, m ust keep at the front of their minds the task of taking the dancers and
spectators on a musical, emotional and  ultimately a social journey. Satisfaction for the participants
comes from reaching a common understanding, which is the realisation that everyone, acting
individually, as a collectivity, is necessary to bring about a satisfying conclusion. Inseparable from
this realisation that others are im portant is the realisation that one's self is im portant and necessary.
Experienced dancers and spectators understand this, and with the music as a facilitator, work to
achieve it. 1 refer to Chernoff to describe how African music achieves its goal of facilitating and
bringing about community and the affirmation of individual selves and collective selves:
The steady changing dance is the best play. Sometimes a new dancer jumps into the dance. You have to 
keep on changing the beat until you see the beat that is good for his dance, and then you play that tune for 
him and he continues dancing...In African music, excellence arises when the combination of rhythms is 
translated into meaningful action...[using] repetition and change...Repetition is a way of emphasising and 
clarifying the drum language...Within the various ways that African music is repetitive, a drummer takes 
his time and repeats his styles to allow an interesting beat to continue, or a repeated rhythmic response 
provides a stable basis to clarify other rhythms which change...Repetition is the key factor which focuses 
the organisation of the rhythms in an ensemble piece. The repetition of a well chosen rhythm continually 
reaffirms the power of the music by locking that rhythm and the people who are listening or dancing to it, 
into a dynamic and open structure. The rhythms in African music may relate by cutting across each other 
or by calling or responding to each other, but in either case, because of the conflict of African cross­
rhythms, the power of the music is not only captured by repetition, it is magnified...As the music engages 
people to participate by actively and continuously integrating various rhythms, a change at just the 
appropriate moment will pace people’s exposure to the deeper relationships of the rhythms...In the control 
of his changes, the drummer directs the movement of the whole occasion...organising and focusing the 
expression of the power of both social and musical relationships {Chernoff1979: 111).
Slowly through the 1970s and 1980s, a musical form developed w hich was structurally  and 
aesthetically vety similar to African musical idioms and musical idioms in other parts of the world 
which are used in a similar way. A DJ, in the case of House and Techno music, directs dancers and 
spectators towards a gestalt, by definition a whole which is greater than the sum  of its parts. In the 
black gay clubs of New York and Chicago where the music first started, the hedonistic pursuit of 
pleasure was the goal, but when the music reached a certain point of developm ent where it was able 
to bring about a feeling of gestalt among the participants, this pursuit of a gestalt became the goal of 
the participants. It was realised that a superior pleasure could be achieved through community, and 
here was a music which could achieve it. The Djs who first set the aesthetic form of the music by 
doing unheard of things to 1970s Disco records knew w hat they where doing. They understood how 
m usic can w ork to bring people together, to strengthen com m unity, and consequently make 
everybody who participated feel stronger individually. In the black gay clubs of New York and 
Chicago, community was strong already, but here was a music which helped make being black and 
gay a little easier to cope with, and it was treasured for that.
H um an societies all over the world know of the power of music. Many have evolved social 
gatherings w here the specific purpose is to reaffirm  and streng then  com m unity  th rough 
participation in music and dance. Rhythm and dance are recognised as having a powerful influence
A Techno or House music DJ should not be compared to the person who plays records at wedding receptions, etc. This has 
nothing to do with ability per sc. Techno and House music records are made as segments to be joined together into one piece 
of music. Also, by using electronic sounds which bear no resemblance to the sound of a given musical instrument, the listener 
has no reference point for a comparative judgment. Judgment is based on the emotional effect the sound has. Consequently, 
because the sounds have no reference point, the music maker, and then the DJ, can alter the sounds and the rhythms in an 
infinite number of ways.
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on hum an beings in establishing and reinforcing individuality and com m unity (Chernoff 1979; 
Schechner and Appel 1990). A musical form and setting which reaffirms and strengthens social 
bonds by aesthetic means, is easily transferable across cultural boundaries for this reason. Modern 
communications technology, since the advent of radio and the phonograph, have provided the 
means for musical idioms to be transported around the globe, sensitizing different cultures to the 
music of others, which has in turn facilitated the spread of Techno and House music. In addition, 
Techno and House music is an instrum ental music made w ith computers. There are virtually no 
words, no language barriers, meaning is provided by the listener and the dancers, and the computer 
is a musical instrum ent not associated with any particular cultural heritage, or any age, sex, gender, 
or race.
At the end of the tw entieth  century, W estern classical m usic and Jazz are virtually  
in ternational m usics, in that they are understood  and appreciated , tru ly  u n derstood  and 
appreciated, by people all over the w orld. Rock music also has spread widely. But just as these 
musics have spread and are understood and appreciated, so the relationship between artist and 
listener, and the relationship between listener and listener which is enshrined in these musics, has 
also spread. So it is w ith Techno and House music. Yet neither W estern Classical music, Jazz nor 
Rock, are musics that are produced through the interaction of the artists and those attending the 
performance. None of these musics imbue a sense of responsibility or feeling of having the power to 
influence events in the listener, and consequently, none of these musics are social in the way that a 
music which urges participation and requires the giving of oneself is. Consequently this relationship 
between the participants has spread w ith the music, only unlike W estern classical music, Jazz or 
Rock, it is actually the event and the prom ise of community which has spread as m uch as, if not 
more than the music. The music can be appreciated on its own as a recording, but listening to it 
always evokes both the desire to participate again and the feeling of individual and communal 
affirmation.
Techno and House music are musics of their time, and as an integral part of a social event, 
they come to represent the values of the people who attend these social events. The sense of 
com m unity engendered by the m usic and the setting then reinforces these values. Of crucial 
importance also, is the developm ent of the idea of community itself which these events engender, 
which has its own values in a given time and place and makes its ow n demands. But community at 
a Techno music or House music party is only possible through the voluntary active participation of 
individuals, so that the successful achievem ent of com m unity also reaffirms and  strengthens 
individuality. A Techno party, then, is potentially an ideal setting to study individual selves and 
collective selves, and the relationship between them in a given time and place. In the case of Japan, 
the underground dance music scene has been slowly developing since about 1991, the time the 
Bubble burst. D uring that period, it has spread throughout the country. From Fukuoka to Sapporo 
there are thriving local underground dance communities, and Japan has a num ber of internationally 
respected Techno and House musicians and DJs.
'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
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6.3) Strategies of Capture
I thought long and hard about the best way to present the data on the party-goers. I knew that it 
was necessary to create in the m ind of the reader, a feeling, a picture, of these people and their lives. 
Who are these Children of the Bubble now cast into an uncertain future, in a present where the most 
fundam ental values are being challenged and reassessed? For this reason, I decided to w rite 
extended pieces of descriptive prose, linked together as a 'concatenation of evocations'. This I have 
done, with no discussion in between the various evocations. Instead I have preceded them, below, 
with notes explaining what, where, and who.
Once again, 'narratives of being and becoming' (Intro) w ere collected during  sem i­
structured interviews, using a series of questions which were addressed to all interviewees (see 
Appendix B). The interview questions were taken from the GA interview (3.1), and modified where 
necessary. I wanted to know if the interviewees thought that the music attracted people with certain 
attitudes and values. And, if so, w hat were these attitudes and values, and how did  it differ from 
other lifestyles and ways of thinking (hokn no seikatsu to kangackata)'. I w anted to know why they 
w ent to parties; w hat did they get from them? Groups constituted on the basis of voluntary 
mem bership have to have som ething that draws people to them. I wanted to know whether they 
were open about going to parties, and about the values and attitudes they associated w ith them. 
Who could they speak to about it. Who could they invite, who could they not invite. Did they talk 
about it at work, etc. At the same time that I was trying to ascertain what the values and attitudes 
were, I was also trying to m ap them  in terms of morality and in terms of social space in relation to 
developments throughout Japan as a whole.
In the same way as with the employees at GA, I asked the party-goers to describe the 
parties, and the relationship among the party goers while at the parties and outside them, in terms 
of familiar concepts, such as sliuudan, nakania, seken, sekentei, senpai/ kohai, attem pting to build up a 
picture of w hether, and how, selves, both individual and collective at the parties, differed from 
these concepts. The interviews were then rounded off w ith more general questions concerning the 
relationship between men and women at parties, again looking for departures from norms, as well 
as conformity. Finally, I asked about hopes for the future of Japan. I did not ask for projections, 
except in one case: Did the interviewees think that the values associated w ith the parties were 
spreading, and would come to dominate. I asked this, not to make any predictions myself, but to get 
an idea of how these people regarded their own position within Japanese society at that moment in 
time.
The interview s w ere undertaken in different locations, by m utual agreem ent between 
myself and the interviewees. The interview s w ith Masa, Rika, Yuka, Keiichi, and Kazuo were 
conducted in Masa and Kazuo’s apartm ent in Ikejiri, Tokyo. This was at Masa's suggestion, and I 
had a policy of accom m odating my subjects whenever possible. The tim ing and place of the
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interviews was more under my control than was the case with the GA interviews, but in all cases 
the interviews were held a location suggested by the interviewees.
Masa and Kazuo's apartm ent is described in the second evocation. The interview  with 
Takeshi and M asumi was a t Intelligent in Ebisu, a shop and meeting place, which is the subject of 
the third evocation. The interview with Choji and Masako was also held at Intelligent. I met Hitomi 
and Ai in the early evening, sitting at the cafe in Yoyogi Park, near the Jingu-Mae Gate. As dusk fell 
on a early w arm  sum m er afternoon, we spent an hour and a half running through the interview 
questions, taking tangents here and there. I had two other interviews planned, one w ith Ichikawa- 
san, the founder of Intelligent, and another w ith Shunsuke, a section head (kncho) with a large air- 
conditioning and heating equipm ent company. Neither of these interviews happened in the end. I 
started the interview with Ichikawa-san, but before we had got past the warm-up, he had closed up 
entirely after refusing to talk about his parents. I tried to move on, bu t he d idn 't answer any other 
questions. Shunsuke had agreed to be interviewed, but I subsequently decided not to go ahead with 
the interview. I decided that talking to me would be too painful for him.
The in terview s w ere deliberately com m unal. I thought carefully about the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of this, which I discuss in detail in the Introduction to the thesis, and 
in 3 .1 .1 had selected these people after having been actively looking for interviewees for about three 
months. I had been going to parties regularly, about once a fortnight for over a year, to venues like 
The Liquid Room in Shinjuku, Yellow in Nishi Azabu, Token Cafe in Meguro, Maniac Love in 
Omote Sando, Feel in Shibuya, Gold in Shibaura, and occasionally Geoid, off TV Asahi Dori, or 
Delight in Shinjuku-ni-chome. I would often end up in quite protracted conversations with people, 
but in the end, I didn 't interview anybody I met in a club. Many agreed to be interviewed, but the 
attempts to meet subsequently always broke down for one reason or another, usually problems in 
synchronizing schedules, but undoubtedly due to lethargy and apprehension as well. As a result, all 
the interviews, except two, are w ith friends of friends, none of whom I selected. In the end, I asked 
Yuka and Masako if they would agree to be interviewed, and if they would ask any of their friends. 
My only directive was that I wanted to interview both men and women, deciding to w ait and see 
what cross-section of people I got, then draw ing conclusions in the light of how the sample was 
assembled. Masako was five years older than Yuka, and they did not have the same circle of friends, 
so I judged that w ould produce a fair cross-section. I took the first thirteen people who were 
suggested to me, who agreed to be interviewed, and who made an arrangem ent w ith me. Twenty 
one people were suggested, eighteen agreed to be interviewed, eleven were eventually interviewed, 
five men and six women, aged between eighteen and thirty two.
I was always aware that I was having some kind of effect on the interviewees, as a result of 
my race, sex, age, appearance etc. (3.1). I always thought very carefully about who I was going to 
interview, and how to best to approach a question. Unlike the interview s at GA, the software 
company, I wore baggy jeans, sneakers, and a loose-fitting T-shirt, and consciously sat in an 
informal way. I was less formal than in the GA interviews, but formal enough, accentuating the 
academic nature of the interviews at the start, to give some gravitas to the occasion. We used first- 
names, unlike the interviews at GA, and I have maintained this difference of address between the
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GA employees and the party-goers in the thesis. Also, my Japanese is quite good, 1 was able to pitch 
my language to create what I judged to be an appropriate distance between us. We also had a lot in 
common: love of the music, and what I regard as those values equating to the responsibilities facing 
late 20th century industrial societies (8). In my experience, people who like Techno music invariably 
embrace new technology favourably, using it comfortably as part of their daily lives. This was 
som ething else we had in common. All the interviewees responded well, although Kazuo hardly 
said a word. But this was clearly not unusual, and although economical w ith his words, he was very 
attentive and involved. H ow  do I know  the interviewees responded favourably? Because my 
questions were given due consideration, and because I am familiar enough w ith Japanese language 
and behavioral strategies to make that judgment. Also, I collected a lot of valuable data, which had a 
consistency across the party-goers and the employees at GA.7
In the second evocation, detailing the interview with Masa, Kazuo, Rika, Yuka, and Keiichi, 
I describe how I came to interview them. I met the Intelligent crew, C hoji, Ichikawa-san, Masurni, 
and Takeshi, by going there after being told about Intelligent by M asako, who often booked 
Ichikawa-san, an Ambient DJ, to DJ at the parties she organised with her boyfriend. Ai and Hitomi 
were introduced to me through Yuka, who also introduced me to Masa. 1 had been introduced to 
Shunsuke at a party, over a year before I asked him to allow me to interview him.
Following the evocations, I review the Iifecourses of the interviewees, identifying trends, 
patterns, and anomalies, before draw ing conclusions. Much of this inform ation came out the 
informal conversation that preceded and succeeded interviews. This was a strategy of m ine to 
orientate both myself and the other interviewees, in relation to me and to each other, and to the 
subject, drawing everybody together onto the same wavelength, and then being part of the moving 
apart, back into the rest of the day. Valuable data was collected during these orchestrated pre- and 
post- stages of the interview .8
The evocations, below, begin w ith an evocation of the final stages of a journey to a party. 
This is an evocation of myself, as I try to give the reader some sense of the occasion. The second 
evocation is the interview in Masa and Kazuo's apartm ent in Ikejiri in Tokyo. Next, I describe my 
first visit to Intelligent in Ebisu, w hen I first met Choji and Ichikawa-san. Then, I describe Masako, 
the Queen of Tokyo Techno, and finally, Shunsuke, revealing why I chose not to interview him after 
all. The order of the evocations is the order in which I wrote them, and does not indicate the order in 
which the events occurred. There is no significance in the order of the evocations, at least none was 
meant.
*******
Vesna, my wife, and I were going to the Liquid Room, one of the most famous venues for Techno in 
the world, located on the eleventh floor of an office building on the southern fringes of Kabukicho, 
the famous entertainm ent district of Shinjuku in Tokyo. All the great names in Techno play here, 
almost one every week, all of them relishing the prospect of playing to w hat is regarded as one of
7See footnote 3 Chapter Three.
8This pre- and post-interview conversation was not possible at GA, due to time constraints
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the best crowds in the world, on a state-of-the-art sound system. The venue is famous because the 
DJs love to play here. That night, though, there were no famous names. It was the third anniversary 
party of Club Venus, the party that had pu t the Liquid Room on the global underground dance 
music map, and all the DJs were local DJs who had been involved w ith Club Venus in one way or 
another. There were no big Japanese names playing either.
Passing through Kabukicho, its usual melange of glitz and sleaze, we saw the queue for the 
Liquid Room winding back at least a hundred metres from the entrance. Masako, who together with 
other Tokyo DJs, such as Wada and Yo C! (Yoshi), was playing that night, had pu t us on the guest 
list, which thankfully allowed us to go straight in. As the elevator approached the eleventh floor, we 
could hear the thum ping beat of the music. I shivered and enjoyed the moment of excitement which 
accompanies entering a party where expectations will be high. As the doors opened, the atmosphere 
hit both of us. The energy was palpable as we stepped out of the elevator, and while going through 
the practicalities of the cloakroom we remained patient, now so close to the dancefloor: the crucible. 
I looked around, people were standing and talking, walking around, sitting around, chatting, 
getting their breath back, bringing the energy from the dancefloor out into the lounge area and into 
each others’ lives, its high energy fuelling connectivity through conversations, smiles, concerns. The 
mood was relaxed but buoyant. Formalities accomplished, we stepped in to the arena. The music hit 
us like a wave, but the sound was so pure, it d idn’t register as loud at all, just pure effect. The Liquid 
Room is a two-tiered auditorium , w ith about five gentle steps separating the upper tier from the 
dancefloor. After having recovered from the initial disorientation caused by the full force of the 
music, the strange projections, the lasers, and the minimal lighting, we could see it. The dancefloor 
was heaving like a choppy sea, heads bobbing up and down, arms waving like corn. Over one 
thousand Japanese locked into the music and each other.
In the m iddle of the dance floor, Vesna and  I looked at each o ther and laughed. The 
atmosphere was exhilarating. A few people around us noticed our reaction and smiled broadly, first 
at us, then at each other. Suddenly we were all smiling, grins getting bigger and bigger. The feeling 
of community undeniable.
The address was Ikejiri in Setagaya-ku, Tokyo. Yuka had set up the interview. I had met her a few 
times at parties but we never really got talking. She was twenty eight, pleasant and easy-going, and 
had trained as a hat designer and maker at art college in Tokyo in the late-Eighties. She had escaped 
to England, as she put it, in 1989, and had lived in Brighton, making hats for friends and selling 
them to a boutique in the town to supplem ent the savings she had brought w ith her from Japan. 
Living in Brighton in 1989 and making hats meant that it was more than likely that she would come 
into contact w ith the exploding House and Techno scene, which she did. Yuka had given me Masa's 
num ber and told me to call him. He was expecting my call and we would arrange the interview. I 
had never met Masa before although he designed the flyers (chimshi) for one of the best parties in 
Tokyo, which I often went to. I had heard a lot about Masa and his colleagues, Kazuo and Keiichi.
231
They had a graphic design com pany called Dynamix, which was getting a reputation for their 
excellent work, and in 1996 were asked by Issey Miyake to collaborate w ith him in designing his 
1997 Paris fashion show production. They also did prospecti for art colleges and com puter schools, 
and prom otional m aterial and conference design for m ainstream  business. When I called, I 
introduced myself and we quickly and efficiently set a date and time.
I had never been to Setagaya-ku before. I'd  travelled through it on the O dakyu Line, 
watching from the windows of the Romance Car as I was carried to Hakone, either for a visit to the 
open air sculpture park or to a hot spa. As I climbed out of the subway, everything looked familiarly 
chaotic. I began to walk along the road towards the apartment, an expressway sitting over the top of 
it. It was late May and Tokyo was experiencing a characteristically hot sunny spell before the tsmju, 
the rainy season, began in early June for a m onth or so. It was hot and noisy, and the pollution from 
the road next to me and the expressway above me was making me nauseous. Eventually, I arrived 
at the apartm ent block, entered the building and took the elevator up to the twelfth floor. The 
building, which looked as though it had been built in the 1970s, was a little dilapidated and I 
expected a typical, dark2LDK, ten mat room .9
As the door opened, Masa w arm ly welcomed me into a large 90m 2 apartm ent w ith a 
panoram ic view of Tokyo looking tow ards Shinjuku. His hair v irtually  covered his narrow  
shoulders, and dressed in royal blue satin flares and a turquoise T- shirt, he took me by surprise. 
The apartm ent was open plan w ith a large L-shaped area leading to two large living rooms, a 
kitchen and bathroom . The walls were covered w ith beautiful fabrics, batiks from Indonesia, a 
popular destination for young Japanese, and w hat looked like Thai silks. In between, there were 
some very im pressive com puter graphics and beautiful com puter generated images on the walls. 
The floors were covered w ith rugs, reminiscent of kilims and bokaras, and there were loads of 
cushions and mbuton, traditional Japanese floor cushions. The doors of both the living rooms were 
open and inside both 1 could see huge Macintosh monitors for graphics, an enormous Canon colour 
printer which m ust have been able to print A2 at least, and more fabrics cushions and com puter art.
I felt as though I was am ong people who were content and in  control of their lives: confident, 
relaxed, and obviously talented and industrious.
It was three o clock, and Masa was the only person there. Had everybody understood that I 
had this carefully planned? Was I about to witness a degree of laisse faire that extended to people not 
turning up for meetings and not bothering or even feeling the need to let anybody know? Masa 
asked me if I d  like som ething to drink and told me that Kazuo had just gone to buy some milk, 
Keiichi had suddenly had to go and visit a client but would be back at about four, and Rika and 
Yuka should be here by now. When he'd m ade the tea, he showed me around the apartment. In the 
foot of the L, which I hadn't been able to see from where I had sat dow n at a low table in the other 
part of the room, there was a balcony w ith plants and shrubs, and another huge M acintosh m onitor 
and PowerMac, w ith a m ind-altering yellow and purple graphic swirling lazily on the seventeen 
inch screen. "Is that som ething you're working on?", I asked. "No that's just a screen saver" Masa
2LDK means two rooms for living and dining plus kitchen. The apartment usually has an area the equivalent of ten tatami 
straw mats, or about fifteen square metres - in other words small.
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replied. I momentarily imagined it m ust be quite pleasant to start the working day with that on your 
screen. We talked about the view and about living in the metropolis:
1 like living in the city and I'm very much in favour of technology, using it to make our 
lives easier and cleaner, using it to conserve and protect the planet. I’m not into living 
on the top of a m ountain and cutting myself off from everybody and everything. I 
know that I could have all my inform ation technology w ith me on the top of a 
mountain, but I want to be with people and know what's going on. Cutting yourself off 
from the world doesn't benefit anybody .
Masa and Kazuo m et at university in 1987. They were both studying art and graphic design. As 
students they lived together, and continued to do so after they had graduated and were working for 
different companies. In 1994, after having w orked for a few years, Masa left his job and began 
working as a free-lance designer. "We lived together and went out at weekends quite a lot. To clubs, 
to Techno clubs. We made a lot of friends in clubs" (Masa). Masa met Keiichi at a party and invited 
him to their place where they discussed the idea of starting Dynamix. "Keiichi and I met in a club, so 
we have a rather close friendship (kinobn dc shivi nltn tomodtichi dnknrci kekko chttushiu no tsunngfiri gci 
tsmjoikanji desu ne)"t Masa told me.
Keiichi had studied economics at Keio University, but had no real desire to join one of 
Japan's large companies, which, as an economics graduate from one of Japan's top universities, was 
virtually expected of him. "I didn 't w ant to join the company world. I d idn 't know w hat I wanted, 
but I didn 't want that. I also wanted to travel, so that is what I did when I graduated". Keiichi had 
been to India and Nepal, Thailand, spending six months in all away from Japan. He had saved 
enough working part-tim e as a student to last that long. "I m ight have stayed longer, gone to 
Vietnam or China probably, but I ran  out of money". When he arrived back, he had prepared 
himself for his reception: I knew that w hen I got back I would have to find a job and it would be 
difficult because I had gone away, but having gone to India and Nepal and Thailand was the 
problem. Going to the U.S. is OK, maybe, but India? I couldn't even get a job in 7 Eleven because 
they thought I was weird. A Keio graduate whose just returned from living in India, that was too 
much!".
Before Masa and I could continue, Kazuo arrived back, accompanied by Rika whom he had 
met entering the apartm ent block. What struck me about Kazuo first, was how shy and reticent he 
was. When com pared to Masa, who was very dynam ic and ebullient, it was difficult to imagine 
them as friends who had known each other for a long time and who were in business together. Rika 
rem inded me of one of those elegant models from the Swinging Sixties 'sm art set’. Dressed in a 
loose fitting light blue cotton kaftan and slacks, she had her copious hair piled up in a Grecian style, 
wearing some very understated earrings and jewellry. She was confident and engaging and shook 
my hand holding eye contact all the time Masa was introducing us. For a moment I was taken aback 
by her presence and sense of self. She was a jewellry designer who, I discovered later during the 
interview, always wore her own jewellry.
Kazuo, Rika , and I sat dow n around the low table on zabuton while Masa asked Rika what 
she wanted to drink. She asked for water, and as he went to get it she began to apologise for being 
late. Masa brought her water and some green tea for Kazuo and me. Rika told us that Yuka had
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called her a few m inutes ago on her mobile phone and would be a little late. I hoped she would 
arrive soon, as I w anted to record every tiring that was said, but d idn 't w ant to start the interview 
before she arrived. As it was, while the others were arriving and we were waiting for Yuka, I was 
busily trying to recall everything that Masa had said about liking the metropolis and his positive 
attitude to technology. W ithout Keiichi being there as well, I decided to wait. Masa had put on some 
ambient music10 and he and Rika began asking me w hat my research was about. Kazuo sat saying 
nothing, but was obviously listening and interested. I soon realised he was sim ply quiet and 
everybody was used to it. I decided to turn the tape recorder on immediately to capture the whole 
conversation. No sooner had we started w hen Yuka arrived. She was wearing one of her hats, a 
burgundy crushed velvet top hat, rem inding me of the Mad H atter in Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland. Her glasses, which invariably sat towards the end of her nose, m ade her look slightly 
eccentric, bu t her black com bat trousers and Dr. M artens gave her an overall image of being 
purposeful and practical.
*******
'Intelligent' has been in Ebisu since 1993. It was founded as 'Limit' as a branch of an underground 
dance m usic 'lifestyle' trad ing  com pany in Seattle, but went independent in 1995. Ebisu is an 
expensive part of Tokyo, nice apartm ents and houses, no industry, and close to the centre. Walking 
from the Yamanote Line station towards Naka-Meguro, Intelligent is on the second floor in a quaint 
little alley just behind the m ain road. Only the nam e on the mailbox inside the door gives any 
indication that you have come to the right place, although even then, it doesn't say which floor. 
Walking up the stairs for the first time, I continued past the first floor and up the next flight of stairs. 
Only then did I begin to hear the call of the drum s, from a distance that unmistakable dull thud. As I 
walked in, I was surprised to hear how  loud the music was, but immediately registered that this 
was not the stuff you tend to hear in high street boutiques and fashion shops - this was real, quality, 
underground Techno music. It was a shop, selling clothing and bags, crazy fashion accessories. 
Fractal T-shirts, holographic slacks and bikini tops, etc. Dayglo sunglasses, fluorecene bracelets and 
necklaces, the kinds of things you 'd  see some people wearing at a typical party. It also sold records 
and a few CDs. There were no fancy shelves or clothes rails, but it was tidy and had sofas and 
armchairs in one of the corners. N ear the door, one of the walls was covered w ith messages and 
photographs of people, in cities, in clubs, on mountains, in forests, in the shop itself. I soon came to 
realise that the shop was like a retreat, a haven, a family home, which people would return to from 
all over Japan, and if they couldn't come in person, they would send postcards and photographs, 
sending their wishes and their love, their stories and their plans. Here on the wall was an indelible 
community that spread the length and breadth of Japan, and out into the w ider world. The role of
10Ambient is a computer-generated electronic music which is used to provide a relaxing ambiance for a social gathering. The 
term was originally used by Brian Eno in the 1970s, who produced a series of soundscapes, such as 'Music For Airports', 
which were not to be listened to particularly, but were to create a mood within a given space inhabited or used by people. 
With the arrival of Techno music and Techno and House parties, ambient music was the name given to the music which was 
used to 'chill-out' to, after dancing all night to Techno or House music. As the underground dance scene developed, the best 
parties would provide a comfortable, relaxing lounge with low lighting, often with comfortable chairs and cushions for 
people to have an alternative to the dancefloor, for when people needed to rest or just wanted to relax and talk.
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the DJ in all of this and their own feelings of respect and affection born of their intimate relationship 
with the dancers, was brought home to me yet again by the messages and cards from the famous 
and the not so famous. I felt almost reverential as I realised how im portant the m usic and the 
community was to these young Japanese. This did not look like escapism, nor fashion or fad, and I 
was to discover just how true that is.
The music was coming from a guy at the end of the shop, playing two decks and a mixer. I 
went up to watch him  work, but he was only playing records, 'beat mixing' as it is called, just 
making sure all the records flow into one another. He looked up and smiled, then held out his hand. 
This was Choji, w hom  I w ould come to know over the coming months. We shook hands and then 
he carried on. I watched for a little longer, but he was only listening to the records, considering their 
possibilities, so 1 wandered around the shop, looking at the clothes and bags and accessories. There 
was an enormous television showing a video of Berlin's Love Parade w ith the sound turned down. 
It looked like it was a copy, for the thousands of euphoric dancers, rhythmically swarm ing around 
the multicoloured floats driving around the streets of Berlin, were blurred and fuzzy. The fuzziness 
with no sound fitted my thoughts perfectly, as I thought about the wall w ith the cards and the 
photos again momentarily.
When I found myself back by the door, somebody else had appeared from the back of the 
shop and appeared to be doing some book-keeping on the counter. He looked up and caught my 
eye, and I took this as the opportunity to introduce myself. This is always an aw kward moment: the 
m om ent w hen you reveal your intentions as an anthropologist. I explained to him w hat I was 
studying and why I had come to Intelligent. This was Ichikawa-san, the boss. I had seen him  DJing 
at Odyssey in the chill-out. He had a shaved head with a small pony tail at the back, and looked like 
a Zen monk. I was to discover later that Ichikawa’s conviction was grounded in Japan's past as 
much as in his active role in building a global community for the 21st century. He was also the first 
and only interview ee who refused to answ er some of my questions. M asum i and Takeshi also 
worked at Intelligent, and I would meet them on subsequent occasions.
********
Masako was the Queen of Tokyo Techno. She, like Yuka, had gone to England in the late Eighties, 
and had worked in London as a secretary for a Japanese company. Like m any Japanese who go 
abroad, her background was very ordinary. Her father worked for Tokyo Gas as a fitter, and her 
mother was a housewife. In London, Masako would go out partying regularly, but after nearly three 
years, in 1991, she had decided that she was getting bored and would return to Japan. Thinking that 
there were no parties in Japan, she began to buy records. Going to the specialist shops she slowly 
built up a collection. W hen she returned to Japan, she bought herself two Technics decks and in the 
seclusion of her small apartm ent began to learn to play the records and mix. She had no intention of 
becoming a DJ and playing in public, she simply wanted to hear the music, and at the time that was 
the only way. In late 1991, a party began under the railway tracks in Yurakucho, one the first parties 
in Japan. She w ent regularly and got to know the organiser. After about six months, one of the DJs 
left to start his own party and Masako was offered the chance to stand in. She never looked back,
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and although she continued to w ork as the m anager of a fashion store in Shibuya, she and her 
boyfriend started what was generally considered to be the best party in Tokyo by 1994, with Masako 
one of the better DJs. She w ould be concentration personified behind the decks, mixing with 
precision and a real sense of urgency. Leading the dancers, w atching the crow d carefully, 
monitoring their reaction to her chosen path, and smiling, urging the music on, communicating with 
everybody when they responded.
•kik'k'kicJtie
Shunsuke was a dashing tall salaryman, a loicho, section chief, who worked for a company that sold 
and fitted industrial air conditioners and air purifiers. Whenever I saw him, he was either dancing 
around like a m ad thing, having a great time on the dance floor w ith his beautiful girlfriend 
Makiko, or chilling-out in the lounge at a party, discussing the complexities of m odern life, always a 
chill-out topic of conversation. His life was certainly very complex. He was m arried w ith two 
children, two little girls, but his wife would not come w ith him to a party. Yet the parties were what 
he lived for. Shunsuke had real problems in his life. Not only did he not have very much in common 
with his colleagues at work, he had slowly drifted away from his wife. Makiko was beautiful and 
intelligent, very composed, and provided a real centre for Shunsuke’s turbulent life. She wanted 
him to leave his wife and let her help him  bring the disparate parts of his life together with her, 
where there w ould be no lies, no hidden secrets. But even though Shunsuke had  let himself be 
drawn into a world which was rapidly tearing him apart instead of making him whole, as he at first 
had hoped, he had told Makiko categorically that he would not leave his wife. Feeling that Makiko 
was wasting her life chances by being w ith him, he eventually told her to go. After that, I saw him 
only occasionally, w ith a different girl every time. They were always pretty, but you only had to 
look behind Shunsuke's famous smile to see that his eyes were sad and empty, and he was tired and 
worried. I had asked if I could interview him, and he agreed wholeheartedly, as ever, but I decided 
not to in the end, as I didn 't want to ask him to talk about something that was so precious to him, 
but which had m ade his life such a misery as well. I remembered vividly how, one night at a party, 
talking with pride about his daughters, he had started crying uncontrollably when he had shown 
somebody a picture of them.
Masa (27), Kazuo (27), Keiichi (28), Rika (23), Yuka (28), Masako (32), Choji (27), Ichikawa san (31), 
Shunsuke (32), as well as M asum i (25), Takeshi (18), Hitom i (24), and Ai (25), w hom  I also 
interviewed, fall around the second and third of my categories of emerging individualism, which I 
outlined at the beginning of this section. To recap: (1) Working in a company like GA, where the 
organisational structure and command structure of the company institutionalizes and legitimates 
individuality through its w orking practices and codes of conduct. (2) W orking in an ’up-dow n' 
company (joge gaisha) and having to hide one’s individuality in order to conform. (3) Working in the 
spaces which are appearing as the flexible economy establishes itself, doing part-time, temporary,
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specialist fixed-contract work, or running their own small businesses.
Masa worked for a design company and left to start his own business because he had his 
own ideas. With the growth of the flexible economy providing opportunities, as the outsourcing of 
specialist w ork increased (5.2), he and Kazuo took their chance with Keiichi, whom  Masa had met at 
a party. Masa said that they trained him to do com puter design, and then he left w hen he felt ready 
to go it alone. He certainly had his life outside work which nobody at work knew much about, but 
he w asn’t under pressure to socialize w ith colleagues. Nevertheless, he had his circle of close 
friends who went to Techno parties occasionally
Kazuo also w orked for a company w hich designed prom otional m aterial. Like Masa, he 
d idn 't have to nurture workplace relationships outside working hours, although he was secretive to 
his colleagues about his life outside work. He and Masa decided to start their own business because 
they anticipated the development of com puter art and graphic design.
Rika an d  Yuka are young entrepreneurs, designing and making highly individual products. 
Yuka had a bad spell for a few months, when she couldn't support herself on her hats, but was able 
to work part-tim e for a friend of Ai's, who m anaged a clothes shop in Harajuku in Tokyo. Both of 
them live and w ork w ithout feeling that they are strange or different. As the flexible economy 
grows, difference becomes the norm, not the exception.
Masako works as a m anager in a fashion store in Shibuya, organised w hat was one o f the 
best parties in Tokyo, and is a DJ. W hen Masako, C hoji, and I were talking about seken, she started 
to tell me about the im portant things in her life and she didn 't even mention her job:
"I don't really have anything to do with mainstream society (atashi amari ippan slmkai to 
kakawartt koto ga sukunai tie). My seken, my world (sekai) is organising parties, hanging 
around at Intelligent, and Techno (laughing)..."
Yet, although she says she doesn 't have m uch to do w ith m ainstream  society, the parties she 
organises and the parties she plays at, are mostly attended by people who can be regarded as being 
in the mainstream. As Masa said: "Even salarymen come to parties (sararinian demo tekutio paatii ga 
suki na hi to de)'\
Choji was w orking as a young salarym an in a large real estate com pany which was 
building and developing commercial property at the height of the Bubble. He became disillusioned 
and looked for a way out:
The things I regarded as necessary in my order of priorities in life changed (jibim no 
kachikan no naka de hits 11yd to sarent mono, jibun no naka de sono kachi kijttn ga kaxoatta). It 
was a time when you p u t your trust in things you could see (son in me ni mieru mono ga 
kekkijoku shinrai dekiru mitai na jidai datta). For example, I was into money and fixed 
assets (laughs) (tatoieba okane de ari ne kotei san de ari). But something changed. Now my 
priorities, my values have changed. Now  the m ost im portant things in my life are 
people (hito), trust and reliability (shinrai) and love (at) (laughs embarrassedly).
Choji had been into Rap and Hip Hop, but then heard Techno when he w ent to Frisco Records, a 
specialist dance music store in Shibuya. He was completely taken by the music and through the 
members of staff at Frisco he went to his first party in 1992. "That was the turning point (sou in no too
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hontd ni waleatte kita jiten lie)''. He bought a pair of Technics decks and left his job six months later. He 
heard that Ripple, a large record chain, needed somebody who knew about Techno and House 
music to develop their stock, and he applied for the job and got it. "I had quite a bit of money saved 
and I was living at home, so my living costs were low. My parents were very worried, but they were 
understanding. My grandparents had put their savings into NTT shares and had lost money in the 
NTT share scandal (1.2), and my parents were still angry about that". Choji lived at home, bought 
records at Frisco, going in every week to see what had just arrived, and practiced. He met Ichikawa 
san at a party and now he works at Intelligent and DJs at parties a couple of times a month.
Ichikawa san was w orking as a producer for N H K 11 on w hat he described as 'cultural' 
programmes (btmkateki to in). He described NHK as a rigid (kntai) organisation, and he left for very 
similar reasons to those which forced Matsuda-san, the President of GA (3.1) to leave Toshiba. "I got 
angry that we only m ade programmes about netsnke12 makers, that kind of thing. 1 never got a say, 
it was so boring". Ichikawa san w anted to make programmes which showed how the old ways and 
ideas were everywhere in the present, not just in  the past. He strongly believes in global awareness 
and responsibility, but he also believes in peoples draw ing on the best of their traditions and 
teaching other peoples about those traditions. He had seen a mail order classified for Limit clothing 
and accessories in the back of Pia, the popular Tokyo listings magazine, and decided to write to 
them asking for a franchise in Tokyo. They agreed to pay for the rent on the shop in Ebisu and to 
supply him w ith stock, so he quit his job at NHK in 1993. He likes m odern ’traditional’ Japanese 
music and contem porary Western music. Philip Glass has done a num ber of collaborations with 
Ambient13 musicians and this is how Ichikawa san came to discover Techno. It is Ambient which 
continues to capture his imagination. When he opened the shop he had the novel idea of installing a 
DJ booth, so that passing DJs could play and he could practice after opening hours. In 1994, 
Ichikawa san bought another Franchise from Limit and opened a store in Osaka, and in 1995, just 
before I met him, they had opened a store in Fukuoka on the southern-most island of Kyuushu and 
a stall in Laforet, the fashion mall in Harajuku in  Tokyo. In January 1996, Ichikawa san, Choji and 
Masumi, borrowed the money to buy out Limit, and Intelligent was started.
Ichikawa san is a quiet person. Masako says he is majime (serious), which I agree with. He 
totally refused to talk to me about his family and their reaction to him leaving NHK. As it was, he 
had appeared to be less than enthusiastic about me interviewing him in the first place, so when 1 
asked him about his family, he became visibly agitated, and would not engage in anything more 
than the shortest and vaguest of answers after that.
M asumi is an architect by training, but had left the architect's practice for which she had 
been working, because she had been w orking there for four years and she was still only doing 
redrawing and m aking final corrections and adjustments to the drawings of the senior architects. 
She had yet to be given her own project and had know n Ichikawa-san from when he was an
^Nippon Hosd Kyokai: Japan Broadcasting Corporation
^Netsitke are hand carved toggles which were used to attach a sake flask or pouch to a person's kimono. Old ones are 
collectors items, as arc new ones made by a recognised craftsmen. The value of netsiike in the present stems from the fact that 
they resonate with the meanings of an idyllic past, ideologically reconstructed in the present.
13See Footnote 7.
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assistant producer working for NHK. She had been in the same kind of situation as M atsuda-san at 
Toshiba, and Ichikawa san at NHK: unable to use her initiative. When Ichikawa-san left to start 
Limit, he had suggested she join him to design and produce the magazine he planned to distribute 
to all those who signed the visitors book in the shop. She had since become responsible for the 
interior design of the shops, and, like everybody, Ichikawa-san, C hoji, and Takeshi, she did her bit 
on the check out.
Takeshi left high school in 1993 and did not go on to university or a college of any kind. 
Adm itting that he was not the best student ever, he told me he'd had enough of studying. Maybe 
he’d study later, he said. He had applied for nearly a hundred jobs and had about twenty interviews 
by the time he got a job as a sales assistant in a clothes shop. He hated it and had been looking for 
something else w hen he saw a classified for an assistant at Intelligent in a recruitment magazine. He 
had no idea w hat life had in  store for him, and even w hen w orking at Intelligent, clearly very 
happy, he had no concern for the future. He was irrepressible, constantly laughing out loud and 
fooling around, well-m eaning and polite, bu t after six months w orking at Intelligent he was 
obviously still revelling in his new-found freedom.
I hadn’t met Hitom i and Ai before the interview. Hitomi had lived in London from 1991 
until 1992. She had gone there to study English after finishing university, and had wanted to stay 
but was refused another visa because her course had finished. When she returned to Japan, she 
trained as a Shiseido cosmetics consultant and was working in Marui departm ent store in Shinjuku 
in Tokyo. She had met Yuka at a party, and Yuka introduced her to me. Ai was a friend of Hitomi's. 
She was a hairdresser who worked in a salon on Takeshita Dori in Harajuku. Hitomi and Ai had 
met when Hitomi went into her salon to get her hair cut, and Ai had cut it. They became friends and 
after about a month Hitomi took Ai to a party.
Shunsuke is an example of somebody who has shunned a company-centred society, but still 
works for an 'up-down' company. Before he found a place where he could be open and could relax 
among like-minded people, he managed to suppress his individuality and conform, "for about eight 
years, so far",14 but once he started going to parties, he found it increasingly difficult to maintain a 
facade. I last saw him in May 1996 and he looked like a man stretched to breaking point, and I was 
told by someone who knew him well that he had already had a warning at work. Choji had been in 
a similar position. He had worked in a large 'up-down' company and as soon as he found people 
like himself, he decided to quit when an opportunity arose. Ichikawa-san's experience was much the 
same, and Masumi's experience in the architect's practice was also not dissimilar. Unfortunately for 
Shunsuke, he w as m arried and had  a family, although maybe the reason w hy Ichikawa-san 
w ouldn't talk to me was because he too has a wife and children whom he had left. His relationship 
with his family obviously causes him pain. With Shunsuke, though, in a perverse way it was his 
strong sense of duty and obligation which was making his life miserable. Others would have given 
up their job, left their partner, and settled dow n with Makiko.
*******
14This was August 1995
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The life stories of all the interviewees are very similar, yet at the same time display differences 
which indicate the kinds of life choices that young Japanese have been faced with in the post-Bubble 
environment. Shunsuke, is the only example of somebody still w orking for a company which is 
unable to accommodate his new individualism , which itself suggests that m ore and more young 
Japanese are leaving their companies rather than staying. This indicates that, although new working 
practices are only being im plem ented slowly, other opportunities are grow ing. This is to be 
expected with the growth of the flexible economy, which is demonstrably bringing in new working 
practices and w ork ethics faster than planned restructuring. W hether by the route of joining an 
established com pany and leaving, or by finding w ork in the flexible economy directly, all the 
interviewees now work under similar conditions, characterised by a m arked separating off of the 
sphere of work from the rest of their lives. In this respect, their lives are organised in exactly the 
same way as the employees at GA, indicating that a pattern may be emerging.
All the interviewees either found themselves unable, or were unwilling, to fit in and form 
m utually fulfilling, lasting relationships w ith their work colleagues, or decided that they would be 
unable to do so if they joined an established company. This left them all w ithout a community w ith 
which to identify, and which would legitimate their selves. Legitimacy derives from the recognition 
of Ego by others. Using Mauss' (1985) three categories of person, w ithout filling a recognised 'role', a 
recognised set of social expectations, these young people had no acceptable 'persowie', a self 
recognised by society, which therefore left them  as an incomplete self, 'moi', which they felt acutely. 
This is purely a schematic explanation, but it helps us understand the im portance of a set of social 
expectations in constructing the self and the need for those social expectations to be recognised.
I was unable to interview anyone who had either wanted to work for an established 'up- 
down (joge gaisha)', but couldn’t due to the effects of the recession, or who had worked for one and 
been m ade redundant. Interviewees w ith these experiences w ould have m ade my sample for 
complete, I feel.
•k'k'k'fcic'k'k
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7.3) The Feeling of Community: The M eaning of Community
In the following chapter, I will look in more detail at the relationship between individual selves, and 
at the relationship between individual selves and collective selves that constitute the relationships 
within a party, together w ith how those relationships define parameters for thought and action and 
define individual selves and the various collective selves in the lives of these young people outside 
the party. In the rest of this chapter, I want to look at what individuality and community means to 
these people, by considering what being at a party feels like. That is to say, how do they describe the 
feeling of individuality and community. Bearing in m ind that Miyanaga (1991) regards a 'private' 
group as a group entered voluntarily on the basis of personal commitment, community of this sort 
has to feel good, otherwise there will be no community. From the feeling of community, I will move 
to the m eaning of community. First, w hat feels good, and then why it feels good, in order to 
establish w hat it is that these people have found to orientate and legitim ate their emerging 
individuality. W hat is contained in the comments about what a party feels like are the structure of 
relationships between individual selves and between individual selves and collective selves in the 
lives of these people, in emotional terms. Vague, certainly, but these emotional narratives are the 
structure of relationships and selves as experienced by these selves. Only once we have established 
what feels good and bad, can we begin to establish w hat is regarded as right and wrong, and then 
can we begin to look m ore closely at the structure of relationships and selves in a community 
voluntarily entered.
I now want to present the transcriptions of what the interviewees had to say about why they go to 
parties, and what it is they get from the parties. Kazuo is not represented here, as he didn't say very 
much at all. I have quoted the little he did say, where relevant. The order of the transcriptions is 
random, and does not represent the order in which the interviews were undertaken or transcribed.
• Masa: I think the parties are very much a part of a lifestyle (seikatsu to michikaku shiteint), which 
includes w ork (shigoto mo fukumete). A lthough w ork is only a part of this lifestyle, there is 
always that feeling which comes from the music and the parties when we are working (shigoto 
wa seikatsu no ichibu ni natchatteiru itsumo kon in kanji to in ka motto ongakti wo kakatteiru toki wa kou 
in kanji de yattari toka). It is inspiring, but it's not all about m editation and contemplation, the 
music's stim ulating and is one of the things about living in Tokyo that I really treasure (mou 
insupireishon to in ka meisd shiteint dake ja nakute shigeki ni ataetekureru ongaku de mou toriaezu ima 
no Tokyo no seikatsu ni wa kakasenai mono no hitotsu desu). It helps me to actively persevere with 
my life (akutibu ni motto ganbarou kana to omottari toka), and w hen I go to a party, I can confirm
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this myself even more (paati ni iku to sara ni jibun de sore ga kakunin dekiru). It's as if I actually feel 
the energy from others on my skin sometimes {hito no cnerngi wo hada de kanjite, ga! te iku toki mo 
aru shi), and if I’m feeling down, people will help each ot\\er(kanashii toki wa minna de tasuke attari 
toka). With the Techno scene, all embellishments are stripped away. A person is not adm ired 
because they wear nice clothes, their self (kosei) is visible and this is w hat is acknowledged, and 
that is how they come to be admired. A person's individuality is visible directly. There is no 
camouflage or m ask to deceive others or yourself. We feel this while we are enjoying ourselves. 
(tekuno shiin to in no wa sore ga amari kazarareteinai. Hito no kosei ga sutoreito ni detekuru. 
Comakashiteinai to in ka, kirei na yofuku wo kirn kara ninki ga deru n ja nakute, jibun wo sutoreito ni 
dashite iku kara sore ga mitomerarete ninki ga deru to in ka. Sou in no wo kanji. te bokura mo asondeiru). 
It's not as if it is something new, what you feel is that you are connected to everybody else and 
you can actually go out and do something big, therefore that is the way of thinking - the Techno 
scene is like that (atarasiiii koto te in yori wa jibun ga ima dekiru koto de minna to tsunagatte okii na 
koto wo yatte iku to iu kanji dakara kangae kata to iu ka tekuno shiin ni kakawaru shisei no mondai kana).
R ik a : "If the Techno is good, a lot of energy comes from it, but at a good party it's not just about 
yourself. A lot of people are enjoying it and everybody is helping each other, giving energy (ii 
tekuno wo kiitari sum  to sugoku sore de enerugi moment shi. Ii paati ni iku to jibun dake ja nakute 
minna mo tanoshindetari toka jibun ga maemuki ni nareru tasukerareru koto ga takusan aru). We can 
help each other alot like this (kimochiteki ni tasukerareru koto ga sugoku aru), and that one by one, 
everybody individually is m aking it happen (hitori hitori ga honto tsukutteiru tte iu kanji). I can 
honestly say I am  able to totally be myself at parties, and not be worried or anxious about that 
(honto ni jibun wo subete dashitemo fttan ga nai). I receive loads of energy and power from all the 
people at the party. As a result everybody is really positive. There are many people at parties 
who feel this, so a real feeling of m utual giving and taking is possible (soko ni iru hito kara sugoi 
enerugi, pawaa wo moment shi dakara sugoku honto ni minna maemuki kitte iu ka sore ga otagai honto 
ni gibti and teiku dekiru). I love the music, but w hat is more im portant is people being together 
(sore yori mo soko ni ite issho ni sugostt hou ga taisetsu na to omoti).
Ai: Everybody is very cooperative and wants to participate together (kekko kydnjokuteki issho ni 
sanka shitai). It's feeling part of a larger whole. People who go to Techno parties are m uch more 
into doing things together (tekuno no hitotachi no ho ga, motto issho ni yatteiru to omou). Everybody 
is very sensitive (minna kekko kankakuteki) to everybody else. It's very comfortable, it feels like 
home (igokochi ga ii).
Keiichi: It's all about going w ith friends, meeting them there, having a good time. Also, meeting 
new people there and having a good time w ith them. All you have to do is go, and it's as if your 
friends just grow and grow. That is very pleasant. If there is somebody you w ant to introduce to 
your friends, you take them  along, that kind of thing. If I know of a good party, and I also know 
somebody who hasn't been but wants to go, I'll invite them. W hether I'd invite people who have
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a different way of thinking (kangnekata no chi gnu hito) I'm not so sure. Some people are open and 
some closed (knrouzu dankai to oupen no dankai to ironna rebern ga aru kedo). So, I can speak to 
anybody who I feel I can share things with. People who I'm not sure if I can share things with, I 
m ight be able to talk to them, invite them  along, and then m aybe share things w ith them, 
although they might turn  out to be a burden and it m ight take time.
• Masumi: I think that people who like this kind of music and participate at parties (paati ni itte 
sanka shite) are open-m inded (oupen maindu). Basically, that is it. I don 't think you can say that 
the lifestyle (seikatsu) is different from any other. It's more a case of a 'way of living ( ikikata)', our 
attitude to life (ikite iku shisei), our values are different (kachikan ga chigau). People w ant to 
become free {jiyuu ni naritai, minna).
• Masako: Looking at the people who like the music, there are a significantly high num ber of 
interesting people. The m usic has no w ords and people have to in terpret it for themselves 
individually. This is important. They're open m inded, futuristic, spiritual (oupen nia'indu datari 
miratteki na koto, supirichuaru na koto toka). The way people meet and integrate is far more fluid ( 
sesshi Imta to iu no wa motto hado wo kanjiru ne). They’re flexible (no ga yawarakai hito da to iu).
• Choji : The music hits you directly, which does not make you happy necessarily, but w hat 
happens is that you become aw are that you have your own way of enjoying the music 
(chokusetsu nan ni ka ataerarete yorokobu n ja nakute. jibun nari no tanoshikata’tte hi no wo jibun de 
kizuite). The music takes you on a journey (tabi ni sasetekuru to iu). Then you realise that there are 
a lot of people enjoying it in their own way. It's quite spiritual (supirichuaru teki na bubun ga aru 
n), but a little different from self-reliance (jiritsu to wa chotto chigau kedo).
• Takeshi: First time, as often seems to be the case, I d idn’t dance. But the time before that there 
was a huge queue, which I was fascinated by. I d idn 't expect it. We d idn’t get in, bu t I had such 
a great time in the queue!
• Yuka: The first time I w ent to a party, there were two dance floors facing each other, with 
everybody dancing. It was as if I could see everybody communicating through dancing ( sono 
toki dansu no kaiwa ga mieru you na ki ga shita no), yet everybody was hearing their own music. 
That really made an impression on me (sore wo hajimete mite, sugoku kando shita).
For Masa, the parties are 'inspiring (insupireishon)', and 'stim ulating (shigeki wo ataete kureru)'. He 
'feels the energy from others (hito no enerugi too....kanjite)', so much so, that sometimes he says he can 
actually 'feel it on his skin (hada de)'. He continues by saying that 'there are no distracting 
embellishments (amari kazarareteinai)’, 'a person is not adm ired because they w ear nice clothes', 
’there is no camouflage or masking1 of the self, so that ’a person's individuality is visible'. All these 
things feel good to Masa, and he finishes by saying that he 'feels as though he is connected to
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everybody else (jibtin ga,...niinna to tsnnagatte)'. These things feel good to Masa for a num ber of 
reasons, which he mentions. They feel good because they inspire him and stimulate him. But it is 
not simply that the feeling of being inspired is good, or that the feeling of being stimulated is good. 
Being inspired or stimulated are states of mind which have a tangible effect on thought and action, 
and consequently have tangible results. As he says: "there is always that feeling which comes from 
the parties w hen I am working", and "you feel that you can actually go out and do som ething 
important". The parties: "help me to actively persevere with my life".
Two things which Masa mentions tells us directly about selves and the relationship between 
selves at these parties. He says: "a person is not adm ired because they w ear nice clothes. Their 
individuality (kosei) is visible and this is w hat is acknowledged. It is on this basis that they are 
admired". According to Masa, it is a person's individuality which is the focus of attention, and is 
what is judged most im portant. However, being together and being there for others is also of key 
importance. Masa tells us that he feels the energy from others and that if he is feeling down, people 
will come and help, and that it is through the feeling of being connected to everybody else that 
individual selves are empowered. Other individual selves acting individually, together, give the self 
the feeling that it can ’do som ething im portant'. Clearly Masa derives som ething very substantial 
from the parties, which is very im portant to him: "they are one of the things about my life in Tokyo 
at the moment which I really treasure".
There are three things which Rika m entions which make her feel good. These are: being 
together w ith other people: "What is most im portant is people being together". The second feeling 
she mentions is the giving and receiving of energy from others, which make her feel "very relaxed 
and very happy" and able "to give energy". The third is: "I can honestly say I am able to totally be 
myself at parties, and not be worried or anxious about that".15 The feeling of being together with 
others and at the same time being able to 'be herself1 makes her feel secure, which makes her feel 
good. So does the giving and receiving of energy and 'power (pawaa)\ The relationship between 
individual selves and the collective selves is sum m ed up by Rika w hen she says: "one by one, 
eveiybody individually is making it happen". "As a result, everybody is really positive. The parties 
are full of people who feel the same, so a real feeling of mutual giving and taking is possible". Being 
able to be yourself, m utual giving and taking, and: "that these feelings are really helpful", are why 
being together and being yourself feel good. Selves, both individual and collective, are empowered 
through the relationship between individual and community. Individual selves, acting individually, 
give energy to each other, facilitated by the music. As Rika says: "If the m usic is good, a lot of 
energy comes from the music". This accords w ith Chernoffs (1979) account (6.2).
Both Choji and Masako are DJs and it is worth listening to w hat they say about how the 
music works in  a party.
The music has no w ords and people have to interpret it for themselves individually. 
Related to this (kekkateki ni), people who like Techno and House music seem to take an 
interest in more tilings, relatively speaking. They're m ore open-m inded (wnri to ma 
kekkateki ni tekuno toka hausit ga suki hito omoshiroi hito ga di n irontta koto ni kijdmi wo
15"Being m yself is described by Rikka and others, as being able to 'fully express their self (jibmt wo subete dasu )'.
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mottari, open mind datari) (Masako).
The music hits you directly, which does not make you happy necessarily. It takes you 
on a journey (tabi ni saseteknreru), but w hat happens is that you become aware that you 
have your own way of enjoying the m usic (choku setsu nan ni ka ataerarete yorokobun ja 
nakute jib tin nari no tanoshikata'tte in no wo jibun de kizuite). Then you realise that there 
are a lot of people enjoying it in their ow n way. Everybody is kind of self-reliant and 
independent, but it's a little different (Choji ).
What makes Masako feel good is that there are a 'significantly high num ber of interesting people', 
who are 'open-m inded, futuristic, spiritual’, who 'meet and integrate in a far more fluid way, and 
who are 'flexible'. What Masako tells us about selves and the relationship between selves, is that 
there are a high proportion of individualistic people, that is individuals who express their selves 
(jibun zoo dasu), by m eans of expressing their individuality (fcosei wo dasti). This is expressed by 
Masako saying they are 'open-m inded', ’flexible’, and that 'they integrate in a far more fluid way'. 
Their sesshi kata (ways of integrating) are not rigid.
Both Keiichi and Masa make this point about integrating in a more fluid way. As Keiichi 
says: "All you have to do is go, and it's as if your friends just grow and grow. That is very pleasant". 
For Keiichi, this is obviously one of the things which makes him feel good about going to parties. He 
also m entions open-m indedness: "Some people are open and some closed. So, I can speak to 
anybody who I feel I can share things with". Keiichi is also prepared to be patient with people who 
he thinks m ight like to go to a party: "People who I’m not sure I can share things with, I m ight be 
able to talk to them, invite them  along and then maybe share things w ith them. They m ight be a 
burden and it m ight take time". For Keiichi, it is not simply a case that people at parties are open 
m inded, they should also be open-m inded tow ards people who m ight not be so 'flexible (no ga 
yozoarakai hito)'. This suggests helping others is also recognised positively. W hat Keiichi tells us 
about selves and the relationship between selves at parties, is that individual selves tend to be open- 
m inded and do not form exclusive groups. Instead they form fluid collective selves which are open 
to anybody. This is in m arked contrast to the strictly defined boundaries and interaction rituals 
which Miyanaga (1990) associates w ith 'the group model of Japanese society'. Hitorni also remarked 
that a characteristic of parties and the sesshi kata of the people who to parties, is that you can make 
friends w ith complete strangers: "People you know absolutely nothing about, who you haven’t been 
introduced to, become friends. This is a recent phenomenon". This reminds me of something Masa 
said w hen we were talking on his balcony before the others arrived. He said: "Keiichi and I met in a 
club, so we have a rather close friendship". Clearly, Masa finds it perfectly norm al that he should 
meet people at a party who are likely to become good friends. This certainly indicates that like- 
m inded people go to Techno parties, but more importantly, that the m anner in which people meet 
and form relationships (sesshi kata) is indeed changing and becoming more fluid. A phenom enon 
w hich dem onstrab ly  accom panies the legitim ation and estab lish ing  of the expression of 
individuality as a prim ary ethic of action and interaction. As 'company-centrism’ begins to weaken, 
a new 'individual-centred' type of community seems to be developing, indicating a redefinition and 
resurgence of community.
M asumi also regards being 'open-m inded (ottpen maindidu)' as a characteristic of the people
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who go to Techno parties. Also participation (paati no itte sanka shite), participating in forging a 
com m unity based on open-m indedness, which sanctions open-m indedness, so that people can 
develop their individuality. She expresses this when she says, everybody who goes to the parties 
wants to 'grow freely (jiyun ni nautili, minna)'. What makes her feel good is that the parties provide a 
space for people to develop their individuality, through the participation of individuals, collectively. 
This makes people feel good. As M asum i rem arked on her im pressions on her first party: ”1 
remember thinking, it’s good to see people enjoying themselves like this, free like this”. Feeling good 
is dependent on people being open-m inded and coming together as open-m inded individuals, 
respecting each other on this basis and enjoying this fundamental commonality and the difference it 
engenders on an individual basis. Masa also made this point when talking about the primacy of 
recognising and focusing on a person's character, expressed through their individuality: "we feel 
this while we are enjoying ourselves".
Ai comments that: "everybody is very sensitive to everybody else". This makes her feel 
good. She says: "everybody is veiy cooperative and wants to participate together”. The fact that 
people are "much more into doing things together", also makes Ai feel good, as does 'feeling part of 
a larger whole’, which she says is: "comfortable (igokochi ga z/)". Participating and cooperating and 
'helping each other', characterise all the narratives.
W hat also stands out is that the  interviewees all think there is a greater awareness and 
m obilisation of cooperation am ong these individualists than there is in o ther walks of life. 
Characterising the people who go to parties as 'people who like Techno/H ouse m usic’, 1 asked 
eveiybody what were the differences in lifestyle compared to other types of people.16 Cooperation 
(k\/dnjoku) was mentioned by everybody. I was surprised when told by these individualists that they 
feel they cooperate and support each other more than other types of people. Yet this is how they see 
it. Part of this feeling comes from the well-being of cooperating in establishing a community for the 
legitimation and nurturing of individuality {kosei), but it primarily comes from the ethic which urges 
participation, and an awareness that a new kind of community is emerging. A t the parties, I could 
feel the excitement that was due, not only to people being aware that they can 'be themselves', that 
is, express their individuality (jibun wo dasn), bu t also because they had found a new community. 
Implicit in this is the em pow ering of individual selves, achieved through participation in this 
common project. Once again we see this emphasis on individuality realised through community 
and com m unity realised through individuality. This was alluded to by Masa when he said a 
person's individuality (kosei) is what is adm ired and recognised (mitomerarete ninki ga deru), and it is 
through the participation and cooperation of individuals expressing their individuality (kosei) that 
both individuality and community are strengthened.
'kitirtck'k'k
^teknno to hausii ga suki hitotachi no seikatsu to hoka no hito no seikatsu to knvabereba, donna chigai ga arimasu ka
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to establish where and how individualists who have no apparent 
institutionalized framework to establish and legitimate their individuality, have attem pted to do so. 
A trend was noted by M iyanaga (1991), whereby a 'new breed' of Japanese, the shin jinrui, or 
'em erging individualists ', as she referred to them , were heralded as the ideal em ployees to 
spearhead companies' efforts to establish post-Fordist production and marketing techniques in the 
m id 1980s. Expected to show  initiative, M iyanaga argues, they w ere forced to conform, and 
consequently became w ithdraw n and non-committal. They began to look outside the workplace in 
order to express their individuality, because they were expected to suppress their individuality in 
the workplace. This, Miyanaga argues, was the beginning of a mass shunning of 'corporate centrism' 
(Okum ura 1985) at the heart of the m ainstream  of Japanese society. These individualists formed 
'private groups’, where they could express their individuality away from the workplace.
W hether in a company like GA, where individuality is defined and legitimated through the 
organisational structure, com m and structure, and w orking practices of the com pany, or in an 
established com pany attem pting  to restructu re  for the future, or in  the flexible economy, 
characterised by part-time, temporary, and short fixed term contract working practices, employees 
are separating work from the rest of their lives. This is either legitimated through being enshrined in 
working practices and codes of conduct, as in the case of new com panies like GA, and in the 
working practices within the flexible economy, or it is slowly being forced on companies who expect 
their employees to place the company at the centre of their lives, by their employees w ithdraw ing 
from participating as expected in the workplace and instead forming 'private groups'. This overall 
trend of separating out the work and private domain, has led to an increase in 'private groups', so 
that we m ust now consider, as M iyanaga speculated, that the 'private g roup’ will become the 
prim ary recourse for Japanese to orientate and legitimate their individual selves and collective 
selves. This process marks a redefinition and resurgence of community accompanying and mutually 
constituting the emerging individualism, and is the way in which a 'people-centered' society seems 
to be emerging.
W ithin a company like GA, w ith an identifiable organisational structure and com m and 
structure w hich encourages and legitimates individuality, there is an identifiable discourse of 
individuality  w hich indicates param eters for thought and action and defines and legitimates 
individualistic selves, bo th  individual and collective. W ithin companies whose organisational 
structure and command structure, working practices and codes of conduct do not yet recognise and 
incorporate this new  individuality  w hich is em erging, individualistic selves look outside the 
workplace, not only to express their individuality, but also to seek recognition and legitimation of 
their individualistic selves. Those new individualists working part-time, on tem porary contracts, or 
on short fixed-term contracts in the flexible economy, may be able to express their individuality in
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the workplace. However, their places of work, as a characteristic of an emerging flexible economy, 
tend not to provide a framework for the establishing and legitimating of their individualistic selves, 
as these companies have yet to establish themselves. This does not m ean that, as and when the 
flexible economy becomes established, employees working in the flexible economy will be unable to 
reference and legitimate their selves in the workplace, although the shift from a 'company-centred' 
society to a 'people-centred' society is likely to mean that the workplace is only one aspect of a 
person's condition which contributes to their sense of self. For the present, however, it looks as 
though these selves, like those in ’up-dow n' companies (joge gaisha), are looking elsew here to 
establish and legitimate their selves, even if they are able to express their individuality in the 
workplace.
In the absence of a framework to reference and define individuality, such as that provided 
by a company organisational structure, command structure, and working practices, as in the case of 
GA, I asked myself how individualistic selves in either 'up-down' companies, or working in the 
flexible econom y seek to establish  and  legitim ate their ind iv iduality . O n the basis that 
individualistic selves and collective selves m utually constitute and define each other, I decided to 
study a 'private group’ in order to apprehend and describe both these individualistic selves and the 
framework of community which recognises and establishes, not only their individuality, but their 
selves, both individual and collective. The private groups I chose to study are Techno parties 
(tekuno pnati). Techno is a particular genre of music which can facilitate the reaffirmation of self and 
community within a given context. A Techno party in Japan is a gathering of individual selves, the 
majority of which are seeking to confirm and legitimate their individualistic selves while enjoying 
themselves. What makes these events primarily occasions to establish and reaffirm individual selves 
and collective selves is the fact that enjoyment is dependent upon these goals being attained.
As a first step to understanding individual selves and collective selves, and the relationship 
between them in a Techno party, I focused on what makes these people feel good about being at one 
of these parties. This is because the individual selves who constitute a voluntarily  entered 
collectivity of selves m ust feel they receive some benefit from m em bership, otherw ise they are 
unlikely to stay. By considering w hat makes them feel good about m em bership, I was able to 
establish the fundam ental criteria which both define individual selves and collective self, and the 
relationship between them. All the people I interviewed, which provide a sample of the types of 
people who attend these parties, feel that the parties are a place w here ind ividual selves and 
collective selves are defined and affirmed. They comes as individuals looking to express their 
individuality  and w ith  the intention of encouraging others to do likewise. Participation and 
cooperation, together w ith the moral rightness of expressing one’s individuality (kosei zoo narubeku 
sutoreito ni dasu) and encouraging others to do likewise (kosei zoo narubeku sutoreito no dete kuru) are 
the nascent fundam ental ethical precepts on which selves, both individual and collective, are 
emerging among these young people and are being forged at these parties. This is something they 
learn by coming to the parties. As will become apparent in the following chapter, there are people at 
the parties who are there for different reasons, and who have either never been before or who have 
only been a limited num ber of times. H ow these 'neophytes' are judged and socialized provides
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further indications of w hat are regarded as acceptable ways of thinking and acting, and further 
evidence of the very open-ended, flexible ways of interacting that are encouraged at the parties.
A t a techno party , the active partic ipation of many selves throw s indiv idual social 
expectations into relief where they become objectified and can be recognised. Once objectified, these 
recognisable social expectations attain an authority and a legitimacy which are then perceived as 
guidelines for thought and action. Objectification results from the sheer num bers of people looking 
and listening, watching and learning, checking and reflecting. Recognition comes in the form of an 
often incoherent but enthusiastic recollection of do's and don'ts, utterances and gestures, aimed at 
oneself and at others. Slowly parameters for thought and practice begin to be consensually agreed.
* * * * * * *
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7. Individuality Through Com m unity, Com m unity Through 
Individuality
1) Individual Selves and C ollective Selves
2) Redefined Com m unity 1: Nakamci and Tanin Reconsidered
3) Redefined Com m unity 2: Seken  Reconsidered
4) Individuality Through Com m unity, Com m unity Through 
Individuality
This chapter begins by once again looking at what constitutes the individual self and its relationship 
to a generalised collective self, this time among those persons who attend Techno parties,, whom 1 
introduced in the previous chapter. W hat we see em erging are fundam ental similarities to the 
example of GA, in the perception of individual selves, in the perception of collective selves, and in 
the relationship between individual selves and collective selves. A similar relationship between an 
individual's m em bership group and reference groups to that am ong the employees of GA also 
emerges, where we see a fragmentation, proliferation and diversification of reference groups, with a 
com plem entary 'loosening-up ' of m odes of m em bership. In the case of the Techno party, 
membership based on a diversification of reference groups, which translates on the ground as, 'you 
can be a member if you respect the fact that everybody is allowed and encouraged to nurture their 
individuality', actually becomes one of the rules of membership. We also saw this in GA, codified in 
the working practices, organisational and command structures of the company, and in a discourse 
which states that, ra ther than doing things in groups (shntidan de), w ork is achieved through 
individuals working together. Diversity of thought and action is implicit in such a discourse and 
becomes a basis for community.
Having first looked at the individual self and its relationship to a generalised collective s elf, 
as apparent am ong those persons who attend Techno parties, I then turn to specific collective selves. 
Consistent with the theme that individual self and collective self inform and define each other, and 
again consistent w ith w hat we see happening  am ong the em ployees of GA, a redefining of 
individual selves leads to a redefinition and reconfiguration of collective selves. By looking at how 
the terms tanin, nakauta and seken are regarded and employed, the topography of individual selves 
and collective selves is m ade visible through the perceived suitability of unsuitability of these terms 
to describe these selves. O ur understanding is enhanced as a result of the discussions among the 
interviewees as they search for alternatives to describe themselves, each other, and the communities
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which they form. In addition, the ways in which these terms are em ployed, w hether suitable or 
unsuitable in this instance, also gives us an insight into the meaning of these terms.
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7.1) Individual Selves and  Collective Selves
In the case of GA, I argued that we are presented w ith an identifiable, objectively verifiable, 
affiliated group (shozoku shuudan). This, I argued, makes our task of establishing the limits of the 
affiliated group and the mode of affiliation relatively easy (4.4). However, I should have paid more 
attention to a specific question I asked all the employees: "Do you use the term 'affiliated group 
(shozoku shuudan)' at GA",1 bu t I was too absorbed in how individuality in GA seems to cause the 
employees to feel that the w ord shuudan, 'group', is unsuitable to describe the kinds of collective 
selves which constitute the company, that I missed the relevance of the w ord 'affiliation (shozoku)'. It 
was only later, when sifting through the transcripts of the interviews w ith the party-goers, that I 
noticed that the notion of affiliation was also regarded as unsuitable to describe mem bership to a 
collective self w here individuality was encouraged and given primacy. W hat was becoming d ea r 
was that 'group (shuudan)' referred to a particular structure of hum an relationships, not simply to 
any collectivity of persons, which is how the term has invariably been used in analyses. 1 realised 
that by arbitrarily im posing the term  'affiliated group' on a given collective self, and by talking 
unqualifiably about 'affiliation (shozoku)' to a given collective self on the basis of a set of logically 
derived universal criteria, I had nearly missed an important relationship between concepts. Always 
careful not to impose categories, and aware of the arbitrary way in which the term 'group1 has been 
employed, this was a salutary lesson indeed.
In the case of M iyanaga's (1991) 'private group’ (6.1), an idealised collective self, objective 
verification under the term s laid out at the beginning of 4.4 initially seemed quite straightforward. 
What is less straightforw ard is whether a 'private group' can be called an 'affiliated group (s)iozoku 
shuudan)'. On the basis of the explanation of an affiliated group given at the beginning of 4.4, a 
'private group' such as a Techno party, or a collectivity of individual selves such as Intelligent, can 
be regarded as an affiliated group. However, there are im portant reasons w hy the term  'affiliation 
(sliozoku)', or the word 'affiliated group (shozoku shuudan)' is unsuitable. First and foremost, a lot of 
people regarded it as unsuitable. 'Affiliation (shozoku)' evidently carries implicit references to a 
particu lar type of m em bership, tying the ind ividual m em ber into a particu la r s tructure of 
relationships, to identifiable codes of conduct, to particular expectations and obligations, and to how 
the individual self should be presented. Following from this, 'affiliated group (shozoku shuudan)' 
does not refer to any collectivity of individual selves which satisfies the criteria of verification laid 
out at the beginning of 4.4, but instead, refers to a culturally specific type of collective self which can 
be recognised and described by its structure, its ethics, its codes of conduct, and by the individual 
selves which constitute it. The types of collective selves I was discussing w ith the interviewees who 
go to Techno parties do not accord with these types of collective selves, and it will probably come as
1G/4 de ion shozoku shuudan to iu kotoba wo tsukaimasu ka
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no surprise that, as with seken, otnote, lira, tatemae, honne, and giri, described in 4.4 and 4.5, in the 
m inds of individual Japanese, 'affiliation (shozoku)1 also tends to conjure images, codes, actions, and 
selves, associated with 'the group model of Japanese society', or more specifically w ith ie structure 
and ideology.
Therefore, 'affiliation (shozoku)' proves to be an unsatisfactory term to describe membership 
of a ’private’ group, be it a group of friends, a Techno party, a company like Dynamix, or Intelligent 
as either a company or a collective self which people identify with, or indeed a company like GA, for 
two reasons. Firstly, this was revealed through the interviewees’ reluctance to use the w ord ’group 
(shuudan)', to describe these various collectivities of individual selves, and secondly, due to the more 
flexible ’ways of interacting (sesshi kata)' w hich these individual selves who constitute these 
collectivities reported, and which I discovered through participation and observation. In the first 
case, shuudan and shozoku imply each other. This was revealed through the uncom plicated m anner 
in which the two terms were used together by some of the employees at GA and by some of the 
party-goers. Those em ployees at GA who questioned w hether shuudan was a suitable word to 
describe the collective selves which constitute the company, also found the idea of affiliation slightly 
unsuitable. Iw ata-san’s answ er to the question: ’Do you use the term  affiliated group (shozoku 
siiuudan) at GA’, is instructive:
Yes, I do use it, especially regarding the separation of work sections. However, as far as 
work goes, there is no precise boundary between the group I’m affiliated to and other 
work groups (hai, toku ni bunsho ni zoku shiteiru to in ka itte ,ta no bunsho no shigoto ni kan 
shite nanka sakai ga kitchiri shiteiru to iu koto de wa nakute). My group deals w ith 
networking, and if another group has a problem  with something to do w ith networks 
and requested some know-how, because the feeling of being affiliated to somewhere in 
particular doesn't really exist, we w ould help (toku ni doko ni shozoku shiteiru you na 
kimochi, ima no tokoro aniari akiraka de wa m i no de, toku ni koko no shozoku to iu you na 
kitchiri shita kangae m i desu yo. Dakara bunshoteki ni wakaretemo achira no shigoto wo 
tetsudattari kochira no shigoto wo kouiatta ga atte. oen wo motomerereba tetsudattari to iu to 
nan de). So even though we are separated into work sections, there isn't really a feeling 
of being affiliated (kitchiri shozoku to iu ishiki de wa m i n desu).
W hat jum ps out of this quote for me is Iwata san's remark that his w ork group is able to help 
another work group because nobody is, strictly speaking, affiliated. Clearly, it is the very concept of 
being affiliated (shozoku) which binds an individual into a particular group, and which does not 
encourage association w ith persons affiliated to another 'group (shuudan)'. A rem ark by Masumi also 
in d ica ted  th a t shozoku an d  shuudan w ere connected , and  connected  th ro u g h  com m on 
understandings of the ie, the traditional Japanese household. Talking about the architect’s practice 
she had worked for prior to joining Intelligent, she said:
"It was som ething that already existed to which I became affiliated (inou aru mono ni 
shozoku shiteita kara). In other words, there was a feeling of being affiliated to a group 
(tsumari shuudan ni shozoku shiteiru kanji), and 1 felt like I was being used (tsukawareteirn 
to iu ki ga shita). At Intelligent I participate of my own will (ima sanka shiteiru jibun no ishi 
de)".
Rohlen (1974) and Okum ura (1992) both note that a sense of belonging to 'something that already 
exists’ is an im portant part of an em ployee's relationship w ith their com pany (2.1, 2.4). In the
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company Rohlen studied, feelings of indebtedness to past generations of employees and obligations 
to fu ture generations w ere encouraged, w hile O kum ura argues that this b inding tem poral 
mechanism, which is anim ated by these feelings of indebtedness and obligation, are a defining 
characteristic of 'corporate centrism' and an im portant mechanism for its reproduction. Both Rohlen 
and O kum ura also argue that this is coopted from the ie. Masumi also suggests in this remark that 
affiliation requires an individual self to suppress their individuality, by remarking that she is 'able to 
use her own m ind ' at Intelligent. This relationship between affiliation and the expression of 
individuality is confirmed by employees at GA. Shinkawa-san, in answ er to my question about 
affiliated groups in GA replied: "No, I don't use it, but you'll find them  in companies like TSshiba 
and Fujitsu". M atsubara-san was m ost explicit on this point. She answered: "Yes, we do use it, but 
together with these groups {shuudan), we also talk of 'individuality (kosei)' quite a lot'.
We can see then, that among collective selves where individuality (kosei) is given primacy, 
'affiliation (shozoku)' is regarded as an unsuitable term to describe the way in which individual 
selves are joined. In other words, the structure of relationships within a group where individuality is 
given primacy is regarded as something other than 'being affiliated to (shozoku shiteiru)'. The reason 
why 'being affiliated to' is regarded as unsuitable to describe membership to the kinds of collective 
selves where individuality is given primacy, can be understood from the structure of relationships 
w ithin a 'group (shuudan)' w here m em bership is described as 'being affiliated to’, for affiliation 
would seem to describe m em bership of a group which conforms m arkedly to 'the group model of 
Japanese society'. However, although affiliation suggests a particular type of membership, tying the 
individual m em ber into a particular structure of relationships, to identifiable codes of conduct, to 
particular expectations and obligations, and to particular ways which the individual self should be 
presented, it does not tell us precisely why 'affiliation (shozoku)' and 'individuality  (kosei)' are 
inimical. The answer lies in the particular kind of sesshi kata, ’way of integrating’, which is implied 
by 'affiliation (shozoku)'. Yamazaki-san also explained why affiliation and the term  'affiliated group 
(shozoku shuudan)' are unsuitable to describe the situation at GA: 'Things are not so rigid here. 
People come together as they like". M embership through affiliation, it seems, forces members to 
associate w ith other members, while urging them  not to associate w ith persons outside 'the group 
(shuudan)', in its new restricted meaning, and only then in strictly defined and limited ways. This 
was clearly expressed by Iwata-san, who said that members of his group were able to help another 
work group because nobody is, strictly speaking, affiliated (shozoku shiteiru) to their w ork groups. In 
fact, the reasoning is the other way round: Persons at GA are expected to help others outside their 
work group, and to communicate w ith any member of the company, regardless of work group, in 
the pursu it of custom er satisfaction (5.1, 5.2). This unrestricted m ovem ent then renders the term  
'affiliated to' unsuitable to describe the way the employees are attached to their work groups. It is 
only as a new  kind of collective self which encourages individuality begins to appear, that the 
precise m eaning of terms used to describe collective selves and m em bership of collective selves is 
revealed, through the unsuitability of these terms to describe the new arrangements.
We can see that 'affiliation' appears to describe a very restricted 'way of integrating (sesshi 
kata)', yet one which conforms to Nakane’s (1970) ha 'frame' model, and to Befu's (1980) ’group model
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of Japanese society . Miyanaga (1991) makes the same point when she remarks that a major reason 
why individuality is feared in Japan because group 'interaction rituals' (tf. Goffman 1959) are so 
rigid and group-specific, that any variation threatens unity. More fluid sesshi kata seem to preclude 
the use of the term  affiliation (sJiozoku) in these examples. ’Affiliation’ would seem to describe a 
rigid, highly group-specific type of membership, together with a strong sense of indebtedness and 
obligation among individual selves to a hierarchically structured, highly exclusive collective self.
The w ord ’group {shuudan)' was regarded by almost all of the em ployees at GA as an 
unsuitable w ord to describe the company, or collective selves within the company (4.3). ’Individuals 
working together’ was the description many fell back on, as they sought to overcome the secondaiy 
meanings which the term group {shuudan)' carries. Not being coerced into a single way of thinking’, 
to use Hashimoto-san s words, was, together with the more fluid ways of integrating, the secondary 
meanings which prevented people from using the word ’group {shuudan)'. Hashimoto-san was quite 
explicit in w hat group {shuudan)' m eant to him: "Where everyone unanim ously follows the 
superiors, follows the same behaviour, which means being coerced into a single way of thinking". 
Masumi tells the same w hen I asked her to compare her previous company w ith Intelligent. She 
m entioned that she was ’allowed to participate with her own m ind’ as a m em ber of Intelligent, 
im plying that she was expected to suppress her individuality and initiative at her previous 
company. Her reasons for leaving the practice and taking up Ichikawa san’s offer at Intelligent were 
because she was not allowed to show initiative or express her individuality (6.3).
Discussion of w hether a Techno party  is a ’group {shuudan)' throws m ore light on what 
people perceive shuudan to mean. In response to the question ’Is a party a ’group {shuudan)',^ 
Masako replied: Yes, superficially it is. But maybe one where everyone has the same consciousness 
{chokusetsuteki na inii wa sou dalcedo ntinua onaji ishiki wo motta shuudan kaino lie). Chogi also 
considered that a party could be a group {shuudan): "In terms of the result, I guess it is a group, but 
one where everyone shares similar inner feelings and meet as a result of that {kekkateki ni shuudan 
deshou kekko naimenteki ni minna chikai bubun wo motte atsimmtteiru shuudan to iu ka)". However, he 
further qualifies w hat he says by saying: "But people come as individuals. They themselves, 
individually, w ant to come, they themselves, individually, w ant to have a good time {demo kojin 
reberu de kiteiru. Jibun ga ikitai, jibun ga tanoshimitai kara to iu ishiki de kiteiru)''. Masako added: 
"Anything goes {nan demo am  deshou). The way people integrate and meet is far more fluid {sesshi 
kata to iu no wa motto hado wo kanjiru ne), they are flexible {no ga yawarakai hito da to iu)''.
On the basis of w hat Masako and Chogi have told us so far, a party can be called a ’group 
{shuudan)' because the individual selves who go to the parties share ’the same consciousness’ and 
’the same inner feelings'. This shared consciousness and shared inner feeling, however, are shared 
feelings of individuality. Expressing the ’inner self, to use Lebra’s (1992) model, is what the party- 
goers have in common. As Masa told us (6.4): "A person is not adm ired because they w ear nice 
clothes, their self is visible and this is w hat is acknowledged, and that is how they come to be 
admired.
Below is the transcript of M asumi and Takeshi trying to decide if a party is a group or not. Their
Paatii wa shuudan desu ka
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ruminations prove revealing:
W ould you call a party a group?3
Takeshi: It's not a group, is it? At a place like that, everybody's doing som ething 
interesting. Various types of people come, and they are just enjoying themselves, that's 
all. It's not a group (shuudan), although I don’t know what it is.
Masumi: It's an occasion, a situation (ba ga am, ha desu xjo) That's all. People come , 
that's all. It's a situation (shichueshun), people dance together, listen to music, talk, that's 
all. People have things in common, but they come as individuals (hito no aida ni kyotsuu 
no mono ga ariL dakedo minna kojin ni kite).
Takeshi: Yes
W hat do they have in  common?4
Takeshi: What do you call it! They’re not friends.
M asumi: It's only the energy of everybody who comes. It’s a sensation (taikan de), a 
oneness (uan desu).
Takeshi: It’s like everybody is your friend for one evening (hito ban dake no tomodachi 
mitai lie) (laughs).
Masumi: That's right, you feel the same as each other (onaji mono zoo issho ni kanjiteiru 
hito)
Takeshi: That's right, it's not a group (shuudan), it's a new thing, it feels different, 
people relate to each other differently (atarashii mono, atarashii kanji de, atarashii ningen 
kankei ga am  kamoshirenai).
M asumi: It m ust a group, there is that oneness, that sameness, but it feels a little 
different (chotto chigau kana shuudan yori demo saki ni itta you ni). It's som ething to do 
with heart and soul (kokoro), that kind of thing (son iu kanjite imasu).
It is on the basis of 'having things in common' which draws the party-goers to think of a party as a 
group. Kazuo alludes to a similar thing: "Well, everybody understands (nanlm minna de wakachau tie 
iu ka), so it is that kind of thing". However, this invariably leads them to qualify this w ith the fact 
that people 'come as individuals', ’by their own will', and it is this which they perceive as w hat 
everybody has in common. Hitomi also m ade this point very clearly: "People come to parties by 
their own will (jibun no ishi de iku), not because their friends go. That may be the reason why they 
first come to a party, but nobody keeps coming simply because their friends do. Compared to other 
situations there are many people who respect others because they are individuals, people with their 
own will (paati no naka de ishi ga tsuyoi hito ga oi n de kojin ni sonkei sum to iu hito mo oi n da to omou)." 
Rika said the same: "Rather than a party being a group, there is the feeling that everybody, one by 
one, is making it happen (shuudan yori mo hi tori hitori ga honto tsukutteiru tte iu kanji)". We heard the 
same descriptions from  the em ployees at GA. This em phasis on collective selves as persons 
participating as individuals rather than  'suppressing their selves' and 'conform ing to a group
Paatn to iu no wa shuudan to iu koto desu ka
4 Saki ni itta ki/otsuu no mono urn nan to iu desu ka
2 5 7
(shuudan ni awasevu)' informs all the descriptions of collective selves in which the individual self is 
recognised and nurtured.
Searching for the reason why a party is different from a group, Masumi decided it was 
'something to do w ith kokoro, the heart and soul of the individual self. This indicates a fundamental 
shift, w here com m onality is recognised on the basis of expressing one's ind iv iduality , of 
encouraging others and allowing others to ’be themselves', which both Rika said she was able to do 
at the parties, and M atsubara-san is able to do at GA (3.6). Revealing the self becomes a prim ary 
code of conduct, w hereas in 'the group m odel of Japanese society’, 'denying the self (jibun ino 
korosu)', or 'suppressing the self (kojin wo osaeru) are primary codes of conduct (4.3), so that we can 
say that it is the kind of individual self, as well as the structure of relationships between individual 
selves, expressed as 'affiliation (shozoku)' in the 'g roup  m odel of Japanese society', which 
problematises use of the w ord 'group (shuudan)' among the party-goers. It was also these reasons 
that caused the employees at GA to search for another way of describing collective selves w ithin the 
company. Am ong the em ployees at GA and those who go to Techno parties, individuality  is 
encouraged and nurtured  through the structure of relationships and through the values of the 
collectivity, while hiding the self is regarded with suspicion and results in a lack of respect for that 
person. Such 'deception (gomakasu koto)', to use Masa's words, was m entioned by Keiichi as well: 
'There is nothing two-faced (nm no) or strange like that going on (lira no nanka hen na kangae ga nai to 
iuka)".
Expressing one's individuality, one's kokoro, becomes a central plank of membership. This 
requires a concomitant acceptance of difference within the collectivity. As Ai said:
"Many people are sensitive, but everyone thinks 'I'm me', and if you compare us to 
other types of people, relatively speaking, we get along well w iyh each other 
(kankakuteki na hito ga oi, demo minna jibun wa jibun to iu kanji dakara hoka no sou iu no ni 
kurabettara hito ne wari to tanoshiku yatteiru). It's just a difference of interests, an unusual 
mood or whatever (Jcyomi no chigai gurai de hen na muudo datari sum  koto tte na yd na Id ga 
sum)".
Accepting difference, then, is another im portant hurdle to m embership, and is most commonly 
expressed by the interviewees as 'open-mindedness (oupen ma'indu)', using the English words. Being 
open-m inded m eans allowing others to express their will (ishi), as well as being willing to express 
one's own kokoro. 'Will (ishi)' and 'so u l/m in d /h ea rt' (kokoro) am ount to one and the same thing. 
Chogi, Ai, and Masako commented that one of the characteristics of people who go to parties is that 
they 'have their own will (ishi ga tsnyoi hito)', and Masumi remarked that it was the expression of 
kokoro which m ade it difficult to describe a party as a 'group (shuudan)'.
Again, we see a discourse of individuality emerging that is very similar to that among the 
employees at GA. The idiomatic language of the party-goers when talking about collective selves is 
dom inated by individuals (kojin), individuality (kosei), open-mindedness (oupen ma'indu), flexibility 
(no gayawarakai), the revealing of heart and soul (kokoro), and of acting on one’s own will (ishi), and 
again, as among the employees at GA, there has been a fundamental shift away from these terms 
being regarded either negatively, or ambivalently, to being regarded positively (4.3). Kokoro is a 
powerful concept in Japanese thought and sense of self, but is regarded w ith  ambivalence. For
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example, revealing one's kokoro is in direct opposition to 'killing the self (jibun wo korosu)', or 
'suppressing the self (kojin zoo osncm)', the prim ary code of conduct for an individual self in a 
collective self which conforms to 'the group model of Japanese society'. Yet, as Lebra notes: "kokoro 
claims m oral superiority...in that it is a reservoir of truthfulness and purity" (Lebra 1992: 112). 
Masa's explanation that respect is based on the individual revealing their true self (6.4), indicates, 
first, that the ethics of the self regarding kokoro have been inverted in this instance, but at the same 
time, the value accorded kokoro remains intact. The same connection between 'individuality (kosei)' 
and kokoro was noted by Moeran (1989) among the potters of Onta, and by Ikegami (1995) as part of 
her 'honourific individualism ', between kokoro and ishi, suggesting again that the individuality 
which is emerging among the employees at GA and among others in Japanese society is not so much 
something new, but is more a redefining of the self drawing on concepts associated w ith the self 
already present in society.
'Will (ishi)' has also tended to be regarded ambivalently. Ishi can be interpreted as the 
manifestation of kokoro, and ordinarily has to be kept under control to conform to strict codes of 
conduct and thought associated with position w ithin an 'affiliated group (shozoku shuudan)'. The 
expression ishi ga tsuyoi, 'to be strong-willed', can easily be imagined to carry negative connotations 
in situations where the individual self is ideally suppressed, yet to have resolve and to persevere 
(gaman), which are also expressions of ishi, are encouraged. 'To be strong-w illed' implies both 
individuality, on the one hand, and the strength to deny the self on the other. Among the young 
people who attend Techno parties, ishi is regarded positively as an attribute of individuality (kosei) 
as well as the means to persevere. Again, there is both continuity and redefinition. Also, as with the 
employees at GA, a high value is placed on participation and cooperation am ong the party-goers
(6.3), indicating that kokoro and ishi are directed as much tow ards others, as towards Ego. So that 
now, instead of community being achieved through the denial of individual selves, community is 
achieved through the expression of individual selves. Kazuo expressed this very clearly, although it 
is difficult to translate. As awkward as it sounds, the best I could come up with was: "It's sort of like 
a person acts, taking the lead from themselves (jibun kara susunde iku tte kanji)”.
The discourses of individuality among those who attend Techno parties and am ong the 
employees at GA are very similar, and just as the employees at GA recognise the importance of 
com m unity and of 'fitting in' (4.3), so do the party-goers. The w ords 'participation (sanka)’ and 
'cooperation (kyoryoku)' come up time and time again, as we are made aware of the importance of 
com m unity in nurturing , legitim ating and also releasing ind ividuality  through em pow ering 
individual selves. The structure of community among the party-goers is also very similar to the 
organisational structure of GA. W hen I asked the question, "If a party is a group (shuudan), how 
does it differ from other groups, for example a company or a tennis club?",5 Yuka responded: "It's 
not like the relationships in an 'up and dow n’ company, we relate horizontally (joge kaisha no 
tsunagari ja nakute, yoko no tsunagari da yo tie). Everybody is equal (minna heito na no)”. Masako said 
the same: "Everybody's equal, basically (minna byddo da tie am teido). There aren't those 'up-down' 
relationships betw een people (amari son in joge kankei wa nat)". C om m enting on 'u p /d o w n
5Paatii to iu no wa shuudan to icha hoka no shuudan to kurabereba donna chigai ga arimasuka
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relationships (joge kankei)', Masumi remarked: "Everybody would say that they don't like that kind 
of thing (sou iu tokoro ga minna wa ’ya da naa tte to omou). Age consciousness (nenrei ishiki) and that 
kind of society is not liked at all (sou iu shakai no chii wa kirai deshou)".
Although everybody is regarded as equal, there is a basis for discrim inating between good 
and bad, and right and wrong. This was made clear to me when Yuka and Rika were explaining that 
although there are no hierarchically organised senpaifkohai, 'senior/junior', relationships on the basis 
of position or age, appreciation of and respect for w hat is regarded as good and bad, and right and 
wrong, dictates that status differentiation does exist. In the same way as at GA, respect for 
individuality and individual selves is based on individual acts, not on age or position, where 
perform ance against com m unally recognised standards does lead to the accruing of status and 
respect.
Respect is important, but there is no sense of somebody being above or below someone 
else. There is none of that (sonkei sum  bubun ga aru kedo, sono hito no sluta ni tsuitem toka 
te, sou iu kangaekata wa nai). I'm not a m em ber of Dynamix or any company, so w hat 
people do or w hat they are like in this respect, I'm not sure. But from a technical point 
of view, and being able to understand  w hat their experience means, and how they 
think, I understand veiy well. So in term s of their experience and their ability, in this 
sense they are senpai. So, if the other person is senpai in this sense, because they have 
more experience and more skills, you are kohai. But this is not a senpai / kohai thing, and 
it does not mean that you keep quiet and listen to what they say. (Yuka)
It was interesting to witness Masa, Kazuo, Keiichi, Yuka, and Rika discussing this question of senpai 
and kohai together. They genuinely do not feel this way about themselves and each other, instead 
genuinely feeling equal and respecting each other and everybody as equals. The problem  they have 
is finding a language to express these new ways of judging and relating to persons. Clearly, casting 
persons as senpai or kdhai is unsuitable. However, they also appreciate that some people are more 
talented than others, some are m ore honest than others, etc. A process of 'distinguishing', and 
'making distinctions' (kejime ga aru) (4.5) and value judgem ents, is clearly evident am ong these 
individualistic selves. Rika took the explanation a little further:
When com paring w hat we are talking about w ith w hat is norm ally im agined w hen 
discussing senpai/kohai (keishiki teki ni wa sou iu senpai/kdhai te wakeru to), there is a 
distinction to be m ade betw een people who have considerable experience etc., and 
those who don't. Just because we are the kind of people who express w hat they feel 
inside, doesn't m ean that we don’t have an understanding of w hat is good as good, and 
try to learn that ourselves. Rather than thinking that somebody is above or below, we 
sincerely regard that w hich is good sim ply as that, and that w hich is bad as bad. 
Because we are like that, there isn't that feeling of above and below.
When discussing tanin, 'others' or 'strangers', Ai discriminated on the basis of dress and dem eanour
(7,3), and after Rika had spoken, Keiichi commented: " Yes, that's true, in this sense there are 
different levels (sou desu ne sou iu lebem no chigai ga am  jdtai)''.
In  the case of GA, we w itnessed a flattening of hierarchy and a shift in the locus of 
responsibility from the collective self to the individual self (3,2). We witness the same fundam ental 
changes in structure and the loci of responsibility among the young people who attend these parties, 
in all aspects of their lives, including work. Good and Bad, Right and Wrong, are recognised and
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due respect is accorded. M asum i’s and Takeshi's discussion on this subject is again w orth  
reproducing in full:
Are there senpai/kdhai relationships at Intelligent? (both burst out laughing)
Takeshi: Yes, there is a senpai/kdhai structure at Intelligent. I'm  the lowest! (laughs 
madly)
Whose the highest?
Takeshi: Ichikawa-san.
M asumi: It s not really like that. We are all responsible for our w ork (minna sekinin ga 
ani) and Ichikawa san is the boss. We have to do our work properly and we have to 
work together, but we are all equal, although Ichikawa san is boss!
W hat is your position, your level, in  Intelligent?
Takeshi: My position?! We're equal! Equal! (byodo! byodd!). No, I'm the lowest! (ore wa 
ichiban shita desu yo).
M asumi: We have no positions above and below ( chii toka joge kankei wa nai n desu yo).
Takeshi: That's right, there aren't any.
M asumi: Even so, Takeshi is the youngest, so he thinks he's the lowest. Me, I don't 
think about it.
Takeshi: Really? (sounding pleased).
M asumi: Takeshi is an administrator, I'm a designer, for example. Others will be other 
things, and each will be respected for what they do (kare wa keieisha da shi, watashi wa 
disaina da shi, ta no hitotachi mo DJ da shi sorezore resupecto shiteiru kara).
Again, as with the employees at GA, we see individual selves who come together to form collective 
selves which foreground individuality, searching for new terms to describe their relationships with 
each other. They foreground individuality and equality, recognise difference and individual acts, 
and make m oral and aesthetic judgm ents based on these discrim inations, which requires an 
idiomatic language to reflect this. Also like GA, at Intelligent, Ichikawa san is boss but everybody 
takes responsibility for their own work, and regard each other as equals.
This equality includes gender equality. None of the w om en reported  any kind of 
discrimination on the basis of gender. Masako, Hitomi, Ai, Yuka, and Rika all simply answered 'No', 
and when I asked again, they repeated their answers. Certainly, from my own observations, this is 
the case, and at a time w hen Japanese wom en are quite militant and very sensitive on the issue. 
Japan is an advanced industrial nation, and its female population is aware of where Japan stands in 
relation to Europe and the U.S. on gender issues. In the current climate of recession and economic 
upheaval, the country's sexual equality laws have been shown to be lacking, which has draw n 
attention to w hat was always very-near-the-surface discrimination against women. This apparent 
lack of discrimination among the party-goers is consistent with the female employees at GA, who 
also reported that they are not discrim inated against, and as far as I could see there were no 
discrim inatory practices or attitudes am ong the male staff. Am ong the party-goers, this lack of
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discrim ination undoubtedly springs from a genuine belief that equality, sexual or otherwise, is 
morally right, but there are other sides to this. These young people feel a qualitative break with their 
seniors, and consequently the sexes feel closer to each other in ways that transcend gender. They 
also feel that any tiling to do w ith w hat they regard as an outdated and corrupt order (1.3), is by 
association tainted. This includes gender relations enshrined in that order. However, although I was 
unable to pursue this line of enquiry, the new individualism  is likely to be gender-specific, as a 
result of certain ways of thinking (kangaekata) and doing (shikata) being regarded as male or female, 
gay or straight. H owever, the ethical precepts which I have described do appear to transcend 
gender, as I would expect. For example, revealing your individuality and encouraging others to do 
likewise, and accepting difference, are not gender-specific.
Masumi was the only w om an to say that male-female relationships am ong those young 
people who go to parties, are the sam e as in other walks of life. However, she was referring to 
'relationships based on love (ren'ai kankei)' as opposed to 'arranged m arriages (mini kekkon)'. Again, 
she and Takeshi proved to be good interviewees together, as their sparring revealed as m uch about 
relationships between older Japanese (Masumi is 25) and younger Japanese (Takeshi is 18), and 
about male female relations am ong these young people, as w hat they actually said. I reproduce 
below their conversation on sexual discrimination:
W hat about relations betw een m en and  w om en at parties. Are there differences from 
other situations?6
Takeshi: Yes, I think so.
M asum i: I don't think so!
Takeshi: Yes it is!
M asumi: Really? How!
Takeshi: Men and women who go to parties can speak to each other as equals (paati ni 
ikti hito, otoko no ko to onna no ko te, hirato ni lianasent).
M asumi: m m m  OI<, in that sense, maybe there isn’t any discrim ination between the 
sexes. At parties everyone is trying to communicate and come together (tsukiad toshite 
int n ja nai ka na).
Takeshi: If you look at it the other way, at society as a whole, there is an obvious clear 
line between men and women, (gyaku ni shakai toka atchi no hoti da to issen motchya imasu 
ne. doushiteuio arimasu yo).
M asum i: Yes, I know, but if you think about couples, I think the relationships between 
men and wom en are m uch the same as in society as a whole (sou kedo danjo kankei, 
koibito no kankei, sou in no wa ren'ai kankei to iu bubun nanka ni ni kan shite wa nita you na 
bubun ga aru lama to omou n dakedo).
6Paatii no it aka de no danjo kankei to iu no wa hoka no jotai no danjo kankei to kurabem to chigai ga arimasu ka
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7.2) R edefined Com m unity 1: Nakama and  Tanin Reconsidered
In this section, I will continue a similar line of analysis, by considering the discourses, or narratives 
(Cohen and Rapport 1995), of individuality and community fomenting among the employees at GA, 
and am ong the young individualists who seek to establish and legitim ate their individuality , 
collectively, through the m edium  of Techno parties, demonstrating that the redefining of individual 
selves leads to redefinition of all types of collective selves.
In GA, 'w ork team  (waaku chiitnu)', is the common term used for those collective selves 
which are an employee’s place of work, headed by a bucho, a departm ent head. Busho, meaning ’post’ 
or 'place of work' was also used a lot by the employees when they were referring to their work 
teams in discussions w ith me. However, the term  is rather formal, and is not used among the 
employee's themselves when referring to their own place of work, or to somebody else’s. On a day- 
to-day basis, everybody referred to their busho as their departm ent (bn). Nobody used the w ord uchi 
in this context. Which, as I noted in 4.3, indicates a greatly reduced sense of 'inside (uchi)' and 
’outside (soto)' am ong both the employees at GA and among the party-goers. In a collective self 
which recognises and encourages the expression of individuality, selves begin to interact, less as an 
extension of a collective self like a 'group (shuudan)', and more as an individual self. As I described 
in 6.3 , this leads to a loosening up of social boundaries, reflected in the m ore fluid 'ways of 
integrating (sesshi kata)', and in a lessened sense of ’us’ and 'them', 'inside' and 'outside', am ong the 
party-goers and among the work teams in GA (7.1).
In addition  to the em ployees at GA and the party-goers regard ing  the w ords 'group 
(shuudan)', or 'affiliated group ( shozoku shuudan)' as unsuitable, the w ord nakama also proved to be 
problematic. Nalaima is a common term  used to describe the sm all circle of im m ediate others 
surrounding Ego. In 4.3, I quoted Inoue (1977), who provides a detailed description of nakama, 
where he explained that the work group is often thought of as nakama. However, Sakamoto-san said: 
"I have never used it in GA. Nakama is not quite the way I feel about it (nakama to iu kankaku to sukoshi 
fiiringu ga chigaimasu). We all work together here". Shinkawa-san replied: "No, not really, I use the 
word ’team (chimu)', or 'member (membaa)"'. Matsubara-san also found it unsuitable: "1 use it, but not 
really at work. Maybe a w ork group is nakama, but as a company we are all together (kaisha ga issho), 
so it's a little different here". Hashimoto-san replied: "Among the staff? No we don't. We say, 'from 
the same departm ent (onaji bu to wa sou in katachi de)'. Nakama is different". W hen I asked the 
employees how nakama was different, they found it difficult to explain why. A lot of people talked of 
nalcama having a different 'feeling (kanji/ feeling)'. However, it is clear that the absence of internal 
boundaries, referred to in this instance through the sentim ent 'everybody working together', is a 
possible reason.
Nakama ordinarily refers to an im mediate group of w ork mates or friends,7 but because
7Keithjtisha's Neiv Japanese English Dictionary, 5th Edition. Ed. Koh Masuda. Also Inoue (1977).
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members of a given w ork group at GA are not confined to that work group, and are in fact expected 
and encouraged to mix and communicate w ith members of other w ork groups and departm ents 
(3.1, 3.2), their sense of nakama is greatly reduced. All the employees commented that 'all things 
passing directly in the norm  (directo ni iro iro na mono ga kekko oi n desu lie)', and 'nothing is fixed 
{tettei shiteiru mono de wa nai)', etc. (3.2). The boundaries betw een groups have been virtually 
elim inated, only really existing for adm inistrative and organisational purposes. As W ada-san 
explained: "At GA there are divisions and sections, and we use those names, and persons concerned 
with a particular thing are located in a place associated with that thing, but it is only tentative (ichio 
aru it da kedo), and the people in those places operate in  a very mobile and fluid way (njuudoteki ni 
ikon)". Nakama is regarded as inappropriate at GA because there is none of that feeling associated 
with tightly-knit intimate groups, rigidly defined internally and externally. An absence of a feeling 
of nakama at GA is closely linked to the absence of factions and cliques (habatsu), m ade impossible by 
the organisational structure and command structure of the company, and due to the empowering of 
individual selves.
In still the majority of Japanese companies, the only link that members of a work team or 
departm ent will have with anybody outside that 'group' w ithin the workplace, is through the head 
of the group, and consequently still not directly. Such an organisational structure encourages the 
development of factions and cliques {habatsu), w hat both Nakane (1970) and Rohlen (1979) refer to as 
the 'informal structure' of a company. This was also how M atsuda-san described Toshiba when he 
worked there (3.1). The feeling engendered within these tightly-knit departm ental 'groups’ is what is 
generally thought of as nakama as it is used within the context of work. Consequently, it is easy to 
see w hy the word nakama is not regarded as suitable by the employees at GA to describe their 
immediate colleagues or their work groups.
The trend of separating off the workplace from the rest of an em ployee's life has also 
rendered  the term  nakama unsuitable to describe sm all intim ate collective selves w ithin the 
workplace. Used in the workplace, nakama strongly evokes kinship relationships (Inoue 1977), and is 
therefore often used in contexts which are openly based on kinship relations hips. Nakama is a term 
which describes w ork groups in a company such as the one Rohlen (1974) studied, or Kondo (1990) 
studied, which is involved in many aspects of an employee's life outside the workplace. Nakama, I 
would argue, as it is used within the workplace, is part of the discourse of 'company as family’, and 
because com pany and family are distinctly separated at GA (3.5), nakama has shifted from the 
domain of w ork to the private domain. However, nobody described their family as nakama either. 
When I asked, ’Do you describe your family or relatives as nakama',% everybody replied ’No, nakama 
are friends'.
Among the party-goers, nakama was the m ain contender in the stakes to replace shuudan as 
the w ord to best describe a party, although in the end everybody thought it to be unsuitable. I first 
asked the question, 'Do you use the word nakama'?,9 followed by ’What does it mean, how do you
Q
Kazokit to shinscki wa nakama desu ka
9Nakaina to in kotoba wa tsukaimasu ka
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use it?10 'Friends (tomodachi)', or 'people who are close (shitashii no hito)' was the reply. Again, 
nobody described their family as nakama. Chogi answered: "Nakama consists of people who you trust 
and have confidence in (nakama wa yappari shinrai kankei ni naritatte to iu kara sa)". I was very 
surprised when Takeshi said: "Everybody who goes to a party is nakama". "Even people you don't 
know?", 1 asked. "People you don 't speak to, yes, certainly", he replied. "Even though there are 
several hundred, in that situation everybody is nakama (sono ha ni iru iiito wa minna natmma)". Only 
Takeshi said that a party was nakama, although eveiybody else clearly thought it felt like nakama, 
eventually deciding that is w asn't. This nakama-like quality was most clearly expressed by an 
exchange between Takeshi and Masumi:
Takeshi: It's like everybody is your friend for one evening (hito ban dake no tomodachi 
mitai ne).
M asumi: That's right, you feel the same as each other (onaji mono wo isshio ni kanjiteiru 
hito).
W hat m ade everybody w onder if a party is nakama is the fact that it feels as though almost 
everybody is a friend, that everybody "is together (jibtin ga isshio to iu koto de nakama de wa aru yo ne)", 
or "has the same consciousness (onaji ishiki wo motta kamoshirenai)", as Masako described it, and 
because there is a significantly high num ber of people a given individual can, as g said: "trust and 
have confidence in". Yuka’s answer also indicated this, together with why a party is not nakama:
"When you're at a party having a good time, and you see everybody else having a good 
time, that makes you feel very comfortable (sugoku hottoshiteiru), which makes you feel 
even m ore happy. In that sense, I suppose you could call it nakama. A lthough 
everybody is enjoying themselves in different ways (jibun ga paati ni itta toki ni sugoku 
kou tanoshii to iu toki wa itsumo to iu imi de wa nakama tte ieru n ja nai kana demo sorezore ga 
tanoshindeiru)”.
Feeling comfortable and having something in common with those around you are clearly feelings 
associated w ith nakama. However, Yuka then realises that everybody is actually enjoying themselves 
in different ways, which leads her to conclude that a party cannot be nakama. Rika said the same:
"Mmm. I think the word nalaima is a little too much, because the other people at a party 
have other life-styles. But even so, at these parties, people can really help each other, 
which is like nakama, but it's not nakama (nakama to iu to kekko ii sugi na bubun mo aru kana 
to omou kedo. Sono hito mo hoka ni seikatsu toka aru kara demo honto ni sono paati no naka de 
wa minna ga ii jotai de tasuke attari toka, kyoryoku shitari toka dekiru shi sore wa nakama no 
you ni mieru kedo chotto chigau to omou n)'\
Hitomi and Ai's answers followed the same form as Yuka and Rika, their thoughts progressing in a 
similar way. My initial question was, 'How does a party differ from other groups in terms of human 
relationships'?11
Ai: Is a party a particular kind of group or is it nakama? Well, a party  is one's own 
group, I guess (paati wa jibun ni totte no shuudan ja nai). And in that sense I think that it 
is like nakama (paati ni jibun ni totte no shuudan to iu ka nakama to iu no wa iru to wa 
omotteiru watashi wa. Zenin ja nakute sono naka ni ippai iru tte kanji). N ot everybody is, but
^Nakama to iu no wa tsukaikata wo agetekudasai
^ P aa tii to iu no wa hoka no shuudan no ningen kankei to kurabereba donna chigai ga anmasu ka
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it feels like it.
Do you use the w ord nakama at parties?
Hitomi: Not especially. The w ord itself is different, it has a different meaning, although 
the meaning of nakama could be applied to a party, there is that sensation (kotoba jitai wa 
chigau to omou kedo sou iu imi mo fukumareteiru kamoshirenai sou iu kankaku ga aru n ja nai). 
Nakama are friends, really.
Ai: I don 't use it especially either. Even though many people who go to parties agree 
about m any things, there is still a lot of separation (paati ni iku iiitotachi wa onaji 
kangaekata ga aru no ni sugoku nanka zvakareteiru you na ki mo sum). Not surprisingly some 
people are into this, some people are into that. There is a sense that there is a lot of 
difference {yappari kou iu no sulci, kou iu no suki de sugoku wakareteiru you na ki ga sum).
Hitomi reports that there is the sensation (kankaku) of nakama at parties, that the meaning implied by 
naka}iia (imi wo ftdcumatteiru) is present at parties. Feelings of interdependence, of cooperation, of 
being connected, of feeling good, and of being able to trust others and having confidence in them, 
are what the interviewees feel when they are at a party, and it is these feelings and sentiments which 
they associate w ith nakama. Therefore, the nakama-like qualities of the parties are the qualities which 
make people feel good and keep people coming, and which creates the setting for the establishment 
and legitimation of the individual selves who attend. Consequently, it is the nakama-like quality 
which is crucial to the success of the parties in their m utually reinforcing tw in roles of making 
people feel happy and making them feel good about themselves. Cooperation, participation, being 
able to 'be yourself (jibun wo subete dasu koto ga dekiru)', and all the things which make people feel 
good about attending a party which I discussed in 6.3 are reminiscent of nakatna. Ai described the 
parties as 'events (ebento)', w hen we were discussing if a party is a ’group (shuudan)', and Masumi 
thought it was an 'occasion' or 'situation (ba ga am, ba desu yo)': "People come, that's all. It’s a 
situation (shichueshun). People dance together, listen to music, talk, get to know each other, and feel 
good".
In 6.2, I suggested that 'p rivate groups' provide a fram ew ork for constructing and 
legitimating the individuality of persons who currently have no other institutional or formal means 
of doing so, and that as a result of this process of establishment and legitimation of selves, 'private 
groups' provide individuals w ith an index and reference for m anaging and negotiating other 
situations, including work. This is particularly true of the Techno party, w here the scale alone 
intensifies the enjoyment and magnifies the feelings of personal em powerm ent, of feeling good 
about one's self, and the rightness of one's place in the scheme of things. It is the nakama-likeness of 
the parties which make these results possible, for nakama is those people and that place where the 
individual self can 'be itself', where it feels it is safe and protected, wanted and supported.
According to the party-goers, nakama implies a high degree of congruity of thought, lifestyle, 
and way of thinking among those who constitute nakama, and although there obviously is a high 
degree of congruity between the party-goers, there is also difference. It is the recognition and 
legitimation of difference which makes it difficult for the interviewees to regard a party as nakama, 
even though it feels the same as nakama. Although on a strictly semantic level, the interviewees say a 
party is not nakama because there is difference, the ethics and codes of conduct which these people
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adhere to are built on the fundam ental ethical precept of recognising and respecting difference. 
Consequently, the respect of and celebration of individuality and difference is also something they 
have in common, so nakama-ness develops and is keenly felt for this reason, too, even if, 
semantically, a party is not regarded as nakama. Again, it is because a party is not strictly speaking 
nakama, that it is possible for such a large collective self to attain nakama-ness, and be effective in this 
way. Not only is nakama fixed in the imagination as a small collective self, the degree of similarity 
which defines nakama can only be m aintained on a small scale. Not even a belief that all members 
are similar could be m aintained on the scale of a Techno party. Consequently, it is the embracing of 
difference which opens up  the possibility of intimacy on a much larger scale. It is mass agreement 
on the ethics of individuality , em bracing open-m indedness th rough the expressing of one’s 
individuality and encouragement of others to do like-wise, which actually creates the feeling of 
nakama-ness. Once again, w e see ind iv iduality  and com m unity being achieved through the 
expression of individuality, rather than through its suppression.
The nakama-ness of the parties provides a setting for these ind iv idual selves to feel 
comfortable enough to openly and relaxedly 'be themselves’. The feeling of nakama, the feeling that 
everybody is a friend, makes people feel comfortable enough to literally 'try out' their individuality 
in the first instance, to integrate and mix in a far more fluid way with people they've never seen 
before or met before, in other words, in public. As Keiichi said: "All you have to do is go, and it’s as 
if your fi*iends just grow  and grow. That is very pleasant". It is then as a result of m any people 
experiencing this together, that expressing one's individuality becomes an acceptable and 'normal' 
way of being-in-the-world.
The interviewees' perception of tanin-ness at Techno parties conforms to their perception of nakama- 
ness. In answer to my question, 'Are there tanin at parties?"12 Masako, Takeshi, and Chogi spoke of 
tanin as individual selves other than Ego. Consistent w ith the em ployees at GA, some people 
regarded tanin in this way. However, while some of the employees at GA regard tanin as persons 
whom 'Ego doesn't know’, whom 'Ego 'has nothing to do w ith (kakawatta no nai hito)', or 'people I 
only acknowledge in passing (aisatsu shita koto aru gurai shikanai hito)', as Ozawa-san described them
(4.3), for m any of the party-goers, tanin is the term used to describe persons 'Ego has nothing in 
common' with. I asked the party-goers, 'Are people you don't know, but who have the same way of 
flunking and consciousness as you, also taninT}3 Yuka replied immediately:
Ahh! No, these people do not feel like tanin. They may be people I don 't know, but they 
are all enjoying themselves in their own way on the same wavelength as me. There are 
many people like that, to whom  I m ight say, 'hello' (Ah! sou iu hito wa tanin to wa 
kanjinai! shiranai hito dakedo onaji hokdsei de tanoshindeiru tte omeru hito tte takusan iru no 
ne 'Hello! tte dare ni demo ieru.). There are also people who are not at all like that as well, 
and I sort of feel estranged from them. These people are tanin ( demo mattaku sou ja nai 
hitotachi mo iru. Sono hitotachi no koto wo watashi wa tanin to kanjiru shi).
in
^Paatu j i g  naka de wa tanin imasu ka
•JO
Paatu no naka de wa onaji ishiki wo motta shiranai hito mo tanin to iu hito desu ka
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Such a perception of people Ego doesn't know as 'not being like tanin', conforms to the perception 
that many of the interviewees had, of people Ego doesn't know 'being like nakama'. This is logical, 
for 'being like nakama implies 'not being like tailin'. In Yuka’s case, this is revealed when she says, 
people she doesn't know, but who are on 'the same wavelength (onaji hokdsei de)' as her, are not tanin. 
Bearing in m ind Takeshi’s view that everybody at a party is nakama, it is also not surprising that he 
doesn't think anybody at a party is tanin. When I asked Mm, 'Are there tanin at parties', he replied:
No, I don 't tliink so. Naturally, the first time you go to a party, everybody except your 
friends is tanin, but after you've been a few times and you are used to it, there are no 
tanin. People who understand w hat it's all about are not tanin (paati ni narete kitara tanin 
ja nai nja nai desu ka ne. Sono ba no fu n ’iki ga wdkatchatteiru hito wa tanin ja nai).
There are those, as Takeshi says, who maybe have come to their first party, who regard 
people they don’t know as tanin. These newcomers might be regarded as tanin. Then there are those 
who may have read about Techno parties in a magazine somewhere, and have come along to see 
what all the fuss is about. Yuka explained:
Are there tanin... Let me give you an example. Apparently, Techno is really fasliionable, 
yes? and there are people who like fashionable things. Therefore, there are people who 
like fashionable things just because they are fashionable, who come to parties. If you 
look in  the latest magazines, or go to the beauty salon, 'Techno is it', is written all over.
When these things happen, everybody jumps on the bandwagon, as they do in Japan.
There are certainly people like this at parties, and in this sense I might call them tanin. 
However, w hen they come to see w hat it's all about, maybe they feel som ething and 
gradually become people who are able to share in it all.
What begins to emerge from the deliberations of w hether som ething is nakama or nakama- 
like, or whether somebody is tanin, is that these judgments are not based on relationships defined by 
affiliation to a collective self. The relationships among the party-goers, as well as the employees at 
GA, are defined by Ego, an individual self, subjectively, on the basis of Ego's feelings about their 
relationship w ith a given other. Consequently, there are degrees of nakama-ness and tanin-ness 
w ithin GA and w ithin the parties wMch are recognised and understood. A t GA, there is no, 'this 
person's in my w ork team so they m ust be nakama because that's what nakama is', regardless of how 
they personally feel about that person. And in the parties, there is no 'this person m ust be tanin 
because I've never met them  before'. The new individualism  em powers individual selves to make 
their own decisions about who they associate with, what kind of a relationsMp an individual self has 
with another, and how they perceive it. This fundamental change to the way in which social groups 
are created, recognised, and defined among the employees at GA and among the party-goers, is an 
im portant aspect of individualism  ushered in by the em pow erm ent of individuals. W ithin the 
workplace, whether it is GA, Dynamix, or Intelligent, we see individual selves being called upon to 
express their individuality by showing initiative and by being asked to take responsibility. Outside 
the workplace, showing initiative and taking responsibility primarily manifests itself as individual 
selves choosing who they associate with, w hat kind of relationships they have, and  how they 
interpret those relationships.
On w hat basis do these individual selves make these judgm ents? If they are not making
2 6 8
them on the basis of who is affiliated to which collective self, they m ust be making subjective 
judgments against personal references which satisfy an ethics of individuality. We saw among the 
em ployees at GA, how  em pow ering ind iv iduals and encouraging ind iv iduality  leads to a 
fragmentation and diversification of reference groups (4.4). Seken, as it is ordinarily understood, is 
the reference group of a particular affiliated group (Inoue 1977), and consistent w ith a fragmentation 
and diversification of reference groups, a sense of seken, a sense of needing to be careful about 
sekentei, and an awareness of seken nnmi standards all dim inished among the employees at GA. By 
discussing w hether a party is seken, whether the party-goers are conscious of their sekentei at parties, 
and whether they perceive any seken nami standards at parties, 1 aim to dem onstrate that a similar 
process of fragm entation and diversification to the that among the employees at GA is occurring 
among the party-goers, and that this in tu rn  will indicate that em erging individuality  and the 
fragm entation of reference groups accompany each other in a dynam ic process, as a result of a 
redefining of the individual self.
'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
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8.3) R edefined Com m unity 2: Seken Reconsidered
In 4.4 I noted how Inoue described seken as "something which cannot be anything other than vague 
and ambiguous (baknzen toshita ainiai na mono to naramrii wo cnni de aron)" (Inoue 1977: 71). Inoue also 
states that "it is hard to see seken as anything other than a num ber of individuals". Chogi also 
described seken as difficult to define and comprising of individual selves:
Seken has no defined shape (katachi no m i mono). It resides inside oneself (doko ni am  ka 
to in, jibun no naka ni am  mono). It is an individual's value standards which you yourself 
set, and which you yourself judge, everyone one by one (jibun ga kachi kijttn wo kimete, 
jibun de handan sum  koto da, minna hitori hitori de). For people who can't make those 
judgments, seken exists somewhere else.
Abe describes seken as: "a netw ork of face-to-face relationships where everybody knows each other 
by sight (kao mishiri no kankei)" (Abe 1994: 59). Consequently, there would seem to be agreement that 
seken resides in ind iv idual selves, not outside them  som ewhere. A lthough Chogi's com m ent 
suggests that seken for some does not reside in the individual self, I think we can interpret him to 
mean, some people rely on the judgm ent of others. This is reminiscent of Doi's (1973), and Lebra's 
(1992) condition of jibun ga nai, 'to be w ithout a self’ (4.3). Given that seken resides in individual 
selves, seken manifests itself through a person's sekentei, either by an individual commenting on what 
others do, such as 'You have to do it this way', or by an individual responding to such a remark or 
responding directly to a seken nami, 'conforming to seken', standard. Either way, we can see that it is 
individuals w ho police and sanction each other, not some authority or body of legislation. And 
indeed, this is w here we can differentiate seken from judicial authority. We can also separate seken 
from 'common knowledge (jdshiki)',w for seken is highly group specific, even though this can involve 
a num ber of identifiably distinct groups which are tied in some way, such as a trade association, or 
dependent on each other, such as com panies that do business w ith each other, or a keiretsu. 
Miyanaga (1991) states that Japanese groups which conform to the 'group m odel of Japanese 
society', have highly group-specific 'interaction rituals' (6.1). These interaction rituals she m entions 
are in fact seken nami standards, which do vary from group to group. Not only do they vary from 
group to group, as I argued in 1.3 seken is often more coercive than judicial law and can actually 
contravene judicial authority, causing members of seken to break the law.
The way to establish the existence of seken is by establishing w hether individual selves, in a 
given situation, feel they ’have to take care of their sekentei (sekentei wo mamoranakereba ikenai)', and
Jdshiki, like seken does reside in individual selves. However, it is not group specific like seken. I did not discuss jdshiki with 
either the employees' at GA or the party goers, however, 1 regard joshiki as J.S. Mill regarded 'common sense morality’: "the 
accumulated wisdom  of mankind about the desirable and undesirable consequences of actions" (Schneewind 1994: 152). 
Jdshiki is often translated as 'common sense', but it does not mean common sense, as in: 1 she has common sense = she is 
sensible', as it tends to be used in English. Neither does joshiki refer to all mankind, as Mill suggests. Jdshiki, as 'common sense 
morality', primarily refers to a body of knowledge concerning Right and Wrong, which members of a given collective self 
share, for example, a nation or ethnic group. The common knowledge of a particular section of society, such as that discussed 
by Bourdieu (1984) in his study of taste, can also be regarded as joshiki.
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whether they feel there are seken twwi standards which they feel forced to acknowledge, or desire to 
acknowledge. These standards can influence how people dress, where they go, w hat they do, who 
they associate with, etc. This is how the employees at GA established for themselves whether seken 
existed within GA. Within the company itself, everybody except M uroya-san said that seken, seken 
nami standards, and the feeling of needing to be careful about their sekentei was absent. This is 
because, to use Hashim oto san's words, the particular kinds of social relationships which create 
seken and seken nami standards, and which require individual selves to be careful about their sekentei, 
have been 'demolished (kuznshita)' (4.4).15
Among the party-goers, nobody considered that a party m ight be seken except Ai, and 
Takeshi and Masumi who reported a slight feeling of seken at parties. When I asked Takeshi if he felt 
the presence of seken at parties,16 he replied: "A little bit to begin with (saisho wa chotto arimasti)". Ai 
had a stronger sense: "Yes, I have a sense of being a part of seken at parties (paati demo seken no nalai 
no you na Id ga sum)". She then thought about it for a moment and added:
There can only be one seken, and at parties there are many different types of people 
(seken ga hitotsu no you na Id ga sum. nanka paati ni urn ironna hito ga irtt n da). Parties are 
more open and not so rigid (motto oupen na to onion, sou in kataku naku). W hether I'd use 
the term seken, I don't know. Seken, sekentei, dotchi nan darou! what is all this!....But in a 
club I do always have that sense [of seken and sekentei] hanging around me (knrabu no 
nalai ni itsumo watashi no nal<a de wa sou itta imiwo mochiawaseteiru).
In Ai's case, she feels the presence of seken, but then goes over in her m ind w hat seken is, as she 
understands it, and decides that it doesn't fit. However, for Ai, there clearly is a selcen-ness about the 
parties. Her point: "There can only be one seken and at parties there are m any different types of 
people" describes how everybody, including the employees at GA, perceive seken as a m oral 
framework which imposes uniformity and conformity of thought and act. The simple fact that there 
are perceived to be 'm any different types of people’ at parties, makes it impossible for a party to be 
seken. Consistent w ith her train of thought that seken implies uniformity of thought and act, Ai also 
comments that: "parties are more open and not so rigid (motto oupen na to omou, sou iu kataku naku)". 
She also has the common perception of seken, noted by Lebra (1992) (4.4), as som ething which 
polices and constrains the individual self. This is revealed when she says: "Even in a place where 1 
have so much fun and can be myself, I still feel it ( jibun zoo dashite tanoshimi kittenai tokoro zva am no 
kamoshirenai)".
Masumi also thought that there was a slight sense of seken at parties (chotto am kana), but like 
Ai, decided that a party cannot be seken because: "everybody is just being themselves". Individual 
selves 'being themselves', implies difference and diversity, not uniformity, consequently Masumi 
perceives a party as unlike seken for the same reason. Even though they say a party cannot be seken, 
it seems as though both of them perceive the conventions, codes of conduct, and ways of thinking 
which are generally acknowledged by those who attend the parties, as seken-like in some way. Once 
again, as w ith shuudan and nakama (7.1, 7.2), we see that redefined individual selves coming 
together, results in a redefined collective self which renders familiar terms unsuitable to describe
16The word 'demolish (kuznsu transitive, kuzurcru intransitive)' was also used by Masumi, Ai, and Keiichi in the same way. 
^Pnatii i no naka ni wa seken to iu jitai no you na ki ni nanmasu ka
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these new collective selves. Yet, at the same time, there is evident similarity betw een these new 
redefined collective selves and other more familiar collectivities, so that we can identify the 
continuities and the changes.
Both Ai and M asumi regard seken as an oppressive 'force (ikioi)', to use Inoue’s (1977) term 
(4.4), which they associate with a particular structuration of community where individual selves are 
expected to conform to uniform patterns of thought and action. Within the collective selves in which 
they find themselves, where 'individuality  (kosei)' is encouraged and legitim ated, pressure to 
conform is m arkedly reduced as a result of individual selves being recognised and legitimated. 
Boundaries are less rigid and exclusionary and 'integration rituals' are less specific to a given 
collective self, focusing instead on general individual qualities (7.1).
Seken w ould  seem  to be one of the secondary m anifestations w hich the term  'group 
(shuudan)' brings to the m inds of all the interviewees, for the interviewee's perception of seken is 
intimately associated w ith having to be aware of who one is addressing and how to act, w ith a 
feeling of being constantly watched and listened to, and of being pressurized to conform to a single 
way of thinking and doing. These feelings were described by the staff of GA as having to deny their 
self (jibun wo korosu)', as Iwata san put it, or 'suppress their self (Jcojin wo osaeru)', as M atsubara san 
expressed it w hen describing an individual's (kojin) relationship to a 'group (shuudan)' (3.5, 4.3). 
When discussing sekentei, Ozaw a-san explained that this suppression took the form of people 
saying: "This is the done thing, you!", or "People are...". Iwata san said the same : "You will hear 
people say, 'You have to do things this way', something associated with seken which you won't find 
at GA" (4.4).
Even though Ai rationalises that a party can't be seken, her sense of seken at parties derives 
not only as I suggested it might, from the particular feeling a person has in any situation where they 
are being judged and they are judging others, but because she does actually have an awareness of 
sekentei at parties. She also had a noticeably different attitude to tanin than the other interviewees, 
from which Hitomi, quite firmly, distanced herself when I interviewed them together. Ai was the 
only interviewee who said that she is aware of sekentei at parties, although she added she wasn't 
bothered about it: "It's there, but I'm not bothered about it (am kedo ki no shinai nani mo betsu ni)". 
However, from other comments she made, she does bring a sense of seken w ith her to the parties. 
D uring the interview , she m ade a num ber of remarks w hen we were discussing tanin which 
indicated that tanin were not simply people Ai had nothing in common with. Ai was classifying 
them and categorising them negatively on the basis that their sekentei d id  not conform to hers. 
Sekentei is im portant to her at parties, and like Inoue (1977), she tries to deny it (4.4), but unlike the 
other party-goers, who clearly had either no regard for, or awareness of sekentei at the parties, Ai 
couldn't always hide it, just as Inoue described of himself (Inoue 1977: iii) H er m arking of social 
space was noticeably more territorially defined than the other party-goers. Ai is more judgmental 
and dismissive of persons she doesn't know on the basis of certain standards she has, which she 
then projects onto others. These are recognisable characteristics of seken manifesting itself through 
individuals, who prejudge and police others with their opinions, reinforcing their own sense of self 
which is dependent for its legitimacy and authority on others also complying to seken standards.
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Ai has a strong personality, but these differences between Hitomi and Ai are not simply due 
to differences in personality or character. It is clear that Ai perceives social space in a less fluid, 
more rigid way, than Hitomi. As might be expected, the other side of having a sense of seken and 
sekentei, is clearly marking tanin negatively, and this is how Ai's sense of seken manifested itself, even 
though she rationalised that parties are not seken.
Are there various sekentei?
Ai: There are, but I’m not bothered about it.
W hat are you aware of at parties?
Ai: I w ant to be fashionable w hen I go to a party (laughs). But a party is an  enjoyable 
thing, so there isn't really anything to be concerned about (anmri tanoshii koto dakara ki ni 
nani koto wa anmri nai).
Hitomi: I don't really feel sekentei myself, so I don't really think about it (jibun de ki ni 
sura sonna ni kangaeta koto nai). O ther than that, I'm aware that everybody is there to 
have a good time, and that nothing else matters.
Do you have to be careful about sekentei at work?
Ai: Well, I can’t be late, can't take time off just when I like. It's not an opportunity to 
relax and play, so yes.
Hitomi: Well, w ork is work, but sekentei, these days? I'm not so sure. There are things 
you have to do, that's all (shigoto wa shigoto deshoti, tashika ni wan to taihen kedo sekentei to 
iu ka ima don kana. yaranakya ikenai koto ga am). Certainly a lot people I w ork w ith are 
aware of sekentei, but many don't care, particularly the younger ones.
At parties?
Ai: Yes, I have a sense of being a part of seken at parties (paati demo seken no naka no you 
na ki ga sum). The other side of that is that I often look at other people and think 
'Whaaaa, look at that!' (gyaku ni paati ni kiteiru hito wo mite 'waaaaa' to onion). Honestly, 
there are tanin but we're there to have a good time, so maybe I'm a little unfair (matomo 
de chotto tanin goto, demo sore wo tanoshindeiru kara, chotto watashi dake zum i kamoshirenai). 
Hitomi: I don’t agree w ith Ai about the tanin thing. We're all there to have a good time 
and that's great ( tanin goto He iu wake ja nai kedo minim tanoshindeiru no wa sugoi ii to onion 
kara). Everybody is very open and friendly (minna oupen de friendly to nari).
Ai: Yes, bu t w hat I m eant is....we're all there to have a good time together, for sure, 
what I m eant was...well, maybe I'm always unfair! (watashi datte, issho ni tanoshinde demo 
sou iu nan da watashi wa itsnmo zurui (laughs).
Ai remarks twice that 'maybe she is unfair'. What she is referring to is her habit of prejudging people 
because they do not conform to her way of thinking and doing, often dressing in Ai's case. She 
believes that people should be judged individually, not by reference to whether they conform to her 
own ways of thinking and doing, but her sense of seken catches her unawares sometimes.
Sekentei is a 'face', the 'presentational self, which the individual draw s like a veil over the 
'inner self where the kokoro, the 'heart/m ind /sou l', resides (Lebra 1992). Sekentei is the embodiment 
of a m orality which requires individual selves to suppress their selves (jibun/kojin) and present a 
'face': sekentei literally means the appearance or condition of seken. Consequently, sekentei is, by its 
very nature, regarded as superficial and deceitful by persons who regard the expression of the self,
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through a person's individuality (kosei), as the only morally correct way to be-in-the-world, and the 
only basis on which to judge a person. By being aware of sekentei, Ai is, by her own standards, 
prejudging people and ignoring their individuality. Yet, Ai is also a person who avidly respects and 
admires individuality in others, and believes that individuality generates community, not decimates 
community (6.3). This m ight appear contradictory, but we should not be surprised that individual 
selves are matrices of conflicting values and apparently incommensurable desires. Ai believes that 
being able to express her individuality and being expected to encourage others to do likewise, rather 
than being expected to suppress her individuality and making sure others do the same, is morally 
correct. Yet, despite this, she does have a sense of seken and sekentei, which she attempts to override. 
Consequently, even though Ai does have a sense for seken, which manifested itself in her answers to 
direct questions about seken and through her attitudes to tanin, she also has a strong dislike of it. 
This is indicated by the way she refers to her attitudes to tanin in the conversation w ith Hitomi, 
above, as zitrui, which means 'deceitfully', and in the conversation below, where she was talking 
about her colleagues at work and whether they go to parties:
Well, not surprisingly, they show no interest particularly. They hate the music, they 
say. That's how they've classified it and they won't change their minds. Everybody at 
w ork likes hip-hop, but the tru th  is that's just a fashion. In fact that whole attitude 
really makes me angry (Ai was getting quite angry here). That's seken for you and I 
want nothing to do w ith it (shokuba no hito wa minna hip hop ga suki de. Jissai ni ima 
hayachatteiru ski, dakara zuatashi sugoku seikatsn ni mi ni tsumasareteimasu yo. Sore ga seken 
da to watashi wa toranai).
Her denial of seken and her strong negative feelings about it seem to accompany her self-awareness 
of it. Her sekentei is a sensibility which rises up in her, a particular way of m apping the social world 
which she doesn't agree with. It catches her unaw ares, just as Inoue (1977) described himself, and 
she doesn't like it.
The explanations of seken and sekentei given by the party-goers conform to those given by 
the employees at GA. Chogi explained sekentei as: "conforming to w hat is around you (sekentei to in 
no wa mazvari ni docho sum  to iu koto deshyo)". Masako as: ''sekentei is worrying about what people are 
going to think about you ( tanin ni don mimreru ka to iu ki ga sum  koto deshiyou)''. However, Chogi 
continued: "But that's not im portant to me (sore wa hitsuyd ja nai). Not bothering people is more 
im portant (hito ni meiwaku zoo ataeranai kara)". 'Not bothering people (hito ni meizuaku zvo kakenai)', is 
the common expression used to describe what sekentei is supposed to achieve, while conforming to 
seken nami standards is generally regarded as the way Ego refrains from bothering people. Chogi 
remarks that sekentei is unim portant to him, but that 'not bothering people’ is im portant to him. 
Masa made the same distinction:
When I walk dow n the street, I’m  extremely aware of the gap between myself and 
others (michi aruiteiru to yappari kou gyappu zva sugoi kanjimasu yo). I walk dow n the 
street w ith that awareness, and occasionally people look at me and snigger. But I'm me 
and I am just being myself, nothing particular (ore zva ore de bctsu ni sore ga jibun de jibun 
dakara). People say things but it doesn't bother me at all. Sekentei is about not causing 
any problems for anybody, supposedly (da sou desn). If you do give somebody a hard 
time, that is unacceptable, and you shouldn't do it. So, if I don't do that, w hat ever else 1 
do has got nothing to do with sekentei. As far as things like sekentei go, I have the self- 
confidence to live my life the way I think I should. When somebody sees that, they may
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dislike it and say something. You know the kind of thing. But that is just how some 
people think, and it doesn’t bother me particularly. So I don 't really have the feeling 
that I have to adjust to others, which is what sekentei is usually thought of as being.
Rather than saying that sekentei is about conforming to others (hito ni awnseru koto), like Chogi, Masa 
regards sekentei as about 'not bothering others'. He says that sekentei involves not causing any 
problems for anybody, and he uses the common expression 1 mentioned above, sekentei to in kn sore 
ga honto ni hito ni meiwaku wo hikern tte iu no wa, to express this moral imperative. However, he then 
says: "If I don't do that, whatever else I do has got nothing to do w ith sekentei {nani shitemo sekentei 
toka sou iu no wo kankei nai to omou)". Masa is dearly  defining sekentei conventionally, in the sense that 
sekentei is 'not bothering others (meiwaku ni kakenai) but he limits the meaning to exclude conforming. 
Clearly, under seken rules, 'not bothering som ebody’ is achieved by conforming to others, but both 
Chogi and Masa are invoking standards for w hat constitutes 'bothering1 somebody which does not 
involve taking care of sekentei. Like Chogi, sekentei is unim portant to Masa. He says he doesn't 'feel 
{ki wa anmri nai)' the need to adjust: "I don 't really have the feeling that I have to adjust to others, 
which is w hat sekentei is usually thought of as being. I just don't have that need to adjust it {dakara 
hito ni awase you tte ki wa anmri nai. sono iwayuru sekentei tte iu ippan no hito to awasenakya ikenai to iu 
riymi mo nai shi, awaseru ki mo nai)''.
Takeshi also marks a distinction bet ween 'not bothering people' and sekentei, and his reason 
for this is very clear: "we come together as individuals {watashitachi wa kojin kojin de atsumatte kara)''.
Sekentei is conforming to others {sekentei to iu no wa hito ni awaseru koto deshou), but we 
come together as individuals, so we say, rather than take care of sekentei, just don't 
cause trouble for others {watashitadii wa kojin kojin de atsumatte iru kara sekentei to iu 
yorimo tanin ni kakechau to ne tsumari jibun igai no hito ni kakechau to yabai desu yo ne)"17.
Sekentei, it seems, is primarily about conforming rather than not causing others trouble. Under seken 
rules, one implies the other, but the difference is apposite. Obviously if Ego is expected to conform, 
then some kind of non-conformity may well bother others. However, if conformity is not a moral 
precept, then what constitutes 'bothering people’, will certainly be redefined, as a result of difference 
being embraced. Takeshi, M asum i and I were sitting on the sofas in the corner of the shop at 
Intelligent in Ebisu discussing all this. Masumi agrees with Takeshi, however her emphasis is subtly 
different:
What Takeshi says is right. Don't upset someone or make them feel bad {nanka iya na 
omoi, fuyukai na kanji ataenai kagiri ni oite wa). There are many people who have different 
values and outlooks {chigau kachikan wo motteiru hito mo ippai iru kara), so you can at 
least speak politely to these people {sou iu hito ni wa ki wo tsukete hanashite, sono kurai).
Instead of saying 'we are individuals, therefore we ignore sekentei', M asumi's em phasis is not on 
Ego, but on Other. She says: 'There are many people who have different values and outlooks (so 
sekentei is unsuitable)'. H er point is not that Ego is an individual and consequently should be 
recognised as such, although I know she believes that, but instead that O ther is an individual and
17Yama clarifies tanin as jibim  igai no hito because he used the meaning of tanin as 'strangers', 'people Ego doesn't know 
personally' in the discussion of whether there are tanin at parties. In this case he uses tanin as meaning 'any person other than 
Ego'.
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should be treated as such. The emphasis is important, for it indicates, in M asumi's case at least, that 
recognition of individuality is not solely ego-centric, but is offered to embrace others, as well as 
desired for oneself. Takeshi's comment was not ego-centric particularly, and I am not contrasting the 
two, but 1 think the fact that M asumi phrased her comment in the way that she did is noteworthy. 
She believes that speaking politely is one 'interaction ritual' which everybody understands. Ijiri 
(1991), judging  from his com m ents on the s tuden ts’ way of com m unicating w ith the o lder 
salarymen, discussed in 5.4, m ight think otherwise.
W hat we are w itnessing is individual selves and collective selves who refer to a moral 
framework that is different to seken. Consistent w ith the redefining of other aspects of individual 
selves and collective selves, moral structures are also being redefined. Seken is clearly a coercive, 
group-specific m oral universe, as all the examples of how seken is m anifested, given by the 
employees at GA and by the party-goers, are of the type: ’You should', ’You have to’, or 'you must' 
statements, all of them moral imperatives seeking to coerce individual selves into uniform ways of 
thinking and acting in specific situations, suppressing individuality (kosei) and difference, and 
propagating an ideology of exclusivity and homogeneity. Instead, moral guidelines am ong the 
employees at GA or am ong the party-goers foreground ind ividual em pow erm ent, recognise 
individuality (kosei) and difference, and do not seek exclusivity and homogeneity.
The individual self is perceived as required to ’express its self (jibun wo dasu /kosei wo dasu)', 
among the party-goers, in the same way as the employees at GA. Yet even for the party-goers and 
the employees at GA, sekentei is regarded as a conventional way of being-in-the-world, whereby the 
individual self presents a ’face’ (Lebra 1977) to seken and hides their self. Sakamoto-san told me: 
"Even a little away from the company [sekentei] becomes very important". The employees at GA and 
the party-goers realise that they are a minority, but see things going in the direction they are 
heading. As Hashimoto-san, head of General Affairs at GA remarked: "I think we are ahead here"
(4.3).
Expressing individuality is becoming an acceptable way of being-in-the-world. We can say 
this because of the discourses of individuality that are circulating through the corridors of power, 
together w ith the em ergence of ind iv iduality  as a positive hum an characteristic w ithin the 
mainstream, indicated by the example of GA and the party-goers. Nevertheless, for still the majority 
of the population, in the course of their lives, going about their daily business, individual selves are 
expected to suppress their ’true feelings (honne)', to hide their ’inner self’ where their kokoro resides, 
and present their sekentei, a 'public behaviour (tatemae)' self. In 4.5 I explained why I regard this ’two- 
tiered se lf (Bachnik 1992, 1994; Tobin 1992) as unsatisfactory, but even so, Japanese do clearly 
perceive kokoro and sekentei as residing in two separate, distinguishable parts of the self (jibun). 
Separating the self into an inner and outer self is, in my opinion, difficult to sustain on the ground.
Seken is regarded  as outside the self, w atching and listening, but resides w ithin the 
individual self, made manifest through a person's sekentei. The idea that seken resides in some outer 
part of the self, while kokoro, which is essentially what is being referred to as the 'inner self, remains 
detached and unaffected by seken is difficult to imagine. In the same way, it is difficult to imagine 
that a person’s sekentei is unaffected by their kokoro. It is also arguable that, for those who feel it,
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there isn't any situation where a person's sekentei is not active, For those who feel it, seken penetrates 
even the m ost intim ate situations, even those m om ents w hen Ego is alone. As M uroya-san 
rem arked: "W hether at w ork or w ith my friends, or anyw here else, that feeling is the same". 
Consequently, M uroya-san m ust feel his sekentei in w hat would be regarded as honne situations. 
Also, the fact that sekentei is regarded as a feeling suggests that it resides deep within the psyche. 
Nevertheless, m any Japanese clearly do regard sekentei as separate from kokoro, and regard the 
suppression of kokoro in all but the m ost intim ate situations as morally correct. By separating the 
kokoro from sekentei, Japanese have a mechanism for dealing with the pluralist m oral spaces which 
the world of seken is. It is much easier to accede to ways of thinking and acting which put Ego in a 
moral dilemma, if his or her conscience can remain uninvolved in an inner self.
The employees at GA and the party-goers regard the suppression of the individual self as 
morally w rong.18 We know this because 'suppressing the self (kojin wo osaern f  jibtin wo korosu)' is 
regarded as 'deceitful (gomakasu)', and the expression of the self (kosei wo dasu!jibun wo dasu)' is 
regarded as ’honest (gomakashiteinai)'. For the interviewees, the self is not split into an inner and 
outer self, but is a unitary self. Tins self was expressed as jibun or kojin, w ith no reference to sekentei 
or kokoro, such as ’we ignore sekentei and reveal our kokoro', suggesting that the individualist self is 
not perceived as a conflation of the two-tiered self by the employees at GA, or by the party-goers, 
bu t is regarded as a qualitatively  different unitary self w hich should express its kosei, its 
’individuality’, not its kokoro.
Having established the close link between kokoro and kosei, we know that 'to express one's 
'individuality (kosei)' essentially means 'to express one's 'h e a rt/so u l/m in d  (kokoro)', w hile the 
established link between kokoro and 'true feeling (honne)' confirms this link. But although we can see 
continuity between a self which is expected 'to suppress itself’ and a self which is expected 'to 
express itself', the continuity was not articulated by the interviewees. The self (jibun) was always 
expressed as a unitary self by all the interviewees, w ith no reference to an 'inner' and 'outer' self, 
until we started talking about sekentei. Consequently, in order to explain sekentei to me, and why 
they regard it as morally wrong, the interviewees referred to the 'two-tiered' model of the self. 
Yamazaki-san at GA adopted this approach (4.4), and Rika does this by contrasting the judging of a 
person on the basis of their sekentei against the judging of a person on the basis of 'what's inside':
Sekentei is w hat a person regards as right. Your own sense of w hat is right. What you 
wear, what you do, where you go, etc. Obviously I care what I look like, but I don't feel 
that it is sekentei (sekentei tte iu knnji ga nai kedo). It feels different, but it's difficult to 
explain.(fan?// wa chigau deshou demo muzukashii sekentei da yo naa). If I’m out walking 
around before m orning dressed like this, on my way home from a club, some people 
will think that it is wrong. They will think its my sekentei. However, I myself don't think 
about it. Rather than thinking about what those people are thinking, I’m more thinking 
about how I'm enjoying myself, w hat I have to do, where I have to go, etc. I'm not 
aware of sekentei. We should be judging people, not on what's on the outside, more on 
what is inside. Sekentei is what's on the outside (soto kara mita hyomen), it has nothing to 
do with the kokoro that's inside (kokoro to kankei nai). Whereas in fact, w hat I look like is 
what is inside (mita me ja nakute motto naimenteki na mono).
1 The suppression of the self is also regarded as inefficient and unproductive by a number of the interviewees, particularly 
the employees at GA (5.1, 5.2).
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In the last sentence, after having described sekentei in terms of an inner and outer self, Rika contrasts 
this two-tiered self w ith herself: "Whereas in fact, what I look like is w hat is inside". She regards her 
self as undivided, a self for all occasions.
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4) Individuality  Through Com munity, Community Through Individuality
It has become clear that there are fundam ental similarities between the em ployees at GA and 
between the party-goers, in the perception of individual selves, in the perception of collective selves, 
and in the relationship between individual selves and collective selves. W hat we see happening is 
that the same ideas and values about individual selves and collective selves w hich are being 
im plem ented in companies like GA, are also developing among individual selves in established 
companies and in the flexible economy, so that a general trend of emerging individuality does 
appear to be occurring across the whole of society, as Miyanaga (1991) speculated it would.
The process of developm ent of individualistic individual and collective selves is one of 
'individuality through community', and 'community through individuality’, whereby individual 
selves and collective selves m utually constitute each other and define each other. 'Individuality 
through com m unity', is the establishm ent and legitim ation of individualistic individual selves 
though m em bership of a collective self w hich encourages individual selves to express their 
individuality (kosei), while recognising and acknowledging the individuality of others. 'Community 
through individuality ', is indiv idual selves coming together to participate and co-operate as 
individual selves aware that community is dependent on all members expressing their individuality 
(kosei), and encouraging others to do likewise. Within a company like GA, this is achieved through 
the organisational structure and com m and structure of the company, and through collectively 
acknowledged discourses of individuality and community, which legitim ate individuality and 
define param eters for thought and action at both the individual and collective level. I regard a 
process of establishing and legitim ating individuality through the organisational structure and 
command structure of an institution, such as a company, as a 'top down' process.
Ind iv idualistic  selves who w ork for established com panies w hich are slow  in 
im plem enting w orking practices and codes of conduct which w ould encourage em ployees to 
develop their individuality, are looking outside the workplace to establish and legitimate their 
individuality. The pace of change am ong established companies is slow, consequently there are 
large numbers of predominantly young (under 35) employees seeking to express their individuality 
and establish and legitimate their selves in this way. They are joined by the burgeoning numbers of 
individualistic selves working part-time, on temporary contracts, or on short fixed-term contracts in 
the flexible economy, who have little to identify w ith w ithin the workplace. Recognition and 
legitimacy are difficult for individual selves to acquire and maintain in a flexible economy for this 
reason. Consequently, like those individualists in established companies, those w orking in the 
flexible economy are also looking to have their selves recognised and legitimated. This process of 
establishing and legitimating individuality is essentially 'bottom-up'.
M iyanaga (1991) noticed that individualistic individual selves unable to express their 
individuality  in the w orkplace, such as those w orking in established 'up-dow n (joge gaisha)"
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companies, were forming 'private groups'. That is 'groups entered voluntarily on the basis of 
personal com m itm ent', invariably outside the workplace (6.1). M iyanga's 'private groups' were 
predominantly family orientated. However, today, this trend has spread. Men and women, married 
and unm arried, are coming together to form small groups of like-minded people, where they can 
express their individuality (kosei). The same is true for those working in the flexible economy. These 
'private groups', however, are too small and too isolated for these individual selves to be confident 
enough to 'be themselves' outside their own 'private groups’. Confidence to 'be yourself comes from 
a feeling of rightness about the self, which for m ost people can only come from recognition by a 
number of 'significant others' that the self is 'OK'. For the employees at GA, this feeling of 'rightness' 
comes from w orking for the com pany itself. The com pany requires its staff to express their 
individuality, and this fact alone confers a considerable degree of legitimacy. In addition, because 
GA is a successful and respected company, this further legitimates the employees individuality.
In the absence of many companies like GA, many young individualistic selves are looking 
for a way to establish and legitimate their selves. A Techno party is one way that individual selves 
can achieve the same results as working for a company like GA. A Techno party is a 'private group' 
of a sufficient size to give those who attend the chance to try out their individuality as if in public, 
which gives them the confidence to 'be themselves' in other situations. This is very much a learning 
process, w here em erging individualists are negotiating the param eters for thought and action 
am ong themselves. People come w ith their ow n social expectations, which, due to the sheer 
numbers of people, are throw n into relief and objectified. What I mean by this is that as individual 
selves interact, similarities and differences of thought and act become visible and can therefore be 
recognised. This impacts on the individual self through the self noticing patterns of thought and 
action at the collective level. On a sufficiently large scale, sim ilarity and difference becomes 
objectified and consequently achieves an authority. Soon, parameters for thought and action begin 
to emerge. This is not a 'top dow n’ process, such as in GA or any company or institution which 
imposes guidelines for thought and action through an organisational and command structure upon 
the individual self and the collective self. Individual selves and collective selves are established and 
legitimated through a 'bottom  up ' process at a Techno party. The process is ’bottom -up’, simply 
because param eters for though t and action are negotiated by in d iv idua l selves w ith  no 
organisational structure or com m and structure. Coalescing individual thoughts and actions form 
patterns, making them recognisable, whereby they become objectified, sedim enting out of the ether 
as individual selves begin to articulate recognisable discourses of being-in-the-world and act within 
those discourses. Parameters for thought and action, articulated through these discourses, acquire 
an authority and a legitimacy. Nevertheless, even though these discourses of being which define 
how individual selves 'should' interact, do appear to be outside selves, everything is negotiated 
through individual selves. There is no organisational structure, no com m and structure, there are no 
tasks.
Individuality (kosei) is defined at the collective level at GA in exactly the same way as among 
the party-goers, articulated by individual selves through a discourse of individuality. However, at 
GA this discourse is itself defined by the organisational structure and com m and structure of the
280
company, making it a 'top-down' process. Even so, the degree of concordance at GA and at Techno 
parties, between the type of selves, both individual and collective, and between the discourses of 
individuality is striking. Not only that, but the relationship between individual selves and collective 
selves is virtually identical, where, in both cases, individuality is achieved by means of community, 
and community is achieved by means of individuality.
An im portant question rem ains to be considered: Are these 'com m unities’ in any way 
constructed in opposition, antagonism , or by other relationship to other communities? In other 
words, are these collectivities of individualistic individual selves symbolically constructed (Cohen 
1985), and are there boundaries at w hich these sym bols are m ore visible or can be better 
understood? In the case of GA, there was a noticeable lack of symbols and rituals, com pared with 
Japanese companies of the kind described by Rohlen (1974) and Kondo (1990). As Nakane (1970) 
explains, unity in companies such as these is achieved by "fostering a feeling of rivalry against other 
similar groups" (Nakane 1970: 10), and provides a good example of a symbolic construction of 
community.
1 did not identify any examples of a symbolic construction of com m unity, by m eans of 
symbols and rituals w ithin GA. In addition, the sense of inclusiveness was reduced through a 
noticeable absence of references to uchi no knishn (our company). I perceived a discourse of 
individuality am ong the employees, generated by M atsuda-san's personal beliefs and business 
philosophy. H ow ever, this was not system atized in any com pany songs or occasions, or in 
opposition to anything. There was a conscious effort by M atsuda-san to be different from companies 
like those described by Nakane (1970), Rohlen (1974), and Kondo (1990). M atsuda-san certainly 
w anted to do things differently than at Toshiba, where he had worked previously, but these were 
operational m atters, and not concerned w ith  identity, the crux of a sym bolic construction of 
community.
Am ong the party-goers, identity, as a 'com m unity', also seem ed unim portan t, w ith a 
noticeable lack of symbols used to indicate membership. The openness which the nascent ethics of 
individuality among the party-goers encourages mitigates against boundaries being erected. I think 
it was quite evident from all that the party-goers said on the various subjects that we discussed, that 
there are no w idespread systematicattempts at inclusiveness, and no vigilance towards maintaining 
boundaries. In fact, there was a noticeable absence of attention paid to defining themselves in 
relation to others, and a willingness to remove boundaries and bring others to parties. Feeling that a 
party is like nakama, a term  to describe a circle of intim ates, as m any of the interview ees did, 
indicates the degree of openness am ong those who attend. A characteristic of the individualism  at 
GA and among the party-goers was a relative absence of a consciousness of 'us' or 'them ', and an 
absence of discourses or symbols to reinforce such a consciousness.
• k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
281
Conclusion
I began the chapter by arguing that the mode of membership by which an individual self is joined to 
a collective self which encourages and recognises individuality (kosei) is not regarded as 'affiliation 
0siiozoktt)’. This is because 'affiliation (shozolat)' appears to describe a particular type of membership, 
tying the individual self into a particular structure of relationships, to particular codes of conduct, 
and to particular expectations and obligations, which are absent am ong the employees at GA and 
among the party-goers. The mode of m em bership of collective selves w ithin GA and at Techno 
parties, together with the ways of integrating (sesshikata) are far more fluid and flexible, making the 
term  'affiliation (shozoku)' unsuitable. The term 'group (shuudan)' also proved to be unsuitable, for 
just like 'affiliation (shozoku)', 'group (shuudan)' implies a collective self where individual selves are 
required to suppress their 'selves' (jibun/kojin), conform to uniform  standards of thought and 
behaviour, recognise particular codes of conduct pertaining to, for example, hierarchy, position, 
gender etc., and maintain rigid boundaries between other similar 'groups (shuudan)'.
The interviewees did consider if a party is a 'group (shuudan)' on the basis that 'everybody 
has som ething in common (ki/otsuu btibun ga aru)'. However, because everybody comes as an 
individual (kojin de atsumatte), everybody decided that a party  is different. A party  was also 
regarded as something other than a 'group (shuudan)' because, as M asumi decided, it was something 
to do with kokoro, (m ind/body/sp irit). Within a 'group (shuudan)', an individual self is expected to 
suppress kokoro. However, am ong the party-goers and am ong the em ployees at GA, kokoro is 
expressed when in a collective self, but as kosei, therefore the expression of kokoro is both that which 
makes a party feel like a group, because everybody 'has the same consciousness', and is also the 
thing which means a party cannot be a group, because kokoro is being expressed. In fact, expressing 
one's individuality (kosei), which requires revealing one’s kokoro, becomes a major part of self- 
actualisation and socialization am ong the employees at GA and the party-goers. A ttaching 
importance to expressing one's kokoro in Japan is nothing new, w hat is new  is that one's kokoro 
should be expressed in all situations, not just in strictly prescribed situations, usually associated 
with w hat are referred to as urn, 'back room', or uchi, 'inside', settings by anthropologists. Consistent 
with the conflation of social dom ains which I argued in 4.5, the settings in which kokoro can be 
expressed are also being redefined, while the essence of the Japanese self remains fundamentally the 
same. This redefinition involves the individual self 'being itself in all settings, anything else is 
regarded with suspicion and considered deceitful. This is a radical change from the 'group model of 
Japanese society', where the self is expected to disguise its 'true self', that is, its kokoro and kosei and 
present its sekentei.
Ishi (will) is redefined in exactly the same way, becoming a positive characteristic of the 
ideal individual self. Once again, though, this redefinition shows m uch continuity w ith previous 
prescriptions of the term ishi. For example, perseverance (gaman), and persistence (gambani), which 
are manifestations of ishi are still regarded highly among the employees at GA and among the party-
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goers. However, ishi becomes the means by which kokoro is revealed through kosei, which marks a 
fundam ental change. It is the mobilisation of ishi in the expression of kosei or of jibun, which is the 
act of asserting oneself, and w hich Ozawa-san was referring to in 3.2 w hen she rem arked that a 
person requires a lot of 'energy (pawaa)' to undertake anything in GA. In other w ords, 'being an 
individual' requires the expenditure of pawaa.
I next tu rned  to discuss w hether there are hierarchical relationships w ithin parties, and 
within the collective selves of the people who go to parties. Just as at GA, individual selves are 
regarded as equal ( taitd/byodo), w ith  judgm ents being m ade on the basis of ind iv idual acts. 
Judgments are subjective, and it is on the basis of such individual judgm ents that individual selves 
come together to form collective selves based on the proxim ity of their judgm ents on a range of 
issues, facts, beliefs, likes, dislikes, goals, etc. These collective selves comprised of individual selves 
whose individuality (kosei) approxim ates in a consensually acceptable w ay are nakmna-like. This 
nakama-ness manifests itself as a feeling (kankaku), as feelings of interdependence, of cooperation, of 
being connected, and of being able to trust others and have confidence in them while being able to 
’be yourse lf. A Techno party , w hich is a very large collection of ind iv idual selves w hose 
individuality and individual value judgm ents approxim ate to an extent that they all come to the 
parties, is nakama-Yfke. It is the nakama-like qualities which make people feel good and w ant to come 
again. However, it is also those things which make a party unlike nakama, which make it possible for 
such a large num ber of individual selves to be so intimate w ith each other. It is the acceptance of 
difference and of individuality  w hich makes such a large gathering possible, and consequently 
opens up the possibility and creates the setting for the recognition and legitimation of selves.
The interviewees' perception of who are tanin and what constitutes tanin-ness tells us more 
again about how social space is being m apped by these individual selves. The pressure to conform, 
together w ith  the restrictions w hich 'affiliation (shozokn)' places on ind iv idual selves, leads 
individual selves who are affiliated to the same 'group (shnndan)', to regard individual selves who 
are not 'affiliated (shozokn. shiteiru)' as tanin, that is, ’individual selves w hich Ego has nothing in 
common with (hjotsuu no nai hito)'. There are no degrees of tanin-ness or nakama-ness within such 
collective selves, or among such individual selves. Proximity to Ego is defined, not by Ego b u t by 
objectively recognised 'affiliation (shozoku)'. Maybe it is only when we realise that individual selves 
in the 'group model of Japanese society', cannot choose their friends, or distance themselves from 
their enemies that we can begin to understand w hat suppressing the self actually means, and why 
somebody like Ozawa-san should become seriously ill simply by living in her own country.
At a techno party, tanin are again 'people Ego has nothing in common with', but because 
individual selves are judged individually, because ways of integrating (sesshi kata) are more flexible, 
because nobody is judged by affiliation, and because individual selves are attem pting to be 'open- 
minded (oupen ma'indu)', which means accepting difference, somebody has to be very different to be 
classified as tanin. In fact, the only people who are classified as tanin are people who are not 
prepared to, or are unable to, express their individuality, and will not, or are unable to, let others do 
so. People Ego doesn't know  can be regarded as 'not tailin', and as nakama, because although Ego 
doesn't know them personally, they are, as Yuka pu t it: "on the same wavelength". Takeshi made an
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im portant distinction as well. When he told me that everybody at a party is nakama, and I remarked, 
'What, people you don 't know?', he replied: "People I don't speak to, certainly". In fact the meaning 
of tanin and of tanin-ness has rem ained m uch the same. What has changed is that the criteria of 
inclusion and  exclusion have radically  altered, w ith  the criteria for inclusion broadened 
considerably. This is how a Techno party can be nakama-like and bring such a large num ber of 
people to such a level of intimacy.
As in the case of GA, all the party-goers reported that they do not have a sense of seken at 
parties, and that they are not aware of their sekentei. Masumi had a slight feeling of seken, which I 
regard as an aw areness of those moral guidelines for thought and action which are present at 
parties. There may be no rules pertaining to seken at parties, but as at GA, there are parameters for 
thought and action which indicate how individual selves should act. However, these guidelines 
cannot be regarded as seken nami standards because nobody is expected to conform to uniform fixed 
defined standards. Instead, everybody is expected to 'be themselves (kosei wo narubekn subete dasu)', 
and is perceived as different (minita sorezorc chigau) and comes as an individual (kojin de atsumatte). 
Ai has an awareness of sekentei which primarily manifests itself as dismissive behaviour, casting 
others as tanin: not on the basis of their kosei but by projecting her sekentei on to them. She is aware 
of this and is uncomfortable about it, for she does believe that individual selves should express their 
kosei and that this should be the basis of community. However, when she is sometimes overcome by 
sekentei, she doesn’t allow others to express their kosei, and if they do, she doesn't recognise it and 
accept it, which, as Hitomi remarked, leads her to the misjudge people, and misjudge them harshly.
So, just like the employees at GA, the reason why seken is absent, and why the party-goers 
do not feel sekentei, is because there are diverse and fragm ented reference groups am ong them, 
arising from the recognition of individuality (kosei). Again, just as among the employees at GA, there 
is a high degree of concordance between the various reference groups of the party-goers, as well. We 
know this because a party is perceived as nakama-like by those who attend the parties, for nakama- 
ness rests on contiguity of thought and act. W hether these fragmented references, as contiguous as 
they might be, can be regarded as seken is difficult to say. The simple fact that a basic ethical precept 
of seken is that individual selves should suppress their self and conform to seken nami standards, 
suggests that a collective self w hich em braces difference and encourages the expression of 
individuality cannot be seken. Again, one of the defining characteristics of seken w ould seem to be 
that all m em bers of a given collective self are subject to the same seken nami standards, which 
enforce internal uniformity and external exclusivity. These rules do not apply within the collective 
selves at GA and w ithin a Techno party, which suggests that seken has been 'demolished' in these 
situations, and that generally speaking, the legitimation of individuality (kosei) actually involves the 
demolition of seken. As a public domain to accompany the new individualism  emerges, the example 
of GA and the Techno parties indicates that this will undoubtedly proceed from the delegitimation 
of seken and the 'demolition' of the structure of relationships which it enforces.
********
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8. Redefined Selves
Through the post WWII period (sengo jidai) (1945-1992), Japan developed into a 'corporate' or 
’company-centred (hdjin chuushin)' society. That is to say, a society in which, generally speaking, a 
person knew  them selves and was know n and judged by others, prim arily  on the basis of 
m em bership of a com pany, corporation, corporate group, or task-orientated group, and was 
expected to give priority to their workplace relationships. Women, many of whom  are not members 
of companies for much, if any of their lives, would most likely be known as the wives or daughters 
of their husbands or fathers. This relationship between an individual and their company was one 
whereby individuals were 'affiliated (zoku / shozoku)' to their companies. The 'com pany-centred' 
society had a num ber of highly visible characteristics. One was a noticeably high percentage of the 
population knowing the precise ranking of the top three or so companies in each industry sector in 
the country, or of at least being aware of who the top three were. Another example was Ego judging 
a person and deciding on the correct way to address a person s /h e  had not met before, through the 
formality of finding out which company that person works for, together w ith their rank in that 
company, and then calculating their position relative to Ego. Only then could intercourse proceed 
satisfactorily. In other words, either knowing the precise ranking of companies and corporations, or 
at least being aware of the necessity to take this into consideration when m eeting or speaking to 
others, was a vital social skill in the ’company-centred1 society. Rural communities found themselves 
somewhat excluded from this post-WWII ’company-centred' society, but in tu rn  found it somewhat 
superfluous. These examples are part of w hat Nakane (1970) called a 'ranking consciousness', a 
sense of 'above and below (joge)', which ranked individuals, groups, communities, whole cities, the 
regions of Japan, as well as the city over the country, and which m arked the 'company-centred' 
society not simply as a post-WWII development, but as a society w ith its roots in the years of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate in particular, but also prior to that in Confucianism.
Companies and corporate groups in the 'company-centred' society displayed a high degree 
of organisational similarity, which stressed internal homogeneity, inclusiveness, and exclusivity 
from similarly structured corporate groups. What this meant was that attributes, such as skills and 
other personal qualities w hich drew  attention to differences betw een the em ployees, were 
downplayed, so that a consciousness of being known as a 'computer progamm er' or an 'accountant' 
were prevented from developing, while a consciousness of all em ployees being a ’m em ber of 
company x' was actively encouraged and propagated, through company organisational structures, 
by means of an ethics of uniform ity, and through discourses of hom ogeneity and belonging.
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Consequently, a member of the 'company-centred' society would be very unlikely to think of himself 
or herself as a 'com puter program m er', and w ould also be thought strange if they introduced 
themselves as such.
Individual selves, that is employees of company x, would prim arily be known by others, 
and would primarily know themselves through 'affiliation (zokit / shozokn)' to company x, as ' A  san of 
company x. This would be enough information for another member of the 'company-centred' society 
to at least roughly locate A san relative to themselves within a few exchanges, which was essential 
for the encounter to proceed satisfactorily. A  san m ay also be known by a particu lar rank in 
company x, and possibly from a particular departm ent or division if it is a large well-known 
company. When introducing themselves to somebody outside the 'company-centred' society, such 
as a foreigner, w ho w ould not be expected to necessarily recognise all the im portant social 
inform ation contained in the answ er "I w ork for N ippon Shokubai", or "I’m a section head with 
Nippon Shokubai",1 A san w ould most likely answ er with one of the following: "I'm a company 
worker, I'm a salaryman, I'm an office worker, I'm a shop worker, I'm a factory worker", instead of 
referencing themselves as a computer program mer or an accountant.
The characteristics of the 'com pany-centred ' society extend beyond  the rank ing  
consciousness which can be traced back to the political organisation of the Tokugaw a Shogunate, 
and before that, to Confucian cosmology. The 'com pany-centred' society also bears a m arked 
resemblance to the ie, or Japanese household. In the post-WWII period, following changes to the 
rules of inheritance in the Civil Code of 1947, w hich divested the eldest son from  inheriting 
everything, including the ie, together w ith industrialisation and u rban  m igration, and the 
developm ent of the nuclear family, the ie as both a family and enterprise unit continued its pre- 
WWII decline. However, in both structure and ideology, the ie lived on and flourished in the 
'company-centred' society, continuing w hat was always its prim ary function as an enterprise or 
w ork organisation. In the post-WWII period, a 'top-dow n' and 'bottom -up' process resulted in 
companies enveloping and taking responsibility for their employees and their families, attempting, 
and succeeding, in fostering a loyalty am ong the employees and their families, who then, out of 
obligation and through coercion, m ade the company their prim ary concern. This process was 'top- 
down' through company organisational structures and discourses of inclusiveness and belonging, 
and 'bottom up', through union representation, seeking to improve employee's conditions.
N ot all employees had this 'total' relationship w ith their places of work. However, these 
persons, primarily employees who worked predominantly in small enterprises of between one and 
ten employees, were still known, judged, and knew themselves, prim arily on the basis of the 
company they worked for, or the company they subcontracted to if that was the case. Women in the 
’com pany-centred’ society were prim arily known by their gender and secondarily through their 
relationship to a place of work, possibly directly if they were employed, or through their families or 
husband, depending on whether m arried or not. Consequently, even persons who had a much less 
emotional and all-embracing relationship w ith their workplace, were still very m uch a part of the
N ip p o n  Shokubai is one of the leading chemical catalyst makers in Japan, also known internationally for its superior 
technology.
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'company-centred' society and were know n and judged by those criteria. These are the prim ary 
references by which individuals are known in the 'company-centred' society, but are not the only 
one's. O ld class mates will always know  each other prim arily on the basis of their school 
relationship, for example, mothers of young children may well know and judge each other on this 
basis, too, but these relationships will only be recognised among those who form these relationships. 
More generally, they will be known in the m anner I have described.
In the ’company-centred’ society, the ie persisted both as the organisational basis of the vast 
m ajority of com panies and other institutions, and in  defining personhood and  interpersonal 
relationships. As w ith the ie, although horizontal relationships between members existed, such as 
those of similar age or grade (dokxjuusci), they did not transcend the primary relationship, which was 
a vertical one-to-one 'parent-child (oyabun kobwi)', or ’sen io r/jun io r (senpai kditai)', relationship, 
which tied all members who were affiliated to the same 'group (shuudan)' together in a relatively 
fixed pattern.
'Affiliation (zoku / shozoku)' itself described a particular m ode of m em bership, tying an 
individual m em ber into this particular structure of relationships, to identifiable codes of conduct, 
and to particular expectations and obligations. ’Affiliation' to a 'group (shuudan)' binds individual 
selves into relationships w ith other members, and discourages them  from forming relationships 
with members of other 'groups'. The w ord 'group (shuudan)', although a generic term, has come to 
refer to this particular structure of relationships betw een individual selves, through secondary 
meanings, w hich also defines the personhood of those who are 'affiliated to (shozoku sum )' it to a 
considerable extent, as indicated by the m oniker 'com pany-centred' society. In the 'company- 
centred' society, the prim ary social entity is not the individual self or the public domain, but the 
'affiliated group (shozokn shuudan)'. A n 'affiliated group (shozoku shuudan)' is not sim ply any 
collectivity of individual selves, it is a particular structure of relationships between a certain kind of 
individual self. However, in common usage, the w ord 'group (shuudan)' has come to connote this 
very particular collective self, constituted by a very particular individual self, due to the almost total 
dominance of this kind of collective self and individual self in the 'company-centred' society.
This structure of relationships is rigid and non-negotiable, dictated by the position of the 
individual self w ithin the rigid hierarchy of the 'group (shuudan)' relative to others. Certainly the 
individual self has room for negotiation and manipulation of others, and is given the opportunity 
for self-expression, how ever, 'non-negotiable' refers to the severely prescribed param eters for 
thought and action w ithin the 'com pany-centred' society, achieved by setting precise rules for 
thought and action at the collective level, together w ith the negative ethical weighting attached to 
the expression of individuality  (kosei). This particular structuration  of relationships, which is 
common to all 'groups' in the 'company-centred' society, is m ade exclusive and binding through 
rigid, precise, group-specific 'ways of integrating (sesshi kata)' w hich fosters inclusiveness and 
exclusivity between 'groups'. This sense of inclusiveness and exclusivity is further reinforced by 
instilling in members the perception that it is impossible to survive outside the 'group'. W hat are 
presented as practical difficulties are then m ade more difficult by an ethics which casts anything 
other than casual relationships with 'outsiders’ as 'disloyal' and ’bad', as anything less than a high
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degree of inclusiveness threatens unity and stability.
In addition to the individual selves who constitute these 'groups (shuudan)' regarding 
themselves and others primarily as members of 'groups’, and prim arily as members of workplace 
'groups', individual selves in the 'com pany-centred' society are, as affiliates of their 'groups 
(shuudan)', expected to ’suppress their self (kojin wo narubeku osaeru)', or 'deny (lit. 'kill') their self 
(jibun wo narubeku korosn)'. It is an ethical imperative of the 'company-centred' society that individual 
selves should hide their individuality (kosei), by means of 'suppressing their self' or 'denying their 
self'. This act of suppression or denial is the responsibility of the individual, but the individual is 
aware that they are likely to 'be stripped of their self (jibun wo magiwareru)' or 'crushed (jibun wo 
tsubusareru)' by other members of the 'group (shuudan)’ acting as 'the group', if they do not ’conform 
(awaseru)', or alternatively they will be forced to leave.
Conformity is achieved by the authority  of seken, which is the m oral fram ework of the 
’company-centred’ society, just as it was the moral framework of Japan w hen the ie was the primary 
social entity. Seken, which is potentially more coercive than judicial law in the 'company-centred1 
society, and overrides both individual rights and the public domain, is the social 'world', invariably 
the workplace and associated relationships, surrounding Ego and Ego's 'group', whichever 'group' 
that happens to be at a given time. The requirement to conform to rigid, uniform  ways of thinking 
and doing is a defining characteristic of seken, as is the ethical imperative to p u t members of seken 
and the repu ta tion  of seken before all else. It is seken which has given us these particular 
characteristics of the relationships between individuals and between individuals and groups in 
Japan. Seken is com prised of all persons know n and unknow n to Ego, w hose reputation can 
potentially be affected by Ego's actions in some way. Seken is perceived to have 'ears' and 'eyes', 
listening to and watching the individual self, checking that s /h e  conforms to uniform seken nami (lit. 
'In line w ith seken)' standards. Seken is also described as having a 'm outh ' to gossip about the 
individual self, coercing the self to conform to seken uniform rules. What are very precise uniform 
standards for thought and behaviour are set at a collective level, bu t they m anifest themselves 
through individual selves watching, listening, and gossiping about each other, constantly saying, 
’you have to do this here', or 'this is the done thing’. Seken is most commonly enforced in this way by 
members of the 'group (shuudan)' coercing each other to adhere to the relevant seken nami standards. 
Some members will be more zealous than others, but the coercive nature of seken, together with the 
spectre of chaos will usually corral the more laisse-faire members into pressurizing dissenters, in 
w hat is often a subtle but inexorable process of m aintaining the status quo. Non-conform ity 
manifests itself as deviance from seken nami (seken banare) and commonly impacts on others as 
'strange (hen)' or ’distasteful (mazui)'. The constituency of seken varies depending on where the 
individual self happens to be, w hat it is doing or thinking, and who it is interacting with. But the 
individual will be motivated and will decide on a course of action by judging w hich seken nami 
conventions apply  for that encounter. Consequently a knowledge of the various seken nami 
conventions which apply to a particular 'group' the individual self is 'affiliated to' at a given time, is 
crucial social knowledge.
Indications of the m oral authority of seken and the way that seken rules are enforced are
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contained in the following two popular expressions: "Seken is noisy, so you have to be careful (seken 
ga urusai kara jichd senebanaranai)", and: "If it wasn't for seken it would be OK to do as you like (seken 
to in mono ga nakereba, jichd shinaku tomo yoi no da ga)". The coercive and intim idating nature of seken 
is expressed in the popu lar expression: "The gossip of seken is frightening (seken no torizata ga 
osoroshii)".
Conformity in the 'company-centred' society is achieved by the individual self mobilizing or 
'making (tsnkuru)' sekentei. Sekentei is the self 'adjusted (seken ni awaseru)' to those persons known and 
unknow n who constitute seken. Sekentei can be thought of as a ’presentational self', a 'face', a 
particular way of acting and appearing which is in accordance w ith seken nami rules. Kiku to Katana, 
the Japanese translation of Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sxuord, gives us a good indication of 
what sekentei is. Hasegawa translates 'for decency's sake' a s , 'sekentei wo tsukurou tame nV (Hasegawa 
1950:192), which literally means, 'for the sake of sekentei'.
Conceptions of personhood and adulthood in the 'com pany-centred ' society are also 
conceived and described in terms of seken and sekentei, for personhood and adulthood depend on an 
individual's ability to negotiate and m anipulate seken through their sekentei, which requires a good 
knowledge of the seken nami conventions w ithin the various seken which an individual self inhabits 
and m oves between. The individual self is required  to 'make sekentei' in accordance w ith  the 
conventions of a given seken by 'm atching/conform ing to (awaseru)' the correct seken nami standards. 
Because individual selves inhabit and move between different settings, they negotiate those settings 
by mobilizing the conventionally recognised sekentei for that situation, a combination of following 
precisely the correct 'ways of integrating (sesshi laita) of the given 'group (shuudan)' and the correct 
'way of integrating' for the specific encounter, defined primarily by the relative position of Ego and 
Other within the 'group'. Seken and sekentei are constantly remade with every encounter, yet remain 
virtually static due to the rigid 'interaction rituals (sesshi kata)' and 'ways of doing (shi kata)' of 
'groups (shuudan)', often described as 'the company's ways (sha fun)' w ithin the workplace. This is 
com pounded by the ethical imperative to 'suppress one's self, one’s individuality (kojin wo narubeku 
osaeru)'. Seken is responsible for ind ividual selves in the 'com pany-centred ' society prim arily 
know ing themselves as extensions of collectivities rather than as individuals, and of acting in 
accordance w ith  the conventions of collectivities, rather than acting as 'individuals (kojin de)' 
expressing their 'individuality  (kosei)'. Individuality  is also the w ell-spring of spontaneity, of 
difference, and of change, and it is because of seken that precedent is so significant in Japan, why 
difference is regarded as subversive, and why change is difficult to initiate.
The perception of 'us' and 'them' in the 'company-centred' society derives from the moral 
framework of seken and the particular ethics of uniformity and exclusivity which constitute w hat is 
regarded as seken nami by a given 'group (shuudan)'. The ethics w hich derive from the moral 
fram ework of seken are also responsible for the w ell-recorded discourses of hom ogeneity and 
'harmony (wa)' which pervade the 'company-centred' society. However, this consciousness of 'us' 
and 'them' is not simply 'inside (uchi)' and 'outside (soto)’, even though 'us' is commonly described as 
uchi in the 'company-centred' society. Even though uchi no commonly refers to 'us', there is no social 
space described as soto in the 'company-centred' society. Social space 'outside' where Ego happens to
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be, is m apped in other more precise ways, as the example of seken and the most common mapping of 
'other' as holca or as a proper noun demonstrates.
Similarly, 'public behaviour' in a given situation is more commonly perceived, and more 
accurately and precisely known by Japanese, as individual selves mobilizing sekentei in response to 
the consensually agreed seken nami standards of seken for that precise encounter. Explaining certain 
prescribed behaviour as tatemae only indicates that a situation or encounter is relatively formal. 
Tatemae to sura simply indicates adherence to a rule or principle, and does not indicate w hat the rule 
or principle is, or provide a means for understanding motivation and action. Explaining action as 
som ewhere on a continuum  w ith  tatemae at one end and honne, translated in this case as 'true 
feeling', at the other, is not how individual selves in the 'company-centred' society decide how to act 
in a given situation. Tatemae, like soto, has been assigned meanings and a level of importance in the 
representation of Japanese society by anthropologists beyond those which they possess for Japanese, 
and brings into question the m anner in which anthropologists privilege and assign m eaning to 
particular concepts. On a very evidential level, seken and sekentei feature far more heavily in daily 
speech in revealing the cognitive m apping of Japanese social space, and in individual explanations 
of motivation and action, than either tatemae or soto, which, in the case of soto does not appear at all, 
and in the case of tatemae is not used to assess a situation and decide on an appropriate course of 
action. If members of the 'company-centred' society do interact using any mentally m apped bi-polar 
continua, and it is questionable to w hat extent they do on the evidence of the m eanings which 
tatemae and soto have for members of the 'company-centred' society, then a continuum  with sekentei 
at one end and kokoro, the individual's 'heart/m ind /sou l, at the other, should be considered, as these 
are the embodiment of the two aspects of the self which members of the 'company-centred' society 
most commonly speak of.
The individual Japanese self has been described as having an inner and outer 'self', an 
'interactional self' and an 'empathetic self, a 'situational self' and as being a 'multiple self. In the 
case of the individual Japanese self which inhabits the 'company-centred' society, the Japanese 
themselves do not think of this self as 'multiple'. Situational, certainly, as the existence of sekentei 
dem onstrates, and  as having at least two aspects or 'surfaces', bu t this situationality  is a 
characteristic of a unitary self (jibun or kojin). Only if fixedness is a characteristic of individual selves, 
that is to say, only we are bound by the presupposition that the individual unitary self is fixed and 
unchanging, do we have to resort to the idea of 'multiple' selves to explain situationality. If we start 
from the position that an individual self can be unitary and situational, then we can keep the 
individual self intact, as it is perceived to be by Japanese people themselves.
The individual self that constitutes the 'company-centred' society is commonly regarded by 
those individual selves as having two aspects or 'surfaces (men)' rather than selves': an ’inside 
(naimen)', which is the realm of kokoro, the individual’s 'heart/ m ind/soul', and an 'outside (In/omen)', 
which is the realm of sekentei or 'face (kao)'. Sekentei is regarded as the conventional way of 'being-in- 
the-world' by m ost Japanese in the 'company-centred' society. There are those members of the 
'com pany-centred' society who say they do not pay any regard to sekentei, but they are the 
exceptions and may in fact pay more regard to it than they care to admit. Others will certainly notice
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if they pay no regard to sekentei. For most people, presenting sekentei involves the simultaneous act 
of suppressing kokoro, which is how most people in the 'company-centred' Japan go about their daily 
business. The correct way of acting when in a 'group (shuudan)' is described as 'suppressing the self 
(kojin wo osaeru)' or 'denying (lit. 'killing') the self (jibun wo korosu)'. Consequently on the basis of this 
deduction, together w ith the way that jibun is used in everyday speech, it w ould appear that 
Japanese in the 'com pany-centred ' society regard their 'self (jibun)' and  their kokoro to be, 
fundamentally, one and the same. On the basis that members of the 'company-centred' society are 
required to suppress their 'self (jibun/kojin/kosei)' and 'make' sekentei when in a 'group (shuudan)’, 
and regard kokoro as an oasis of truth and purity, this accords w ith the view of most members of the 
'com pany-centred' society that, although it is m orally correct to circum scribe kokoro in most 
situations, kokoro is morally superior to sekentei. This is corroborated by the view that sekentei is 
concerned w ith appearance (mie/yoshi), and is regarded as superficial (hydmenteki). Even though 
seken is the m oral framework of the 'company-centred' society, the special m oral status accorded 
kokoro seems to act as a powerful counterbalance to keep the inherently arthritic and suppressive 
tendency of seken in check, by breathing life and energy into society through individuals expressing 
their kokoro. This would explain both the special place that kokoro has in Japanese society, and why it 
is carefully circumscribed.
In the 'company-centred' society, like the /e-centred society before, the situations in which 
this individual self is allowed to express their kokoro and does not have to 'suppress their self are 
strictly prescribed. Expressing kokoro', the 'heart/m ind /sou l', refers to the expression of one's 'true 
feelings'. This w ould norm ally only be in the presence of intim ately know n others, such as 
im mediate family and friends, and typically referred to as kazoku (immediate family), miuchi or 
nakama. However, in these situations, some individuals report that they still feel their sekentei 
present. This is hardly surprising, as the self is unitary and sekentei and kokoro, can in no way be 
independent and separate of each other. Sekentei cannot remain detached and unaffected by kokoro, 
and kokoro can never be free of the feeling of having to act according to some convention. Even when 
the individual self is alone, quiet, and away from all noise and distraction, we should expect seken to 
be present, in the imagination and in the conscious and unconscious mind.
Individual Japanese selves in the 'com pany-centred' society regard them selves to be 
complete as individual selves, and com prom ised particularly w hen in a 'group (shuudan)' and 
subject to seken conventions. We can say this because, as a member of the 'company-centred' society, 
the individual self when in a 'group (shuudan)' is expected to 'suppress the self or 'deny the self. If, 
as some w riters have suggested, the individual self was somehow incom plete or partial as an 
individual self, and only complete w hen in the company of others, then we should expect language, 
sensibility, and cognition to reflect this, which they do not. Even though this individual self is 
regarded as unitary and complete by the m em bers of the 'com pany-centred' society, it is not 
regarded as autonom ous, unlike the idealised W estern individual self. This is an im portant 
difference between the Japanese concepts of individuality under discussion, and Western concepts 
of individuality. The belief that the individual self in Japan is complete and separate as a moral and 
social body, but at the same time is constituted by, and dependent upon other individual selves for
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its sense of self and for its self-expression, is demonstrated in various conceptions of the relationship 
between individual selves and between individual selves and collective selves across time: in 
M edieval Japan (Ikegami 1995), in the ’company-centred' society, and in the em erging 'people- 
centred' Japan. All these conceptions of self indicate the im portance of ind ividual selves and 
collective selves in m utually constituting and defining each other, and being socially acceptable only 
when in an ethically defined equilibrium  with each other. The relationship betw een seken and 
sekentei is just one example of this. Another example is the positive ethical valence attached to the 
concept 'to have a self (jibun ga am)'. 'To have a self (jibun ga am )' is to contribute to the collective 
effort, w ithin ethically prescribed relationships w ith other individual selves, while at the same time 
maintaining an independent self. This is confirmed by the negative ethical valence attached to 'to not 
have a self (jibun ga nai)', which refers to an individual self being unable to m aintain independence 
of thought or act w hen among other individual selves, particularly when in a 'group (shuudan). To 
be recognised as a 'se lf requires the individual to be social, that is, to nurtu re  and m aintain 
relationships w ith other individual selves. At the same time, this concept of the self, both individual 
and collective, makes it quite clear that the 'company-centred' society is a society which legitimates 
and recognises the importance of individual selves, if not individuality (kosei).
The 'company-centred' society recognises the individual self, but requires it 'to suppress its 
self1. This is explained by the relationship between kokoro and seken, and indicates that kokoro is the 
moral individual self and that seken is the moral collective self in the 'company-centred' society. 
Indeed, it is the relationship between kokoro and seken, one of tension, negotiation, and manipulation, 
which is how the relationship between jibun and shuudan is lived out day-to-day. This is not a 
relationship of opposition and antagonism, even though jibun and shuudan in the 'company-centred' 
society exist in a state of constant tension, a tension which Ikegami (1995) notes has existed since the 
beginning  of the T okugaw a Shogunate, the time w hen the tw in  goals of ind iv idual-self 
determ ination and civic duty were first articulated and brought together. Ikegami tells us that at 
this time, an ethics and aesthetics of personhood which advanced an ideology of individuality was 
brought under the control of an ethics and aesthetics of civic duty. This ideology of proud  
individualism  was not outlawed, but contained and channelled to further the pursuit of civic duty, 
existing in a state of tension ever since. These seemingly conflicting ideologies and the ethics that 
developed from them  through the Tokugaw a period, form the basis of the ethics of the 'company- 
centred' society, and explain the apparent contradiction of the ethical precepts of jibun ga am  and 
jibun wo korosu in the 'company-centred' society. Rather than a contradiction, in much the same way 
as during the Tokugawa period, these apparently contradictory ethical precepts explain both the 
tension that continues to exist between the goals of individual self-determination and 'civic duty' 
within the 'company-centred' society, and the position of a severely circumscribed individuality 
within that society.
Through the latter half of the post-WWII period (sengo jidai), the tension between the tw in 
goals of individual self-determination and 'civic duty' have come under increasing strain. There has 
been a shift in the balance between the pursuit of individual self-determ ination and civic duty 
among the members of the 'company-centred' society, away from a pursuit of civic duty towards the
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pursuit of individual self-determination. This shift has been gradual, but has not been substantial 
until the aftermath of the Bubble. Nevertheless, even though both ethics and concepts of personhood 
which constitute the 'com pany-centred1 society have been overw helm ingly dom inated and 
determ ined by the ideology of civic duty rather than the ideology of individual self-determination, 
both present in society over the centuries, the moral fram ework and structure of relationships 
engendered by the ideology of civic duty is susceptible to being underm ined by only a small shift in 
the balance between individual self-determination and civic duty, due to its inherent rigidity and 
legitimacy based on conformity to uniform ways of thinking, doing, and integrating. The authority 
of the moral order which underpins the 'company-centred1 society, together w ith the structure of 
relationships and concepts of personhood engendered by that order, depend on uniformity and a 
high level of conformity to that uniformity for their legitimacy. Since the early 1970s, that conformity 
has slowly been eroding.
This erosion of conformity is a result of increasing numbers of individual members of the 
’company-centred' society pursuing the goal of individual self-determination with more vigour than 
they pursue the goal of civic duty, and is a com bination of a gathering disenchantm ent and 
disillusionm ent w ith the pursu it of civic duty am ong the population, as it is constituted in the 
'com pany-centred' society, together w ith the prom otion of ind iv idual choice and individual 
difference by the guardians of the 'company-centred' society, by encouraging the population to 
participate in the accumulation of capital, and particularly commodities, which with their seemingly 
endless diversification and reinvention, has stim ulated both the pursuit of the goal of individual 
self-determ ination and the growth of difference, both of which have the potential to underm ine 
uniformity. Promoting a diverse consumer sensibility almost certainly has contributed to the shift in 
the balance between individual self-determination and civic duty, but only indirectly. The moments 
when people en masse were moved to question the legitimacy and the authority of the 'company- 
centred' society, notably the 'oil shocks' of the early 1970s and the collapse of the Bubble in 1991, are 
not attributable to the prom otion of the accumulation of capital and commodities directly, but to 
disenchantment and disillusionment among the people themselves due to feelings of betrayal and 
deception by the guardians of the ’company-centred’ society.
The ideology of civic duty was underm ined in this way by a combination of two things. 
First, the fundam ental difference and inherent irreconcilability between the ethical base which 
supported the idea of civic duty in the ’company-centred’ society, seken, and the ethical base which 
underpinned the idea of the nation-state of Japan, as enshrined in the concept of a civil society: equal 
rights for all individuals under common law, together with a strong public dom ain to protect those 
rights. These two very different moral frameworks sat uncomfortably together throughout the post- 
WWII period. In the end, the ideals and practices which were engendered by the notion of ’civic 
duty’ passed dow n through Japanese history, were underm ined by the guardians of the ‘company- 
centred’ society, that is, governm ent, the bureaucracy, and corporations, by their dem ands for 
continued efforts ’in the national interest' when both unable and unwilling to fulfill their promises to 
the working population for putting civic duty first and building the 'company-centred' society. 
Through the 1980s, this was against a backdrop of the majority of the population, for the first time,
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refusals to comply w ith transfer orders and litigation against companies brought by their employees 
or their families, began to increase and  began to make the news. Therefore, by the collapse of the 
Bubble in 1991, having constantly deferred reward on the pretext of ’national interest’, but in effect, 
in the interests of oyake, the ethics of civic duty were judged to be unacceptably biased and unfair by 
the majority of the population, and  not in their interests. A lthough seketi was still the dom inant 
moral framework in the country, this judgm ent by the members of the ’com pany-centred’ society 
was clearly m ade on the basis of an ethics of equal rights for all individuals, and the perception of 
the existence of a public dom ain to protect and enforce those rights. Both moral orders were 
susceptible to being undermined. An ethics of individualism, whereby all members are equal under 
common law, and which is enshrined in the Japanese Constitution, the Civil Code of 1947, and in 
common law, was consistently being underm ined through the post-WWII period in Japan by a 
barrage of ideological discourses which cast all individualism as unjapanese. Any trace of the proud 
self-determination which had been present through the centuries went unrecognised and was also 
relentlessly attacked and cast as unjapanese. The increase in the num ber of individuals pursuing the 
goal of individual self-determination with more vigour than the goal of civic duty through the 1970s 
and 1980s was almost exclusively framed as a colonisation of the Japanese individual self by a 
Western individualistic self that was gaining entry through cultural and economic exchange, rather 
than disillusionm ent with the notion of civic duty, as constituted in the ’com pany-centred’ society. 
This ’in d iv id u a tio n ’ (Dore 1992) was regarded  negatively by being cast as un japanese by 
conservative voices, who were also the dom inant voices. This was the discourse of ’individualism 
(kojimhugi)’ versus ’groupism  (shuudamhugi)', w hich quite evidently was the big post-W W II 
showdown between the old adversaries.- the twin goals of individual self-determination and civic 
duty. ’Groupism ’ was presented, not as the embodiment of civic duty, bu t as the embodiment of 
Jnpaneseness, while 'Individualism ', was presented, not as the em bodim ent of a long Japanese 
tradition of proud self-determination, but as unjapanese. In fact neither 'groupism (shundamhugi)' or 
'individualism (kojimhugi)' had m uch to do w ith civic duty or individual self-determ ination, or 
indeed, very m uch to do with Japaneseness. They were both course manoeuvres in the attem pt of a 
nation to re-establish its own sense of self after one hundred years of uninterrupted upheaval and 
reinvention.
The collapse of the Bubble signalled the end of the 'company-centred' society. Of course, it 
has not disappeared over night, but its legitimacy was irreparably dam aged by the collapse and fall­
out from the Bubble. This was not solely due to the majority of the population regarding the 
politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen who represented the 'company-centred' society as being 
corrupt or self-interested, and who regarded themselves as having been abused and exploited. 
Indeed, the coercive nature of the 'company-centred' society, the immense concentration of power at 
the top, and the almost unquestioning respect for authority, would almost certainly have fought off 
a challenge to its legitimacy, had it been just a question of ethics. In such an event, probably very 
little would have changed, a fact given credence by the maimer in which the custodians of oynke 
continue to resist change, even w hen the dam age to the country as a result is considerable. What
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was also required, was evidence that the system  had outlived its usefulness an d  was no longer 
effective in doing w hat it had been designed to do, to 'catch up and overtake (oitsuki oilcosu)' the 
West. This is to pu t it things very simply, but this is essentially the case. It has been the combination 
of these two eventualities occurring at the same time which has resulted in the rapid m anner in 
which legitimacy has been conferred on the idea of the 'people-centred' society.
The developm ent of the 'people-centred' society has been gradual, even though it seems to 
have appeared quite suddenly. However, this is the nature of the transfer of legitimacy. It is as if a 
revolution has occurred w ithout the people setting one foot in the streets in protest. A lthough the 
level of anger and sense of betrayal has remained consistently high for the best part of a decade, the 
removal of the Liberal Democratic Party (jiminto) from power in 1993, after over forty years of 
unin terrupted  rule, was about as close to a visible revolution as the country came. The LDP 
managed to claw their way back into pow er in 1995, but by then events and conditions had m ade a 
return to the 'company-centred' society impossible. Much like a revolution, little seems to have 
changed on the ground, in people's daily lives, but this is not the case. Not only has the rise in 
unemployment and a burgeoning flexible economy changed the social landscape, the emergence of 
a new  individualism  am ong the m ainstream  of the population, together w ith the legitimacy 
conferred on 'individuality (kosci)' in the aftermath of the Bubble, marks a fundamental shift, both in 
the balance between the twin goals of individual self-determination and civic duty in Japan, but also 
in the m eaning of civic du ty  itself. The individualism  that is emerging is identifiably a Japanese 
individualism  w ith a long history, not by any m eans predom inantly  a colonising 'W estern' 
individualism. Certainly, it is unlikely to be completely devoid of any traces of 'individuation' (Dore 
1992) engendered and conveyed by capitalist modes of production and consum ption, and by the 
ideologies and discourses of universal hum an rights, which derive significantly from 'W estern' 
concepts of individualism. Indeed, it is predominantly the changing conditions of global capitalism, 
which has given the impetus to the need to 'retool' the minds of the Japanese people, which together 
with the disgracing of dyake, has sw ung the ethical pendulum  in favour of expressing individuality 
rather than suppressing it. However, individualism  and individuality are not solely products of 
Christianity or capitalism, and although both of these may engender and prom ote individuation, 
they did not give rise to the ind iv idualism  w hich is em erging in post-Bubble Japan. This 
individualism  is recognisably grounded in ethics and concepts of personhood present in the 
'company-centred' society, and traceable as far back as the Kamakura period at least (1185-1333).
The meaning of civic duty is likely to change more fundamentally because the moral order 
that underp inned  civic duty  in the 'com pany-centred ' society, seken, is both inflexible and 
unreceptive to change, and is irreconcilable w ith a moral order which engenders, legitimates, and 
prom otes equality of individual selves, individual self-expression, difference, and a strong public 
domain. The drive for uniform ity of thought and act which characterises seken, together with the 
primary ethic of the requirement to put seken before all else, suggests that there is little likelihood of 
seken existing in some modified form, and now that legitimacy has been conferred on 'individuality 
(ikosei)', this is being show n to be the case. Rather than being modified, it seems as though seken is 
being replaced by an ethics of individualism , bu t one which stresses community rather than 'civic
296
duty (gimu)'. The Japanese individualism  that is emerging in the aftermath of the Bubble contains 
within it a strong element of civic responsibility, and one which does not look like seken very much 
at all. Part of the ideological campaign waged against individualism through the post-WWII period, 
was the argum ent that individualism  was not only unjapanese, but that it entailed automatic social 
chaos. This is being shown to be fallacious. A new community is em erging along with the new 
individualism , and although this is being accompanied by a degree of social chaos, this is not a 
condition of the new individualism , but a condition of the changeover from a 'company-centred' 
society to a 'people-centred' society. Com munity remains very im portant in the 'people-centred' 
society.
The prim ary category of person in the 'company-centred' society is the 'affiliated group 
(shozoku sluiudan)', rather than the individual self and the public domain. However, the prim ary 
category of person in the ’people-centred1 society is the individual self. There has been little mention 
of the public dom ain in discussions of the ’people-centred’ society so far, but as the new 
individualism  becomes established, and as the dominance of the 'affiliated group' and of seken 
subsides, so a stronger sense of a public domain will emerge, supported by legislation. The change 
from a 'company-centred' society to a 'people-centred' society is not a volte free by any means. Just as 
the individual self in the 'com pany-centred' society was valued and had its place, so does the 
collective self have its place and its value in the 'people-centred' Japan. However, as far as these 
things are quantifiable, the value of com m unity in the 'people-centred' Japan is higher than  the 
value of 'individuality (kosei)' in the 'company-centred' Japan. This is borne out by the constant 
references by individualistic individual selves to the importance of other individual selves in 
facilitating the expression of individuality (kosei). This is corroborated by the general feeling in the 
country that the growth of'private groups' and of people openly expressing then- individuality (kosei 
wo dasu) in the 1990s, is not regarded as a colonisation or a deterioration by the majority, but as a 
necessary adjustm ent to bring the balance between individual and community, in the form of the 
twin goals of individual self-determination and civic duty, back into a more harmonious equilibrium.
Whereas a prim ary code of conduct in the 'company-centred' society was the requirem ent 
that individual selves should 'suppress their self (kojin wo narnbeku osaeru)' or 'deny (lit. 'kill') their 
self (jibun wo nantbekn korosu)', a prim ary code of conduct in the 'people-centred' society is the 
requirem ent that individual selves should 'express their self (kosei wo narnbeku dasu/jibun wo 
narnbeku dasu/kojin wo narnbeku dasu)'- This code of conduct is then ethically w eighted by 
prescribing the suppressing  of one's 'individuality  (kosei)', or the suppressing  of one's 'self 
(jibun/kojin)', as 'deceitful (gotnakasu)', and 'the expression of one's self (jibun wo dasu)' as 'honest 
(gowakashiteinaiy. This fundam ental difference in the kind of individual self that constitutes the 
'people-centred' society engenders all kinds of other differences between the 'company-centred' 
society and the 'people-centred' society, although the importance of community and the manner in 
which individual selves and collective selves define and m utually constitute each other remains 
much the same. The requirem ent 'to express one's individuality' is accompanied by the requirement 
to allow others to do likewise, and not only allow them to do so, but to encourage them to do so and 
to support them in that endeavor. This requires a concomitant acceptance of difference within the
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collectivity, which immediately casts the ethics of uniformity which derive from seken and which 
prescribe individual action in a 'group (shuudan)' in the 'company-centred' society, as problematic. 
The emphasis on encouraging and supporting other individual selves is evident in the importance 
attached to ’participation (snnka)' and  'co-operation Q:\jor\joku)' in the nascent discourses of 
individualism  that are emerging. This em phasis on participation and co-operation, and on the 
im portance of com m unity in generating  ind iv idualism  and  m ain tain ing  it, is one of the 
characteristics of the new  individualism. The individual selves who constitute the 'people-centred' 
society regard themselves as individuals who are morally obliged to express their 'individuality 
(kosei)', but in a m utually reinforcing relationship w ith other individual selves expressing their 
'individuality'. Therefore, it is understood that a person is only able to express their 'individuality' if 
there are others to be individual with. ’Individuality ' in the 'people-centred' society is therefore 
perceived to only be possible through community. This marks out the new individualism  emerging 
in post-Bubble Japan as an individualism  different from 'Western' concepts of individualism, which 
stress individual autonomy and sovereignty. Autonomy and individual sovereignty are important 
aspects of the new  individualism  in Japan, but they are perceived as only achievable through 
community, and not at the expense of community. The discourses of individuality em erging in 
post-Bubble Japan stress ’participation (snnka)' and 'co-operation (hjonjoku)' far more than discourses 
of Western individuality .2 W hat is regarded as morally correct: that people should actively 
participate as individuals by expressing their individuality and encouraging others to do likewise, is 
re-inforced by the belief that the expression of ind ividuality  is only possible through the 
participation and co-operation of others.
The individual self w hich constitutes the 'people-centred' society is also recognisably 
Japanese, rather than 'Western', because it is clearly related to the individual self that constitutes the 
'company-centred' society, and to concepts of personhood that extend further back in time. In the 
'com pany-centred' society, kokoro (h ea rt/m in d /so u l) and jibnn (self), are essentially the same, 
although not used interchangeably. We know this, not least because, when this individual self is in a 
'group (shnndan)', it is required to 'conform (slmudan niawaseru)', which is described as 'suppressing' 
jibun and 'making' sekentei. 'M aking sekentei', which is tatenme behaviour, requires the 'suppressing' 
of kokoro, consequently jibun and kokoro appear to be different cognitive connotations of the 'true 
self. Individual selves who constitute the 'people-centred' society report that they are expected to 
'express' or 'reveal' their jibun and do not feel they have to 'make' sekentei. In addition, they report 
that they are able to, and are expected to 'do the things they think are right (jibun no tadashii to omou 
koto)', which is the same as 'expressing kokoro (true feeling or intention)'.
Although kokoro is the repository of the 'true feeling and intention' of the individual self in 
the 'company-centred' society and the 'people-centred' society, the individual selves who constitute 
the 'people-centred' Japan whom  I have spoken to, do not say that an ethical im perative of the 
'people-centred' society is that individual selves should 'express their kokoro (kokoro wo narnbeku
2
Ikegami points out that, although discourses of Western individualism stress individual autonomy and sovereignty, the 
experience of individual selves indicates that: "on a simple yet very profound level, our...true identity cannot be separated 
from our social relationships. Intuitively we recognise that we ‘experience' happiness when we are properly connected to 
others and valued by them. At the same time, we search - sometimes at great emotional cost - for the grail of the 'true self" 
(1995:372).
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dasu)'. A lthough ’to express jibun' means to express one's 'true' self, there is som ething about kokoro 
which suggests that 'to express one's self does not mean 'to express one's kokoro. However, I contend 
that they are fundamentally the same, only there are other meanings contained in the idea of kokoro 
which render its usage in this way problematic. Of course, it has also become convention not to 
think of kokoro in this way. Once again, this appears to be due to a perception of kokoro in the 
'people-centred' society which has carried over from the 'company-centered' society. Lebra (1992) 
makes a point that kokoro is 'asocial' and does not in fact interact with other selves directly at all, but 
remains 'uncontaminated' as the repository of truthfulness and purity within the individual self. In 
other words, it remains untouched by social interaction and by social convention. This sense of 
kokoro as som ehow 'beyond society' is reinforced by, if not a result of, the m anner in which the 
expression of kokoro is severely circumscribed by the ethics which derive from the moral framework 
of the 'company-centred' society. In the 'company-centred' society, even in those intimate situations 
when kokoro is allow ed to be expressed, conventions still apply and are felt by m any people. 
Consequently, ]<okoro is perceived to exist alm ost in a state of grace beyond expression. This 
perception of kokoro appears to have carried over into the 'people-centred' society, further indicating 
that the new individualism is grounded in Japan's past.
The individual self which constitutes the 'company-centred' society is perceived as having 
two 'surfaces': an 'inside (naimen)', the realm  of kokoro, and an 'outside Qiyomen)', the realm  of 
sekentei. No such partitioning characterises the individual self which constitutes the 'people-centred' 
society. Neither does this individual self describe itself in terms of kokoro and sekentei in any sense, 
judging on the basis of those whom  I spoke to. 'What is seen from the outside is w hat is inside' was 
the closest these unpartitioned unitary selves came to describing themselves in terms of kokoro and 
sekentei. A nd only once was the 'expression of kokoro' m entioned as a characteristic of these 
individual selves, and then only tentatively. I only heard these individualistic individual selves 
describing themselves using the terms, jibun, kojin and kosei.
The m eaning of kosei in both the 'company-centred' society and the ’people-centred' society 
is also very much the same, except, like jibun, the ethical valence on the expressing of kosei has been 
reversed. In addition, the relationship between kosei, jibun and kokoro in the 'people-centred' society 
is also seemingly unchanged from their relationship in the 'company-centred' society. Nevertheless, 
even though kosei is clearly related to leokoro in the 'people-centred' society as it is in the 'company- 
centred' society, differences exist, once again stemming from the perception of kokoro in both the 
'company-centred' society and the 'people-centred' society outlined above. Kosei is not asocial by any 
means, and does not remain untouched by social interaction. In fact, even though kosei is the essence 
of the individual self, it is not wholly subjective, but intersubjective. In a m anner very similar to that 
described by Ikegami (1995) in her explanation of the expression of honourific individualism  in 
Medieval Japan, the 'sense of self of an individual self in the 'people-centred' society is 'heightened' 
by their more subjective sense of self coming into 'proximity' w ith their intersubjective sense of self. 
This heightened 'sense of self' is kosei. Sekentei is also a 'sense of self (rather than 'a self) which is 
heightened by an intersubjective and subjective sense of self coming into proxim ity. But this 
similarity, and the fact that kosei is situational and intersubjective, does not m ean that kosei is much
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the same as sekentei. To begin with, Japanese themselves regard kosei and sekentei as fundamentally 
different: kosei is one's individuality, the m anifestation of one's 'true self, sekentei is a 'face' to 
conform to fixed, defined standards (shuudan ni numseru / seken ni azoaseru). Secondly, even though 
kosei is m odulated by situation and encounter, the fact that social and moral space in the 'people- 
centred' society is unitary, means that the individual self is consequently expected to consistently 
express or reveal their 'self {jibun)' in all situations and in all encounters in that unitary moral and 
social space, by expressing their kosei. This is in marked contrast to sekentei, where the multiple social 
and moral spaces of the 'affiliated groups {shozokti shuudan)' and various seken which constitute the 
'com pany-centred' society, require that the individual self, ra ther than being consistent in all 
situations and encounters, should instead conform to the conventions and ethical imperatives of the 
particular 'affiliated g roup’ or seken the individual self is in at any given time, by m aking the 
appropriate sekentei.
This im portant difference between an intersubjective and situational kosei, and sekentei, is 
further confirmed by the fact that the moral and social space in which individual action takes place 
in the ’people-centred' society is perceived and m apped as a unitary space. This is understood for 
two m ain reasons: First, because the individual selves who inhabit this space regard it as unitary, 
and second, because of the emergence of a nascent 'universal ethics' which apply within that space, 
rather than a ’particularistic group utilitarianism 1 (Bellah 1985) which characterises the ’company- 
centred1 society. Just as the m apping of social space in the 'company-centred' society is consistent 
with the partitioning of the individual self into the realms of kokoro and sekentei, so the m apping of 
social space in the 'people-centred' society is consistent with a self which perceives itself as unitary 
and unpartitioned. Social space in the 'people-centred' society is m apped as a single dom ain, 
inhabited by unitaiy, unpartitioned individual selves, who are expected to consistently and reliably 
{shinmi dekiru) 'be themselves (jibun zoo narnbeku dasu /  jibun no tadashii to omou koto zoo narnbeku dasu)'. 
This contiguity between personhood and the m apping of social space is to be expected, just as we 
should also expect the m oral fram ework, and the ethics which derive from  it, to define and 
legitimate this concept of personhood and this m apping of social space.
The question of the intersubjectivity and situationality of this unitary and unpartitioned 
individual self brings me to the relationships between individual selves in the ’people-centred’ 
society, and to the nature of com m unity. It is the legitim ation of individuality  {kosei), and the 
sanctioning of difference, engendered by the fundamental ethical imperatives, 'to reveal one's self 
and to allow and encourage others to do likewise, which radically alters the relationships between 
individual selves, and between individual selves and collective selves in the 'people-centred' society. 
The basic requirem ent that all individual selves, regardless of age, sex, or position w ithin an 
organisation, such as a company, should 'express or reveal their selves {jibun zoo narnbeku osaeru)' 
and should allow  and encourage others to do likewise, renders all ind iv idual selves 'equal 
(taito/ byodd)', as all individual selves are subject to these basic conventions of action and interaction. 
Individual selves engage w ith each other as equals, not on the basis of 'affiliation to groups {shuudan 
ni zokti sum )' or on the basis of position, age, or sex. However, this does not m ean that value 
judgments are not made and that individuals are treated similarly. It is this fact that all individual
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selves are em pow ered to make subjective judgm ents aud act on them  that readers all individual 
selves ’equal (taito/ byado)'. The notion of kejime (distinction), and of making value judgm ents (kejime 
ga am )  against standards of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', 'ugly' and 'beautiful' remains 
undiminished.
The prim ary category of person in the 'people-centred' society is the individual self, not the 
'affiliated group'. Therefore, the loci of responsibility for passing judgm ent and for decision making, 
shifts from the 'affiliated group' to the individual self. This m eans that the authority to make 
judgments, and to make decisions, shifts from the level of the 'affiliated group' to the individual self, 
further encouraging the expression of individuality (kosei) and initiative (skttehb). This results in a 
fragm entation and diversification of references and value judgm ents, w hich is confirm ed by 
individual selves reporting an absence of any seken nami conventions within such a collective self, 
and having no sense of having to 'make' sekentei. This 'equality', unlike seken, brings morality, 
concepts of personhood, and the m apping of social space, into line w ith common law, and the 
juridical imperative that everyone should be treated the same under the law.
The legitimating of the expression of individuality (kosei), leads to a diversification of 'ways 
of thinking (kangae Imta)' and 'ways of doing (shi kata)', and prom pts a loosening-up of the ways 
individual selves integrate (sesshi kata). Individual selves in the 'people-centred' society are not 
bound by the rigid, precise 'ways of integrating (sesshi kata)' which characterise the 'company- 
centred' society. In the 'people-centred' society, the 'ways of integrating (sesshi kata)' are far more 
flexible, in order to accommodate individual expression and subjective judgm ent which results from 
the legitimation of 'individuality (kosei)’. This loosening-up of 'ways of integrating1 renders the term 
'affiliation (shozoku/zoku suru)' unsuitable to describe the modes of m embership of individual selves 
to collective selves which privilege the individual self and require individual selves to 'express their 
self'. This is because the term 'affiliation' connotes rigid, precise, binding, 'ways of integrating'. The 
term shuudan is also rendered problematic to describe collective selves in the people-centred society, 
as it too connotes the kind of internally inclusive, rigidly hierarchical, 'affiliated group (shozoku 
shuudan)' which is the prim ary category of person in the 'company-centred' society. It remains to be 
seen whether the term shuudan will lose its association with 'affiliated group' and become a generic 
term for collective selves in the 'people-centred' society, or whether another word, such as dantai, 
which also refers to a collectivity of individual selves, but with less of a connotation of 'affiliated 
group' than  shuudan, will become the common term  for a collective self in the 'people-centred' 
society.
With the individual self as the prim ary category of person in the 'people-centred' society, the 
topography of community also changes. Instead of a series of particularistic regulated social spaces, 
all of them  morally distinct, which bind individual selves into rigid, hierarchical 'affiliated groups', 
in opposition to other 'affiliated groups', individual selves are able to form and move between 
'private groups', which they enter voluntarily, on the basis of personal commitment. All members of 
these communities are 'equal (taito/ bxjodo)', and are required to express their 'individuality (kosei wo 
narnbeku dasu)'. The legitimacy of these 'private groups', together with the contiguity of thought and 
act which exists betw een these individual selves who come together on the basis of personal
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com m itm ent, as equals, provides a basis for them  to orientate them selves w ithin the w ider 
community and w ithin the public domain, and acts as a springboard for their contribution to the 
w ider society. Flexible sesshi knta allow for individual selves who have never m et before to forge 
relationships, to be adventurous, and to broaden their experience and their understanding. The shift 
to the individual self as the primary social entity has freed the individual from the threat of rejection 
by the 'group' as the ultimate sanction, by being cast into the void. By not being 'affiliated to groups 
{shuudan ni zoku sum )', and by being em powered to act individually and subjectively, individual 
selves are freed from a coercive and constraining society, to participate as equals, and to contribute 
their own unique qualities. The potential for initiative and creativity present within every individual 
is unleashed by the legitimating of individuality and difference, and it is this as much as a changing 
moral climate which has driven the pragmatists in the 'company-centred' society to embrace change 
and the idea of a 'people-centred' society.
Personhood and cosmology, and as a result, personhood and ethics, are inextricably linked. It has 
been by means of a 'topographical triangulation' of the self, an assessment of personhood, ethics, 
and the m apping of social space, that I have attem pted to trace and define the individualism  that is 
emerging in post-Bubble Japan. I have argued that this individualism  is an identifiably Japanese 
ind ividualism , d isplaying continuity  w ith Japan 's past. I have a ttem pted  to show  that the 
individualism  em erging in post-Bubble Japan is grounded in Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian 
concepts of personhood, being part of a tradition of 'proud self-determ ination' or 'honourific 
individualism ', w hich characterised the sam urai of the M edieval, Tokugaw a, and early Meiji 
periods. Dum ont (1985) tells us that the roots of m odern Western individualism  derive from the fact 
that, in the Christian tradition, 'man exists as an individual in relation to God'. In Shinto, Buddhist, 
Confucian, and  N eo-C onfucian cosm ology, ind iv iduals are not, ind iv idually , in a private 
'outworldly' (Dum ont 1985) relationship w ith one god, but in relation to other individuals, other 
creatures, plants, and the earth  and sky itself. The interdependence of ind iv idual selves in 
determ ining their m utual fate is more evident in the Japanese tradition than it is in the Western 
tradition, where an understanding of individualism  is not based on a perception of the m utual 
interdependency of individual selves, and it is this recognition of m utual interdependency which 
characterises the new individualism  em erging in the aftermath of the Bubble, and differentiates it 
from Western theories of individualism.
These concepts of personhood are evident am ong the employees at GA and am ong the 
party-goers. Among the party-goers, there is a noticeable sense of cause-and-effect, and of moral 
causation through the in terdependence of persons. Individual selves am ong the party goers 
understand  very w ell the causality that flows from their own indiv iduality . This is why 
participation and cooperation are regarded as key elements in the engendering and maintenance 
and reproduction of individuality {kosei), and through that, the maintenance and reproduction of 
community. Carrithers (1985) notes that w hat is regarded as 'skillful' in Buddhist thought, is also a
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morally correct a c t  This is evident am ong both the employees at GA and the party-goers. In the 
Buddhist scheme of things, ’skill' itself is the pow er of reasoning to discern w hat is right for the 
individual self, and, due to the belief in moral causation, what is right for others. Among the party 
goers in particular, the num ber of references to the individual self facilitating its own attainment of 
peace and well-being, in other words, facilitating the expression of its individuality (kosei), by 
facilitating others in attaining such a state, are considerable and more than 1 have noted in Britain or 
in other countries in which Christian/H ellenistic concepts of personhood prevail. This emphasis on 
individuality through com m unity, and community through individuality is not som ething which 
has characterised discourses of individualism  in Britain or the United States, for example, but is 
something which characterises the individualism emerging in Japan.
I have not charted the development of the new individualism in post-Bubble Japan from its 
early beginnings, in the m anner of D um ont, as this is beyond the scope of this study. Dum ont's 
categories of 'outworldly' and 'inworldly' individualism  are powerful tools for understanding the 
developm ent of m odern Western individualism, rather than individualism  per se. A transition from 
an 'outw orldly ' individualism  to an 'inw orldly ' individualism  can be roughly discerned in the 
Japanese case, but rationalisation and secularization are the processes by which individualism  has 
turned  'inw orldly ' in Japan. In Japan we see a sim ilar tradition of 'outw orldly ' individualistic 
teachers and travellers throughout Japanese history, w hat D um ont refers to as 'the wise man 
detached from the w orld1. This is particularly true of the Buddhist tradition. But after this point, 
D um ont's m odel breaks down. In the Japanese case, and apparen t in Shinto and B uddhist 
cosmology in particular, the 'outw orld' and the 'inworld' are not separated in the same way as in 
Christian cosmology. Other (superficial?) similarities also exist, which tempt the analyst into using 
Dumont's model to reveal the course of Japanese individualism  over time. In the early Christian 
tradition, the marriage of Hellenistic N atural Law and Christian m orality by the early Christian 
teachers is reminiscent of the joining of Confucian priciples for secular purposes and Buddhist 
strictures for religious purposes, to form the basis of a natural law  of the universe and hum ankind’s 
place in it. Just as the 'outw orldly ' individual seeking either salvation (Christian), knowledge 
(Hellenistic), T ruth (Vedic), or Enlightenm ent/N egation (Buddhist), is a common feature of hum an 
societies in cosmological, moral, and social terms, so the linking of secular philosophy and religious 
morality is also som ething which is not uncommon. These points aside, Dum ont's model cannot 
describe the Japanese case. Which, rather than leading to the conclusion that individualism  has not 
developed independently  in Japan, suggests that there are more w ays than one for a m odern 
individualism to develop.
A lthough the ind iv iduality  em erging in post-Bubble Japan is identifiably a Japanese 
individualism, capitalism, and arguably more importantly, concepts of personhood associated with 
Universal H um an Rights, have played their part. However, the existence of an individuality in 
Japan for over fifteen hundred years at least, demonstrates that individualism per se is not a product 
of capitalism, or, as Bellah (1985) first argued, is not a condition of its appearance or developm ent 
either. Capitalism  does seem to have encouraged w hat Dore (1991) term s 'individuation ' in a 
num ber of ways, but this individuation is also clearly a product of technological developm ent and
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creeping rationalisation and. secularization, all of w hich cannot unproblem atically be cast as 
resulting from capitalist modes of production. That well-spring of capitalism, the creation of desire, 
and corresponding consumer trends towards increased product diversity and 'individuality', may 
have encouraged individualism, but it has not created it in Japan.
Capitalism at the end of the 20th Century A.D., however, has its own 'cultural logic' (Harvey 
1989, 1990; Jam eson 1991). M anifestations of this 'cultural logic' are very evident in Japan, 
particularly among those persons who have been freed from the constraints of the cultural logic of 
the 'company-centred' society. In Japan, this is nowhere more evident than in the spaces of the 
flexible economy, and particularly  am ong those m embers of the underground  dance m usic 
movement. The underground dance music movement, not only in Japan, is the first manifestation of 
an 'information-age culture'. This m ovement is late tw entieth century, post-postm odern culture, 
flourishing in post-Bubble Japanese society. As a product of these times, it attempts, and for the first 
time successfully manages, to bring together ideals which have been some of the major goals of 
industrial societies for the second half of this century, but have continually been undermined by the 
reproduction and spread of mainly Christian nineteenth century ideas about gender, race, and 
nation, through conduits accompanying capitalist economic expansion from Europe and the United 
States.3 The main reason why this cultural logic has been able to thrive and develop in situations 
often dom inated by other values, is due to the opportunities which have become available in the 
spaces opened up in advanced industrial nations by the stalling of the global economy, together 
w ith the high level of w ealth and education w ithin those societies. This level of affluence and 
education allows people to survive and thrive w ithin the spaces w hen previously they could not. 
This has been further aided by to the w idespread availability of relatively cheap inform ation and 
digital technology as a means of communication, which allows these people to communicate quickly 
and efficiently, to feel empowered individually and to feel part of something much larger.
It is because the culture is generated and currently primarily exists within the spaces opened 
up by flexible economies, that the dance music movement is regarded as 'underground', when it is 
in fact extremely large with a high profile, with many people who do not directly associate with the 
culture holding many of its values.4 It is the first truly international culture, in that it is produced 
and consumed in no one place, and cannot be identified in terms of national boundaries. What has 
up to now only been an ideal, possible only as way of imagining the world, is now a possible reality, 
and is a lived reality for an increasing num ber of people. This is the first cultural movement which 
effaces and then reinstates differences of race, culture, and gender, as equal and with m utual 
respect. Again, what has largely been an ideal is now a lived reality for more and more people. It is 
the cultural m ovem ent to have realised the m ost complete synthesis so far of hum an beings, 
machines, and the natural (physical) world, in that it does not prioritize or exclude any of these, 
instead searching for a balance betw een the three. W hat drives all these attem pts to efface 
d ifferences and re-eva lua te  p rio rities is the increasing aw areness of the fragility  and
While Christian values have been spread ail over the globe through capitalist economic expansion, in local situations the 
dominant values supported by the capitalist economy also continually seek to undermine any attempts to reform them.
^ h c  reverse no doubt also holds true.
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interdependence of systems, and a m istrust of traditional scientific and rationalistic hegemony. This 
cultural m ovem ent seeks to integrate science back into hum an experience. It does not seek to 
exclude capitalist economic values either, but seeks to bring them into a balance with other values. 
This is som ething w hich is already happening. N one of w hat I have m entioned should  be 
unfamiliar. In short, this cultural movement is the first sign of a successful synthesis of many of the 
ideas and values which, within m odern industrial societies, are cast as our responsibilities for the 
future.
Capitalism, as well as rational scientific method, has brought us to this point in an evolving 
consciousness. On the threshold of a new m illennium , a sense of ind ividuals having to take 
responsibility for their actions, because we are confronted with facts that strongly indicate that each 
of us, individually, can influence not only those in our village any more, but those in villages on the 
other side of the world, is growing rapidly. This 'knowing' results from hum an beings, particularly 
those in advanced industrial societies, arriving (again?) at a point where they are confronted by the 
reality of causation and the interdependency and fragility of systems. Capitalism has brought those 
of us in advanced industrial societies to a point where we are increasingly confronted with global 
responsibilities, cast as moral responsibilities at a personal level. In this sense, Iate-20th Century 
capitalism is, in its various locations, engendering a global personhood that is an individualism, on 
the basis of D um ont's description: "Where the individual is a param ount value, I speak of 
individualism" (Dumont 1985: 94). Individuality (kosei) among all the employees at GA, and among 
all the party-goers, was infused to varying degrees with the morality of this global consciousness I 
have described above. Some w ith  considerable eloquence, others only able to articulate 
inarticulately, but in all cases w ith consistency and varying degrees of urgency. Therefore, I 
conclude that the new  individualism  in Japan is a Japanese ind iv idualism  that developed 
independently of W estern individualism , but that the new  individualism  in Japan also bears the 
characteristics of an emerging global sense of personhood, and one that should not be regarded as 
'Western', but as 'global'. Capitalism would certainly seem to be intrum ental in this global sense of 
personhood, but drawing out individualism in a particular location rather than introducing it.
*******
The sky is a metal blue. It is sharp and metallic. Shimmering in an early Spring sun above the buzz 
of traffic and the sounds of the street. I am filled with a sense of possibilities when I look at this sky, 
as if a jet was streaking across it, when 1 would first, momentarily, wonder where it was going, then 
imagine the lives of the people on the plane, ordinary, sometimes filled w ith joy, sometimes with 
pain, maybe looking dow n and wondering the same tilings. Yet even though I am filled with a sense 
of the unknown, this sky is Tokyo for me as much as anything else. The colour, ranging from a very 
particular irridescent metallic blue at the zenith, through to a pale pearlescent shimmering haze at 
the skyline. Sometimes there is a hint of orange and purple at the base, which can be staggeringly 
beautiful at dusk. It is the pall of traffic fumes and noise, but no less beautiful or evocative. The air 
still with a nip in the mornings, but with the faintest heat of that early Spring sun.
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The sky is too much. I can't contain and organise the feelings it fills me w ith now and 
triggers from before. I search for ways to com prehend it, to make sense of it, to describe it and 
explain it to you. If I imagine w hat it w ould sound like if I hit this Tokyo sky, it would sound as if I 
had just hit an em pty 40 gallon oil d rum  with a piece of timber. A complex sound, discordant, 
surprisingly short w ith little ring. Then afterwards I w ould hear other sounds which I had not at 
first heard. The complexity of the sound would m ultiply and reverberate through my consciousness, 
piling on layers of barely understood meaning, rather than achieving the opposite. But richer for 
that. It would be the sound of an old discarded piece of wood on a grubby old forgotten 40 gallon oil 
drum, but that description still leaves me almost frantic, only compounding the sensation of the sky, 
hardly explaining it. The drum  would also be discarded, first used for lube oil. Green and larger 
than life when delivered new, white stenciled letters sprayed fleetingly on the side, but already with 
sm udges of grease. Then probably used again and again for old sum p oil, now dented and 
forgotten, discarded, maybe somewhere under this brilliant blue Tokyo Spring sky.
I’m looking at the Tokyo sky from a footbridge outside Ueno Station, on the 3rd April 1995. 
It could have been described in many ways. Indeed it undoubtedly was, and can still be described in 
many ways because I’m looking a t a video of this sky on the 18th March 1998, nearly three years 
after it has passed into night over a thousand times. I went to Ueno to visit Ameyokocho in Tokyo 
on that early April day in 1995.1 had been going around with the camera since New Year, trying to 
capture on film the images and sounds of Tokyo which had sedimented in my consciousness and 
unconsciousness in the time I had been there. A kaleidoscope of images, sounds, smells, sensations, 
emotions, tastes, touches, voices. I did not intend to use the film like this, but now, as I search for a 
way to bring my discussions to a satisfactory conclusion, to reintegrate them  into existence, I have 
gone looking for the film of Ameyokocho and Ueno. Will I be able to see a 'company-centred' 
society' here? Will I be able to see a 'people-centred' society here? Will there be Redefined Selves 
walking around AmeyokochS? After nearly six years of studying these selves, am I able to recognise 
them in the street? Will you be able to recognise them  on the basis of my explanations? I have 
watched the video three or four times now. The first image is Ueno Station from a footbridge on a 
brilliant Spring morning...
*******
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Buch5
Bushido
Giri
Habatsu
Hodmen
Honne
Ie
Ikikata
Ishi
Izakaya
Jibun
Jicho
Jiminto
Kaisha
Kacho
Kangaekata
Kanrisha
Keiretsu
Kigyo seiri
Kojin
Kokoro
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place/fram e/situation 
head of departm ent 
sam urai ethics 
a form of endless reciprocal obligation 
a clique
a nursery school/kindergarten 
honest intention/true feeling 
a household/family unit/dwelling 
way of living 
will
a Japanese drinking house
the individual self/oneself
assistan t section head
Liberal Democratic P arty  of Japan
a company
a section head
way of thinking
m anager/adm inistrator
a particular grouping of companies
industrial restructuring
the individual self
heart/mind/soul
Kudoka < 3  E  3 ‘hollowing out’ of industry
Meiwaku t b b i o  < bother/trouble
Meirei shiki order of command
Mi body and mind undifferentiated
Miuchi & 3 t > a circle of close relatives/lriends
Nakama a circle of close friends/colleagues
Omote the front/formal
Omote muki t f # facing the front/being formal
On ^3 h j & obligation
Oyake & the public domain
Oshoku m M , corruption
Rameiiyasan Japanese noodle b ar
Seken b t b ' h itfcfW a moral space of significant others
Seken nami compliant w ith seken rules
Sekentei m m the self conforming to seken rules
Sesshikata i ± -d L f t f t way of integrating/associating
S h an a ish itsu g y o  b ^ ^ b b X c f e f c O  f t f t h!  'in ternally1 unemployed
Shacho a s m anaging director/president
Shakai b ^ ^ b the W estern concept of 'society'
Shikata way of doing/a method
Shikikeiretsu b #  i t  W a x command structure
Shireikeito O command structure
Shokusekisha 1/ <k <C h t  cT b  ^  l i W #  manager/person o f responsibility
Soshiki X  b  c? organisational structure
Soto dir <tl 9V outside (physical marker)
Sukyandaru X  y ^ ) V  a scandal
T a n t o s h a  7C Av b  O b  X  - j d l^ ^  the person responsible/a manager
T a r e n to  ] / X  h  a young media star (under 21)
T a t e m a e  a system/public behaviour
U c h i  'O'^ d f t  inside (physical marker)
One's own (social m arker)
Ura 5  b m the rear/inform al
Ura muki facing the rear/being informal
Wagamama selfish
Wairo f o b  6 mm bribery
Yudofu t i l  s i ® a beancurd stew
Zaibatsu t f w f x mm a particular grouping of companies
Appendix
Party Questions
Party-G oer's Questions
1) Why do you like Techno or House music?
2) Do you th ink  there  is a particu lar lifestyle or way of th inking  associated w ith Techno or 
House music?
3) W hat are the differences betw een th is lifestyle and way of th inking  w hen compared to 
other lifestyles and ways of thinking?
4) Who do you go to parties  with?
5) Are there people you cannot ta lk  to about the parties?
6) Who can't you ta lk  to? Why?
7) Please tell me about your first time a t a party.
8) Would you describe a party  as a 'group (shuudan.)'? Would you say there are 'groups' a t a
party?
9) If  there are 'groups' a t  parties, do these differ from other types of 'groups'? Please describe 
the differences in detail.
10) Are there senpa i/koha itype relationships a t the parties  or among your friends and 
colleagues a t you place of work?
11) Do you use the word nakam a  a t parties, among your friends, or a t  work?
12) Are there tanin  a t  parties? Who exactly is tanin? Are there tanin  a t you place of work?
13) Do you have to take care of seken te i a t parties?
14) Do you have to take care of seken te i a t work or among your friends?
15) Is there anyw here you have to take care of sekentei?
16) Do you th ink  of a party  as a kind of seken ?
17) If so, please describe it. If not, how is it different from seken?
18) Do you th ink  of yourself as p a r t of seken  w hen you are a t work? Among your friends?
19) W hat do you regard  as seken n a m i?
20) Do you have friends who have nothing to do w ith your going to parties?
21) How does your lifestyle fit in  w ith theirs'?
22) Do you th ink  there is any kind of discrim ination among the party-goers against other 
types of people?
23) Is there sexual discrim ination a t the parties? How are women a t the parties  trea ted  by 
men, compared to o ther women? Do women who go to parties tre a t each other differently 
from other women?
24) Do you th ink  the kind of lifestyle and way of th ink ing  among the party  goers will spread 
among other types of people?
25) W hat are your hopes for the fu ture of Japan?
26) Is privacy im portan t to you?
27) Can you give me some examples of privacy?
Appendix
DA Employees' Questions
1) W hat is your cu rren t position in DA?
2) W hat exactly does your job involve?
3) W hat positions have you held since you've been a t DA?
4) Has th is company been forced to restructure?
5) Would you describe DA as a 'typical' Japanese company?
6) Is working a t DA different from working a t other companies?
7) Please describe the com m and structu re  a t DA?
8) Do you th ink  your shacho  is like the presidents of other companies?
9) Do you have a bucho ? Do you have a sim ilar relationship w ith your bucho in  DA as 
in your previous company/ as your friends have in  their companies?
10) Do you ta lk  about DA w ith  your wife/girlfriend/family/friends? W hat do they th ink  
of DA?
11) Do you have any work com m itm ents outside work or in  the evenings or weekends?
12) Do you use the term  nakam a  a t DA? Who exactly is nakam a?
13) Do you have to take care of seken te i a t DA?
14) W hat is seken te i?
15) Are you aw are of seken  a t  DA?
16) W hat is seken nanii a t DA?
17) Are there tanin  working a t DA? Who is tan in?
18) Do you have high school and university  reunions? Do you look forw ard to them? 
W hat do your old friends th ink  about your curren t job? Are these m eetings 
nakama? Are they seken?
19) Do you stay  in touch w ith  colleagues from your former company?
20) Jap an  is often described as a nation of shuudan shugi. W hat does th is mean? Do 
you agree w ith th is analysis?
21) W hat is kojin?
22) W hat is the relationship betw een kojin  and shuudan?
23) W hat is the relationship betw een jib u n  ad shuudan?
24) How has Jap an  changed since you were a child?
25) Are teenagers today the sam e as w hen you where a teenager? How are they the 
same? How are they different?
26) W hat would you like a Jap an  of the fu ture to be like?
27) W hat is gin?  Do you feel g ir i a t DA?
28) Is privacy im portan t to you?
29) Can you give me some exam ples of privacy?
